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LIBRARY 


Theological     Seminary, 

PRINCETON,     N.    J. 


Shilf 
Bool; 


_i4J 


,;  -*.e<;^».ee<^^33<^^?s<:^^9®<^^33'^^'*  <?► 


PRINCETON.   tS.   J.  i 

Partoftlie  ® 

♦       ADDrSON  ALEXANDER  LIBRARY,  Z 

which  was  presented  by  |j| 

Mp,«sk8.  K.  L.  and  a.  Stuart.  U 


VIEWS 


IN 


THEOLOGY, 


VOL.  III. 


FROM  NOV.   1831,  TO  MAY   1833. 


NEW-YORK  : 

JOHN  P.  HAVEN,  148  NASSAU-STREET. 
AMERICAN  TRACT  SOCIETY'S  HOUSE. 

1833. 


CONTENTS. 


No.  IX The  Murray.Street  Discourses — Characteristics  of 

the  Theoretical  and  Controversial  "  Plan"  to  which  "  Sin 
is  necessarily  incidental" — Jeremiah  Evarts. 

No.  X Mr.  Coleridge's  Metaphysics — The  Christian  Spec- 
tator's Review  of  Dr.  Fisk — A  Letter  to  Rev.  Joel  Hawes, 
D.  D.  on  Dr.  Taylor's  Theological  Views. 

No.  XI The  Holy  Spirit's   Regenerating  Influences— The 

Doctrines  of  Physical  and  Voluntary  Depravity — Differ- 
ences of  Obedient  Acts  in  Excellence. 

No.  XII Truths  through  which  the  Spirit  convicts  and  sanc- 
tifies— Theological  Controversy — The  Christian  Spectator 
on  the  Permission  of  Evil. 


V  I  j:  vv  s 


THEOLOGY. 


ZVo.  121.     Vox.,  zzi:. 


NOV.    1831. 


NEW-YORK: 
JOHN  P.  HAVEN,  142  NASSAU-STREET, 

AMEIUCAN  TRACT  SOCIETY'.S  HOU!-E. 

1831. 


^^ 


\  ^\ 


V 


J.  SCVMUUR,  PRINTER, 

AXN-i)  REET,  CORNER  OF  NASSAU. 


CONTENTS. 


Art.  I. — The  Murray-street  Discourses,       ....     1 

Art.  II. — Characteristics  of  the  Theoretical  and 
Controversial  "  Plan"  to  which  "  Sin 
is  necessarily  incidental." 48 

Art.  III. — Jeremiah  Evarts, ,     .     86 


The  Views  In  Theology  will  continue  to  be  published 
semi-annually,  in  May  and  November,  and  be  devoted 
chiefly,  as  heretofore,  to  discussion  on  the  Doctrines  of 
Religion.  Four  numbers  will  form  a  volume.  Those  who 
desire  the  work,  will  please  to  give  notice  to  the  publisher, 
at  142  Nassau-street.  Ministers  and  theological  students 
of  whatever  denomination,  will  receive  it,  if  desired,  with- 
out charge. 


THE 


MURRAY  STREET  DISCOURSES. 


It  is  one  of  the  most  propitious  characteristics  of  the 
present  period,  and  one  that  has  both  acted  as  a  Cause,  and 
resulted  as  an  effect,  of  the  great  benevolent  enterprises  to 
which  the  age  has  given  birth ;  that  the  teachers  of  the 
protestarit  churches  of  various  denominations,  between' 
whom,  until  within  a  recent  period,  but  little  intercourse 
had  taken  place,  have  at  length  learned  to  recognize  each 
other  as  the  ambassadors  of  Christ,  instead  of  the  ministers 
6f  sectarianism,  and  become  accustomed  to  interchange  the 
labours  of  their  office,  and  unite  in  the  great  ^ork  of  en- 
forcing the  gospel  on  those  around  them,  and  communi- 
cating its  blessings  to  the  perishing  of  otlier  lands.  It  is 
a  noble  and  refreshing  spectacle.  Like  brethren  of  the 
same  family  whom  some  slight  differences  had  unwisely 
been  allowed  to  separate,  but  whose  fraternal  sensibilities 
needed  but  a  fit  occasion  to  be  re-excited,  they  have  af 
length,  recalled  by  th6  hand  of  Providence,  again  met  be- 
neath the  paternal  roof;  the  parental  blessiiig  bestowed  in 
common  has  softened  their  hearts,  the  reception  from  each 

other  of  the  hand  of  confidence,  and  the  reciprocation  of  kind- 

1 


ness  have  revived  their  better  susceptibilities,  rekindled  their 
affection,  and  given  reassurance  to  the  feeling  that  they  are 
brethren,  and  need  but  to  fulfill  the  duties  of  mutual  cour- 
tesy, forbearance,  and  good  will,  to  secure  each  other's 
esteem,  and  prove  the  instruments  of  each  other's  happiness. 

Of  this  freer  intercourse,  and  readier  co-operation  in  their 
professional  labours,  the  delivery  and  publication  of  these 
Discourses  are  a  result;  the  greater  portion  of  which  arre  from 
the  pens  of  presidents  of  colleges,  theological  professors,  or 
pastors,  both  of  different  denominations,  and  different  and 
distant  sections  of  the  country.  The  church  to  whom  they 
addressed  them,  in  soliciting  their  authors  to  the  task,  re- 
cognized them  as  the  ministers  of  the  gospel ;  their  accept- 
ance of  the  invitation  involved  an  acknowledgment  of  the 
church  and  each  other,  as  fellow  disciples  of  Christ ;  and 
their  concurrence  in  the  discussion  of  topics,  in  respect  to 
which  many  differences  exist,  and  union  in  giving  publicity 
to  their  labours,  form  an  additional  expression  of  that 
mutual  regard. 

Efforts  of  this  kind  are  suited  to  give  birth  to  other  good 
effects  beside  the  promotion  of  harmony.  The  expectation 
of  addressing  an  audience  under  such  circumstances,  and  of 
presenting  their  discourses  to  the  public  in  conjunction 
with  men  of  distinguished  talents  and  cultivation,  must  na- 
turally produce  an  excitement  both  of  interest  and  caution, 
highly  propitious  to  successful  exertion  ;  to  inspire  mode- 
ration in  the  statement  of  doctrines  that  are  subjects  of  dif- 
ferences ;  and  care  in  the  task  of  composition  and  delivery. 
The  fruits  of  such  an  exigence  may  fairly  be  expected  to 
form,  at  least,  favourable  specimens  of  the  mental  resources 
of  their  authors.  Not  to  be  excited  to  vigorous  exertion, 
or  to  put  forth  only  ill-digested  efforts,  would  betray  but  a 


slight  leal  in  their  Master's  cause,   and  a  very  inadequate 
respect  for  the  favourable  judgment  of  their  fellow-men. 

These  Discourses  accordingly,  making  fit  allowance  for 
their  differing  advantages  of  topic,  may  doubtless  be  regarded 
as,  at  least,  fair  examples  of  the  relative  manner  of  their 
authors.  Some  of  the  themes  offer,  indeed,  far  happier 
fields  than  others  for  discussion,  but  all  enjoy  the  recom- 
mendation of  adequate  dignity  and  importance,  and  are  too 
extensive,  rather  than  too  circumscribed,  for  the  limits  of  a 
single  discourse.  They  generally  exhibit  marks  of  care- 
ful composition,  and  abound  with  happy  examples  of  grace- 
ful diction,  dignified  sentiment,  and  vigorous  reasoning. 
They  are  marked  likewise  by  a  caution  and  moderation  in 
the  statement  of  doctrines,  beyond  what  has  usually  cha- 
racterized discussions  on  such  topics  ;  and — apart  from  the 
differences  that  may  exist  in  respect  to  those — are  singularly 
exempt  from  representations  and  sentiments  that  can  gene- 
rally be  regarded  as  objectionable.  The  onl}^  signal  ex- 
ception to  this  remark  occurs  in  the  first  Discourse  from  the 
pen  of  Dr.  Spring,  and  is  of  so  extraordinary  a  character, 
and  so  closely  related  to  some  of  the  themes  on  which  I 
shall  have  occasion  to  dwell  in  the  progress  of  this  article, 
as  to  merit  some  notice. 


"  There  is  a  single  consideration  on  which  I  would  dwell  more 
largely,  if  I  were  not  afraid  of  being  misinterpreted  and  misunder- 
stood. The  peculiar  character  of  the  age  in  which  we  live,  furnishes 
a  powerful  reason  for  solicitude  in  relation  to  the  great  doctrines  of 
the  bible. 

"  It  is  not  so  much  the  age  of  a  speculative  philosophy  that  the 
friends  of  truth  have  any  thing  to  fear  on  that  account.  It  is  not  the 
"  unhinging  subtlety"  of  the  enemies  of  the  cross,  that  threatens  a  re- 
moval of  the  ancient  landmarks,  were  it  not  for  the  negligence  atid  in- 
difference of  the  friends  of  truth  themselves.     But  from  some  cause 


there  is  a  strange  apathy  to  tlie  truth.  It  is  the  age  of  business  and 
not  of  investigation.  It  is  the  age  of  a  charity  so  liberal,  a  benevo. 
lence  so  active,  an  excitement  so  febrile,  tliat  nothing  seems  to  satis, 
fy  good  men,  short  of  that  spirit  of  mutual  concession,  which  savours 
of  a  criminal  indifference  to  all  religious  opinions.  Men  from  whom 
the  church  had  hoped  better  things,  are  satisfied  with  very  easy  and 
liberal  views.  Thirty  years  ago,  the  church  of  God  aimed  at  large 
attainments  in  grace  and  knowledge  ;  and  in  too  great  a  degree  to 
the  unwarrantable  exclusion  of  benevolent  action.  But  the  order  of 
things  is  now  changed,  and  at  the  expense  of  truth.  And  yet  who  would 
not  tremble  to  say  that  too  much  is  either  done  or  attempted  for  the 
conversion  of  the  world  ?  When  we  look  abroad  upon  the  world,  we 
see  that  a  field  of  labour  is  opening  that  is  unspeakably  gratifying  to 
every  benevolent  mind,  and  such  a  field  as  the  church  never  before 
saw.  But  is  it  not  possible  that  this  zeal  for  christian  enterprise  needs 
the  baptism  of  an  orthodox  spirit,  and  unless  it  is  more  deeply  imbued 
with  it,  must  not  only  fail  of  accomplishing  what  it  might  otherwise 
accomplish,  but  scatter  in  wide  profusion,  tares  among  the  wheat  ? 
Combinations  of  truth  and  error,  even  in  plans  of  benevolent  enter- 
prise are  of  very  doubtful  tendency.  Error  has  always  been  willing 
to  go  with  truth,  just  so  far  as  truth  will  go  with  error;  whereas 
truth  ought  to  go  with  error  no  farther  than  error  will  go  with  truth  ; 
and  even  in  this  apparently  safe  companionship,  truth  is  very  apt  to 
become  crippled  and  lame.  If  I  do  not  survey  the  signs  of  the  times 
through  a  deceptive  and  gloomy  medium,  there  are  dangers  in  this 
matter,  to  which  neither  the  church,  nor  her  watchmen  are  sufficient- 
ly awake.  We  should  not  be  surprised,  if  in  this  age  of  business  and 
ignorance,  action  and  concession,  it  should  be  found  necessary,  be- 
fore the  expiration  of  many  years,  for  another  Whitfield  or  Edwards, 
to  sound  the  note  of  alarm  to  the  American  churches.  Nor  do  I 
feel  at  liberty  to  suppress  these  reflections  while  urging  the  impor- 
tance of  attainment  in  christian  knowledge. 

"Who  duly  appreciates  the  intrinsic  excellence  of  trutn  ?  Who  duly 
estimates  the  place  it  holds  in  the  purposes  of  divine  mercy  toward 
this  apostate  world  ?" 

"  It  is  a  melancholy  fact  that  orthodoxy  is  becoming  a  term  of 
reproach ;  that  steadfastness  in  the  faith  requires  unwonted  self-deni- 
al. Unbending  adherence  to  doctrines  has  already  become  a  burden, 
well  nigh  too  oppressive  to  be  borne.  Doctrinal  instruction  is  be- 
coming unpopular,  and  is  already  too  cold  and  heartless  for  the  spirit 
of  the  age."     pp.  31.  32.  34. 


Imputations  like  these,  of  criminal  indifterence  to  all 
religious  opinions,  and  of  fatal  error,  to  the  church  at  large, 
the  benevolent  institutions  of  the  age,  and  the  ministers  of  the 
gospel  themselves,  as  a  body,  which  he  has  carried,  however 
he  intimates,  to  a  far  less  extent,  and  expressed  with  much 
greater  moderation  than  he  should  have  felt  to  be  justifi- 
able, had  he  not  been  fearful  of  being  misunderstood,  are 
novel  topics  for  such  places  and  occasions,  and  not  a  little 
adapted  to  excite  surprise.  Within  a  recent  period,  it 
seems,  an  essential  change  has  taken  place  in  "  the  order 
of  things,"  "  and  at  the  expense  of  truth."  "  The  church 
of  God,"  which,  "  thirty  years  ago,"  "  aimed  at  large  at- 
tainments in  grace  and  knowledge,"  has  suddenly  sunk 
into  "  a  strange  apathy  to  the  truth,"  and  passed  to  such 
an  extreme,  "  that  nothing  seems  to  satisfy"  even  "  her 
good  men,  short  of  that  spirit  of  mutual  concession,  which 
sayours  of  a  criminal  indifference  to  all  religious  opinions." 
In  other  words,  religion  itself  has  declined  to  such  a  de- 
gree, that  even  the  best  portion  of  the  church  has  not  only 
ceased  to  aim  "  at  grace  and  knowledge,"  and  become 
satisfied  "  with  very  easy  and  liberal  views,"  but  has  grown 
restive  and  unmanageable  under  any  thing  better  than  "  a 
criminal  indifference  to  all  religious  opinions."  The 
imputations  themselves  are  formal  and  explicit,  and  the 
parties  whom  they  implicate  distinctly  defined ;  not  "  the 
enemies  of  the  cross,"  who  are  addicted  to  "  speculative 
philosophy"  and  the  arts  of  an  "  unhinging  subtlety,"  but 
^'  the  friends  of  truth  themselves,"  "  the  church  of  God," 
and  those  of  "  her  good  men,"  who  are  exhibiting  to  the 
age  "  a  charity  so  liberal"  "  and  a  benevolence  so  active;" 
and  if  they  are  founded  on  adequate  grounds ;  if  they  are 
not,  indeed,  clearly   unauthorized  and   extremely  unjust, 


the  church  has,  unquestionably,  nivolved  herself  hi  a  de- 
gree of  guilt  and  danger,  which  not  only  justifies  his 
sounding  this  stifled  "  note  of  alarm,"  but  makes  it  his  im- 
perious duty  fearlessly  to  develope  the  evil  in  all  its  extent, 
and  bring  forth  the  "  strong  reasons"  that  demonstrate  its 
existence,  in  so  conclusive  a  manner,  as  to  preclude  all  mis- 
conception of  his  meaning  and  misrepresentation  of  his  de- 
signs. Are  they  then  sustained  by  obvious  and  adequate 
evidences,  or  contradicted  by  indisputable  facts  ? 

Whether  or  not  any  better  proofs  of  the  reality,  or  ex- 
planation of  the  origin  of  these  imputed  evils,  could  be 
given,  it  will  not  be  very  readily  believed  that  the  causes  to 
which  he  refers  them,  can  have  had  any  agency  in  calling 
them  into  existence.  It  is  not  very  easy  to  discover  how 
a  liberal  charity,  an  active  benevolence,  or  a  quick  sen- 
sibility, can  have  given  birth  to  "  a  criminal  indifference 
to  all  religious  opinions  ;'*  nor  how,  indeed,  such  an  indif- 
ference can  possibly  consist  with  this  charity  and  benevo- 
lence, the  great  and  almost  sole  object  of  which  is  to  in- 
fluence "  religious  opinions,"  and  form  and  give  them 
efiiciency  in  accordance  with  truth ;  for  this  is,  of  course, 
their  end  in  the  distribution  of  the  scriptures,  the  difi'usion  of 
tracts,  and  the  support  of  ministers  rightly  to  divide  the  word 
of  life,  and  make  it  "  profitable  for  doctrine,  for  reproof, 
for  correction,  for  instruction  in  righteousness,  that  the 
man  of  God  may  be  perfect,  thoroughly  furnished  unto  all 
good  works."  This  "  criminal  indifference  to  all  religious 
opinions,"  has  certainly  taken  a  most  extraordinary  method 
of  developing  itself,  if  these  are  the  proofs  of  its  existence 
and  modes  of  its  exertion. 

But  his  representations  are  as  difficult  to  be  reconciled 
with  facts  at  large,  as  his  assumption  is  that  such  evil  efi'ects 


can  have  sprung  from  those  causes.  No  fancy  can  be  more 
utterly  aside  from  the  truth,  than  that  the'church  has  under- 
gone any  such  retrocession  in  knowledge.  The  fact  is  in- 
dubitably the  extreme  reverse,  and  it  is  the  natural  and 
almost  inevitable  result  of  the  more  propitious  circumstances 
which  she  has  enjoyed  of  late,  than  at  any  former  season. 
A  multitude  of  causes  were  in  vigorous  action  during  a  long 
period  preceding  the  last  "  thirty  years,"  that  withdrew  the 
attention  of  even  "  her  good  men,"  in  no  inconsiderable 
degree,  from  the  interests  of  religion,  which  subsequently 
have  either  not  existed  at  all,  or  exerted  only  a  far  inferior 
influence.  The  first  twelve  or  fifteen  years  from  1770, 
were  distracted  by  perpetual  civil  contentions  and  the  war  of 
the  revolution,  which  kept  the  general  mind  in  continual  and 
passionate  excitement;  while  the  next  eighteen  or  twenty 
were  marked  by  scarcely  less  agitation,  from  the  difficulties 
of  the  currency  debt  and  dispersion  of  the  army,  resulting 
from  that  war,  the  reconstruction  of  the  government,  and  the 
French  revolution,  that  like  all  other  secular  events  that 
strike  the  passions  with  overpowering  interest^  greatly  inter- 
rupted the  influence  of  the  gospel,  and  obstructed  the  devo- 
tion of  its  ministers,  as  well  as  the  attention  of  the  public  at 
large,  to  its  interests.  Their  effects  were  seen  accordingly 
in  a  fatal  decay  in  numerous  instances,  and  the  impeded 
progress  generally  of  the  churches,  an  unexampled  depres- 
sion of  morals,  and  a  wide  and  frightful  diffusion  of  open 
and  virulent  infidelity.  Since  that  period,  however,  and 
especially  from  the  close  of  the  last  war,  the  public  mind 
has  been  far  freer  from  these  all-absorbing  excitements,  and 
offered  far  fewer  obstacles  to  the  access  of  truth  ;  and  it  is 
not  to  be  believed,  without  the  most  decisive  proofs,  that 
these  superior  advantages  have  been  utterly  lost,  and  both 


8 

the  clergy  and  church  relapsed  under  their  influence,  into 
even  a  worse  neglect  and  ignorance  of  the  gospel  than  had 
taken  place  during  those  difficult  scenes.  It  is  against  all 
probability ;  it  is  equally  against  all  facts,  for  nothing  is 
more  certain  or  obvious  than  that  these  happier  circumstan- 
ces have  been  felt  and  improved  to  at  least  no  slight  degree. 
Their  influence  is  seen  in  the  almost  incredible  increase  that 
has  taken  place,  and  the  dissemination  of  the  means  of 
knowledge,  the  vast  multiplication  of  theological  books, 
the  circulation,  before  utterly  unexampled  in  the  world,  of 
periodicals  devoted  to  the  interests  of  religion,  and  the 
immense  diftiision  of  useful  commentaries  on  the  scriptures. 
Can  any  one  who  looks  at  these  great  facts,  forming  so  con- 
spicuous a  characteristic  of  the  age,  believe  that  the  church 
at  large,  has,  after  all,  undergone  under  their  influence  such 
a  frightful  retrogradation  in  knowledge,  and  attachment  to 
the  truth  ?  Are  none  of  these  learned,  eloquent,  and  popu- 
lar publications  read,  or  read  with  fit  instruction  ?  Or  has 
the  present  generation  sunk  so  far  below  its  predecessors  in 
sense,  as  to  peruse  this  vast  multiplicity  of  works,  without 
deriving  from  them  even  that  degree  of  benefit,  which  their 
ancestors  had  the  wisdom  to  educe  from  their  more  scanty 
means  ?  Can  any  one  who  looks  at  the  advances  that  have 
been  made  in  the  methods  and  extent  of  instruction  in  the 
collegiate  institutions,  at  the  numerous  theological  semina- 
ries which  have  been  established,  and  the  superior  means  of 
preparation  for  the  sacred  office  which  they  afibrd,  and  es- 
pecially at  the  important  progress  that  has  been  made  in 
biblical  learning,  believe  that,  after  all,  the  present  genera- 
tion of  orthodox  ministers  know  less,  and  care  less  respect- 
ing the  truth,  than  their  predecessors?  Who  were  those 
prodigies  of  learning,  wisdom  and  faithfulness,  whose  supe>' 


Hor  ministry  the  church  had  the  happiness  *'  thirty  years 
ago"  to  enjoy  ?     Who,  that  have  passed  from  the  stage  dur- 
ing that  period,  with  perhaps  the  sole  exception  of  Dvvight 
and  Mason,  have  not  left  many  superiors  in  knowledge,  and 
equals  in  fidelity  and  devotedness  ?     Or  what  other  conclu- 
sion can  any  one  form  who  looks  impartially  at  the  more 
varied    and    multiplied    labours    of    the    ministry   at    the 
present  day,  and  the  results  of  their  influence  in  the  condi- 
tion  of   the   church?      Are  there   not  as   many  sermons 
preached,  as  many  "  discourses"  delivered,  as  much  extempo- 
raneous and  informal  instruction  given,  as  at  any  former 
period  ?     Are  not  the  chief  doctrines  of  Christianity  as  fre- 
quently made  the  theme  of  discussion  in  the  pulpit ;  as  just 
views  entertained  and  exhibited  of  the   great   scheme  of 
redemption;    and    as    correct    and  efi'ective   applications 
addressed  to  reason  Jlnd  conscience,  of  the  doctrines  and 
precepts  of  the  gospel  ?     Is  there  not  as  much,  and  tenfold 
more   scriptural  knowledge   communicated  to  the  young, 
through  the  instrumentaUtyofBible  classes,  Sunday  schools, 
and  the  almost  infinite  multiplicity  of  books  that  have  been 
produced   for  their   instruction?     And  has  not  the  Most 
High  owned  and  blessed  the  labours  of  these  ministers  as 
signally,  and  crowned  them  with  success  by  eflusions  of  the 
Spirit,  at  least  as  frequent,  as  general,  and  as  extraordinary 
as  at  any  other  period  ?     It  is  certainly  not  according  to 
the  usual  course  of  things,  that,  under  the  action  of  these 
stupendous  aids  and  excitements  to  knowledge,  the  church 
should  only  sink  into  "ignorance"  and  "apathy  ;"  and  if 
such  is  indeed  the  fact,  it  is  indisputably  one  of  the  most 
extraordinary  of  the  wonders  of  the  age. 

Some  very  important  changes  havs  certainly  taken  place 

in  respect  to  the  subjects  and  methods  of  discussion  in  the 

2 


10 

pulpit,  and  in  the  theoretical  views  extensively  of  the  church. 
Different  apprehensions  are,  indeed,  to  some  extent,  enter- 
tained, of  the  nature  of  religion  itself  and  its  doctrines,  but 
it  will  scarcely  be  thought  to  have  arisen  from  an  increase 
of  "ignorance"  or  "apathy  to  the  truth."  There  are  far 
fewer  now  for  example  than  "  thirty  years  ago,"  who 
perplex  their  reason  and  blunt  their  moral  sensibilities  in 
endeavoring  to  persuade  themselves  that  they  are  willing  to 
be  "  punished  with  everlasting  destruction  from  the  presence 
of  the  Lord,  and  from  the  glory  of  his  power,  when  he 
shall  come  to  be  glorified  in  his  saints,  and  to  be  admired 
in  all  them  that  believe,"  in  order,  "  if  necessary,"  to  glorify 
his  justice;  and  make  that  extraordinary  sentiment  the 
criterion  of  doctrinal  knowledge  and  conversion.  There 
are  far  fewer  who  waste  their  days  and  confound  their  com- 
mon sense,  in  dwelling  on  the  sophisms  of  Emmons,  and 
struggling  to  drill  themselves  into  that  absurd  scheme  :  and 
there  are,  especially,  far  fewer  ministers  who  pervert  their 
office  in  the  wretched  attempt  to  force  the  whole  gospel  of 
the  grace  of  God  within  the  limits  of  those  near-sighted 
speculations.  The  church  as  a  body,  has  gained  juster 
views  of  the  nature  of  the  truths  and  duties  of  religion,  and 
of  the  legitimate  business  and  ends  of  the  ministry.  Is 
this,  however,  to  be  regretted  f  Is  it  a  crime  or  calamity 
that  those  who  thus  distorted  the  gospel,  or  their  suc- 
cessors, have  at  length  learned  their  errors,  and  had  the 
wisdom  to  abandon  them,  and  become  better  disciples  and 
teachers  of  the  truth  ?  or  that  thousands  and  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  Christians  who  exhausted  their  sensibiUties  on  those 
paradoxes  to  which  I  liave  adverted,  and  turned  their  very 
religion  into  a  sour  and  crabbed  selfishness,  have  emerged 
from  that  "  Siberian  bog,"   and  embraced  juster  views  of 


11 


God  and  their  duty,  and  entered  under  their  promptings  on 
a  career  of  "  chanty  so  liberal  and  a  benevolence  so 
active  ?"  That  these  changes  have  taken  place  is  beyond  all 
contradiction,  and  that  they  will  continue  to  occur  until 
none  of  that  race  is  left,  is  equally  certain ;  and  to  those 
who  persuade  themselves  that  the  whole  truth  of  the  gospel, 
or  any  portion  of  it,  lies  within  the  compass  of  those  dog- 
mas, it  will  doubtless  be  matter  of  heartfelt  regret ;  but  the 
church  at  large  will  probably  feel  but  little  sympathy  with 
their  griefs,  and  as  little  respect  for  the  causes  in  which  they 
have  their  origin. 

It  is  not  easy  to  discover  what  better  grounds  he  can  have 
had  for  the  "  melancholy"  representation  "  that  orthodoxy 
is  becoming  a  term  of  reproach  ;  that  steadfastness  in  the  faith 
requires  unwonted  self-denial ;"  that  "  unbending  adher- 
ence to  doctrines  has  already  become  a  burden  well  nigh 
too  oppressive  to  be  borne,"  and  that  "  doctrinal  instruction 
is  becoming  unpopular,  and  is  already  too  cold  and  heart- 
less for  the  spirit  of  the  age  ;"    as  happily  all  this  is  quite 
as  palpably  the  reverse  of  fact.     There    is    no  surer  or 
speedier  passport  to  public  respect,  affection,  and  influence, 
than  an  able,  faithful,  and  consistent  inculcation  of  the  great 
essentials  of  the  gospel,  sustained  by  a  corresponding  hfe 
of  purity,  dignity,  and  unmixed  regard  for  the  welfare  of 
souls.     Not  a  solitary  instance  can  be  designated  in  the 
history  of  the  last  "  thirty  years,"  in  w^hich  a  minister  who 
has  thus  fulfilled  the  duties  of  his  office,  has  failed  to  com- 
mand either  the  high    confidence   and  veneration   of  the 
church,  or  of  the  public  at  large.     Did  the  late  Dr.  Wilson 
of  Philadelphia,  Dr.  Mason  of  our  own  city,  Dr.  Dwight, 
Dr.  Backus,  Dr.  Strong,  or  any  others  of  a  similar  charac- 
ter,   ever   have    occasion    to    complain    that    "  unbending 


--^  12 

adherence  to  doctrines"  had  "  become  a  burden  well  nigh 
too  oppressive  to  be  borne,"  and  find  that  they  had  injured 
themselves  in  the  esteem,  or  sunk  themselves  in  the  confi- 
dence of  the  church  by  the  force,  fidelity,  and  "  steadfast- 
ness" with  which  they  preached  the  great  truths  of  the  gos- 
pel ?  Or  did  those  who  have  been  cut  off  from  among  us, 
at  their  entrance  on  a  career  of  distinguished  usefulness  and 
respect,  whose  untimely  fall  filled  the  community  with  regret, 
and  over  whose  sepulchres  piety  still  lingers  in  tender  and 
sorrowful  remembrance  ? — the  ingenuous  and  eloquent 
Whelpley  ;  the  disinterested  and  devoted  Bruen  ;  the  gifted 
and  accomplished  Christmas,  whose  fervor  of  piety,  simplicity 
and  truth  of  thought,  dignity  of  manners,  and  eloquence, 
imparted  a  reality,  elevation,  and  sanctity  to  religion,  that 
instinctively  disarmed  objection,  and  drew  from  all  hearts 
the  willing  homage  of  respect  and  love.  It  certainly  was 
far  otherwise  with  them.  Neither  these  youths  nor  those 
elders  ever  found  that  their  "  steadfastness  in  the  faith 
required  unwonted  self-denial,"  nor  that  their  "  unbending 
adherence  to  doctrines  had  become  a  burden  well  nigh  too 
oppressive  to  be  borne."  They  were,  on  the  contrary,  in 
their  element  when  announcing  the  great  messages  of  salva- 
tion, and  enforcing  their  dread  and  gracious  sanctions  with 
all  the  fervor  of  their  affections  and  force  of  their  eloquence. 
To  have  held  loosely  to  their  doctrines,  to  have  disguised 
their  sentiments,  or  mutilated  their  messages,  in  order  to 
adapt  them  to  the  selfish  wlsiies  of  men,  and  catch  their 
guilty  applause,  would  indeed  have  rendered  their  office 
and  themselves  an  insupportable  burthen.  But  they  neither 
needed,  nor  were  capable  of  those  arts.  They  did  not 
regard  the  gospel  as  so  bare  of  evidence,  or  destitute  of 
dignity  and  adaptation  to  awe  the  intellect  and  strike  tlie 


13 

conscience,  as  to  render  it  a  hopeless  task  to  recommend  it, 
at  least,  to  the  respect  of  the  "  good  men"  of  the  church  ; 
but  chose  the  "  manifestation  of  the  truth,"  as  the  fit,  the 
certain,  and  the  only  method  of  "  commending  themselves 
to  every  man's  conscience  in  the  sight  of  God."  And  what 
was  thus  true  with  respect  to  them,  is  equally  true  in  respect 
to  all  others.  Let  those  be  designated  who  are  most  dis- 
tinguished for  the  wisdom,  boldness,  consistency  and  faith- 
fulness, with  which  they  preach  the  great  doctrines  of  the 
gospel,  and  they  will  be  found  to  be  identically  those  whom 
the  church  regards  with  the  highest  esteem,  and  in  whom 
she  reposes  the  largest  confidence.  If  there  are  any  who 
find  themselves  unable  to  command  her  respect,  they  must 
look  for  the  cause  to  something  else  than  their  "  steadfast- 
ness in  the  faith ;"  and  will  be  much  more  likely  to  find  it 
in  their  dereliction  of  that  duty,  or  in  some  obliquity  of  man- 
ners, that  renders  their  ministry  distrusted  and  inefficient. 

But  this  "  spirit"  of  "  apathy  to  truth"  and  "  criminal 
indifference  to  all  religious  opinions,"  has  extended  its 
blighting  influence  also  it  seems  to  the  great  charitable  en- 
terprises of  the  age. 

"But  is  it  not  possible  that  this  zeal  for  christian  enterprize 
needs  the  baptism  of  an  orthodox  spirit  ;  and  unless  it  is  more  deep- 
ly imbued  with  it,  must  not  only  fail  of  accomplishing-  wliat  it  might 
otherwise  accomplish,  but  scatter  in  wide  profusion  tares  among  the 
wheat  ?  Combinations  of  truth  and  error  even  in  plans  of  benevolent 
enterprise,  are  of  very  doubtful  tendency.  Error  has  always  been 
willing  to  go  with  truth,  just  so  far  as  truth  will  go  witii  error  ;  where- 
as truth  ought  to  go  with  error  no  farther  than  error  will  go  with 
truth  ;  and  even  in  this  apparently  safe  companionship,  truth  is  very 
apt  to  become  crippled  and  lame.  If  I  do  not  survey  the  signs  of  the 
times  through  a  deceptive  and  gloomy  medium,  there  are  dangers  in 
this  matter,  to  which  neither  the  church  nor  her  watchmen  are  suffi- 
ciently awake.    We  sliould  not  be  surprised  if  in  this  age  of  business 


14 

and  ignorance,  action  and  concession,  it  shonld  be  found  necessary  be- 
fore the  expiratiomof  many  years,  for  another  Whitfield  or  Edwards, 
to  sound  the  note  of  alarm  to  the  Anjerican  churches." 

These  benevolent  institutions  then,  instead  of  being  de- 
voted, as  they  are  usually  thought  to  be,  to  the  dissemina- 
tion of  the  gospel  in  distinguished  exemption  from  all 
human  intermixtures,  are  little  better  than  mere  instruments 
of  scattering  "  a  wide  profusion  of  tares  ;"  the  very  "  zeal 
for  christian  enterprise,"  in  which  they  have  their  origin, 
"  needs  the  baptism  of  an  orthodox  spirit,"  and  except  it 
speedily  becomes  "  more  deeply  imbued  with  it,"  the  most 
deplorable  efi'ects  must  inevitably  result ;  and  a  special  and 
signal  intervention  of  Providence  become  necessary  to  arrest 
the  evil.  If  "  there  are  dangers"  of  this  character  "  in  this 
matter,"  they  are  certainly  alarming,  and  may  well  carry 
anxiety  to  the  hearts  of  those  even,  who  are  not  so  scrupulous 
as  to  demand  a  pure  exemption  from  error  in  the  conduct 
of  these  undertakings,  but  insist  only  that  "truth  ought  to 
go  with  error  no  farther  than  error  will  go  with  truth," 
though  "  even  in  this  apparently  safe  companionship,  truth 
is  very  apt  to  become  crippled  and  lame  !"  "  The  order  of 
things  is  changed"  indeed,  "  and  at  the  expense  of  truth," 
if  the  "  christian"  graces  themselves,  or  any  one  of  them, 
can  thus  need  baptism,  and  "the  baptism  of  an  orthodox 
spirit."  These  "  are  dangers"  it  cannot  be  denied,  "  to 
which  neither  the  church  nor  her  watchmen  are  awake." 
Christian  and  orthodox  belong,  it  seems  in  this  gentleman's 
apprehension,  to  different  categories,  and  his  recommenda- 
tion is  that  the  former  should  be  baptized  into  the  latter  ! 

These  passages  present  an  accusation  of  "  the  American 
churches"  more  grave  in  its  import,  aftecting  the  character 
pf  a  larger  number  of  pious,  useful,   learned  and   distin- 


15 

guished  individuals,  and  involving  more  extensive  and 
important  interests  than  almost  any  other  that  has  been 
offered  against  them.  Is  it  then  authorized  and  so  imperi- 
ously called  for  ?  Where  are  the  facts  that  can  justify  it  ? 
Are  the  eminent  individuals  whom  the  church  has  entrusted 
with  the  conduct  of  these  great  enterprises,  characterized  by 
such  an  "  apathy  to  truth"  and  "  criminal  indifference  to 
all  religious  opinions,"  as  to  merit  these  sweeping  imputa- 
tions ?  Are  any  proofs  of  it  to  be  discovered  in  their  public 
acts  ?  in  the  constitutions  themselves  of  the  societies,  whose 
objects  they  are  appointed  to  accomplish  ?  in  their  instruc- 
tions to  their  agents  or  missionaries  ?  in  the  reports  of  their 
operations,  or  their  addresses  to  the  public  ?  Let  then  the 
documents  be  produced.  Have  they  exhibited  any  such 
disregard  to  the  high  duties  of  their  station,  in  the  selection 
of  those  whom  they  have  sent  forth  to  convey  the  gospel  to 
distant  and  perishing  nations  ;  of  Hall  and  Newell,  Mills  and 
Judson,  Parsons,  Fisk,  Goodell,  or  any  of  the  long  train 
who  have  followed  in  their  steps  ?  Are  any  Unitarians,  Uni- 
versalists.  Pelagians,  Roman  Catholics,  or  any  other  erro- 
rists,  to  be  found  among  them  ?  Is  there  a  solitary  indivi- 
dual in  the  long  catalogue,  who  is  not  utterly  above  suspi- 
cion in  respect  to  all  fundamental  articles  of  faith,  and 
attachment  to  truth  ?  Is  there  one  whom  these  societies 
would  not  dismiss  in  an  instant  from  their  service,  if  found 
capable  of  offering  as  grievous  an  injury  to  the  church  as 
is  involved  in  this  gentleman's  accusation  ?  Did  any  of 
those  especially  whose  names  I  have  recited,  whose  single- 
ness of  heart,  self-sacrifice,  and  martyr-like  constancy, 
have  reflected  lustre  on  the  church,  and  exhibited  a  happier 
image  of  the  piety  and  devotedness  of  the  first  ages  of 
Christianity,  than  had  before  for  a  long  time  been  beheld, 


16 

leAve  behind  them,  when  they  quit  their  native  shores,  any 
better  men  than  themselves ;  more  happily  "  imbued"  with 
truth,  fraught  with  a  nobler  zeal,  a  holier  self-denial,  or  a 
more  heroic  courage  ?  Not  certainly  among  those  who 
cannot  even  sustain  the  trials  of  orthodoxy  in  this  land  of 
toleration,  ease,  and  abundance  ;  to  whom  the  task  of  "  un- 
bending adherence  to  doctrines  has  become  a  burden  well 
nigh  too  oppressive  to  be  borne  ;"  who  need  the  perpetual  in- 
cense of  applause  to  nerve  their  courage  and  sustain  their 
fidelity,  and  wilt  at  every  disappointment  of  hope,  or  just 
rebuke  of  error. 

Has  it  been  discovered  or  surmised  that  any  of  these 
missionaries  have  ever  exhibited  a  disregard  to  truth  in 
their  instructions  to  the  heathen,  or  others  ?  Is  it  not  the 
universal  conviction,  that  the  reverse  is  most  clearly  and 
commendably  the  fact  ?  that  it  is  one  of  the  most  obvious 
and  happy  characteristics  of  their  ministry,  that  they  have 
employed  themselves  in  the  annunciation  of  the  great  and 
essential  truths  of  the  gospel,  without  the  intermixture  of 
the  metaphysical  speculations  which  are  so  usual  in  the  re- 
gions of  nominal  Christianity  ?  This  is,  indeed,  from  the 
extreme  ignorance  of  the  great  mass  of  those  whom  they  are 
called  to  address,  almost  as  much  a  matter  of  necessity, 
perhaps,  as  of  duty.  They  would  exhibit  a  perverse  and 
pitiable  spectacle  truly,  were  they,  like  some  whom  they 
left  behind  them,  to  make  it  the  business  of  their  office 
to  drill  their  unlettered  hearers  into  the  belief  that  the 
truths  of  the  gospel  itself  have  no  adaptation  to  turn  them 
from  sin  to  holiness,  and  can  have  no  instrumentality  to  that 
end ;  or  that  the  essence  of  revelation  lies  in  the  dogma 
that  Gou  creates  all  their  actions.  In  the  east,  indeed, 
some  of  them  have  found  all  necessity  of  inculcating  this 
latter  theory,  had  they  otherwise  been  disposed  to  dwell  on 


It 

it,  superseded  by  the  speculations  of  native  philosophers, 
and  its  belief  wherever  held,  an  insuperable  obstacle  alike  to 
the  access  of  the  gospel,  and  the  excitement  of  an  effective 
sense  of  obligation.     In  place  of  perverting  their  office, 
nd  disfiguring   Christianity  by  the  inculcation  of  these 
or  kindred  errors,  they  have  employed  themselves  solely 
in  making    known    the    great    facts,    truths    and  require- 
ments of  the  gospel, — the  existence  and  chafacter  of  God, 
the  obligations  and  guilt  of  men,  their  destiny  to  a  future 
being  and  judgment,  the  gift  of  a  Saviour,  the  great  evehts 
of  his  ministry  and  object  of  his  death,  the  mission  of  the 
Spirit,  the  necessity  of  reconciliation  to  God,  and  mode  of 
pardon  and  acceptance,  the  duty  of  penitence,  humility, 
faith,  love,  prayer,  learning  the  scriptures,  observing  the 
sabbath,  obedience  in  short  in  all  things  to  God  and  be- 
nevolence to  men.     And  in  thus  confining  themselves  to 
the  simple  annunciation  of  "  Christ  and  him  crucified," 
which  they  have  found  to  be  "  mighty  to  the  pulling  down 
of  strong   holds,"    and   the  only   effectual   instrument  of 
saving  men,  they  have  exhibited  an  example  of  wisdom  and 
fidelity  that  should  not  only  shield  them  from  rebuke,  but 
teach  a  useful  lesson  to  those  at  large  who  are  employed  in 
the  sacred  office.     One  of  the  great  and  happy  effects,  in- 
deed, that  may  be  anticipated  from  these  enterprises  is,  a 
propitious  reaction  on  the  church  at  home,  recalling  her 
members  to  juster  views  of  the  nature,  and  her  teachers  to 
wiser   methods   of  enforcing  the  gospel ;    a  reverberation 
under  the  influence  of  these  powerful  causes,  of  the  voice  of 
Christianity  from  the  isles  of  the  Pacific,  and  the  shores  of 
India,  freer  of  the  jarring  intermixtures  of  human  invention, 
and  discordant  accompaniments  of  sectarian  art,  that  shall 
atract  the  ear,  not  only  of  our  own  country,  but  of  Europe, 

3 


18 

and  charm  by  its  symphony,  their  dissonant  elements  into 
concord. 

The  observations  which  he  offers  to  demonstrate  the  ne- 
cessity of  a  purer  orthodoxy  in  the  conduct  of  these  bene- 
volent enterprises,  are  fraught  with  a  singular  incompati- 
bility with  the  assumption  of  that  necessity,  and  are  as  ab- 
surd as  his  imputations  on  these  enterprises  themselves  are 
unjust.  "  Combinations  of  truth  and  error,"  he  informs 
us,  "  even  in  plans  of  benevolent  enterprise,  are  of  very 
doubtful  tendency .^^  In  place  of  transcending  in  this  asse- 
veration, the  views  that  are  generally  entertained  of  the 
importance  of  truth,  he  falls  immeasurably  below  them. 
Not  an  individual  probably  can  be  found  among  the  mul- 
titudes whom  his  accusations  affect,  who  does  not  regard 
error  in  all  degrees  and  *'  combinations,"  as,  not  of 
*'  doubtful"  or  uncertain  "  tendency,"  but  necessarily 
dangerous,  and  fruitful  especially  of  evil  in  all  enterprises 
like  these,  that  possibly  are  to  fix  the  character  of  churches, 
and  perhaps  of  nations,  for  long  periods  in  the  regions 
where  they  are  the  instruments  of  first  planting  the  gospel. 
Still  more  difficult  would  it  be  to  find  any  among  them  so 
lax  in  doctrine,  or  indifferent  "  to  all  religious  opinions," 
as  to  subscribe  to  the  extraordinary  sentiment  that  truth 
may  go  with  error,  as  far  as,  according  to  his  account, 
error  is  willing  to  go  with  truth.  "  Error  has  always  been 
willing  to  go  with  truth,  just  so  far  as  truth  will  go  with 
error ;  whereas,  truth  ought  to  go  with  error,  no  farther 
than  error  mil  go  with  truth.^^  How  the  corrective  here 
proposed,  to  "  a  strange  apathy  to  truth,"  is  to  remove  or 
diminish  the  evil,  it  is  a  matter  of  some  intricacy  to  dis- 
cover. "  Truth  ought  to  go  with  error  no  farther  than 
error  will  go  with  truth."     Even  his  orthodoxy  then,  it 


49 

seems,  In  place  of  proscribing  error,  only  requires  that 
truth  should  "  go  with  error  no  farther  than  error  will  go 
with  truth,"  though  "  even  in  this  apparently  safe  com- 
panionship, truth  is  very  apt  to  become  crippled  and  lame." 
To  what  extent  then,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  know, 
is  error  "  willing"  to  carry  this  "  companionship  ?"  "  Just 
so  far,"  he  assures  us,  "  as  truth  will  go  with  error." 
"  Error  has  alioays  been  willing  to  go  with  truth,  just  so 
far  as  truth  will  go  with  error."  But  if  truth  may  go  with 
error  as  far  as  error  will  go  with  truth,  and  error  is  always 
willing  to  go  with  truth  as  long  as  the  latter  will  submit  to 
her  company ;  then  clearly  truth  may  "  always"  go  with 
error  !  The  "  orthodox  spirit,"  with  which  "  this  zeal  for 
Christian  enterprise"  is  to  be  "  more  deeply  imbued,"  thus 
turns  out  to  be  nothing  else  than  a  blank  indifference  "  to 
all  religious  opinions."  Truth  is  to  relax  the  conscienti- 
ousness and  delicacy  which  she  has  hitherto  cherished,  and 
learn  to  become  as  little  scrupulous  of  the  "  companion- 
ship" of  error,  as  error,  which  "  has  always  been  willing 
to  go  with"  her,  is  of  the  company  of  truth.  This  is 
verily  baptising  Christianity  into  orthodoxy.  "  What 
fellowship  hath  righteousness  with  unrighteousness,  and 
what  communion  hath  light  with  darkness  ?"  saith  the 
Spirit  of  inspiration ;  "  whereas,"  saith  the  preacher, 
*'  truth  ought  to  go  with  error  no  farther  than  error  will  go 
with  truth,"  and  "  error  has  always  been  willing  to  go 
with  truth !"  A  single  example  will  lift  the  veil  from  this 
doctrine,  and  develope  its  full  import.  The  truth  that  God 
exists,  may  go  with  the  error  that  denies  his  revelation,  as 
far  as  this  error  will  go  with  that  truth,  and  that  is  into  the 
central  regions  of  deistical  unbelief;  and  the  truth  that  man 
exists  and  is  a  voluntary  agent,  may  go  with  the  error  that 


20 

denies  the  divine  existence,  as  far  as  this  error  will  go  with 
that  truth,  and  that  is  into  the  bottomless  gulf  of  atheism. 
Should  the  time  ever  arrive  when  the  church  at  large,  or 
any  considerable  portion  of  her  ministers  shall  become  ca- 
pable of  uttering,  even  inadvertently,  sentiments  fraught 
with  such  extraordinary  errors  as  his  observations  thus  in- 
volve, it  will,  indeed,  need  the  baptism  of  a  better  spirit, 
and  a  far  mightier  intervention  from  above  to  arrest  the 
evil,  than  the  gift  of  an  Edwards  or  Whitfield  could  re- 
quire. 

His  readers  of  course  neither  will  nor  can  in  justice  re- 
gard him  as  having  desigmd  to  express  all  the  exceptiona- 
ble sentiments  which  his  representations  thus  convey,  nor 
as  having  had  any  clear  apprehension  of  their  import. 
They  dout^tless  wiU  feel  authorised  however,  to  judge  from 
them  of  his  qualifications  for  the  task  of  criticism  and  de- 
nunciation, which  he  has  taken  upon  himself  to  discharge, 
and  to  determine  to  what  degree  of  weight  his  opinions  are 
entitled.  They  will  deem  it  to  have  been  at  all  events  the  part 
of  wisdom,  if  not  an  essential  requisite,  for  one  who  felt 
himself  called  on  to  utter  such  a  philippic  against  the  "  ap- 
athy to  truth"  and  ''  ignorance"  of  the  church,  to  see  that 
his  own  sentiments  were  free  at  least  from  all  such  funda- 
mental objections.  But  I  turn  to  the  more  grateful  topics, 
presented  by  the  Discourses,  and  reflections  they  are  adapt- 
ed to  suggest. 

It  does  not  fall  within  ray  object  to  notice  minutely  the 
peculiarities  of  each  Discourse,  nor  to  dwell  at  large  on  the 
excellencies  of  reasoning,  sentiment  or  style  with  which  they 
abound,  or  opposite  defects  from  which  they  are  not  ex 
empt,  but  rather  to  glance  at  a  few  general  traits  that  dis 
tinguish  them,  and  give  them  a  title  to  regard. 


21 

I.  They  recognise  and  urge  it  as  a  fundannental  law  of 
the  theological  profession,  that  the  business  of  the  religious 
teacher,  whether  in  the  pulpit  or  professorial  chair,  is  simp- 
ly to  develope,  illustrate,  and  enforce  the  knowledge  that  is 
revealed  and  sanctioned  in  the  word  of  God  ;  and  that  ac- 
cordingly all  doctrines  and  speculations  put  forth  under  the 
name  of  Christianity,  should  both  have  their  foundation  in 
the  volume  of  divine  truth,  and  lie  within  the  certain  and 
clear  limits  of  inspiration. 

"  Our  merciful  Creator  who  has  undertaken  to  be  our  teacher 
gives  us  instruction  by  his  works  and  by  his  word.  By  his  works  in 
the  material  and  in  the  spiritual  world,  he  teaches  us  those  trutiis 
which  constitute  JVatural  Theology.  By  his  word  contained  in  the 
scriptures  of  the  Old  and  New  Testament,  he  casts  a  clearer  light  on 
the  truths  of  Natural  Theology,  and  in  addition  to  this,  teaches  those 
doctrines  which  constitute  Christianity,  relating  chiefly  to  the  sin  and 
ruin  of  man,  and  to  the  character  and  work  of  the  Redeemer," — '  The 
proper  employment  of  reason  in  matters  of  religion'  is  '  to  learn  what 
God  teaches ;  to  obtain  the  knowledge  of  the  facts  and  doctrines 
which  he  exhibits,  particularly  those  which  he  exhibits  in  his  word  ; 
to  arrange  them  in  a  suitable  order,  and  to  apply  them  to  their  vari- 
ous uses.'  "-And  as  our  chief  concern  is  with  the  truths  of  revelation, 
our  chief  business  is  to  apply  ourselves,  in  the  proper  use  of  our  ra- 
tional powers,  to  the  study  of  the  holy  scriptures.' 

*'  The  position  which  I  take  on  this  subject  will  require  that  two 
things  in  particular  should  be  set  aside,  as  not  falling  within  the  pro- 
vince of  reason." 

"  The  first  is,  attempting  to  originate  truth.  AH  the  elements  of 
our  knowledge,  all  the  materials  on  which  our  reason  is  to  act,  are 
furnished  for  our  use  in  the  works  and  in  the  word  of  God.  These 
simple  elements  we  may  combine  together  with  almost  endless  varia- 
tions ;  but  we  can  never  increase  them,  and  should  never  attempt  in 
any  way  to  change  them.  To  originate  any  fact  or  any  doctrine, 
is  what  does  not  belong  to  us,  and  what  human  reason,  however 
strong  may  be  its  temptation,  ought  never  to  undertake.  In  regard 
to  many  parts  of  the  christian  religion,  the  simple  doctrines  and  facts 
which  we  learn  from  the  word  of  God,  may  prove  insufficient  to  sat- 


22 

isfy  the  cravings  of  curiosity  or  of 'pride,  or  they  may  be  liable  to  objec- 
tions which  we  cannot  obviate.  In  such  cases,  after  trying  in  vain  to 
discover  in  the  sacred  volume  the  additional  truth  we  wish  for,  we 
may  be  inclined  to  give  another  direction  to  our  intellectual  powers, 
and  to  make  an  effort  to  originate  or  produce  something,  which  shall 
afford  the  relief  we  desire.  The  fertility  of  the  imagination,  instead 
of  being  directed  as  it  should  be  to  the  illustration  of  truths  already 
known,  may  be  put  to  the  unnatural  task  of  originating  some  principle, 
of  producing  some  notion,  which  may  supply  or  seem  to  supply  the 
mortifying  deficiency  of  our  knowledge." — "After  venturing  thus 
beyond  the  province  of  reason,  the  next  step  is,  to  meditate  often  and 
with  complacency,  on  the  imaginary  principle,  till  it  assumes  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  reality,  and  then  believe  it.  And  the  next  step  is,  to 
contend  for  it,  though  a  mere  fiction,  as  a  fundamental  truth,  and  to 
expend  immeasurable  zeal  in  support  of  that  which  owed  its  exist- 
ence to  mental  fermentation.  Now  every  thing  like  this,  every  at- 
tempt to  produce  a  new  moral  or  religious  principle,  or  to  make  any 
addition  to  the  simple  doctrines  and  facts  which  God  has  taught  us, 
carries  us  at  once  beyond  our  bounds.'' 

"  The  other  thing  which  must  be  set  aside,  as  not  belonging  to  the 
province  of  reason,  is,  sitting  in  judgment  upon  any  of  the  doctrines  or 
facts,  which  God  7iiakes  known."     Dr.  Woods. 

This  great  law  obviously  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all 
authorized  theological  instruction.  To  reject  it,  is  to  dis- 
card the  volume  of  inspiration  as  the  rule  of  faith ;  and  to 
transcend  it,  is  to  attempt  to  pass  off  the  devices  of  human 
folly,  under  the  sanction  of  divine  wisdom. 

Whatever  then  is  put  forth  as  a  doctrine  of  God,  should 
be  either  expressly  revealed,  or  clearly  authorized  in  the 
volume  of  inspiration ;  and  whatever  does  not  enjoy  thai 
sanction,  should  either  not  be  taught  at  all,  or  only  exhibit- 
ed in  its  proper  character  as  a  dictate  of  reason,  a  logical 
probability,  or  a  mere  conjecture,  that  has  no  pretence 
whatever  to  support  from  the  word  of  God.  There  are 
indeed  innumerable  truths  and  facts  that  are  presented  to  us 


23* 

through  the  works  of  creation  and  providence,  or  immedi- 
ately conveyed  to  our  consciousness,  which  are  assumed  and 
recognized  as  already  and  necessarily  known  to  us,  rather 
than  formally  taught  in  the  scriptures;  such  as  that  we  are 
intelligent  beings,  and  of  a  nature  that  fits  us  to  be  subjects 
of  such  a  government  as  is  established  over  us ;  and  it  is 
indubitably  the  province  of  the  theological  teacher  also,  to 
recognize,  unfold  and  enforce  these  facts  and  truths,  in  their 
natural  connexions,  with  those  which  are  announced  by  the 
voice  of  inspiration.     There  is  an  utter  difference,  however, 
between  thus  recognizing,  on  the  one  hand,  and  tracing  out 
these  involved   truths,   without  transcending  the  limits  of 
divine  authority,  or  the  certain  facts  of  consciousness,  and 
attempting  on  the  other,  violently  to  crush  the  truths  that 
are  plainly  revealed  in  the  sacred  word,  into  the  mould  of 
unauthorized  theories.     The  one  is  the  legitimate  use  of  the 
works  and  word  of  God — the  other  a  fatal  abuse  of  them. 
It  is  in  truth  in  determining  where  the  line  that  separates 
these  opposite  methods^  lies,  that  frequently  the  first,  and 
often  the  chief  error  is  committed  ;  and  according  as  they 
have  erred  here,  one  class  has  transcended  the  bounds  of 
revelation,  and  put  forth  the  fictions  of  their  philosophy  as 
the  doctrines  of   God  ;    and  another  circumscribed   those 
boundaries  themselves,  and  denied  truths  that  are  clearly 
recognized  and  plainly  declared  in  the  volume  of  inspira- 
tion.    In  the  one  instance,  they  have  endeavoured  to  out- 
spread the  representations  of  the  divine  word,  over  the  arti- 
ficial surface  of  their  theories;  in  the  other,  to  narrow  down 
its  import  to  the  dimensions  of  their  ignorance  or  wishes. 
And  these  are  indeed  the  only  modes  in  which  false  doc- 
trines are  produced.     It  is  never  by  the  developement  of 
truths  that  are  assumed  or  implied  on  the  pnges  of  revela- 


24 

tion,  or  the  exhibition  in  their  proper  connexions  with  those 
or  other  truths  of  the  sacred  word,  of  facts  that  are  taught 
us  by  consciousness,  or  the  existence  and  phenomena  of  the 
external  universe,  that  the  legitimate  bounds  of  theological 
instruction  are  overpassed  and  error  committed.  It  is 
not  by  the  intermixture  o^  knowledge  derived  from  any  other 
parts  of  the  ways  or  works  of  the  Most  High,  with  the 
teachings  of  inspiration,  that  his  will  is  misrepresented  and 
the  aspect  of  his  government  disguised ;  but  solely  by  sub- 
stituting ignorance  in  place  of  knowledge,  and  superseding 
his  wisdom  by  our  presumption  and  folly. 

Had  this  great  rule,  which  thus  clearly  cannot  be  disre- 
garded with  any  safety  to  religion,  been  rigidly  observed, 
how  different  would  have  been  the  history  of  theology  ? 
How  many  of  the  systems  which  have  been  put  forth  as  the 
certain  dictates  of  revelation,  at  most  would  only  have  en- 
joyed the  rank  of  probabilities  or  conjectures ;  and  how 
many  more,  that  through  long  periods  have  fatally  dazzled 
and  misled  the  church,  would  never  have  gained  even  a  mis- 
chievous publicity,  but  been  abandoned  at  their  birth  as  the 
hideous  offspring  of  presuming  ignorance  or  daring  impiety  ? 
How  have  they  disfigured  and  perverted  Christianity — 
making  her  at  one  time  to  disown  her  author,  and  at  another 
to  deny  herself;  here  to  contradict  her  most  peculiar  and 
momentous  truths,  and  there  to  transgress  or  abrogate  her 
holiest  laws ;  now  to  become  the  forward  sanctioner  and 
fosterer  of  her  deadliest  enemies,  and  now  the  relentless 
persecutor  of  her  friends.  And  with  what  a  deluge  of  evils 
have  they  overspread  the  church  ;  perplexing  the  path  of 
piety,  obscuring  or  obliterating  the  truths  that  are  the  guide 
and  support  of  faith,  perverting  the  affections,  adding 
force   to  temptation,  and  misdirecting    hope.     And  what 


25 


an  exh^ustless  armory  of  "  darts"  have  ihey  proved  to  the 
great  adversary  of  souls,  and  enabled  him  to  gain  over  mul- 
titudes an  easy  triumph ;  beguiling  them  with  false  reliances, 
provoking  them  to  contemn  religion,  or  exasperating  their 
hatred?     The  mischiefs  to  which   these  errors  have  thus 
given  birth,  form  a  more  appalling  spectacle  than  any  other 
that  history  presents.     The  bloody  conquerors  that  have  so 
often  strode  over  the  nations,  and  like  a  flaming  whirlwind, 
crushed  them  to  the  earth,  have  as  speedily  vanished  from 
the  scene,  and  left  them  like  the  prostrate  fields  to  re-erect 
themselves  in  strength  and  beauty,  in  the  calm  and  sunshine 
of  succeeding  peace.     The  great  fountains  of  knowledge 
have  never  been  permanently  dried  up  by  them,  nor  poison- 
ed, nor  the  intellect  chained  down  by  the  fetters  of  lasting 
error,    nor    an    abiding    mist    of   metaphysics    transfused 
through  the   atmosphere,  so  dispersing  and  refracting  the 
rays  of  truth,  that  only  faint  and  distorted  images  could 
reach  the  eye.     This  worst  of  despotisms  was  reserved  to 
those  who,  usurping  the  rights  of  God,  have   ventured  to 
legislate  over  the  church,  and  abrogated  his  government 
by  denying  the  truths  of  his  word  on  the  one  hand,  or  in^ 
termingUng  their  falsehoods  with  them  on  the  other. 

The  frightful  evils  which  the  pride  of  genius,  the  pre- 
sumption of  philosophy,  and  more  frequently  still,  the  self- 
confidence  of  weakness  and  ignorance  have  thus  inflicted 
on  the  church,  should  thunder  warning  on  the  ear  of  those 
who  hold  the  sacred  office,  against  the  repetition  of  such 
mischiefs,  and  inspire  the  church  herself  with  caution  against 
the  rash  and  turbid  theorizers  who  threaten  to  renew  them. 
II.  Their  exhibition  of  the  government  of  the  Most 
High,  as  established  over  and  adapted  to  man  as  he  now 
exists,  and  of  its  moral  means  as  fitted  to  the  ends  for  which 

4 


26 

they  are  instituted  and  employed,  is  a  conspicuous  charac- 
teristic of  these  Discourses. 

"  The  christian  religion  takes  human  nature  as  it  actually  is;  and 
disregarding  all  adventitious  differences,  it  enters  into  the  inner  man, 
and  speaks  to  all  the  same  language  ;  addresses  in  all  the  same  prin- 
ciples and  feelings ;  and  supplies  every  where  the  same  wants  of  this 
dying,  immortal,  rational,  accountable  being.  It  recognizes  his  pro- 
foundest  moral  feelings,  the  mighty  movements  of  his  spirit,  and  every 
thing  in  him,  which  loves  to  grapple  with  infinity,  and  rejoices  in  the 
thoughts  of  eternity,  and  longs  after  immortality."  It  "is  adapted 
to  all  conditions  of  human  existence,  and  produces,  wherever  it  pre- 
vails, the  same  effects."  "The  founder  of  Christianity  has  taken 
man  as  a  being  compounded  of  matter  and  mind,  with  reason,  con- 
science, passion,  and  appetite,  and  has  treated  him  according  to  his 
natural  constitution.  It  does  not  exterminate  any  principle  of  our 
nature,  or  indulge  any  evil  propensity ;  but  with  most  consummate 
wisdom  and  benevolence  it  regulates  the  wonderful  machinery  of 
man." — Dr.  Rice. 

"•  Every  one  is  conscious  of  possessing  certain  original  desires, 
which  are  inherent  in  his  very  nature,  and  which  exist  independently 
of  all  circumstances ;  and  in  the  gratification  of  which  consists  his 
happiness." — "  Whatever  then  is  best  adapted  to  meet  these  original 
desires,  is  of  course  best  fitted  to  promote  man's  true  happiness. 
Taking  the  gospel  just  as  we  find  it,  I  shall  endeavour  to  show  that 
all  these  desires  are  successfully  met  in  it,  and  in  nothing  else.'' — Dr. 
Sprague. 

"  The  law  of  God"  "  is  just  in  its  demands,  for  these  are  always 
commensurate  with  the  capacity  of  its  subjects,  never  exacting  more 
at  any  given  moment,  than  what  equals  the  ability  of  the  subject  to 
perform."  "It  is  this  eternal  correspondence  between  ability  and 
obligation  that  manifests  his  righteousness  who  made  the  law,  and 
who  thus  appeals  to  our  moral  judgment — '  are  not  my  ways  equal  ?'" 
—Dr.  Cox. 

That  the  government  of  the  Most  High  was  established 
over  man  as  he  now  exists,  and  is  adapted  to  his  present 
nature,  as  perfectly  as  his  administration  over  angels,  is 
fitted  to  the  nature  of  that  order  of  beings,  none  who  look 


27 

at  the  subject  with  impartiality  can  doubt.  There  was  no 
other  than  the  present  human  nature  in  existence  at  the 
institution  either  of  the  law  or  gospel,  or  the  promulgation 
of  any  of  the  requirements  or  prohibitions,  conditions  or 
promises,  which  belong  to  their  administration.  Whatever 
may  be  thought  to  have  been  the  fact  with  the  first  pair 
before  the  fall,  neither  they  after  that  event,  nor  any  of  their 
descendants,  at  any  subsequent  period,  ever  possessed  any 
other  nature  than  that  which  is  now  common  to  the  race. 
If,  ti)erefore,  the  divine  government  was  not  established 
over,  and  made  to  correspond  to  this  nature,  it  of  course 
cannot  have  had  any  such  relation  to  any  human  nature 
whatever  either  of  that  or  any  subsequent  period,  and  ac- 
cordingly can  never  have  merited  the  character  of  wisdom 
or  justice. 

The  supposition  that  the  government  of  the  Most  High 
was  not  formed  for  the  nature  with  which  man  is  now  con- 
stituted, also  implies  that  the  chief  measures  of  his  adminis- 
tration are  likewise  disproportioned  to  an  equal  extent  and 
imsuited  to  each  other.  The  great  provisions  of  the  gospel 
are  indisputably  instituted  for  that  identical  nature  which 
now  exists,  as  it  is  to  that  and  that  only  that  they  are  actu- 
ally applied.  It  is  that  nature,  and  not  one  that  once  ex- 
isted for  a  short  period  only  in  the  garden  of  Eden,  and 
vanished  forever  from  being  at  the  touch  of  the  forbidden 
fruit,  that  is  the  subject  of  the  sprinkling  of  the  blood  of 
Christ,  of  renovation  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  exaltation  to 
glory.  To  suppose,  therefore,  that  all  the  other  parts  of 
the  divine  government  are  not  instituted  with  the  same 
reference  and  adaptation  to  that  nature,  is  to  suppose  either 
that  the  atonement  itself  is  formed  for  another  than  that  to 
which  it  is  applied,  or  that  the  law  was  instituted  for  a  dif- 


29 

ferent  one  from  timt  for  which  the  atoninc^  sacrifice  was  offer- 
ed ;  which  is  obviously  to  subvert  all  their  essential  relations, 
and  utterly  to  deny  either  the  one  or  the  other. 

But  the  divine  government  itself  is,  in  fact,  and  most 
manifestly  fraught,  in  all  its  representations  of  his  faculties, 
relations  and  agenc}',  its  exhibition  of  his  passions,  wants, 
temptations,  sufferings  and  enjoyments,  its  appointment  of 
his  duties,  delineations  of  his  character,  and  provisions  for 
his  salvation,  with  every  conceivable  mark  of  exact  and 
intentional  coincidence  with  and  adaptation  to  the  present 
nature  of  man.  It  is  to  this  nature  that  all  its  laws  and 
promises  are  addressed,  and  (his  reason,  heart  and  con- 
science, that  its  moral  means  are  employed  to  teach  and 
influence.  It  is  this  nature  that  obeys  and  transgresses 
those  laws,  and  this  that  is  saved  and  lost  under  that  instru- 
mentalit)'.  To  deny  it,  and  carry  the  denial  to  its  fit 
results,  were  at  a  stroke  to  blot  out  all  revelation  to  us,  and 
annihilate  the  divine  government;  and  a  clear  discernment 
and  full  and  consistent  manifestation  of  it,  is  obviously  indis- 
pensable to  a  proper  apprehension  and  exhibition  of  the 
religion  of  the  Bible. 

This  great  characteristic  of  the  government  of  the  Most 
High  has  obviously  hitherto  enjoyed  but  a  very  inadequate 
notice  from  the  ministers  of  religion,  and  exerted  far  too 
slight  an  influence  on  their  apprehensions  and  methods  of 
teaching.  By  multitudes,  indeed,  it  has  been  formally  de- 
nied ;  and  not  a  few  of  the  theories,  doctrines  and  arguments, 
that  are  still  current  in  the  theological  world,  are  founded 
on  an  open  or  virtual  assumption,  that  many  of  the  impor- 
tant measures  oftiie  divine  administration,  are  not  suited  to 
the  powers  and  susceptibilities  of  man  as  he  is  now  formed, 
but  correspond  only  to  the  superior  attributes  of  a  nature 


29 

which  is  supposed  to  have  been  originally  possessed  by  the 
first  pair,  and  lost  forever  at  the  fall.  And  is  not  this  at 
least,  one  among  the  causes  that  have  contributed  to  dis- 
courage and  paralyze  their  labours,  and  led  them  to  go 
through  their  ministry  with  so  little  use  of  "their  judgment, 
or  aid  from  the  excitements  of  hope,  fear  and  sympathy  ? 
What  other  effect  could  be  expected  to  result  from  a  deep 
and  settled  conviction  that  their  labours  not  only  have  no 
natural  adaptation  to  benefit  their  impenitent  hearers,  but 
that  even  a  supernatural  suspension  and  retroversion  of  the 
laws  of  nature  must  be  accomplished  in  order  to  prevent 
them  from  exerting  a  pernicious  and  fatal  influence,  and  that 
whenever  the  Most  High  vouchsafes  to  pour  out  on  their 
people  his  Spirit,  his  influence  is  exerted  independentlv  and 
irrespctively  of  their  instrumentality  ?  But  just  apprehen- 
sions of  the  relations  of  the  means  of  the  gospel  to  the  ends 
for  which  they  are  instituted — the  conviction,  conversion, 
and  sanctification  of  men — are  obviously  adapted  to  pro- 
duce precisely  the  opposite  efl'ects,  by  prompting  endeavors 
at  fit  and  skilful  applications  of  them,  exciting  a  fixed  ex- 
pectation of  success  when  used  in  their  appointed  manner, 
and  inspiring  a  settled  reliance  on  God,  for  his  promised 
blessing.  A  clear  conviction  indeed,  that  he  has  appointed 
them  to  that  instrumentality,  that  it  is  through  them  and 
nothing  else,  that  he  accomplishes  those  ends,  and  that  he 
has  revealed  a  gracious  purpose  of  rendering  them  effica- 
cious by  the  influence  of  his  Spirit,  is  manifestly  a  fit  and 
natural  ground  for  a  full  and  influential  reliance  on  him  for 
that  gift ;  and  this  reliance  will  naturally  rise  in  strength 
and  efficacy  in  proportion  to  the  depth  and  force  of  that 
conviction. 

This  great  theme  presents  to  the  teachers  of  religion  im- 
perative claims  to  their  gravest  consideration.     It  is  clearly 


30 

a  subject  of  fundamental  inijjortance.  It  enters  more  or 
less  into  every  topic  of  instruction,  and  the  views  that  are 
formed  of  it  necessarily  impart  their  character,  whether  of 
truth  or  error,  to  every  branch  of  a  theological  system.  Mis- 
takes in  respect  to  it  cannot  be  uninfluential  nor  harmless, 
but  must  be  fraught  with  fatal  mischief.  Just  apprehensions 
of  it  are  indispensable  to  a  fit  and  skilful  discharge  of  the 
commission  of  ambassadors  for  God.  They  cannot  inter- 
pret his  will  and  intentions  aright,  explain  the  principles 
of  his  administration,  vindicate  its  measures,  and  enforce  its 
claims,  while  they  only  partially  comprehend,  or  essentially 
misconceive  them.  They  must  understand  the  nature  of 
the  government,  which  it  is  their  business  to  exhibit  and 
enforce,  and  the  nature  of  those  to  whom  they  address  their 
messages,  before  they  can  exert  their  destined  influence,  and 
gain  for  the  gospel  a  universal  prevalence  and  triumph. 
They  must  cease  to  labour — as  has  heretofore  too  often  hap- 
pened— under  the  paralyzing  impression  that  their  means 
have  no  possible  adaptation  to  the  ends  for  which  they  are 
appointed  to  employ  them,  and  listen  to  thejuster  teachings 
of  consciousness,  reason  and  inspiration.  They  will  learn 
from  these  that  their  ministry  enjoys  by  the  appointment  of 
God,  a  fixed  and  essential  station  among  the  means  through 
which  salvation  is  conveyed  to  their  fellow-men,  and  an 
appointment  that  has  its  grounds  in  their  nature  as  moral 
.agents  ;  that  the  reason  that  their  labours  are  necessary  is, 
that  "  faith  cometh  by  hearing,  and  hearing  b}'  the  word  of 
God,"  and  that  as  the  church  and  world  cannot  "  hear 
without  a  preacher,"  so  they  cannot  "  preach  except  they 
be  sent" — except,  in  other  words  they  actually  fulfill  the 
office  of  ambassadors,  by  exhibiting  in  all  its  proper  rela- 
tions that  identical  message  which  they  are  commissioned 
to  deliver. 


31 

III.  The  portraiture  which  these  Discourses  present  of 
infidelity,  as  tlie  offspring  of  appetite  and  profligate  princi- 
ples, aud  as  resting  its  hope  of  popularity  on  appeals  to 
passion  and  the  shameless  avowal  of  its  depravity,  is  sig- 
nally just  of  that  which  has  lately  clamoured  so  fiercely 
through  the  land,  and  is  happily  adapted  to  correct  the 
extravagant  apprehensions  which  some  have  indulged,  that 
It  may  possibly  gain  a  general  prevalence. 

"  Unbelievers  are  commonly  fond  of  representing  their  opinions  as 
derived  from  reason;  as  the  offspring  of  free  and  candid  inquir;/. 
But  did  you  ever  know  an  individual  of  this  class  who  really  was  in 
the  habit  of  seriously  studying  the  Bible,  or  who  appeared  at  all  dis- 
posed to  make  either  the  evidences  or  the  doctrines  of  Christianity 
the  object  of  close  and  earnest  examination  ?  Did  you  ever  know  an 
infidel  who  seemed  to  become  such  by  serious  investigation;  by 
sober  argument ;  by  carefully  weighing  the  testimony  which  the 
word  of  God  presents  in  favour  of  its  lieavenly  origin  ?  I  will  ven- 
ture to  say,  you  never  did."  "  Men  commonly  become  infidels  by 
ignorance,  by  thoughtlessness,  by  pride,  by  prejudice,  by  turning 
away  their  minds  from  the  Bible,  and  from  all  sober  inquiry ;  by  for- 
getting God,  and  by  flying  from  all  appropriate  reflection  on  his  cha- 
racter,  and  the  claims  which  he  asserts  on  his  rational  creatures." 

"  Thousands  of  the  young,  as  well  as  of  the  aged,  have  been  ma- 
nifestly drawn  into  infidelity  by  their  evil  passions  and  their  vices. 
The  history  of  many  a  youthful  victim  of  unbelief  has  been  in  sub- 
stance, as  follows:— He  was  taught  from  the  cradle  to  reverence  the 
Bible,  and  instructed  to  attach  importance  to  the  great  sanctions 
which  it  unfolds.  But  when  he  entered  on  the  gay  world ;  when 
false  honour  began  to  dazzle,  and  criminal  pleasure  to  allure;  when 
licentious  habits  gradually  unfolded  their  attractions,  and  ungodly 
companions  rendered  him  fan.iliar  with-  scenes  of  profanenoss''  and 
vice,  he  was  not  slow  in  perceiving  that  such  pursuits  were  alto- 
gether inconsistent  with  the  principles  of  his  education.  This  at 
first  filled  him  with  deep  anxiety.  T],e  conflict,  however,  in  its 
power,  did-  not  last  long.  He  telt  obliged  either  to  abandon  the 
principles  of  his  youth,  or  to  give  up  his  unhallowed  indulaences. 
iJe  was  resolved  not  to  part  with  the  latter;  and,  therefore,  gave  uv 


32 

the  tbniier.  At  lirst  he  hesitated ;  then  he  doubted,  or  rather  tt'ied 
to  doubt ;  then  he  disbeheved ;  not  because  he  had  examined,  and 
found  rehgion  false ;  but  because  he  had  made  it  necessary,  for  his 
own  peace  of  mind,  to  believe  it  false.  He,  at  length,  succeeded  in 
persuading  himself  that  all  his  former  seriousness  and  scruples  were 
idle  dreams  ;  that  he  might  live  as  he  listed  without  any  fear  of  an 
hereafter ;  until,  in  the  end,  he  became  prepared  to  take  his  stand 
with  the  most  determined  enemies  of  the  gospel,  and  even  to  '  sit  in 
the  seat  of  the  scornful.'  Now  can  any  one  doubt  that  in  all  such 
cases,  unbelief  is  the  offspring,  not  of  sober  inquiry,  but  of  corrupt 
inclination;  not  of  a  sincere  and  candid  search  after  truth,  but  of  a 
desire  to  be  liberated  from  the  restraints  which  the  religion  of  Christ 
imposes  ?"     Dr.  Miller. 

These  representations  are  peculiarly  true  of  the  propa- 
gators and  disciples  of  infidelity,  who  have  of  late  so 
strenuously  endeavoured  to  give  conspicuity  to  their  cause. 
They  are  rejectors  of  the  gospel,  not  from  any  want  of 
adequate  evidence  of  its  divine  origin,  nor  from  any  legiti- 
mate objection  to  its  truth,  but  solely  from  the  impulse  of 
temptations  that  either  have  withdrawn  them  from  the  just 
consideration  of  the  subject,  embittered  them  with  prejudice, 
exasperated  their  passions,  or  what,  perhaps,  still  more  fre- 
quently happens,  from  the  mere  goadings  of  conscience 
that  cannot  be  repressed,  and  clamours  of  appetite  that  can- 
not be  indulged  with  self-complacency,  except  by  extir- 
pating from  themselves  all  sense  and  conviction  of  the 
truth  of  Christianity. 

In  the  character  in  which  infidelity  is  at  present  exhibit- 
ing itself,  it  has  far  less  to  recommend  it  to  those  who  re- 
tain any  lingering  respect  for  decency,  or  desire  for  repu- 
tation, than  at  most  former  periods.  Heretofore  it  has 
thought  it  a  matter  of  policy  to  put  on,  as  far  as  practicable, 
an  air  of  dignity,  and  maintain  a  semblance,  at  least,  of 
some  of  the  qualities  which  mankind   arc  disposed  to   re- 


33 

spect.  It  has  associated  itself  with  nobility  and  power, 
assumed  the  mask  of  philosophy,  arrogated  the  sanction  of 
science,  and  attempted  to  flutter  on  the  pinions  of  wit.  Of 
late,  however,  it  presents  itself  in  a  somewhat  different 
mien  ;  offering  far  less  lofty  claims  to  the  honours  of  philo- 
sophy, and  less  laboured  pretensions  to  the  aids  of  logic 
and  science.  It  no  longer  comes  recommended  by  any 
splendour  of  talents  or  lustre  of  knowledge  in  those  who 
are  its  propagators,  nor  associated  with  any  refined  and 
lofty  sentiments  that  can  yield  it  dignity,  nor  wit  that  can 
throw  over  its  hideousness  a  momentary  glare.  Its  wit  has 
sunk  down  into  ribaldry,  and  its  sarcasms  into  blasphemies 
that  shock  the  ear  of  decorum  as  well  as  piety.  Like  the  ' 
last  and  hopeless  struggle  which  profligacy  is  sometimes 
seen  to  make  to  keep  up  its  gaiety  and  attract  disgraceful 
notoriety,  rather  than  sufler  oblivion  ;  weary  of  its  mask, 
and  conscious  that  its  gait  is  known,  it  is  at  length  ven- 
turing forth  unveiled,  and  attempting  to  catch  the  crowd 
by  shapelessness  and  indecency. 

In  this  exacerbated  form,  however,  it  obviously  is  as  un- 
friendly to  the  peace  of  society,  as  it  is  hostile  to  the  inter- 
ests of  religion;  and  must  meet  a  stern  antagonist  on  the 
bench  of  civil  justice,  as  well  as  in  the  chair  of  theological 
instruction.  With  not  a  single  prop  on  which  reason  can 
lean,  nor  a  solitary  sentiment  with  which  the  better  sensibil- 
ities of  the  heart  can  sympathize  ;  with  nothing  on  which  it 
can  fasten  a  hold  except  the  hunger  of  forbidden  appetites, 
and  the  recklessness  of  disgrace  and  ruin,  it  cannot  propa- 
gate nor  sustain  itself,  but  must  meet  a  speedy  end.  Such 
of  its  disciples  as  escape  the  dungeons  of  justice,  or  grasp  of 
the  halter,  will  fall  victims  after  a  short  career  to  their  un- 
natural excesses.     Its  utter  incompatibility  with  the  very 

5 


34 

nature  of  man,  which,  in  order  even  to  the  gratification  of 
any  thing  like  a  far-sighted  selfishness,  requires  personal 
safety,  security  to  property,  and  the  means  and  opportiniity 
of  cherishing  and  enjoying  the  domestic  afl'ections,  must  in- 
sure its  almost  universal  rejection.  It  does  not  need  the 
self-denial  of  a  martyr,  or  faith  of  a  christian,  to  discard  a 
system  which  would  at  a  stroke  annihilate  all  those  forms 
and  means  of  happiness,  and  convert  the  world  into  a  desert. 
It  can  never  find  many  disciples  among  those  who  have  pro- 
perty to  preserve,  families  to  rear,  domestic  bliss  to  enjoy 
and  communicate,  blessings  to  diffuse  and  receive,  reputa- 
tion to  sustain,  or  any  hopes  of  future  good  to  themselves 
or  families  fromin  dustry,  skill  or  honour  ;  for  with  all  these 
it  wages  as  open  and  unsparing  war  as  with  the  claims  and 
requirements  of  religion  itself. 

A  more  active  diff'usion,  accordingly,  and  zealous  en- 
forcement of  the  great  truths  of  the  gospel,  is  obviously  the 
only  proper  method  of  checking  and  correcting  this  profli- 
gacy ;  not  open  attacks  and  formal  attempts  at  its  refutation. 
It  was  unwise  in  public  journalists  and  others  to  attract  the 
general  notice  to  the  Avretched  outcasts  and  wanderers  from 
Europe,  who  have  been  the  chief  instruments  of  giving  it  an 
impulse,  by  chronicling  their  movements,  and  reporting 
their  impious  doctrines.  They  should  never  enjoy  a  re- 
cognition, unless  before  the  civil  magistrate.  It  Hatters 
them,  to  be  held  up  to  notoriety,  if  it  even  be  to  point  at  them 
the  finger  of  scorn,  and  reprobate  their  indecency.  It  con- 
fers importance  on  their  agency  and  doctrines,  and  gives 
them  what  is  more  their  object  probably,  than  any  thing 
else — the  advantage  of  conspicuity.  Nothing  is  so  utterly 
fatal  to  their  purposes  as  general  neglect,  nor  any  other 
punishment  so  severe  as  to  be  thrown  back  in  solitude  upon 


35 

themselves,  where  reason  may  have  an  opportunity  to  es- 
cape from  the  tyranny  of  passion,  and  conscience  to  re-assert 
her  dreaded  power. 

IV.  The  last  characteristic  of  these  Discourses  which  I 
have  space  to  notice,  is  their  recognition,  in  the  natureofthe 
gospel  itself,  of  the  views  and  labours  of  the  church,  and  the 
effusions  of  the  Spirit,  of  causes  which  not  only  render  it  cer- 
tain that  the  religion  of  Christ  will  continue  to  sustain  it- 
self in  our  land,  but  authorize  the  fullest  assurance  that  it 
will  acquire  a  much  more  general  diffusion,  and  ultimately 
rise  to  a  far  more  predominating  influence  over  the  popula- 
tion at  large. 

"  We  shall  endeavour  to  show  that  the  gospel  of  Jesus  Christ  will 
universally  prevail  ;  from  its  peculiar  adaptedness  to  gratify  the 
\yants  of  our  sensitive  nature;  from  the  intimations  in  the  history  of 
the  world,  vvhicli  the  Creator  of  the  universe  has  given,  that  such  is 
his  determination  ;  and  from  the  fact  that  the  elements  of  society 
have  been  so  combined,  that  at  some  time  or  other,  such  must  be  the 
necessary  resuh."     Dr.  AVayland. 

The  views  here  exhibited  and  eloquently  enforced  in  the 
Discourse  from  which  these  sentences  are  transcribed,  are 
the  dictate  of  sound  forecast  and  philosophy,  as  well  as  the 
fit  offspring  of  christian  faith.  The  apprehensions  which 
some  appear  to  entertain,  and  suppositions  that  are 
often  advanced,  that  religion  may  ere  long  become  extinct 
in  our  land,  or  that  at  least  the  nation  at  large  may  turn  to 
open  and  shameless  infidelity,  indicate  as  slight  a  consider- 
ation of  the  great  principles  of  human  nature,  the  constitu- 
tion of  civilized  society,  and  the  various  causes  which  act 
on  men  in  favor  of  religion,  beside  a  pure  attachment  to  its 
spiritual  character,   as   they  do   of  the  nature  of  religion 


36 

itself,  and  the  assurances  with  whicli  we  arc  presented  in  the 
gospel  of  its  perpetuity  and  universal  prevalence.  1  regret 
to  perceive  from  the  last  report  of  the  American  Board  of 
Commissioners  for  Foreign  Missions,  that  an  organ  of  that 
body  has  sufl'ered  himself  in  so  important  a  paper,  to  indulge 
in  conjectures  or  suppositions,  as  they  are  perhaps,  rather 
than  apprehensions,  of  this  character.  It  is  unsuited  to  the 
dignity  of  that  venerable  body,  to  which  not  only  the 
American  church,  but  the  christian  world,  in  a  sense,  looks 
up  for  an  example  of  severe  wisdom,  long  forecast,  and 
superiority  to  impulse  from  the  transient  shocks  that  dis- 
turb society,  to  enter  on  speculations  that  have  so  little  of 
the  sobriety  of  fact,  or  probability  to  recommend  them  ; 
and  unwise  to  resort  to  them  for  motives  to  excite  or  sustain 
an  adequate  interest  in  tiie  great  objects  to  whose  advance- 
ment that  institution  is  devoted. 

No  nation  can  ever,  at  large,  become  the  disciples  of  infi- 
delity without  adequate  causes;  and  these  causes  must 
pbviouslj'  work  their  effect,  either  by  obliterating  the  know- 
ledge, or  shrouding  the  evidences  of  the  truth  of  religion  ; 
or  by  pouring  on  the  general  mind  such  a  tempest  of  tempt- 
ation, as  to  prevent  that  evidence  from  exerting  its  ordinary 
and  natural  influence.  Christianity,  however,  is  not  only 
sustained  by  evidences  which  no  human  intellect  can  ever 
subvert  or  shake,  and  which  none  can  even  assail,  except  on 
principles  that  sap  the  foundations  of  all  certainty  in  history, 
and  all  confidence  in  testimony ;  but  by  proofs  so  clear, 
abundant,  and  convincing,  that  no  ordinary  obstacles  of 
ignorance  or  pride,  nor  temptations  of  prejudice,  malevo- 
lence, or  enmity,  arc  adequate  to  resist  their  power.  The 
experiment  of  eighteen  hundred  years  has  shown,  that 
wherever  it  is  freely  diffused,  and  enjoys  an  opportunity  of 


37 

exerting  its  appropriate  influence,  it  always  succeeds  in 
commanding  a  general  assent.  Not  a  solitary  exception  is 
recorded  on  the  page  of  history ;  nor  an  instance  in  which 
it  has  been  carried  to  pagan  nations  and  allowed  to  make  a 
fair  experiment  of  its  powers,  that  it  has  not  gained  a  foot- 
hold ;  and  won  the  reason,  conscience,  heart  and  hopes  of 
man,  to  its  adoption.  It  is  on  the  conviction  of  this  great 
fact  indeed,  that  the  society  to  which  I  have  alluded,  and  all 
others,  act  in  their  attempts  to  plant  the  gospel  in  foreign 
lands,  and  sustain  it  in  our  own.  If  it  were  not  thus  known 
and  felt  that  the  gospel  carries  within  itself  the  adequate 
and  certain  means  of  gaining  the  assent  of  the  great  mass 
of  those  to  whom  it  is  fairly  presented,  and  that  it  will 
always,  to  some  extent  at  least,  prove  efficacious  through 
the  enforcing'influences  of  the  spirit  of  grace  that  attend 
its  annunciation,  none  would  ever  be  found  to  enter  on  so 
arduous  an  undertaking.  No  such  uncertainty,  however, 
attends  it.  It  is  as  well  ascertained  a  fact,  as  any  other  in 
the  history  of  man  or  the  laws  of  providence,  that  the  gos- 
pel, when  fitly  ofiered  to  comnuniities  and  nations,  invaria- 
bly produces  those  effects  on  large  and  often  prevailing 
numbers,  and  it  is  accordingly  as  much  a  matter  of  settled 
expectation,  as  any  other  effect  which  the  usual  course  of 
events  has  shown  always  to  result  from  appropriate  causes. 
The  question  then  respecting  the  probable  or  possible 
extinction  of  Christianity  in  this  land,  resolves  itself  into 
the  simple  problem,  whether  any  causes  exist  or  are  coming 
into  existence,  that  can  either  universally  extinguish  the 
knowledge  of  the  gospel,  or  raise  against  it  such  a  storm  of 
prejudice  and  enmity,  as  totally  to  disarm  it  of  its  power 
over  the  general  intellect,  and  cause  it  to  be  discarded  and 
proscribed — events,  manifestly  that  are   not  only  without 


38 

a  shade  of  likelihood,  but  that  cannot  easily  be  believed  to 
lie  within  the  sphere  of  possibility.  Their  production 
would  obviously  involve  a  general  suspension  of  education 
and  extinction  of  its  means,  an  obstruction  of  all  the  ordi- 
nary channels  of  knowledge,  and  a  total  suppression  of  the 
freedom  of  opinion.  But  these  effects  could  never  be  pro- 
duced without  not  only  a  total  extinction  of  liberty,  but  a 
subjection  of  the  nation — considering  its  present  character, 
and  the  arts  which  now  enter  into  the  very  fabric  of  civil- 
ized society,  and  are  essential  to  its  subsistence — to  a  more 
abject  slavery  than  was  ever  yet  experienced.  These  arts, 
and  the  sciences  in  which  they  have  their  origin,  cannot  be 
wrenched  from  the  social  structure,  without  a  total  dissolution 
of  its  elements.  The  press  would  need  to  be  annihilated, 
the  ministry  and  evei-y  profession  exterminated,  knowledge 
extinguished,  and  the  church  blotted  from  existence ;  but 
these  could  never  be  swept  from  the  scene,  without  hurling 
the  whole  nation  back  into  the  lowest  depths  of  barbarism. 
The  question  in  effect  then  is,  whether  any  probabilities 
exist,  that  the  nation  itself  will  ever  suppress,  or  suffer  any 
other  to  extinguish  within  it  all  the  sciences  and  arts  which 
form  the  chief  means  and  ornaments  of  civilized  life,  the 
existence  and  exercise  of  which,  as  they  necessarily  involve 
the  general  and  free  diffusion  of  knowledge,  and  the  unfet- 
tered action  of  the  press,  must  accordingly,  while  continued, 
yield  the  right,  and  place  the  means  of  religious  informa- 
tion within  the  access  of  the  community  at  large. 

No  such  resemblance  subsists  between  the  institutions, 
condition,  and  character  of  this  nation,  and  those  of  the 
French  of  the  last  century,  as  to  authorize  any  inference 
from  their  history  to  the  probability  of  similar  future  events 
with  us.     The  causes  yvhich  here  ensure  the  perpetuation 


39 

of  the  knowledge  and  influence  of  the  gospel,  had  never 
any  prevalent  agency  or  being  there,  nor  have  those  which 
produced  her  general  infidelity,  any  existence  here.  That 
nation  never  enjoyed  the  blessings  of  a  general  education, 
n  well-educated  and  faithful  ministry,  a  universal  diffusion 
of  the  scriptures,  and  a  free  tofeation  of  opinion  ;  and  yet 
though  debarred  of  all  these  blessings,  it  required  the  im- 
postures, oppression,  and  accumulated  provocations  of  a 
thousand  years,  and  the  combination  of  a  series  of  inciden- 
tal causes,  to  which,  perhaps,  no  possible  conjunction  of 
events  could  ever  again  give  birth,  to  push  them  on  to  that 
terrific  paroxysm  of  madness  and  impiety.  The  almost 
entire  restriction  of  religious  knowledge  to  the  sacerdotal 
order,  the  ignorance  and  profligacy  of  a  large  portion  of 
the  clergy,  the  absurd  and  demoralizing  doctrines  and  indul- 
gences of  the  church,  the  oppression  of  a  despotic  govern- 
ment, of  which  that  church  was  alternately  the  tool  and  the 
directress — even  these  numerous  and  powerful  causes  that 
had  accumulated  strength  and  exacerbation  through  a  long 
tract  of  ages,  were  not  alone  enough  to  have  produced  at 
that  period,  that  frightful  convulsion  ;  and  never,  perhaps, 
could  have  given  it  existence,  had  not  a  sudden  and  great 
accession  to  general  knowledge  imparted  a  strong  impulse 
to  the  public  mind ;  a  class  of  novel  and  mighty  geniuses 
been  led  to  combine  their  agency  in  assailing  Christianity, 
and  finally  the  eruption  of  our  revolution,  poured  a  glare  of 
political  light  on  the  nation  at  large,  and  kindled  an  ardent 
desire  and  hope  of  liberty.  Had  the  destin}'  of  even  a 
score  of  the  chief  champions  of  infidelity  been  changed  to 
obscurity  by  any  series  of  events,  it  is  probable  that  all 
other  causes  would  never  have  wrought  that  nation  up  to  a 
public   abjuration  of  Christianity  ;  and  yet  that  abjuration 


40 

had  passed  but  a  brief  period  only,  before  the  exigencies  of 
state  required  as  formal  a  restoration  of  the  form  at  least  of 
relifirion,  to  s'i\t  force  to  law,  salety  to  life,  and  security  to 
property,  without  which  society  itself  cannot  subsist.  Had 
it  happened  that  any  one  of  these  principal  causes  had  not 
been  united  to  the  combinjition,  that  event  would  probably 
never  have  taken  place.  Had  the  scriptures,  for  example, 
in  place  of  being  confined  to  the  hands  of  a  few  ecclesiastics, 
been  generally  diffused  for  a  series  of  ages,  numerous  indi- 
viduals and  famihes  would  have  been  found  in  every  de- 
partment, citv",  and  village,  familiar  with  their  truths,  believ- 
ers of  their  doctrines,  and  jox'ful  expectants  of  tlieir 
promised  blessings ;  and  the  leaven  of  their  influence  would 
thus  have  been  transfused  through  the  whole  community. 
The  existence  and  action  of  these  causes  would  as  certainly 
have  given  rise  to  competent  and  de\oted  teachers  of  die 
gospel,  the  organization  of  pure  churches,  and  the  multipli- 
cation and  active  use  of  all  the  usual  instruments  of  diffusing 
and  enforcing  the  influence  of  Christianity  ;  and  had  all 
these  been  wrought  into  the  structure  of  societal',  exerted 
their  appropriate  agency,  and  shed  their  redeeming  influ- 
ence over  the  people,  they  would  as  infallibly  have  prevented 
the  existence,  or  counteracted  the  action  of  all  those  to 
which  the  general  atheism  of  the  nation  owed  its  existence, 
reformed  the  church,  softened  and  refined  the  government, 
diffused  and  heightened  the  social  and  domestic  virtues  ; 
and  thus  precluded  from  being  the  provocations  and  means 
which  igave  excitement  and  power  to  the  malignant  efforts  of 
Voltadre,  Rousseau,  and  their  coadjutors,  in  their  onset  on 
Christianity'.  Those  individuals  themselves,  indeed,  enhght- 
ened  by  her  truths,  transformed  by  her  power,  imbued  with 
her  rectitude  and  benevolence,  and  inspired  by  her  hopes — 


41 

ill  place  of  plotting  and  fiercely  struggling  to  accomplish 
her  extinction — might  then  have  knelt  at  her  altars  among 
the  holiest  and  most  fervid  of  her  disciples,  and  consecrated 
the  lofty  energies  of  intellect  and  passion  with  which  they 
were  gifted,  to  the  vindication  of  her  rights,  and  diffusion  of 
her  blessings. 

No  such  analogy,  therefore,  exists  between  the  character 
and  condition  of  the  two  nations,  as  to  make  the  frightful 
catastrophe  of  the  one,  any  ground  of  anticipating  a  similar 
career  of  the  other.  On  the  contrary,  the  general  causes 
which  are  determining  the  moral  destiny  of  this  nation  au- 
thorize the  expectation  of  precisely  opposite  results.  Our 
government,  in  place  of  being  devoted  to  the  aggrandize- 
ment of  the  rulers,  at  the  expense  of  general  misery  and 
oppression,  is  instituted  for  the  sole  purpose  of  enforcing 
right,  and  diffusing  and  maintaining  the  blessings  of  liberty. 
We  enjoy  a  full  freedom  of  opinion,  an  unfettered  press, 
and  extraordinary  facilities  of  acquiring  and  disseminating 
knowledge.  The  population  at  large  is  intelligent  beyond 
any  other  nation,  and  possessed  of  juster  views  of  the  legiti- 
mate objects  of  government,  the  means  and  value  of  national 
happiness,  the  rights  of  conscience,  and  the  relations  of  re- 
ligion to  civil  institutions.  Immense  numbers  of  churches 
are  firmly  established  throughout  almost  every  section  of  the 
country,  eminently  pure  in  doctrine  and  practice,  and  gifted 
with  a  ministry  distinguished  for  a  knowledge  of  their  pro- 
fession, and  skill  and  fidelity  in  discharging  its  duties,  and 
standing  in  that  relation  to  the  church  and  society  at  large, 
which  presents  the  highest  excitements  to  diligence,  faith- 
fulness and  success.  A  wide  and  almost  universal  dissemi- 
nation gf  the  Scriptures  is  enjoyed,  and  numerous  institutions 

founded  and  liberally  endowed  for  the  purpose  of  supplying 

G 


4^ 

whatever  wants  may  still  exist  of  the  sacred  word,  and  per- 
petuating the  universal  possession  of  that  blessing.  A  mul- 
titude of  schools  and  classes  are  instituted  in  the  church, 
which  carry  the  knowledge  of  the  gospel,  with  an  energy 
and  success  hitherto  unknown,  to  the  great  body  of  the 
young,  and  which,  from  the  general  sentiment  in  favor  of 
education,  and  the  favorable  moral  influence  which  these 
institutions  are  seen  to  exert,  have  conciliated  the  approval 
and  engaged  the  co-operation  of  the  friends  of  knowledge 
and  good  order  at  large,  as  well  as  of  religion,  and  given 
certainty  to  their  continued  support.  Societies  are  formed 
and  extensive  provisions  made  for  the  aid  of  youth  in  pre- 
paration for  the  ministry,  and  theological  seminaries  esta- 
blished where  means  of  education  for  the  sacred  office  are 
furnished,  that  insure  the  distinguished  competence  and  dig- 
nity of  the  profession.  Here  is  thus  a  combination  of  causes 
interwoven  with  the  very  fabric  of  our  social  and  civil  exis- 
tence, which,  by  all  the  laws  of  human  events,  assure  to  this 
people,  as  a  body,  beyond  the  possibility  of  disappointment, 
the  continued  knowledge  of  the  gospel,  and  its  free  action 
on  their  minds,  and  consequently  the  perpetuity  and  perpe- 
tual progress  of  its  influence  over  their  principles  and  man- 
ners. It  is  then  the  sober  dictate  of  reason,  and  no  extrava- 
gance to  believe,  that  none  of  the  causes  which  have  hitherto 
had  a  determining  sway  over  the  afl*airs  of  men,  can  ever 
intervene  to  intercept  these  anticipated  blessings,  and  plunge 
the  nation  back  into  a  night  of  atheism  or  infidelity. 

With  all  these  causes  are  still  to  be  conjoined  the  mighty, 
and  till  the  present  period,  almost  unknown  influences  of  the 
great  institutions,  which,  in  sending  forth  the  gospel  to 
foreign  lands,  and  diflfusing  its  blessings  through  the  desti- 
tute regions  of  our  own,  are  developing  to  the  world  new 


43 

features  and  proofs  of  the  power  and  benevolence  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  giving  birth  to  incidents  of  sublime  and  over- 
powering interest,  that  spread  their  fame  through  every 
gradation  of  society,  and  carry  attraction  to  every  class  of 
intellect ;  and  finally,  to  all  these  are  to  be  superadded, 
what  is  of  infinitely  greater  moment  than  all  other  conside- 
rations, the  extraordinary  and  almost  miraculous  effusions 
of  the  Almighty  Spirit  that  characterize  the  age,  whose  ap- 
proaches no  hostile  eye  can  foresee,  and  whose  agency  no 
art  can  elude  nor  skill  successfully  contravene,  and  who, 
like  a  bolt  from  heaven,  instantaneously  attracting  univer- 
sal attention  to  the  great  themes  of  religion,  imparts  to  its 
friends  a  new  and  supernatural  impulse,  and  with  an  invi- 
sible hand  beats  down  its  haughty  enemies,  and  converts 
them  into  approvers  and  co-operators.  When  all  these 
causes,  together  with  the  certain  promises  of  continued  and 
larger  gifts  of  this  divine  agency,  are  united  in  the  account, 
it  becomes  not  only  the  dictate  of  sound  reason,  and  the 
part  of  christian  faith  and  hope,  to  anticipate  with  confi- 
dence the  continuance,  more  extensive  diffusion,  and  tri- 
umphant influence  of  these  infinite  blessings ;  but  to  doubt 
respecting  it,  is  scarcely  less  than  infidelity  itself — a  flagrant 
distrust  in  heaven  against  all  the  natural  and  supernatural 
assurances  that  can  give  certainty  to  our  expectations  of 
future  events. 

It  were  grateful  to  pursue  this  theme  and  sustain  these 
conclusions,  by  the  numerous  considerations  which  lend 
them  confirmation  from  the  history  of  the  past,  the  favour- 
able contrast  of  the  present  activity,  strength,  and  efiiciency 
of  the  church,  with  its  want  of  combination,  its  feebleness, 
and  inaction  at  the  commencement  of  the  century,  the 
character  of  that  part  of  the  population  which  furnishes  the 


44 

chief  portion  of  emigrants  to  the  new  regions  of  tlie  country, 
and  various  other  topics ;  but  tliey  will  naturally  suggest 
themselves,  and  I  turn  rather  to  the  duties  and  responsibi- 
lities that  arise  from  the  relations  of  the  present  to  future 
generations. 

An  almost  boundless  moral  influence  is  lodged  by  the 
Ruler  of  the  universe  in  the  hands  of  the  present  generation, 
both  of  real  and  nominal  christians,  for  weal  or  woe,  to  their 
descendants ;  and  every  step  they  take  in  reference  to  their 
interests,  is  fruitful  of  destiny  to  unborn  millions.  No  in- 
dividual can  possibly  stand  neuter,  nor  escape  the  responsi- 
bility of  contributing  either  to  the  advancement  or  obstruc- 
tion of  these  important  concerns.  Not  those  only  who 
take  an  open  and  resolute  part  in  the  efforts  that  are 
making  for  the  support  and  perpetuation  of  Christianity, 
or  who  deliberately  oppose  its  sway,  but  all  of  every  other 
class  lend  a  direct  or  indirect  influence  to  those  ends,  by 
educating  their  families  or  neglecting  to  instruct  them,  by 
contributing  to  the  general  dissemination  of  knowledge,  or 
obstructing  its  difl'usion ;  by  lending  or  denying  their 
agency  and  countenance  to  the  support  of  good  order,  and 
the  suppression  of  whatever  endangers  personal  safety  or 
interrupts  the  secure  enjoyment  of  domestic  and  social 
blessings ;  by  acting  the  part  of  enlightened  Iriends  to  ra- 
tional liberty,  or  its  enemies,  and  labouring  to  give  stability 
and  perpetuity  to  our  useful  civil  institutions,  or  to  subvert 
them, — all  lend  a  real  and  palpable  influence,  whether 
such  is  their  intention  or  not,  to  the  cause  of  Christianity, 
or  throw  obstructions  in  its  way ;  as  all  those  agencies  of 
the  one  class,  by  giving  the  gospel  access  to  the  general 
mind  and  room  for  action  on  the  great  principles  of  human 
nature,  are  so  many  instruments  of  its  diflusion,  pcrpetua- 


45 

linn,  and  certain  success  ;  and  those  on  tlie  other,  by  ob- 
structing the  channels  of  its  dissemination  and  Influence, 
contribute  to  check  its  power  and  limit  its  triumphs.  Those 
who  oppose  it,  though  they  cannot  accomplish  its  general 
overthrow,  may  yet  produce  wide  spread  evils,  and  incur 
the  guilt  of  debarring  its  infinite  blessings  from  many  indivi- 
duals, and  calling  causes  into  action  that  shall  involve  their 
final  ruin;  and  those  who  labor  for  its  advancement, 
though  they  may  not  succeed  in  achieving  all  at  which 
they  aim,  will  yet  exert  a  powerful  agency  that  will  give 
birth  to  great  immediate  blessings,  and  transmit  a  long 
succession  to  future  generations. 

It  is  obviously  the  duty  of  the  church  and  community  to 
sustain  and  advance  all  the  great  institutions  whose  object 
is  to  disseminate  the  blessings  of  general  education,  to  place 
the  volume  of  truth  in  the  hands  of  every  family  and  indi- 
vidual, to  send  the  living  teacher  to  every  destitute  village, 
and  dwelling,  and  to  raise  up  and  fit  for  the  future  agen- 
cies of  the  church,  a  learned  and  devoted  ministry.  To 
abandon  these  great  objects,  were  scarcely  less  than  apos- 
tacy  from  the  cause  of  Christ ;  to  oppose  them,  w  ere  to 
wage  war  on  human  happiness,  as  well  as  his  kingdom.  No 
constructive  duty  was  ever  clearer  than  is  that  of  carrying  on 
these  enterprises,  until  their  objects  are  fully  accomplished. 
Their  appeals  to  the  church  and  world  for  a  cordial  and  ge- 
nerous support,  are  so  many  voices  from  heaven,  proclaim- 
ing what  glory  to  God  in  the  highest  demands,  and  peace  o)i 
earth  and  good  will  to  men  require. 

The  chief  task  of  sustaining  the  religion  of  Christ,  and 
transmitting  its  blessings  to  future  generations,  obviously 
belongs  to  the  ministers  of  the  gospel ;  and  they  are  as  obvi- 
ously to  fulfil  that  high  commission  chiefly  by  tiie  faithful 


46 

illsciiarge  of  the  ordinary  duties  of  their  several  spheres — 
the  just  exhibition  of  its  character,  and  claims  to  assent  and 
acceptance ;  a  fit  manifestation  of  its  adaptation  to  the 
nature,  wants,  and  condition  of  men;  and  a  direct  and 
instant  application  of  its  great  and  glorious  truths  to  the 
reason,  conscience,  and  afl'ections.  And  what  lofty  and 
powerful  motives  urge  them  to  furnish  themselves  for  the 
momentous  enterprise,  by  all  the  aids  of  knowledge  and 
discipline  of  art,  that  can  give  dignity  to  their  office  and 
efficiency  to  their  labours  !  To  the  young,  especially,  these 
inducements  should  address  themselves  with  redoubled 
force,  and  prompt  them  to  aim  at  a  thoroughness  of  prepa- 
ration and  energy  of  effort,  that  bear  some  proper  corres- 
pondence to  their  responsibilities — at  a  finished  cultivation 
of  their  powers,  the  attainment  of  just  and  capacious 
views,  familiarity  with  large  and  noble  sentiments,  and  the 
expectation  of  great  labours,  great  trials,  and  great  success. 
Without  thus  tasking  their  energies,  and  entering  the  field 
with  all  the  advantages  of  cultivation,  they  not  only  cannot 
fulfil  their  high  trust,  but  cannot  maintain  the  dignity  of 
their  profession,  nor  keep  pace  with  the  progress  of  the  age  ; 
but  with  them,  and  the  usual  blessing  of  God,  they  will 
sustain  the  interests  committed  to  their  charge,  and  give 
triumphant  diflusion  to  all  the  infinite  blessings  which  are 
the  appointed  fruit  of  their  faithful  instrumentality.  In  no 
other  country  is  religion  so  dependent  for  support  on  public 
opinion,  nor  that  opinion  so  largely  influenced  by  the  pulpit, 
as  in  this  ;  nor  is  there  any  other  where  so  direct  and  deci- 
sive an  influence  is  exerted  by  it,  when  appropriate  means 
and  efforts  are  employed  to  render  it  efficacious.  The  pul- 
pit is  accordingly  the  scene  where  their  agency  is  chiefly  to 
be  exerted,  and  the  destinies  of  the  church,  so  far  as  they  are 


47 


concerned,  are  ,o  bede.ermined.  Let  them,  then,  but  fulfill 
the.r  dnty,  and  with  the  accustomed  favour  of  heaven  the 
church  ,s  safe,  and  the  perpetuity  and  perpetual  triumph  of 
the  gospel  are  rendered  sure. 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE 
THEORETICAL  AND  CONTROVERSIAL  "PLAN' 


TO   WHICH 


"  SIN  IS  NECESSARILY  INCIDENTAL." 


The  theological  system  of  "  the  Dvvight  Professor  of 
Theology  in  Yale  College,"  is,  obviously  from  the  notices 
of  it  wiiich  have  been  offered  informer  numbers,  essentially 
incompatible  with  the  orthodox,  and  its  disciples,  if  it  have 
any,  must  naturally  form  a  new  and  peculiar  sect.  That 
efforts  are  still  to  be  made,  at  least  as  zealously  as  hereto- 
fore, for  its  support  and  dissemination,  is  sufficiently  appa- 
rent from  the  tone  of  his  reply  to  Dr.  Woods ;  and  to  be 
made  too,  it  seems  to  be  a  matter  of  just  expectation, 
without  any  important  modification  of  its  doctrines,  or 
amendment  either  in  the  expedients  which  are  relied  on  for 
its  support,  or  the  spirit  by  which  it  has  hitherto  been 
characterized.  A  sufficient  period  has  elapsed  since  its 
adoption  and  jDublication,  for  his  views  of  it  to  have  be- 
come thoroughly  matured,  and  ample  means  and  opportu- 
nity have  been  enjoyed  for  a  settled  decision  respecting  the 
validity  of  the  objections  which  it  has  been  called  to  en- 
counter; and  he  has  also,  in  his  numerous  and  labo^jred 
discussions,  given  the  public  adequate  materials  for  a  just 


49 

judgment  respecting  himself  as  a  tlieologian  and  contro- 
versialist. The  character,  therefore,  both  of  the  system 
itself,  and  the  means  to  which  it  is  to  owe  its  dissemination, 
may  be  considered  as  essentially  fixed  and  developed. 
A  brief  recapitulation  of  its  principal  doctrines  in  their 
connexions  with  each  other  and  relations  to  the  gospel,  and 
retrospect  of  the  expedients  which  are  employed  for  its  de- 
fense and  propagation,  will  serve  still  more  clearly  to  de- 
velope  that  character,  and  enable  those  who  are  solicited  to 
adopt  its  principles,  to  form  a  just  estimate  of  the  process 
through  which  they  will  be  required  to  pass,  in  order  to 
become  its  disciples. 

The  first  class  of  its  doctrinal  points  to  which  I  shall  ad- 
vert, is  that  which  relates  to  the  attributes  and  agency  of 
moral  beings ;  in  which  he  has  united,  it  will  be  seen,  the 
opposite  doctrines  of  a  self-determining  power  of  the  will, 
and  of  physical  depravity;  and  intermixed  besides  several 
other  positions  peculiar  to  himself,  that  are  incompatible 
alike  with  those  dogmas,  the  laws  of  moral  agency,  and 
the  truths  of  revelation. 

The  former  is  presented  in  the  doctrine  that  from  the 
very  nature  of  voluntary  agency,  it  is  impossible  to  prove, 
that  the  Almighty  Ruler  himself  of  the  universe  can  exert 
such  an  influence  through  any  medium  whatever  on  a  moral 
being,  as  infallibly  to  sway  him  to  obedience ;  or  that  the 
supposition  of  his  being  prevented  by  such  an  influence 
fVom  sin,  will  not  involve  a  self-contradiction.  But  this  is 
to  assert  that  there  is  no  proof  that  motives  have  any  deter- 
mining influence  on  the  mind  in  its  choices,  or  that  there  is 
any  certain  connexion  between  their  influence  and  the  ex- 
ertion   of  the    volitions    which   it   puts   forth   under   their 

agency  ;  and  this  is  to  assert  that  there  is  no  certainty  or 

7 


50 

evidence  that  the  mind  does  not  determine  itself  in  every 
volition  wholly  independently,  and  irrespectively  of  any 
inducement  from  the  objects  of  its  choice. 

The  identity  of  these  positions  with  the  great  essentials 
of  Arminianism,  which  it  was  the  object  of  President 
Edwards  to  subvert  in  his  Enquiry  into  the  freedom  of  the 
Will,  is  seen  from  the  annexed  passages  from  that  work. 
He  exhibits  the  following  as  the  "  notion  of  liberty"  en- 
tertained by  "  Arminians,  Pelagians,  and  others  who  op- 
pose the  Calvinists." 

'"  1.  That  it  consists  in  a  self-determining  power  in  the  will,  or  a 
certain  sovereignty  the  will  has  over  itself  and  its  own  acts,  whereby 
it  determines  its  own  volitions,  so  as  not  to  be  dependent  in  its  dtjter- 
minations  on  any  cause  toithoul  itself,  nor  determined  by  any  thing 
prior  to  its  own  acts.  2.  Indifference  belongs  to  liberty  in  their  no- 
tion of  it,  or  that  the  mind,  previous  to  the  act  of  volition,  be  in 
equilibria.  3.  Contiugcnce  is  another  thing  that  Ijelongs  and  is  es- 
sential to  it ;  not  in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  word,  as  that  has 
been  already  explained,  but  as  opposed  to  all  necessity,  or  any  fixed 
and  certain  connexion  with  some  previous  ground,  or  reason  of  its  ex- 
istence.''''   Edwards's  Works,  edition,  1830.     Vol.  ii.  p.  39. 

The  theory  here  stated,  of  a  self-determining  power  in 
the  will,  is  thus  obviously  precisely  that  of  Dr.  Taylor,  that 
from  the  nature  of  moral  agency,  no  fixed  and  certain  con- 
nexion can  exist  between  any  influence  which  the  Most 
High  can  exert  on  the  mind,  and  the  volitions  that  are  put 
forth  under  it;  but  that  after  he  has  carried  his  efforts  to 
determine  its  actions  to  the  utmost  possible  extent,  its 
choices  may  still  be  directly  the  reverse  of  those  which  he 
endeavours  to  excite. 

The  supposition  that  the  powers  of  moral  agency  them- 
s«;lvos  form  the  sole  reason   of  their  beinu'  exerted  in  the 


51 

manner  in  which  they  are,  which  it  was  President  Edwards's 
object  to  refute  in  the  following  passage,  is  identically  that 
also  which  is  advanced  by  Dr.  Taylor,  and  lies  at  the  foun- 
dation of  his  hypothesis. 

"  The  question  is  not  so  much,  how  a  spirit  endowed  with  activity 
comes  to  act,  as  why  it  exerts  such  an  act,  and  not  another  ;  or  why 
it  acts  with  such  a  parlicular  delcrminalion  ?  If  activity  of  nature  be 
the  cause  why  a  spirit,  (the  soul  of  man  for  instance)  acts  and  does  not 
lie  still,  yet,  that  alone  is  not  the  cause  wliy  its  action  is  thus,  and 
thus  limited,  directed,  and  determined.  Active  nature  is  a  general 
thing ;  it  is  an  ability  or  tendency  of  nature  to  action,  generally 
taken,  which  may  be  a  cause  why  the  soul  acts  as  occasion  or  rea- 
son is  given;  but  this  alone  cannot  be  a  sufficient  cause  why  tlie  soul 
exerts  such  a  particular  act,  at  such  a  time,  rather  than  others.  In 
order  to  this,  there  must  be  something  besides  a  general  tendency  to 
action;  there  must  also  be  a parWcu/ar  tendency  to  that  individual 
action.  If  it  should  be  asked  why  the  soul  of  man  uses  its  activity  m 
such  a  manner  as  it  does,  and  it  should  be  answered,  that  the  soul 
uses  its  activity  thus,  rather  than  otherwise,  because  it  has  activity, 
would  such  an  answer  satisfy  a  rational  man  ?  Would  it  not  rather 
be  looked  upon  as  a  very  impertinent  one  ? 

"  That  the  soul,  though  an  active  substance,  cannot  diversify  its 
own  acts,  but  by  first  acting,  or  be  a  determining  cause  of  different 
acts  or  any  different  effects,  sometimes  of  one  kind  and  sometimes  of 
another,  any  other  way  than  in  consequence  of  its  own  diverse  acts, 
is  manifest  by  this  :  that  if  so,  then  the  same  cause,  the  same  causal 
influence,  without  variation  in  any  respect,  would  produce  different 
effects  at  different  times.  For  the  same  substance  of  the  soul  before 
it  acts,  and  the  same  active  nature  of  the  soul  before  it  is  exerted, 
i.  e.  before  in  the  order  of  nature,  would  be  the  cause  of  different 
effects,  viz.  different  volitions  at  different  times.  But  the  substance 
of  the  soul  before  it  acts,  and  its  active  nature  before  it  is  exerted, 
are  the  same  without  variation.  For  it  is  some  act  that  makes  the 
first  variation  in  the  cause,  as  to  any  causal  exertion,  force,  or  influ- 
ence; but  if  it  be  so,  that  the  soul  has  no  different  causality,  or  di- 
vine causal  influence;  in  producing  these  diverse  effects :  then  it  is 
evident  that  the  soul  has  no  influence  in  the  diversity  of  the  effect ; 
and  that  the  difference  of  the  effect  cannot  be  owing  to  any  thing  in 
the  soul;  or  which  is  the  same  thing,  the  soul  does  not  determine  the 


52 

diversity  of  the  effect ;  wliich  is  contrary  to  the  supposition.  It  is 
true  the  substance  of  the  soul  before  it  acts,  and  before  there  is 
any  difference  in  that  respect,  may  be  in  a  different  state  and  circum- 
stances ;  but  those  whom  I  oppose  will  not  allow  the  different  circum- 
stances of  the  soul  to  be  the  determining  causes  of  the  acts  of  the  will, 
as  being  contrary  to  their  notion  of  self-determination." — pp.  56,  57. 

That  the  theory  here  opposed  by  President  Edwards, 
that  the  active  nature  of  the  soul,  or  its  powers  of  moral 
agency,  may  solely  determine  the  mode  in  which  it  acts,  in 
defiance  of  all  external  influences,  is  the  theory  of  Dr.  Tay- 
lor, is  seen  from  the  following  among  many  of  the  passages 
in  which  it  is  exhibited. 

"  It  will  not  be  denied  that  free  moral  agents  can  do  wrong  under 
every  possible  injluence  to  prevent  it.  The  possibility  of  a  contradiction 
in  supposing  them  to  be  prevented,  is  demonstratively  certain.  Free 
moral  agents  can  do  wrong  under  all  possible  preventing  influence.'' 
"But  this  possibility  that  free  agents  will  sin,  remains  (suppose  what 
else  you  willj  so  long  as  moral  agency  remains,  and  how  can  it  be 
proved  that  a  thing  will  not  be,  when  for  aught  that  appears  it  may 
be.'  When  in  view  of  all  the  farts  and  evidence  in  the  cas',,  it  remains 
true  that  it  may  be,  what  evidence  or  proof  can  exist  that  it  will  not 
be.'"     Christian  Spectator,  1830,  p.  565. 

The  doctrine  here  clearly  is,  not  only  that  the  mind  mai/ 
determine  its  choices  solely  by  its  powers  of  moral  agencj' 
independent!}^  of  every  influence  from  without;  but  that  its 
nature  is  such,  that  the  Creator  himself  cannot  possibly 
prevent  Its  being  determined  solely  in  that  manner  in  its 
volitions. 

After  this  refutation  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  powers 
themselves  of  moral  agency  may  alone  determine  the  mode 
in  which  they  are  exerted,  President  Edwards  proceeded  in 
other  passages  to  overthrow  tiie  doctrine,  that  the  mind 
cannot,  without  an  infringement  of  its  freedom,  be  controlled 
in  its  volitions  by  -t  moral  influence. 


53 

"  That  every  act  of  the  will  has  some  cause,  and  consequently,  (by 
what  has  been  already  proved,)  has  a  necessary  connexion  with  its 
cause,  and  so  is  necessary  by  a  necessity  of  connexion  and  conse- 
quence, is  evident  by  this,  tlfat  every  act  of  the  will  whatsoever  is 
excited  by  some  motive  ;  which  is  manifest,  because,  if  the  mind  in 
willing  after  the  manner  it  does,  is  excited  by  no  motive  or  induce- 
ment, then  it  has  no  end  which  it  proposes  to  itself,  or  pursues,  in  so 
doing ;  it  aims  at  nothing  and  seeks  nothing.  And  if  it  seeks  nothing, 
then  it  does  not  go  after  any  thing,  or  exert  any  inclination  or  pre- 
ference towards  any  thing.  Which  brings  the  matter  to  a  contradic- 
tion ;  because  for  the  mind  to  will  something,  and  for  it  to  go  after 
something  by  an  act  of  preference  and  inclination,  are  the  same  thing. 
"  But  if  every  act  of  the  will  is  excited  by  a  motive,  then  that  mo- 
tive is  the  cause  of  the  act.  If  the  acts  of  the  will  are  excited  by  mo- 
tives, then  motives  are  the  causes  of  their  being  excited  ;  or  which  is 
the  same  thing,  the  cause  of  their  existence.  And  if  so,  the  existence 
of  the  acts  of  the  will,  is  properly  the  ejfect  of  their  motives.  Motives 
do  nothing  as  motives  or  inducements,  but  by  their  influence  ;  and  so 
much  as  is  done  by  their  influence,  is  the  effect  of  them.  For  that  is 
the  notion  of  an  effect,  something  that  is  brought  to  pass  by  the  injlu- 
ence  of  something  else.  And  if  volitions  are  properly  the  effects  of 
their  ^motives,  then  they  are  necessarily  connected  with  their  motives  ; 
every  eflfect  and  event  being,  as  was  proved  before,  necessarily  con- 
nected with-  that  which  is  the  proper  ground  and  reason  of  its  exist- 
ence. Thus  it  is  manifest,  that  volition  is  necessary,  and  is  not  from 
any  self-determining  power  in  the  will  ;  the  volition  which  is  caused 
by  previous  motive  and  inducement,  is  not  caused  by  the  will  exerci- 
sing a  sovereign  power  over  itself,  to  determine  cause  and  excite  voli- 
tions in  itself.  This  is  not  consistent  with  the  will  acting  in  a  state 
of  indifference  and  equilibrium,  to  determine  itself  to  a  preference  ; 
for  the  way  in  which  motives  operate  is  by  biasing  the  will,  and 
giving  it  a  certain  inclination  or  preponderation  one  way."  p.  86,  87. 

The  doctrine  he  is  here  endeavouring  to  establish,  that 
motives  are  the  causes  of  tke  volitions  that  are  put  forth  un- 
der their  agency,  and  accordingly  constitute  a  certainty  of 
the  exertion  of  those  volitions,  is  thus  identically  the  con- 
verse of  Dr.  Taylor's  system,  who  teaches  that  it  can  never 
be  made  a  matter  of  certainty  by  any  moral  influence  which 


54 

God  can  bring  to  act  on  the  mind,  what  volitions  will  be 
exerted  under  its  agency  ;  and  if  President  Edwards's  state- 
ments and  reasonings  are  correct,  the  total  error  of  that  hy- 
pothesis is  indubitably  certain :  for  if  the  motives  that  act 
on  the  mind,  are  the  real  and  sole  causes  that  it  makes  the 
choices  which  it  does,  and  if  there  is  in  every  instance  an  in- 
fallible connexion  between  them  and  the  volitions  which 
are  put  forth  under  their  influence,  then  ii  is  clear  that 
God  can,  by  determining  the  motives  that  reach  the  mind, 
determine  with  absolute  certainty,  through  their  instrumen- 
tality, the  choices  also  that  are  exerted  under  their  agency. 
I  add  another  passage  from  his  Enquiry,  in  which  he  traces 
his  opponent's  views  of  moral  agency  to  some  of  the  absurd 
consequences  to  which  they  directly  conduct. 

"  One  thing  more  I  would  observe  concerning  the  inconsistence  of 
Arminian  notions  of  moral  agency  with  the  influence  of  motives.  I 
suppose  none  will  deny,  that  it  is  possible  for  such  powerful  motives 
to  be  set  before  the  mind,  exhibited  in  so  strong  a  light,  and  under 
such  advantageous  circumstances,  as  to  be  invincible,  and  such  as  the 
mind  cannot  but  yield  to.  In  this  case  Arminians  will  doubtless  say 
liberty  is  destroyed,  and  if  so,  then  if  motives  are  exhibited  with  haU' 
so  much  power,  they  hinder  liberty  in  proportion  to  their  strength, 
and  go  half  way  toward  destroying  it."     p.  IGl. 

Dr.  Taylor's  doctrine  that  God  cannot  exhibit  such  an 
array  of  motives  to  the  mind,  as  to  render  it  invincibly  cer- 
tain that  it  will  yield  to  it,  without  infringing  its  powers 
of  moral  agency,  is  thus  again  seen  to  be  a  doctrine  of  Ar- 
minianism,  and  one  of  the  articles  of  that  scheme  which 
President  Edwards  assailed  and  endeavored  to  overthrow. 

It  were  easy  to  add  further  proofs  of  the  coincidence  of 
these  systems,  by  a  multitude  of  other  quotations,  but  these 
render  it  sufficiently  clear  that  Dr.  Taylor's  doctrines  on 


55 

this  subject  are  a  mere  re-production  of  the  long  exploded 
dogma  of  a  self-determining  power  of  the  will,  without  any 
other  alteration  than  a  change  of  the  terms  in  which  it  is 
expressed. 

In  conjunction  however  with  this  doctrine,  he  likewise 
holds  that  the  nature  of  the  mind  itself,  while  it  remains  un- 
regenerate,  forms  an  absolute  certainty  that  every  moral  in- 
fluence that  reaches  it,  will  prompt  it  to  sin.  Thus  it  is  one  of 
the  chief  objects  of  his  sermon  to  show,  that  men  are  sinners 
hy  nature,  or  in  other  words,  that  their  nature  itself  is  the 
cause  of  their  sinning,  and  constitutes  a  certainty,  apart 
from  any  consideration  of  the  moral  influence  by  which  they 
are  to  be  excited,  that  they  will  uniformly  transgress. 

"  Why  ascribe  sin  exclusively  to  nature?  I  answer,  it  is  truly  and 
properly  ascribed  to  nature,  and  not  to  circumstances,  because  all 
mankind  sin  in  all  the  appropriate  circumstances  of  their  being.  For 
all  the  world  ascribe  an  efFect  to  the  nature  of  a  thing,  when  no 
possible  change  in  its  appropriate  circumstances  will  change  the 
effect ;  or  when  the  efFect  is  uniformly  the  same  in  all  its  appropriate 
circumstances."    p.  13. 

This  is  an  express  representation  that  the  nature  itself 
of  the  mind  is  such,  while  unregenerate,  as  to  render  it 
invincibly  certain  that  a  disobedient  volition  will  be  put 
forth  under  every  motive  that  can  possibly  be  conveyed  to 
it ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  such  a  certainty  is  constituted 
by  its  nature,  of  its  sinning  universally,  that  no  moral  in- 
fluence that  God  himself  can  possibly  present  to  it,  can 
ever  prove  the  instrument  of  intercepting  that  result,  and 
leading  it  to  obedience. 

We  are  presented  with  a  similar  representation  also  in 
his  statements  and  reasonings  respecting  "  the  selfish  priu- 


56 

ciple"  which  he  ascribes  to  the  mind,  and  exhibits  as  laying 
the  foundation  of  an  immutable  certainty  that  every  mora! 
influence  that  can  reach  it  while  that  continues  in  activity, 
will  prompt  it  to  transgression. 

"  So  entirely  does  this  principle,  while  active  in  the  mind,  control 
and  direct  the  thoughts,  and  modify  and  check  all  the  constitutional 
emotions  and  feelings  in  subserviency  to  itself;  so  entirely  does  it 
employ  them  in  the  things  of  earth  and  time  ;  so  absolutely  does  it 
enlist  the  whole  man  to  secure  its  own  gratification,  protection,  and 
perpetuity,  that  it  shuts  every  avenue  of  the  mind  against  the  sanc- 
tifying approach  of  truth.  No  dungeon  was  ever  more  firmly  barred, 
or  more  deeply  dark  than  all  the  inner  chambers  of  the  soul  when 
under  the  active  tyranny  of  this  principle.  Were  there  no  other 
access  to  the  inner  man  except  through  this  principle  of  the  heart; 
were  there  nothing  to  which  the  motives  of  the  gospel  could  be  ad- 
dressed, but  the  hardihood  of  this  fell  spirit,  no  way  to  overcome  this 
'  strong  man'  except  by  direct  assault,  then,  for  aught  we  can  see, 
the  moral  transformation  of  the  soul  were  hopeless  even  to  Omnipo- 
tence."'    Christian  Spectator,  1829,  p.  39. 

This  "  selfish  principle"  is  thus  exhibited  on  the  one 
hand,  as  presenting  a  completely  insuperable  obstacle  to  the 
successful  action  on  the  mind  of  any  motive  to  obedience 
that  can  possibly  be  conveyed  to  it,  and  on  the  other,  as 
rendering  it  indubitably  certain  that  every  temptation  will 
successfully  excite  it  to  sin ;  or  as  constituting,  in  other 
words,  an  invincible  connexion  between  every  moral  influ- 
ence that  acts  on  the  mind,  and  the  exercise  of  sinful  voli- 
tions under  its  agency.  This,  however,  as  was  shown  in 
the  remarks  on  this  subject  in  the  sixth  number  of  this 
work,  is  nothing  else  than  the  doctrine  of  physical  depravity 
disguised  under  another  name. 

We  have  thus  the  doctrine  on  the  one  hand,  that  the 
powers  of  moral  agency  are  such  that  God  can  never  con- 


57 

stltUte  a  ceftainty  by  any  influence  that  he  can  exert,  that 
the  mind  will  in  any  given  instance  put  forth  a  given  kind 
of  volition  ;  and  on  the  other,  that  those  powers  themselves 
are  such  as  to  constitute  a  certainty  that  it  will  exert  a 
given  kind  of  volition  in  every  instance  of  its  agency  while 
unrenewed,  so  absolutely  invincible,  that  God  himself  can 
never,  by  any  influence  that  he  can  exert  on  it,  subvert  that 
certainty  and  prompt  a  different  choice  ;  and  these  dogmas 
are  identically  those  which  vi  ere  opposed  and  overthrown 
by  Edwards,  the  sanction  of  whose  name  he  now  claims  to 
sustain  his  theories ! 

In  connexion  with  these  erroneous  and  contradictory 
views  of  the  attributes  and  actions  of  the  mind,  he  has  ad- 
vanced several  other  positions  peculiar  to  himself,  that  are 
not  less  distinguished  for  inconsistency  with  trutii  and  each 
other.  Among  them  is  the  representation  that  the  cause 
from  which,  according  to  Dr.  Dwight,  "  volitions  flow," 
and  which  he  employed  the  terms  taste,  tendency,  and  dis- 
position to  designate,  is  in  truth  a  mere  preference  of  the 
^ind,  in  place  of  a  constitutional  attribute,  as  Calvinists 
have  held,  and  that  accordingly  there  are  leading  choices, 
like  that  disposition  in  character  and  agency,  that  are 
perpetually  exerted  by  the  mind,  as  that  disposition  was 
held  to  dwell  in  it  perpetually,  and  give  birtii,  like  that,  to 
all  subordinate  volitions  that  are  of  the  same  class ;  thus 
implying  that  every  mind  is  incessantly  directing  its  atten- 
tion to  innumerable  sets  of  cotemporaneous  perceptions, 
and  exerting  towards  them  as  many  corresponding  co- 
existent sets  of  distinct  and  differing  volitions  ! 

In  conjunction  with  this  theory,  he  has  also  put  forth  the 
assumption  in  many  of  his  reasonings,  that  the  purpose 
with  which   the  mind   first  directs  its  notice  to  an  object. 


58 

determines  the  moral  nature  of  all  the  volitions  which  it 
exerts  during  its  continued  attention  to  that  object ;  or,  in 
other  words,  that  there  is  a  fixed  connexion  between  the 
moral  character  of  the  first  volition  in  a  series  in  regard  to 
an  object,  and  that  of  the  whole  series  ;  the  first  impressing 
its  exact  likeness  on  the  next  in  the  chain,  and  that  and 
each  following  one  conveying  it  in  like  manner  to  its  suc- 
cessor throughout  the  series. 

Such  arc  the  main  doctrines  of  this  gentleman  respecting 
the  powers  and  laws  of  moral  agency,  and  which  he  has 
made  the  foundation  of  most  of  his  long  and  laboured  argu- 
mentation on  the  subjects  to  which  they  relate.  Whether 
they  are  any  more  compatible  with  the  facts  of  conscious- 
ness and  experience,  and  the  doctrines  of  revelation,  than 
they  are  with  each  other,  I  leave  the  reader  to  judge ;  or 
whether  they  offer  any  better  promise  of  "  freeing  the  sub- 
ject from  distressing  and  groundless  perplexity,"  than  those 
doctrines  of  Edwards  to  which  they  stand-opposed. 

The  next  branch  of  his  system  which  I  shall  notice,  is 
that  which  respects  the  divine  agency  and  purposes. 

His  chief  doctrine  on  this  subject,  and  that  on  which 
most  of  his  other  speculations  in  regard  to  it  are  founded, 
is  that  the  nature  of  moral  agency  is  such,  as  to  render  it 
impossible  for  God  to  exert  an  influence  on  men  that  shall 
constitute  a  certainty  of  the  mode  in  which  they  will  act. 
But  this  clearly  implies  that  God  cannot  possess  any  cer- 
tainty in  regard  to  the  actions  of  his  creatures,  and  conse- 
quently can  have  no  knowledge  or  probability  respecting 
the  future  history  or  ultimate  results  of  his  kingdom.  But 
if  these  positions  are  in  accordance  with  fact,  it  follows  with 
equal  certainty  that  he  cannot  have  formed  any  purposes,  or 
cherished  any  expectations  respecting  the  events  of  their 


59 

ag'encv,  except,  at  most,  as  mere  possibilities.  Dr.  Taylor 
accordingly  openly  teaches  that  the  divine  plan  only  in- 
cludes what  God  himself  does,  in  distinction  alike  from  the 
holiness  and  happiness,  and  the  sin  and  misery  which  are 
its  consequences.  His  representations,  therefore,  directly 
deny  the  omnipotence  and  omniscience,  supreme  wisdom 
and  benevolence  of  the  Most  High.  If  he  cannot  possess 
any  certainty  respecting  the  future  actions  of  his  creatures, 
he  clearly  cannot  foreknow  them,  and  if  he  cannot  fore- 
know any  of  the  events  that  are  to  transpire  in  their  agency 
throughout  their  interminable  existence,  he  not  only  cannot 
be  omniscient,  but  his  knowledge  plainly  can  extend  to 
only  a  very  limited  portion  of  the  events  that  are  to  take 
place.  But  if  he  gave  being  to  the  universe  and  is  main- 
taining it  in  existence,  without  any  certainty  that  its  final 
results  are  not  to  be  supremely  disastrous,  it  is  equally  cer- 
tain that  he  cannot  have  been  prompted  in  its  creation,  nor 
can  be  guided  in  its  government  by  eidier  infinite  wisdom 
or  supreme  benevolence. 

Dr.  Taylor,  still,  however,  professes  to  believe,  that  the 
divine  purposes  extend  to  all  events,  sin  not  excepted  ;  and 
resents  the  inquiry  by  Dr.  Woods,  whether  he  holds  the 
doctrine  of  divine  decrees  in  the  usual  sense,  as  an  outrage 
for  which  no  excuse  or  palliation  can  exist ;  and  would  pro- 
bably have  professed  to  be  equally  indignant  had  a  similar 
inquiry  been  made  respecting  the  doctrine  of  election,  the 
perseverance  of  the  saints,  tlie  truth  of  the  divine  promises, 
threatenings  and  predictions,  or  the  perfection  of  the  divine 
wisdom  and  benevolence ;  as  he  protests  while  teaching 
those  of  his  doctrines  which  are  contradictory  to  these,  that 
"  he  is  not  aware  of  any  departure  in  any  article  of  doc- 
trinal belief,  from  his  revered  instructor,  the  former  Presi- 


60 

dent  of  the  College."  By  what  expedient,  however,  hU 
system  on  tiiese  points  is  to  be  reconciled  with  tliat  of  Dr. 
Dwight,  whose  views  are  the  exact  reverse  of  his,  or  how 
the  hypothesis  that  God's  plan  has  no  reference  to  the 
agency  of  his  creatures,  is  compatible  either  with  the  belief 
that  his  purposes  extend  to  all  events,  or  with  the  doctrine 
of  election,  he  has  not  thought  pi-oper  to  inform  his  readers. 

Such  are  some  of  the  chief  doctrines  of  his  theological 
system  and  their  relations  to  each  odier  and  the  word  of 
God.  If  we  turn  from  these  to  the  methods  of  teaching 
them,  which  he  has  chosen,  and  the  expedients  to  which 
he  has  resorted  for  their  defense,  they  will  be  seen  to  be 
equally  peculiar  and  extraordinary. 

The  most  important  of  his  views  were  at  first  ostenta- 
tiously put  forth  as  recent  discoveries  and  improvements 
that  were  adapted  to  produce  important  changes  in  theo- 
logy. Representations  of  this  kind  were  not  only  uttered 
in  private,  and  suggested  to  the  pupils  of  the  seminary,  who 
universally  seem  to  have  been  led  to  regard  the  sysiem  as 
widely  differing  from  that  of  the  orthodox,  but  are  distinctly 
set  forth  in  most  of  his  discussions  on  the  subject.  He  says 
of  the  theory,  which  it  is  the  object  of  his  note  to  state  and 
sustain,  that  it  exhibits  the  only  refutation,  of  which  he  has 
any  knowledge,  of  the  objection  which  it  is  intended  to 
Overthrow,  and  that  it  "  presents  the  moral  government  of 
God,  as  no  other  theory  in  the  view  of  the  writer  does  pre- 
sent, in  its  unimpaired  perfection  and  glory,  to  deter  from 
sin  and  allure  to  holiness  his  accountable  subjects." 

Intimations  of  a  similar  nature  are  also  given  in  his  re- 
view on  the  Means  of  Regeneration,  and  repeated  in  his 
reply  to  Dr.  Woods. 


6^    . 

"  He  has  discarded  the  dogma,  that  f3in  consists  in  anj'  thing  dip- 
tinct  from,  or  antecedent  to  vioral  action.  He  has  maintained  that 
sinners  never  truly  use  the  means  of  regeneration,  except  at  the  mo- 
ment of  regeneration  itself.  He  has  called  in  question  the  theory 
"  that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good  ;  and  demanded 
the  proof  of  an  assumption  on  which  this  theory  confessedly  rests." 
p.  576. 


These  claims,  however,  to  originahty,  have  at  other  times 
been  essentially  modified  or  retracted,  according  as  the 
pressure  has  been  felt  of  the  new  objections  which  his 
scheme  has  been  called  to  encounter,  or  as  its  ultimate  in- 
fluence on  his  reputation  has  presented  itself  under  "  another 
aspect."  Though  a  portion  of  his  sermon  was  employed 
in  endeavoring  to  show  that  his  having  adopted  its  peculiar 
views,  could  not  with  any  fairness  be  ascribed  to  sinister 
motives ;  thus  assuming  that  its  doctrines  were  essentially 
unlike  those  of  his  hearers  ;  yet  when  it  was  found  that  they 
had  excited  a  deep  distrust  of  his  orthodoxy,  he  declared  in 
the  preface  to  the  sermon,  that  he  had  "«o  reason  to  believe 
that  the  views  it  contains  are  in  any  essential  respect  diverse 
from  those  of  his  brethren  who  heard  it  ;^^  that  he  had 
"  no  doubt,"  "  that  the  general  proposition"  would  "  meet 
with  the  approbation  of  all  who  hold  the  fundamental  doc- 
trines of  the  gospel ;"  that  "  in  regard  to  some  of  the  more 
specific  statements,  he"  supposed  "  that  there  is  in  some 
limited  degree  a  semblance  of  controversy,  rather 
than  real  fi?/'vem/y  of  opinion,"  and  that  he  was  not  "  aware 
o(  any  change  in  his  own  views,  on  these  points,  since  he 
entered  the  ministry ;  nor  of  any  departure  in  any  article 
of  doctrinal  belief  from  his  revered  instructor  in  theology, 
the  former  President  of  the  College."  And  when  he  had 
become  aware  with  what  total  amazement  and  distrust  these 


62 

declarations  were  received,  so  inconsistent  with  the  apolo- 
gies contained  in  the  sermon  itself,  for  his  adoption  of  its 
doctrines,  he  sent  forth  his  Inquiry  for  the  purpose  of  show- 
ing how  he  imagined  it  could  be  made  out,  that  he  was 
fully  "justified  in  disclaiming  a  departure  from  Dr.  D.  in 
any  article  of  doctrinal  belief."  The  object  in  like  manner 
of  his  review  of  Dr.  Bellamy,  is  to  show  that  "  his  theory 
respecting  the  reasons  of  the  admission  of  sin  into  the 
divine  kingdom,  instead  of  owing  its  origin  to  himself,  as 
he  had  intimated  in  the  note  to  the  sermon  in  which  he  first 
gave  it  publicity,"  was  taught  by  that  writer  before  him  ! 
Whether  it  would  have  been  thought  necessary  to  utier  any 
of  these  protestations,  or  resort  to  any  of  these  eflbits  to 
vindicate  himself  from  the  suspicion  of  having  abandoned 
the  orthodox  faith,  had  his  system  been  welcomed  b}'  the 
clergy  and  churches,  as  an  essential  improvement,  and  as 
entitling  him  to  "  the  praise  which  our  admiration  confers 
on  the  highest  intellectual  attainments,"  the  reader  must 
judge. 

How  the  statement  that  "  he  has  discarded  the  dogma 
that  sin  consists  in  any  thing  distinct  from,  or  antecedent  to 
moral  action,"  is  to  be  interpreted,  it  is  not  easy  to  see.  If 
the  meaning  is,  that  after  having  himself  held  and  taught  the 
doctrine  of  physical  depravity  for  many  years,  he  lias  at 
length  discarded  it  from  his  system  ;  how  is  it  to  be  re- 
conciled with  his  statement,  "  that  he  is  not  aware  of  any 
rhange  in  his  own  views  on  these  points  since  he  entered  the 
ministry.''"  If  the  meaning  is,  that  he  was  the  first  to  dis- 
card that  doctrine,  and  teach  that  there  is  no  sin  except  in 
volitions,  how  is  it  to  be  reconciled  with  the  fact  that  this 
latter  doctrine  had  been  taught  in  Yale  College,  and  was 
held  bv  at  least  most  of  the  class  of  tlieological   students 


63 

who  left  that  institution  one  or  two  years  before  he  began 
to  change  his  views  on  the  subject  ?  a  fact  well  known  to 
the  officers  and  graduates  connected  with  the  College  at 
that  period,  and  perfectly  well  known  to  himself  Or  how 
IS  it  to  be  reconciled  with  the  fact  that  it  had  been  for  near 
half  a  century,  though  in  a  diflerent  connexion,  a  prominent 
article  in  the  theological  system  taught  in  New-England i 
which  is  usually  denominated  the  exercise  scheme  ? 

What  however  after  all,  does  his  rejection  of  the  doctrine 
of  physical  depravity  amount  to  ?    Nothing  of  the  least  sig- 
nificance beyond  a  mere  change  of  phraseology.     He  has 
simply    spread    the  term  "moral   action"    back    over  the 
scheme  of  a  constitutional  and  permanent  cause  of  sin,  and 
left  that  cause  itself  in  existence,  in  all  Its  strength  and  ac- 
tivity, as  a  universal  attribute   of  human  nature ;  and  has 
added  to  this  theory,  moreover,  the  dogma  of  an  innumera- 
ble multitude  of  permanent  volitions  in  the  mind,  that  pos- 
sess all  the  power  and  exert  the  agency  which  were  ascribed 
by  Dr.  Dwight  and  President  Edwards  to  the  constitution- 
al  cause    or    disposition   from   which,   according  to   their 
theory,  volitions  flow,   and    derive  their  moral   character. 
These  are  all  the  "  more  accurate  distinctions,"  tlfat  he  has 
introduced  into  this  subject.     The  rejection  of  the  dogma 
of  physical  depravity  is  not  among  the  improvements  to 
which  he  has  given  birth,  nor  is   the  adoption  of  the  doc- 
trine that  sin  is  an  attribute  of  actions  only,  in  the  sense  in 
which  it  has  been  advanced  in  the  pages  of  this  work.     His 
representations  are  as  widely  variant  from  that,  as  is  the  doc- 
trine of  physical  depravity  itself.     And  they  who  simply  re- 
ject this  latter  theory,  and  adopt  the  doctrine  that  sin  is  an 
attribute  of  voluntary  actions  only,  no  more  become  thereby 
the  disciples  of  his  system,  than  they  do  of  the  scheme  of  di- 


64 

vine  efficiency,  or  any  other  dogma  with  which  that  theory 
has  no  necessary  connexion. 

His  discussions  have  been  marked  from  their  commence- 
ment to  their  close,  with  a  singular  absence  of  every  thing 
like  proofs,  especially  from  the  scriptures,  of  the  truth  of  his 
system.  That  nothing  like  a  demonstration  of  any  of  the  er- 
roneous dogmas  which  are  wrought  into  his  speculations, 
has  been  presented  by  him,  was  indeed  a  matter  of  necessi- 
ty. It  might  however  have  been  expected  that  one  who  had 
so  thoroughly  persuaded  himself  of  their  truth,  as  to  ofler 
them  to  the  public  as  the  dictates  of  reason  or  revelation 
that  are  more  happily  fitted  than  any  others  to  disentangle 
the  subject  from  "  distressing  perplexity,"  and  "  exhibit  the 
moral  government  of  God  in  its  unimpaired  perfection  and 
glory,"  would  have  been  able  to  advance  something  in  the 
shape  of  reasons  for  its  support.  He  has  scarcely  however 
done  as  much  even  as  that.  The  most  efficient  claims 
which  he  has  offered  in  its  favor,  are  founded  on  the  alleged 
ignorance  of  those  whose  views  he  has  assailed,  and  these 
claims  themselves,  as  has  been  seen,  and  as  he  indeed  ad- 
mits, are  nothing  but  the  "objections"  of  mere  "ignorance" 
which  he  has  himself  pronounced  utterly  "  incompetent" 
to  the  task  which  he  has  employed  it  to  perform. 

His  views  seem  not  only  to  have  been  adopted  without  any 
sufficient  evidence  of  their  accuracy,  but  also  to  have  been  put 
forth  with  but  very  inadequate  apprehensions  of  the  principles 
on  which  they  are  founded,  and  conclusions  to  which  they  are 
adapted  to  carry  him,  and  consequently  with  but  a  very  in- 
sufficient preparation  for  the  objections  with  which  they 
have  had  to  contend.  And  such  has  been  also  very  obviously 
at  every  step  of  his  progress,  and  still  is  the  fact.  No  other 
supposition  can  explain  the  extraordinary  want  of  consist- 
eiuy  which  has  characterised  his  discussions. 


65 

Thus  he  clearly  appears  not  to  have  been  aware  that  in 
the  second  part  of  his  sermon,  which  was  employed  in  show- 
ing in  what  sense  he  regards  men  as  sinners  by  nature,  he 
was  openly  reasserting  one  of  the  principal  features  of  the 
doctrine  of  physical  depravity  ;  nor  that  in  his  reasoning  in 
his  note  in  respect  to  one  of  the  "  groundless  assumptions," 
he  was  literally  and  directly  disproving  his  statements  and 
argumentation  respecting  the  other.  He  was,  doubtless, 
equally  unaware  that  in  conjoining  his  admission  that  his 
theory  is  a  mere  "  hj^pothetical  statement,"  which,  for  aught 
he  knows  at  least,  is  utterly  incapable  of  proof,  with  the  posi- 
tive assertion  that  no  one  can  ever  prove  the  truth  of  the  op- 
posite theory ;  he  fully  conceded  to  the  cavillers  at  the  di- 
vine conduct  whom  he  was  opposing,  the  impossibility  of 
refuting  their  objections  ;  and  he  was,  possibly,  equally  un^ 
conscious  that  in  all  the  great  principles  of  his  theory  and 
reasonings  for  its  support,  in  place  of  meeting  the  enemies 
of  "  divine  decrees  and  revelation,"  he  was  merely  "  hum- 
bly" walking  in  "  the  broad  footsteps"  of  the  great  cham- 
pions of  Arminianism,  the  imputation  of  whose  sentiments  to 
him,  he  resents  as  so  causeless  and  unjust. 

His  views  of  some  of  the  subjects  of  which  he  has  had  oc- 
casion to  treat,  seem  to  have  fluctuated  very  essentially 
when  events  have  led  him  to  contemplate  them  "  under 
another  aspect."  When  he  had  occasion  to  demonstrate 
the  exact  coincidence  of  President  Edwards's  views  with  his 
own,  respecting  the  nature  and  cause  of  sin,  he  assured  us 
that  *'  nothing  appears"  in  what  Edwards  says  on  that  sub- 
ject "  like  the  doctrine  that  a  propensity  or  tendency  to  sin 
belongs  to  human  nature  as  a  substantial  attribute,"  and 
that  "  it  is  perfectly  consistent  with  his  notion  of  tendency  to 
sin,  that  it  should  depend  on  man's  external  circumstances, 


66 

and  wholly  cease  by  a  change  in  these  circumstances."  In 
hisConcio  ad  Clerum,  however,  lie  presents  precisely  the  op- 
posite representation  of  the  Calvinistic  doctrine  on  that 
subject. 

"  What,  then,  are  we  to  understand  when  it  is  said  that  mankind 
are  depraved  by  nature?  I  answer — that  such  is  their  nature,  that 
they  will  sin,  and  only  sin  in  all  the  appropriate  circumstances  of  their 
being.  . 

"  To  bring  this  part  of  the  subject  distinctly  before  the  mind,  it  may 
be  well  to  remark,  that  the  question  between  the  Calvinists  and  tiie 
Arminians  on  the  point  is  this — whether  the  depravity  or  sinfulness 
of  mankind  is  truly  and  properly  ascribed  to  their  nalure,  or  to  their 
circumstances  of  temptation  ?  And  since  as  it  must  be  confessed,  there 
can  no  more  be  sin  without  circumstances  of  temptation,  than  there 
can  be  sin  without  a  nature  to  be  templed,  why  ascribe  sin  exclu- 
sively to  nature  .'  I  answer — it  is  truly  and  properly  ascribed  to  na- 
ture and  not  to  circumstances,  because  all  mankind  sin  in  all  the  ap- 
propriate circumstances  of  their  being.  For  all  the  world  ascribe 
an  effect  to  the  nature  of  a  thing,  when  no  possible  change  in  its  ap- 
propriate circumstances  will  change  the  effect ;  or  when  the  effect  is 
uniformly  the  same  in  all  its  appropriate  circumstances."     p.  13. 

From  these  representations  it  is  apparent  that  unless  he 
regards  Edwards  as  having  held  the  same  theory  on  this 
subject,  as  the  Arminians  whom  he  was  opposing,  his 
views  of  the  Calvinistic  doctrine  respecting  it,  have  under- 
gone an  entire  revolution  since  he  penned  the  first  of  these 
passages !  a  singular  subject,  certainly,  for  such  totally 
contradictory  apprehensions  and  statements,  by  one  who  has 
made  it  so  frequently  the  theme  of  controversy,  and  who 
thinks  it  "  proper  to  remark  that  he  is  not  aware  of  any 
change  in  his  own  views  on  these  points  since  he  entered 
the  ministry !"  His  representations  respecting  several 
other  topics,  have  exhibited  mental  lluctuations  and  revolu- 
tions equally  extraordinary.     Thus,  at  one  time,  the  schen>c 


67 

of  physical  depravity  has  been  exhibited  as  the  prevalent 
doctrine  of  New-England,  and  as  constituting  a  most  for- 
midable obstruction  to  the  influence  of  the  gospel.  At 
another,  however,  all  respectable  Calvinistic  writers,  both 
there  and  elsewhere,  have  been  represented  as  entirely 
agreeing  with  him  in  what  he  regards  as  the  rejection  of 
that  doctrine ;  and  none,  it  has  been  intimated,  have  ever 
thought  of  imputing  it  to  them,  except  a  few  orthodox  bre- 
thren who  have  fallen  into  "  Arminian  and  Unitarian"  er- 
rors, in  interpreting  the  language  in  which  it  is  supposed  to 
be  expressed. 

No  indications  have  hitherto  been  seen  that  the  criticisms 
to  which  his  disquisitions  have  been  subjected,  have  proved 
of  any  service  to  him.  Each  of  his  discussions  on  these 
topics  has  been  made  the  subject  of  animadversion  ;  and  to 
say  nothing  of  the  observations  on  them,  which  have  been 
offered  by  myself,  a  multitude  of  mistakes  in  his  definitions, 
statements  and  reasonings,  and  many  essential  errors,  have 
been  pointed  out  by  his  clerical  brethren.  Not  a  solitary  topic 
of  importance  has  passed  under  his  discussion,  respecting 
which  it  has  not  been  shown  beyond  confutation,  that  he  has 
fallen  into  fatal  and  palpable  mistakes,  and  involved  himself 
in  inextricable  inconsistencies.  Not  the  slightest  benefit, 
however,  it  would  seem,  has  been  derived  by  him  from  these 
important  aids.  Not  a  solitary  concession  has  escaped  him 
on  any  of  the  topics  in  regard  to  which  he  has  erred,  nor 
any  indication  of  a  wish  to  avert  the  injuries  which  his  mis- 
conceptions are  adapted  to  occasion. 

In  place  of  gladly  correcting  the  errors  of  his  specula- 
tions, when  pointed  out  to  him,  his  method  has  been,  in 
some  instances,  to  pass  them  in  silence,  or  simply  reassert- 
ing the  accuracy  of  his  views,  to  treat  them  as  though  no 


68 

objections  liad  been  alleged  against  them ;  as  in  regard  to 
the  incompatibility  demonstrated  by  Dr.  Woods,  of  his 
theory  respecting  the  limitation  of  divine  power,  both  with 
the  doctrine  of  God's  universal  providence,  and  with  induce- 
ments to  prayer  :  objections  obviously  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance, and  utterly  unavoidable  by  any  other  expedient  than 
the  abandonment  of  his  theory.  Instead,  liowever,  of  at- 
tempting to  elude  them,  he  has  pi-eferred  simply  to  assert, 
that  "  the  providential  government  of  God"  and  *'  the  uni- 
versality of  ins  providential  purposes  are  not  obscured"  by 
his  system  :  but  that  they  "  extend  to  all  events  on  this 
scheme,  and/orwi  ilie  same  basis  for  submission  and  prayer, 
confidence  and  joy,  under  the  perfect  dominion  of  God, 
which  exists  on  the  other." 

In  other  instances,  when  urged  by  "  the  pressure  of  new 
objections,"  he  has  chosen  to  shift  his  ground,  and  ascrib- 
ing new  and  arbitrary  significations  to  his  language,  and 
objects  to  his  reasoning,  to  affirm  that  it  is  only  by  miscon- 
cepti(  1  or  misrepresentation  that  they  are  interpreted  in  the 
sense  in  which  they  were  originally  used.  A  signal  exam- 
ple of  this  is  seen  in  the  pretence  that  he  offered  his  theory  re- 
specting the  admission  of  sin  into  the  universe  as  a  mere  hypo- 
thesis or  conjecture,  without  pretending  positively  to  express 
any  opinion  in  respect  to  its  truth  ;  while  at  the  same  time 
he  not  only  employed  it  to  vindicate  the  conduct  of  God  from 
objection,  and  declared  it  to  be  in  his  judgment  the  only 
tiieory  which  can  solve  the  difficulties  of  the  divine  admin- 
istration, but  affirmed  that  there  is  no  medium  between 
adopting  it,  and  assenting  to  the  dogma  which  he  professes 
to  discard,  that  "  sin  is  the.  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good  " 

Another  singular  measure  to  which  "he  has  resorted  i'or 
the  purpose  of  shielding  his  speculations  from  objection,  is 


60 


aw  attempt  to  siiow  that  he  is  fully  sanctioned  in  them  |jy 
most  of  the  distinguished  writers  of  New-England,  and  the 
pretense  that  they  enjoy  the  approval  of  many  of  the  most 
conspicuous  and  popular  ministers  of  the  present  day.  Thus 
while  professing  that  he  "  has  discarded  the  dogma  that  sin 
consists  in  any  thing  distinct  from,  or  antecedent  to  moral 
action,"  and  "  called  in  question  the  theory  that  sin  is  the 
necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good,"  he  has  laboured 
more  strenuously  than  for  almost  any  other  purpose,  to  de- 
monstrate, that  in  place  of  having  deviated  on  these  topics 
from  Calvinistic  theologians,  the  views  of  Calvin,  the  West- 
minster divines,  Edwards  andDwight  on  the  former,  and  Bel- 
lamy on  the  latter  topic,  are  in  coincidence  with  his  OAvn.  In 
order  however  to  give  color  to  these  pretenses,  he  has  found 
it  necessary  to  institute  a  number  of  new  and  extraordinary 
laws  of  interpretation,  the  most  important  of  which  is  that 
which  he  denominates  "  the  true  usnsloquendi,"  which  teach- 
es that  the  language  itself  of  a  writer,  should  never  have  any 
decisive  voice  in  determining  what  the  sentiments  are  which 
It  is  employed  to  express;  but  that  its  interpreters  should  be 
wholly  guided  in  their  judgment  respecting  its  import,  by 
the  views  which  they  themselves  entertain  of  the  subject  of 
which  it  treats  ;  a  rule  doubtless  well  adapted  to  the  exi- 
gency for  which  it  was  devised,  and  the  only  one  by  which 
he  could  impart  any  show  of  truth  to  his  representations  re- 
specting the  doctrines  of  Edwards,  Bellamy  and  Dwight ; 
but  which  would  annihilate  at  once  all  certainty  respecting 
the  meaning  of  language,  and  render  it  as  easy  to  discover 
any  one  set  of  doctrines  in  an  author  as  any  other. 

When  no  other  expedient  has  promised  an  escape  from 
the  difficulties  of  his  condition,  he  has  ventured  to  turn  round 
and  boldly  disavow  his  statements  and  reasonings,  and  claim 
that  they  were  solely  meant  to  express  the  opiniojis  of  his 


70 

opponents,  in  place  of  liis  own.     Of  this  a  conspicuous  ex- 
ample is  seen  in  the  follovvine;  passage. 

"  But  wc  have  one  tiling  more  to  add  respecting  Dr.  Taylor's  in- 
quiry, '  Can  it  be  proved  from  facts  that  God  could  secure  any  of  his 
moral  creature?  in  holiness  without  this  influence?'  (i.  e.  of  the  pun- 
ishment of  sin.)  Dr.  Woods  supposes  Dr.  Taylor  in  this  question  to 
affirm  that  it  could  not  he  done.  But  the  contrary  is  obvious  from  the 
whole  tenor  of  his  remarks.  He  was  simply  reasoning  with  his  op- 
ponents on  their  own  principles  ;  the  argument  was  exconcessisy  *  You 
maintain  (what  1  do  not)  that  God  prefers  sin  to  holiness  in  its  stead. 
On  your  principles  then  I  ask,  may  not  God  have  chosen  to  admit  the 
existing  sin  into  the  system  as  the  best  means  of  securing  his  obe- 
dient kingdom  in  perpetual  allegiance  .''  May  not  Ihis  be  the  good  in 
view  of  which  he  chose  not  to  prevent  sin  .''  Jf  so,  then  the  reason 
of  the  choice  is  a  different  one  from  that  which  you  assign.  And  un- 
til you  prove  that  this  was  nut  the  reason,  you  cannot  affirm  that  sin 
entered  the  system  as  '  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good.' 
Dr.  Woods  then  has  confounded  an  argument  ex  concessis,  with  a 
statement  of  Dr.  Taylor's  opinion  on  this  subject ;  and  has  triumphed 
greatly  in  the  complete  overthrow  of  his  opponent,  by  that  which  has 
no  existence,  except  in  the  inaccuracy  of  his  own  conceptions." 

"  But  we  have  shown  (p.  .551)  that  the  sup|)osition  alluded  to  by 
Dr.  W.,  viz.  '  that  the  sin  of  some  might  be  necessary  to  secure  the 
holiness  of  others,'  was  no  part  of  Dr.  T.'s  scheme;  that  he  made  it 
merely  as  an  argument  ex  concesais,  which  was  fatal  to  his  opponent, 
while  he  himself  places  his  reliance  on  a  very  different  supposition." 
Christian  Spectator  for  September,  If!;30,  p.  5,'jl,  556. 

He  thus  solemnly  assures  us,  that  in  place  of  being  em- 
ployed in  the  passage  here  referred  to,  in  expressing  his 
own  sentiments,  he  was  simply  and  professedly  stating  the 
views  of  his  opponents,  and  reasoning  from  them  for  the 
purpose  of  refuting  their  theory  ;  and  that  this  was  so 
clearly  the  fact  as  to  render  Dr.  Woods'  construction  of  his 
language  and  object  an  inexcusable  and  most  discreditable 
error.  The  argument,  in  respect  to  which  he  ofters  this 
asseveration,  is  that  in  the  last  paragraph  of  the  following 
passage. 


71 

"  Is  there  then  the  least  particle  of  evidence,  that  the  entire  pre- 
vention of  sin  in  moral  beings  is  possible  to  God  in  the  nature  of 
things .'" 

•'  All  evidence  of  the  truth  of  this  assumption  must  be  derived 
either  from  the  nature  of  the  subject,  or  from  known  facts.  Is  there 
such  evidence  from  the  nature  of  the  subject?  It  is  here  to  be  re^ 
marked,  that  the  prevention  of  sin  by  any  influence  that  destroys  the 
power  to  sin,  destroys  moral  agency.  Moral  agents  then  must  pos- 
sess the  power  to  sin.  Who  then  can  prove,  a  prion,  or  from  the  na^ 
ture  of  the  subject,  that  a  being  who  can  sin,  will  not  sin  ?  How 
can  it  be  proved,  a  2>non,  or  from  the  nature  of  the  subject,  that  a 
thing  will  noihe,  when,  for  aught  that  appears,  it  may  be?  On  this 
point  is  it  presumptuous  to  bid  defiance  to  the  powers  of  humau 
reason  ? 

"  Is  there  any  evidence  from  facts  ?  Facts,  so  far  as  they  are 
known  to  us,  furnish  no  support  to  the  assumption  that  God  could,  in 
a  moral  system,  prevent  all  sin,  or  even  the  present  degree  of  pin 
For  we  know  of  no  creature  of  God,  whose  holiness  is  secured  with- 
out that  influence  which  results  either  directly  or  indirectly  from  the 
existence  of  sin  and  its  punishment.  How  then  can  it  be  shown 
from  facts,  that  God  could  secure  any  of  his  moral  creatures  in  holi- 
ness, without  this  influence;  or  to  what  purpose  is  it  to  allege  in- 
stances of  the  prevention  of  sin  under  this  influence,  to  prove  tliat 
God  could  prevent  it  without  this  influence  ?  Rather  do  not  all 
knov/n  facts  furnish  a  strong  presumption  to  the  contrary  ?  If  God 
could  prevent  all  sin  without  this  influence,  why  has  he  not  done  it? 
Be  this,  however,  as  it  may,  since  God  has  not,  so  far  as  we  know, 
prevented  sin  in  a  single  instance  without  this  influence,  how  can  it 
be  proved  from  facts,  that  he  could  have  prevented  all  sin,  or  even 
the  present  degree  of  sin  in  a  moral  system  ?  Had  his  creatures  done 
what  they  could,  then  indeed  there  had  been  more  holiness  and  less 
sin.  But  the  question  is,  vi^hat  could  God  have  done  to  secure  such  a 
result  ?  Had  he  prevented  the  sins  of  one  human  being  to  the  present 
time,  or  had  he  brought  to  repentance  one  sinner  more  than  he  has, 
who  can  prove  that  the  requisite  interposition  for  the  purpose 
would  not  result  in  a  vast  increase  of  sin  in  the  system,  includino- 
even  the  apostacy  and  augmented  guilt  of  that  individual.  In  a 
word,  who  is  competent  to  foretell,  or  authorized  even  to  surmise  the 
consequences  of  the  least  iota  of  change  in  the  present  system  of  in- 
fluence to  produce  holiness  and  prevent  sin  ?  If  no  one,  then  all  as- 
sumptions on  the  subject,  like  that  under  consideration,  are  wholly 


72 

uruvarrantetl.  It  may  be  true,  that  God  will  secure,  under  the  pre- 
sent systom  of"  things,  the  greatest  degree  of  holiness  and  the  least 
degree  of  sin,  which  it  is  possible  to  him  in  the  nature  of  things  to 
secure.  Neither  the  nature  of  the  subject  nor  known  facts,  furnish 
a  particle  of  evidence  to  the  contrary.  The  assumption,  therefore, 
that  God  could,  in  a  moral  system,  have  prevented  all  sin,  or  the  pre- 
sent degree  of  sin,  is  wholly  gratuitous  and  unauthorized,  and  ought 
never  to  be  made  the  basis  of  an  objection  or  an  argument."  Ser- 
mon, p.  32,33. 

Were  tlie  language  and  reasoning  of  this  passage  to 
fonn  the  sole  ground  of  our  judgment  respecting  his  design 
in  it,  it  would  be  a  matter  of  some  difficidty  to  find  any 
materials  for  the  conclusion,  that  he  was  professedly  express- 
ing in  it  the  sentiments  of  his  opponents  in  place  of  his 
own,  and  endeavouring  to  convince  them  by  tracing  their 
system  to  its  legitimate  results,  that  it  is  fraught  with  the 
means  of  its  own  subversion  !  To  appreciate  the  difficulties 
which  obstruct  such  a  judgment,  it  should  be  noticed  that 
no  disagreement  exists  as  to  the  fact  that,  as  Dr.  Woods 
represented,  he  actually  proceeded  in  the  argument  on  the 
liypothesis  that  "  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good  ;"  as  this  fact  he  expressly  concedes  and  affirms  in  the 
passage  in  which  he  disclaims  the  doctrine  itself  of  that 
assumption.  "  He  was  simply  reasoning,"  he  says,  "  with 
his  opponents  on  their  own  principles;  the  argument  was 
ex  roncessis  ;^^  and  the  concession  from  which  he  argued, 
he  states,  was  the  doctrine  "  that  God  prefers  sin  to  holi- 
ness in  its  stead  ;"  whilst  the  object  of  the  reasoning  from  it 
was,  he  assures  us,  to  show  the  possibility  that  God  may 
"  have  chosen  to  admit  the  existing  sin  into  the  system,  as 
the  best  means  of  securing  his  obedient  kingdom  in  per- 
petual allegiance  ;"  and  the  proof  which  he  alleged  to  de- 
monstrate that  possibility,  was  the  considieration,  as  he 
aflirms,   "  that  as  God  has  not,  as  I'ur  as  we  know,  pre- 


73 

vented  sin  in  a  single  instance  without  this  influence,  i.  e. 
of  the  punishment  of  sin,"  there  are  no  "  facts"  from  which 
it  can  be  proved  "  that  he  could  have  prevented  all  sin,  or 
the  present  degree  of  sin,"  nor  that  "  had  he  prevented  the 
sins  of  one  human  being  to  the  present  time,  or  had  he 
brought  to  repentance  one  sinner  more  than  he  has,  the  re- 
quisite interposition  for  the  purpose  would  not  have  re- 
sulted in  a  vast  increase  of  sin  in  the  system,  including  even 
the  apostacy  and  augmented  guilt  of  that  individual."  The 
argument  itselfj  therefore,  indisputably  from  his  express  re- 
presentation, proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  sin  is  the 
necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good. 

The  sole  question  to  be  determined  respecting  it  then  is, 
whether  any  evidences  exist  in  the  passage,  or  its  argument 
will  permit  the  belief,  that  he  was  simply  reasoning  in  it 
trom  the  principles  of  his  opponents,  in  distinction  from  his 
own,  and  for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing  their  scheme. 
To  form  a  just  judgment  on  the  subject,  it  should  be  re- 
marked, in  the  first  place,  that  the  passage  itself  does  not 
exhibit  any  indication  whatever  that  he  was  merely  arguing 
in  it  ex  concessis,  in  the  manner  he  now  represents.  A  reader 
who  should  neglect  to  compare  the  passages,  .would,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  infer  from  the  fact  that  the  usual  marks 
of  quotation  are  affixed  to  the  sentences,  "  You  maintain 
(what  I  do  not)"  &.c. — transcribed  above  from  the  Spectator, 
in  which  he  professes  to  repeat  the  argument  in  the  note  to 
the  sermon, — that  they  are  actually  taken  as  they  purport  to 
be,  from  that  argument,  and  present,  accordingly,  decisive 
proof  of  the  truth  of  his  representation  respecting  it.  No 
such  statement,  however,  or  language,  nor  any  thing  bear- 
ing any  resemblance  to  theni,  exists  in  that  passage,  and  the 

whole  pretense  that  it  is  a  quotation  is  a  deception.     "  Not 

10 


7^ 

a  hint  is  jj^iven"  in  that  part  of  the  note,  "that  the  supposi- 
tion" on  which  he  there  proceeded,  "that  the  sin  of  some 
might  be  necessary  to  secure  the  holiness  of  others,  icas  no 
part  of  Dr.  TJ's  scheme  ;  that  he  made  it  merely  as  an  argu- 
ment ex  doncessis,  which  was  fatal  to  his  opponent,  tohile  lie 
places  his  reliance  on  a  very  different  supposition.''''  (p.  536.) 
The  whole  aspect  of  the  passage,  on  the  contrary,  is  ps 
clearly  and  exclusively  indicative  that  the  views  which  it 
expresses  are  his  own,  and  meant  to  be  exhibited  as  such, 
as  is  that  of  any  other  passage  in  the  sermon  or  note ;  and 
to  have  attributed  to  him  any  other  intention  in  it,  M'ould 
have  been  as  utterly  unauthorized  and  unjustifiable,  as  it 
would  be  arbitrarily  to  impute  to  him  a  false  design  in  any 
other  portion  of  his  discussions.  This,  however,  is  one  of 
the  least  of  the  difficulties  with  which  his  representation  is 
perplexed. 

A  more  formidable  objection  to  it  is,  that  the  con- 
clusion which  it  ascribes  to  the  argument  in  the  note,  is 
essentially  different  from  that  which  it  is  in  fact  the  object 
of  his  reasoning  there  to  sustain.  'As  he  represents  in 
his  professed  quotation  of  it,  the  object  of  that  argument 
is  to  show,  that,  on  the  principles  of  his  opponents,  God 
may  have  "  chosen  to  admit  the  existing  sin  into  the  system, 
as  the  best  means  of  securing  his  obedient  kingdom  in  per- 
petual allegiance :"  not  because  he  could  not  prevent  the 
admission  of  that  sin.  In  place  of  that,  however,  the  object 
at  which  the  argument  in  the  note  aims  is,  to  show  that 
"  the  assumption  that  God  could  in  a  moral  system  have 
prevented  all  sin,  or  the  pr£sent  degree  of  sin,  is  wholly 
gratuitous  and  unauthorized,  and  ought  never  to  be  made 
the  basis  of  an  objection  or  an  argument ;"  and  "  the  repre- 
sentation" that  no  one  "  can  prove  that  the  requisite  inter- 
position for  the  purpose"  of  preventing  the  "  sins  of  one 


7.0 


human  being-  to  the  present  lime,"  or  bringing  "  to  repen- 
tance one  sinner  more  than  he  has,"  "would  not  result  in 
a  vast  increase  of  sin  in  the  system,"  instead  of  being  the 
ultimate  point  which  it  was  his  efibrt  to  sustain,  was  simply 
the  poo/ which  he  offered  to  show  that  it  could  not  be  de- 
monstrated from  facts,  that  God  could  have  prevented  all 
sin,  or  the  present  degree  of  sin.  In  place  of  a  just  exhibi- 
tion of  his  reasoning  therefore,  he  has  in  his  pretended  quo- 
tation of  it,  mistaken  his  evidence  for  his  conclusion,  and 
substituted  the  proof  of  the  inference,  which  he  was  labour- 
ing to  support,  for  the  inference  itself,  which  that  proof  was 
employed  to  sustaiia  ! 

A  still  more  perplexing  objection  to  his  representation  is, 
"that  in  place  of  exhibiting  the  reasoning  in  the  passage  as 
an  argument,  ex  concessis,  or  of  any  other  species,  it  con- 
verts it  into  a  piece  of  sheer  tautology,  without  either  logic 
or  sense ;  the  inference  deduced  from  the  concession,  being 
a  mere*  repetition  of  the  concession  itself,  instead  of  a 
relative  proposition.  The  position  conceded  by  his  op- 
ponents, from  which  he  professes  to  reason  is,  that  "God 
prefers  sin  to  hoUnessin  its  stead,"  because  it  is  "the  neces- 
sary means  of  the  greatest  good  ;"  for  he  admits  that  they 
regard  that  as  the  ground  on  which  "sin  entered  the 
system."  But  the  inference  also  which  he  deduces  from 
this  position  is,  that  "  the7i''  God  may  "  have  chosen  to 
admit  the  existing  sin  into  the  system  as  the  best  means  of 
securing  his  obedient  kingdom  in  'petpetual  allegiance  f -^ 
that  is,  because  it  is  "  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good  ;" — a  mere  repetition  of  the  conceded  position  itself, 
in  place,  of  a  different  one  obtained  from  it  by  logical  de- 
duction ;  an  argument  ex  concessis  truly  ! 

But  his  final  step  in  the  reasoning  is  still  more  extraordina- 
ry. "  May  not  this,''  he  says,  "  be  the  good  in  view  of  which 


7G 

he  chose  not  to  prevent  sin  ?  If  so,  llien  tlie  reason  of  the  clioice 
is  a  diflcrcnt  one  from  that  which  voii  assign:"  that  is,  if  the 
reason  of  the  choice  is  in  truth  what  you  allege ;  then  instead 
of  being  that,  it  "  is  a  different  one  from  that  which  you  as- 
sign !"  '*  And  until  you  prove  that  this  was  not  the  reason, 
you  cannot  affirm  that  sin  entered  the  system,  as  '  the  neces- 
sary means  of  the  greatest  good  :'  that  is,  in  other  words, 
initil  you  prove  that  the  reason  which  you  assign,  is  not 
tiie  true  reason  ofnts  admission  into  the  system,  you  cannot 
affirm  that  it  is  the  true  reason  of  its  admission  .!  or  more 
succinctly  still — you  cannot  affirm  your  theory  to  be  true, 
until  you  have  proved  it  to  be  false  !  The  argument  at 
large  is  thus  equivalent  to  the  following.  A  being  con- , 
ceded  to  be  A,  it  follows  that  A  is  A.  Wherefore,  until  it' 
is  proved  that  it  is  not,  it  cannot  be  affirmed  that  it  is  !  By 
most  who  "  deserve  the  praise  which  our  admiration  confers 
on  the  highest  intellectual  attainments,"  this  would  proba- 
bly be  thought  to  be  a  iion  seqidtur.  Not  so,  howeVfer,  with 
"  the  Dwight  professor  of  theology  in  Yale  College."  He 
solemnly  assures  us,  that. this  is  his  argument  in  the  passage 
in  the  note  in  question  ;  and  "  that  he  made  it  merely  as  au 
argument  ex  concessis,  which  was  fatal  to  his  opponent.^^ 

A  further  difficulty  with  which  his  representation  is  per- 
plexed, is,  that  both  the  essential  thoughts,  and  the  reason- 
ing of  the  note,  which  he  disclaims,  are  Ukewise  exhibited  in 
the  passage  itself  of  the  sermon  to  which  the  note  refers  ; 
where  they  are  indisffutably  employed  to  express  his  own 
sentiments.     The  passage  is  the  following  : 

"  Do  you  then  say  that  God  gave  man  a  nature,  which,  he  knew 
would  lead  him  to  sin  ?  What  if  he  did  f  Do  you  know  tliat  God  could 
havo  done  better,  better  on  the  whole,  or  better  if  he  gave  him  exis- 
tence at  all,  rve;i  for  the  individual  hinipclf  The  error  lies  in  the 


77 

gratuitoMs  assumption  that  God  could  have  adopted  a  moral  system, 
and  prevented  all  sin,  or  at  least  the  present  degree  of  sin.  For  no 
man  knows  this — no  man  can  prove  it.  The  assumptiontherefore  is 
wholl}'  unauthorized  as  the  basis  of  the  present  objection,  and  the 
objection  itself  groundless.  On  the  supposition  that  the  .evir which 
exists  is,  in  respect  to  divine  prevention,  incidental  to  the  best  po.ssi- 
ble  system,  and  that  notwithstanding  the  evil,- GcJd  will  securethe 
greatest  good  possible  to  him  to  secure,  who  can  impeach  either  his 
wisdom  or  his  goodness,  because  evil  exists  .''  I  say  then,  that  as  igno- 
rance is  incompetent  to  make  an  objection,  and  as  no  one  knows  that 
this  supposition  is  not  a  matter  of  fact,  no  one  has  a  right  to  assert 
the  contrary,  or  even  to  think  it.  Suppose  then  God  had  adopted  a 
different  system,  who  is  competent  to  foretell  or  to  conjecture  the  re- 
sults— or  even  the  results  of  one  iota  of  chango  in  the  present  .'■ystem  ? 
Suppose  God  had  made  you  just  like  Adam,  or  even  like  Lucifer,' and 
placed  you  in  similai;  circumstances,  do  you  know  that  you  would  nut 
have  sinned  as  he  did?  How  do  you  know  that  had  you  commenced 
your'immortal  career  with  such  aggravated:.guilt,  God  would  not  have 
found  it  necessary  to  send  you  to  hell  without  an  offer  of  mercy,  and 
that  you  would  not  have  sunk  in  deeper  wo  than  that  wliic!)  now 
awaits  you?  How  do  you  know  that  what  might  have  been  true  re- 
pecting  yourself,  had  not  been  true  of  any  otl^er  possible  system  of 
accountable  beings  ?  How  do  you  know  that  had  God  ordered  things 
otherwise  than  he  has,  this  very  world,  now  cheered  with  the  palls 
of  mercy  and  brightened  with  the  hopes  of  eternal  life,  yea,  that 
heaven  itself  would  not  now  be  trembling  under  the  thunders  of  retri- 
butive vengeance?"     Sermon,  p.  29 — 33. 

We  have  thus,  in  the  s6rmon  itself,  in  the  passage  to  which 
the  note#refers,  every  important  qiierj*,  intimation,  state- 
ment, and  conchision,  that  constitutes  that  part  of  the  note 
which  he  now  disclaims !  We  are  not  only  assured  as 
positively  as  in  the  note,  that  "the  assumption  that  God 
could  have  adopted  a  system  and  prevented  all  sin,  or  at 
least  the  present  degree  of  sin,"  is  gratuitous  and  incapable 
of  proof;  but  the  same  consideration  is  alleged  to  support 
that  assertion  ;  the  assurance  that  there  is  no  ground  for 
the  conclusion,  that  bad  God  pursued   any  other  course  of 


78 

aflmlnlstration  than  he  has,  or  departed  an  iota  from  l^is 
present  system,  a  far  greater  sum  of  shi  would  not  have  re- 
sulted from  it,  and  possibly  the  general  apostacy  of  his 
kingdom  :  in  other  words,  thjit  there  are  no  materials  for 
proving  that  those  evils  have  not  been  prevented  solely  by 
the  influence  exerted  by  the  punishment  of  sin  ;  and  that  is, 
that  there  are  no  evidences  that  God  may  not  "  have  chosen 
to  admit  the  existing  sin  into  the  system,  as  the  best  means 
of  securing  his  obedient  kingdom  in  perpetual  allegiance." 
But  the  difficulty  of  assenting  to  his  statement  is  consum- 
mated by  the  fact,  that  he  repeatedly  employs'these  repre- 
sentations in  the  review  itself  also,  in  which  he  disclaims 
them,  and  professes  that  they  contain  "  no  part  of  his 
scheme  !"  Thus  he  says  in  reference  to  that  part  of  the 
note,-  and  partially  quoting  its  language  : 

"  Dr.  Taylor  asked,  on  the  supposition  that  God  liad  prevented  «uiy 
past  sin,  who  can  prove  that  the  requisite  interposition  for  the  pur- 
pose would  not  result  in  a  vast  increase  of  sin  in  the  universe  ?  Now 
this  is  a  main  question — a  question  on  the  face  of  it,  fitted  to  show 
how  ahsolutely  naked  ai'e  the  assumptions  of  Dr.  Woods,  and  of 
others.  For  how  do  they  know,  how  can  they  prove — what  can  au- 
thorize them  to  assert  that  the  least  iota  of  change  in  God's  appointed 
system  of  moral  influence,  would  not  have  resulted  in  a  vast  increase 
of  sin  ?  We  say  man  is  too  ignorant  to  make  assertions  to  the  con- 
trary."    p.  554.  ^ 

The  representation  here,  is  thus  indisputably  fully  equi- 
valent to  that  which  he  imputes  to  his  opponents,  and  dis- 
claims as  expressing  his  own  opinion.  Tf  no  one  is  autho- 
rized to  assert  or  assume,  that  the  least  iota  of  change  in 
God's  appointed  system  of  moral  influence,  would  not  have 
resulted  in  a  vast  increase  of  sin  in  the  system  ;  there  must 
be  an  equal  certainty  that  no  one  can  have  any  authority 
for  tiip  assertion  or  assumption,  that  the  reason  of  God's  not 


79 

introducing  any  such  change,  is  not,  that  the  admission  of 
"  the  existing  sin  into  the"  system,"  is  "the  best  means  of 
securing  his  obedient  kingdom  in  perpetual  allegiance ;" 
nor  that  the  permission  of  "  the  sin  of  soine,"  is  not  "  ne- 
cessary to  secure  the  holiness  of  others."  I  add  one  more 
passage : 

''  We  will,  however,  for  the  sake  of  bringing  Dr.  Woods  to  the  real 
question,  go  still  further — we  will  sUppjose  that  God,  if  he  had  pleased, 
could  have  prevented  all  sin  in  the  Jiuvian  race  for  ever.  But  how 
does  this  prove  that  he  cculd  have  kept  all  sin  out  o^h.\s  immense  moral 
kingdom  1  No  one  doubts  that  God  can  prevent  some  moral  agents 
from  einning  ;  but  how  does  this  prove  that  he  could  have  prevented 
all.'  How  does  it  prove  that  if  he  had  changed  the  system  as  he  must 
by  other  interpositions,  in  order  to  have  prevented  any  from  sinning 
whom  he  has  not  prevented,  there  would  not  have  been  as  the  con- 
sequence immeasurably  more  sin,  than  will  exist  under  the  present 
system  as  it  is  ?  Now  this  is  the  question  which  must  be  answered, 
let  all  subordinate  questions  be  answered  as  they  may.  This  is  the 
real  question  as  presented  by  Dr.  Taylor,  and  in  the  most  explicit 
manner.  After  saying  of  one  supposition, '  be  this  as  it  may'  (and  thus 
showing  that  he  did  not  place  his  reliance  on  that,)  he  says,  but  the 
question  is — what  could  God  have  done  to  secure  more  holiness  and 
less  sin  in  a  moral  system  ?  This  is  the  task  then  which  devolves  on 
Dr.  Woods,  viz.  to  prove  that  God  could  have  kept  all  sin,  or  the 
present  degree  of  sin,  out  of  a  universal  moral  system."     p.  562. 

The  passage  in  the  note  to  which  he  here  refers  and 
partially  quotes,  is  the  following. 

"  If  God  could  prevent  all  sin  without  this  influence,"  (i.  e.  of  the 
punishment  of  sin,)  "  why  has  he  not  done  if  ?  Be  this,  however,  as  it 
may,  since  God  has  not,  so  far  as  we  know,  prevented  sin  in  a  single 
instance  without  this  influence,  how  can  it  be  proved  from  facts  that 
be  could  have  prevented  all  sin,  or  even  the  present  degree  of  sin,  in 
a  moral  system  ?  Had  his  creatures  done  what  they  could,  then  in- 
deed there  had  been  more  holiness  and  less  sin.  But  the  question  is, 
what  could  God  have  done  to  secure  such  a  result.''     Had  he  pre- 


80 

vented  the  sins  of  one  human  being  to  the  present  time,  or  bad  he 
brought  to  repentance  one  sinner  mofc  tlian  lie  has,  who  can  prove 
that  the  requisite  interposition  for  the  purpose,  would  not  result  in  a 
vast  increase  of  sin  in  the  system^  including  even  the  apostacy  and 
augmented  guilt  of  that  individual?"     p.  33.  „!• 

If  his  language  have  any  just  meaning,  and  his  argu- 
mentation any  intelligible  object,  these  passages  are  indis- 
putably, in  every  essential  particular,  fully  equivalent  to 
each  other.  In  place  of  there  being  a  new  and  diflerent 
"  supposition"  introduced  in  the  latter,  between  the  remark, 
"  be  this  as  it  may,"  and  the  statement,  "  but  the  question 
is,  what  could  God  have  done  to  secure  such  a  result ;" 
^e'  supposition  on  which  he  founds  the  last  inquiry,  is  ob- 
viously identically  the  same  as  that  on  which  he  had  be- 
fore proceeded.  The  only  diflerence  is,  that  the  object  of 
his  former  question  is  to  know  how  it  can  be  proved  from 
fact^,  that  God  could  have  prevented  all  sin,  or  the  present 
degree  of  sin,  without  the  influence  derived  from  punish- 
ment ;  and  that  of  the  latter,  how  it  can  be  proved  that  had 
he  dispensed  with  that  influence,  in  any  degree  or  instance, 
by  preventing  a7ii/  one,  or  number  of  the  particular  sins 
vihich  he  note  suffers  men  to  commit,  it  would  not  have  re- 
'sidted  in  an  increase,  in  place  of  a  diminution,  of  the  gene- 
ral sum  of  sin.  The  ground  then,  and  object  of  his  in- 
quiries, in  each  of  these  instances,  his  terms,  his  argument, 
and  his  meaning,  are  identically  the  same  ;  and  in  avowing 
and  repeating  the  latter,  as  he  lias,  as  presenting  the  real 
and  whole  question  at  issue  between  him  and  Dr.  Woods, 
and  affirming'  that  neither  Dr.  W.  nor  any  one  else  can 
refute  the  assumption  on  which  he  proceeds  in  it,  he  has 
given  the  most  abundant  evidence  that  in  penning  it  origi- 
nally in  the  note,  in  place  of  reasoning  ex  concessis,  he  was 


81 

as  truly  and  exclusively  employed  iii  exlubiting  liis  own 
views,  and  prompted  in  it  by  as  perfect  a  confidence  in  their 
accuracy,  as  he  was  in  the  composition  of  the  above  pas- 
sages in  th«  Spectator,  in  which  he  repeats  and  unequivo- 
cally sanctions  its  language  and  reasoning,  as  expressing 
his  own  opinion ! 

From  these  considerations  it  is  apparent,  that  all  the 
facts  and  appearances  in  the  case  are  wholly  against  his 
statement,  that  he  offered  the  queries  and  assertions  of  the 
note  in  question,  "  merely  as  an  argument  ex  concessis," 
as  completely  as  they  can  be  against  a  similar  pretense 
in  respect  to  any  other  passage  in  his  discussions  ;  and  that 
accordingly,  if  we  are  guided  in  our  judgment  respecting 
it  by  the  usual  laws  of  evidence,  we  shall  reject  his  state- 
ment, and  regard  him  as  having  penned  the  passage  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  expressing  his  own,  in  place  of  the  opinions 
of  his  opponents.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  disregarding  these 
facts,  we  assent  to  his  statement,  we  shall  then  be  forced  to 
the  conclusion,  that  no  assurance  can  be  felt  that  his 
genuine  intentions  in  any  of  his  language  can  ever  with 
any  certainty  be  known.  His  own  asseverations  then)selves 
obviously  can  never  add  any  confirmation  either  to  our 
convictions  or  doubts  respecting  his  meaning ;  as  no  cer- 
tainty can  be  possessed  that  they  may  not  also  be  disclaimed, 
invested  with  a  new  signification,  or  converted  into,  a 
statement  of  his  opponents'  opinions,  whenever  the  "  pres- 
sure of  new  objections"  may  require  such  a  course  in 
order  to  their  "  effectual  refutation  !" 

Such  are  the  principal  characteristics  of  this  gentleman's 
theoretical  and  controversial  "plan."  The  essentials  of  his 
theoretical  system,  consist,  it  is  seen,  of  three  great  articles  : 
the  denial  on  the  one  hand,  of  the  possibilitv  of  God's  go- 

n 


82 

verning  his  creatures,  or  constituting  a  certainty  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  they  will  act ;  and  consequently  a  denial  of  all 
the  doctrines  of  reason  and  revelation  which  assert  or  imply 
his  supreme  dominion  over  them,  and  the  causes  that  influ- 
ence their  agency  :  the  assertion  on  the  other,  that  a  cause 
is  lodged  in  their  physical  nature,  which,  while  they  remain 
unregenerate,  constitutes  an  invincible  certainty  that  they 
will  sin  in  all  their  agency  :  and  finally  the  theory  of  an  in- 
numerable congeries  of  permanent  volitions  and  perceptions 
in  the  mind,  as  causes  of  all  transient  and  subordinate  voli- 
tions. 

His  controversial  "  plan"  consists  of  a  single  element — 
the  assumption  and  exercise  of  the  right  of  ascribing  to  his 
own,  and  the  language  of  others,  precisely  whatever  mean- 
ing his  wants  and  wishes  at  any  stage  of  his  progress  in 
controversy,  may  happen  to  require. 

From  these  characteristics,  then,  of  the  system,  it  is  suffi- 
ciently apparent,  that  its  disciples,  if  it  have  any,  must  soon- 
er or  later  secede  from  their  present  connexions,  and  form  a 
distinct  sect.  To  imagine  that  the  orthodox  can  ever  con- 
found this  hideous  mass  of  error  and  absurdity,  with  what 
they  regard  as  the  essential  doctrines  of  the  gospel,  or  per- 
suade themselves  that  the  process  through  which  its  disciples 
must  pass,  in  order  to  become  its  admirers  and  propaga- 
tors, can  be  best  adapted  to  fit  them  to  be  ministers  of 
Christ,  were  alike  an  aflront  to  Christianity  and  to  them. 
Nothing  more  can  be  requisite  to  accomplish  the  exclusion 
of  its  adherents  from  the  ranks  of  the  orthodox,  than  a  clear 
discernment  of  the  import  and  tendency  of  its  doctrines  ; 
nor  any  thing  more  to  lead  its  disciples  to  an  open  seces- 
sion from  that  body,  and  disavowal  of  the  evangelical  sys- 
tem, than  a  distinct  perception  of  the  conclusions  to  whick 


83 

tiieir  principles  f\re  fitted  to  carry  them,  and  courage  and 
consistency  to  follow  them  to  their  legitimate  results.  How, 
if  they  comprehend  the  import  of  their  dogmas,  can  they 
continue  to  believe  or  profess  the  doctrines  of  efficacious 
grace,  while  they  openly  deny  the  possibility  of  God's  ex- 
erting an  influence  that  shall  possess  any  efficacy  in  determi- 
ning the  actions  of  men  ?  How  can  they  continue  to  main- 
tain a  real  or  apparent  faith  in  the  doctrines  of  God's  pur- 
poses, and  fore-knowledge,  election  and  perseverance,  while 
they  formally  deny  the  possibility  of  his  constituting  a  cer- 
tainty of  a  future  event  in  the  agency  of  his  creatures,  and 
thence  of  his  possessing  any  knowledge  of  their  future  char- 
ter and  destiny.  It  is  clearly  impossible.  They  only  need 
intellect  and  light  enough  to  pass  through  the  simplest  and 
most  unavoidable  process  of  which  the  mind  is  capable — -the 
perception  of  the  equality  of  equal  or  coincident  proposi- 
tions— to  be  carried  inevitably  by  their  system,  if  they  ad- 
here to  it,  to  the  rejection  of  every  doctrine  and  declaration 
of  the  gospel  that  relates  in  any  degree  to  the  future  char- 
acter and  condition  of  dependent  intelligences. 

It  will  carry  them  likewise  with  equal  certainty  to  the  disbe- 
lief of  most  of  the  natural  and  moral  attributes  of  the  Deity. 
It  denies  on  the  one  hand  the  possibility  of  God's  preventing 
sin  in  any  instance  in  which  it  takes  place  ;  and  on  the 
other,  that  the  reason  that  he  permits  it,  is,  that  it  is  better 
to  permit  it,  than  it  would  be  to  prevent  it,  were  that  practi- 
cable J  and  thence  exhibits  its  existence,  as  the  ground  of 
more  evil  immeasurably,  than  the  good  which  is  made  to 
result  from  it.  These  positions  therefore,  united,  represent 
the  Most  High  as  creating  and  upholding  innumerable 
multitudes  of  beings,  whose  existence  and  agency,  after  all 
his  efforts  to  counteract  their  evil  influences,  are  infinitely 


84 

detrimental  to  liis  kingdom.  Ifsncli  however  is  the  fact,  it 
obviously  detracts  equally  from  the  perfection  of  his  natu- 
ral attributes  and  moral  character.  How  in  any  consisten- 
cy with  them,  can  it  be  accounted  for,  that  he  creates  and 
sustains  those  beings,  or  any  of  them  ?  Does  he  perfectly 
foresee  from  the  beginning  all  the  events  of  their  existence, 
their  successful  resistance  of  his  efforts  to  govern  them,  and 
the  immense  and  lasting  injury  which  they  inflict  on  his  em- 
pire ?  For  what  reason  then  is  it  that  he  gives  them  being  ? 
Is  it  from  some  motive  presented  by  the  effects  of  their  exis- 
tence ?  If  so,  it  must  obviously  be,  either  from  some  moral 
good  that  can  be  made  to  result  from  their  agency,  by  the 
counteracting  efforts  of  his  wisdom,  or  else  from  delight  in 
that  agency  itself,  or  its  punishment.  The  former,  however, 
the  system  expressly  denies ;  and  to  assert  the  latter,  is  to 
deny  alike  the  wisdom  and  benevolence  of  God.  To  escape 
then  this  detraction  of  his  character,  is  it  assumed — as  the 
scheme  necessarily  implies — that  he  does  not  and  cannot 
foresee  the  events  of  their  agency,  and  thence  that  he  gives 
them  existence  and  upholds  them,  in  total  uncertainty  of  all 
that  is  future  in  their  history,  but  with  the  intention  of  ma- 
king every  effort  in  his  power  to  secure  them  in  holiness  and 
happiness,  and  with  the  hope  of  success  ?  But  this  denial 
of  his  prescience  involves  an  equally  fatal  impeachment  of 
his  character.  For  it  not  only  divests  all  the  promises? 
predictions  and  threatenings  of  his  word,  which  have  any 
reference  to  the  actions  of  his  creatures,  of  every  shade  of 
veracity,  but  denies  his  knowledge  of  immeasurably  the 
greatest  portion  of  the  future  events  which  most  intimately 
concern  his  happiness  and  glory,  and  thence  sweeps  from 
our  grasp,  every  certainty  of  his  wisdom  and  goodness. 
What  but  infinite  presumption  and  folly  could  it  be  to  create 


a  universe  of  agents,  and  maintain  them  in  being,  without 
any  power  whatever  of  controlling  their  conduct,  or  foresee- 
ing or  conjecturing  what  consequences  were  to  result  from 
their  existence  ;  and  thence  without  any  certainty  or  proba- 
bility that  they  might  not  be  infinitely  disastrous  to  himself 
and  to  them!  The  great  principles  of  the  system  will  thus 
inevitably  carry  its  disciples,  if  they  follow  it  to  its  legiti- 
mate results,  to  an  open  and  total  denial  of  the  most  essen- 
tial of  the  natural  and  moral  attributes  of  God,  and  all  the 
fundamental  doctrines  of  the  gospel.  If  they  admit  his  pre- 
science of  future  events,  they  must  deny  his  wisdom  and 
goodness ;  if  they  give  up  his  fore-knowledge,  they  must 
likewise  deny  his  veracity,  and  impute  to  him  infinite  reck- 
lessness in  place  of  benevolence,  and  exhibit  him  as  infinite- 
ly presumptuous,  instead  of  wise. 


JEREMIAH   EVARTS. 


Important  aids  in  theological  inquiries  are  often  ob- 
tained, by  turning  aside  from  abstract  investigations  of  the 
sacred  volume,  to  the  exemplifications  that  occur  in  the 
providence  of  God,  of  the  great  principles  of  his  administra- 
tion, and  the  practical  illustrations  of  the  spirit  and  power 
of  religion  that  are  seen  in  the  lives  of  his  children.  A 
field  for  such  observations,  singularly  instructive  and  attract- 
ing, is  presented  in  the  mental  endowments,  moral  charac- 
teristics, and  beneficent  career  of  the  late  Jeremiah  Evarts, 
Corresponding  Secretary  of  the  American  Board  of  Com- 
missioners for  Foreign  Missions. 

He  entered  on  his  existence  a  brief  period  since,  without 
any  extraordinary  superiority  of  endowments  or  advantages 
of  condition,  and  had  all  his  knowledge  to  acquire,  his  cha- 
racter to  form,  and  his  influence  to  exert,  on  the  principles 
that  are  common  to  the  race  at  large.  While,  however,  multi- 
tudes who  commenced  their  career  cotemporaneously  with 
him,  on  the  same  great  theatre,  and  under  the  action  of  essen- 
tially the  same  species  of  causes,  are  passing,  or  have  passed 
through  life,  without  making  their  advantages  the  means  of 
any  important  utility  to  themselves,  or  themselves  the  instru- 
ments of  any  signal  benefit  to  others,  he  made  the  gifts  and 
opportunities  with  which  he  was  favored,  the  means  of  emi- 
nent good  to  himself  and  usefulness  to  his  fellow  men, 
advanced  himself  to  eminence  in  mental  cultivation,  useful 


87 

knowledge  and  energy  and  elevation  of  character,  became 
adequate  to  the  various  and  important  exigencies  of  his 
life,  and  by  his  wide  and  benificent  influence,  made  himself 
a  blessing  to  the  church,  a  benefactor  to  tbe  world,  and  an 
ornament  to  the  race. 

Where  then  lay  the  secret  of  his  success  ? — a  question 
worthy  to  attract  the  attention  of  every  aspirant  after  excel- 
lence and  usefulness.  What  are  the  peculiar  causes  to 
which  it  is  to  be  traced,  and  the  great  principles  .which  con- 
ducted him  to  its  attainment?  Every  thing  in  his  career  is 
not  indeed  to  be  regarded  as  the  result  of  some  peculiarity  in 
him,  or  the  sole  product  of  his  efforts.  The  chief  field  of 
his  agency,  and  thence  in  a  degree  the  extent  of  his  useful- 
ness, were  not  exclusively  of  his  creation  ;  the  contrivance, 
institution,  and  support  of  the  great  Missionary  Enterpise, 
which  formed  the  principal  theatre  of  his  labours,  having 
been  common  to  him  with  many  others ;  and  the  ag6ncy  to 
which  he  was  called  by  it,  having  contributed  as  much  per- 
haps to  render  him  what  he  was,  as  he  contributed  to  give 
to  that  enterprise  its  character  and  efficiency.  He  doubtless 
could  never  have  exerted  the  influence  which  he  did,  nor 
been  what  he  became,  had  not  the  hand  of  Providence 
placed  him  in  a  condition  making  large  demands  like  that, 
on  his  intellect  and  heart,  and  oftering  powerful  excitements 
to  cultivation,  and  superior  facilities  for  usefulness.  Still 
it  is  to  him  that  we  are  to  look  for  the  grounds  of  his  having 
become  so  eminently  qualified  for  that  station,  and  for  his 
having  made  so  wise  and  successful  a  use  of  the  favorable 
influences  which  it  brought  with  it.  These  are  doubtless 
to  be  seen  in  his  constitutional  peculiarities,  mental  habits, 
and  moral  principles. 

I.  Of  the  former  of  these,  one  of  the  most  conspicuous 
was  the  felicitous  adaptation  to  each  other,   of  his  mental 


88 

powers  and  susceptibilities  ;  or  the  happy  adjustment  of  the 
energy  of  his  aftections  to  the  strength  of  his  intellect — a 
peculiarity  of  constitution  eminently  propitious  to  a  success- 
ful development  of  the  mind,  and  the  formation  of  a  useful 
character. 

The  diversities  in  the  original  constitutions  of  men  in 
this  respect,  are  perhaps,  as  numerous  and  great  as  in 
almost  any  other.  Individuals  differ  vv^idely  not  only  in 
their  susceptibilities  of  emotion,  and  the  energy  of  their 
affections,  but  also  in  the  proportions  which  their  powers  of 
feeling  bear  to  those  of  their  intellect.  As  a  general  fact, 
the  same  capacities  of  knowledge  in  the  female  sex  are  asso- 
ciated with  a  far  livelier  sensibility  than  in  men  ;  and  great 
differences  in  this  particular  exist  likewise  among  those  of 
the  same  sex.  Great  quickness  and  violence  of  passion  are 
frequently,  and  perhaps  usually  the  attendants  of  a  weak 
reason  ;  while  eminent  powers  of  intellect  are  often  seen  in 
conjunction  with  a  phlegmatic  temperament. 

In  many,  however,  there  seems  to  be  a  fundamental  dis- 
proportion between  their  intellectual  and  sensitive  nature ; 
or  a  want  of  a  fit  adjustment  of  the  energy  of  their  emotions, 
to  the  nature  of  the  perceptions  by  which  they  are  excited. 
They  exhibit  essentially  the  same  interest  in  insignificant, 
as  in  important  themes  ;  and  are  raised  to  much  the  same 
excitement  by  small  as  by  great  causes.  Almost  any  class 
of  views  carrying  them  apparently  to  the  extent  of  their  ca- 
pacity, they  have  no  more  interest  to  expend  on  the  most 
momentous  subjects,  tlian  they  are  accustomed  to  waste  on 
those  of  the  most  inferior  importance. 

In  Mr.  Evarts,  there  was  a  propitious  adjustment  to 
each  other  of  these  branches  of  his  mental  constitution  ;  his 
susceptibilities  of  emotion  <oward  the  objects  of  his  know- 


89 

ledge,  being  so  happily  coincident  with  his  powers  of  per- 
ception, as  to  render  the  extent  and  vividness  of  his  appre- 
hensions, the  measure  in  an  eminent  degree  of  the  vivacity 
and  intenseness  of  the  affections  which  they  excited. 

This  constitutional  peculiarity  is  obviously  one  of  the 
most  propitious  to  the  formation  of  a  wise  and  useful  cha- 
racter. It  tends  to  secure  to  objects  an  attention  corres- 
ponding to  their  importance  ;  forms  a  permanent  and  effi- 
cient safeguard  against  precipitancy,  extravagance,  and  en- 
thusiasm, is  one  of  the  chief  foundations  of  a  sound  judgment, 
and  contributes  an  essential  agency  to  the  establishment  of 
fixed  principles,  and  the  formation  of  uniform  habits.  Its 
favourable  agency  in  him,  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  he  was 
seldom  disproportionately  influenced  by  the  causes  that 
acted  on  him  ;  that  the  impressions  made  by  objects  corres- 
ponded so  prevalently  with  their  nature ;  and  that  his  in- 
terest in  them  rose  in  intensity,  as  his  knowledge  of  them 
advanced,  and  his  apprehensions  became  more  vivid  and 
comprehensive. 

II.  A  distinguished  facility  in  discerning  relations,  and 
thence  in  tracing  effects  to  causes,  was  another  conspicuous 
characteristic  of  his  mental  constitution. 

This,  which  is  preeminently  the  attribute  of  reason,  and 
the  highest  peculiarity  of  intelligent  natures,  is,  like  the 
other,  bestowed  on  different  minds,  in  widely  different  mea- 
sures. To  some  it  is  given  in  such  eminent  degrees,  as  to 
enable  them  to  glance  intuitively  through  long  trains  of 
relations,  and  gain  results  at  once,  which,  by  most  of  even 
gifted  intellects,  can  be  obtained  only  by  a  laborious  pro- 
cess of  attention,  inquiry,  and  reasoning.  By  others  it  is 
enjoyed  in  but  far  inferior  measures ;  their  apprehensions 

seldom  extending  beyond  the  perceptions  excited  by  exter- 

12 


90 

nal  ODJects,  the  suggestions  of  memory,  and  the  discovery 
of  the  most  closely  connected  and  obvious  relations.  They 
never  push  their  inquiries  beyond  a  narrow  circle,  nor  carry 
their  reasonings  further  than  the  simplest  steps.  No 
lightning  glances  ever  disclose  to  them  the  distant  con- 
nexions, nor  long  trains  of  ratiocination  conduct  them  to 
the  remote  conclusions  of  abstract  knowledge. 

This  power,  however,  like  all  others,  is   susceptible  of 
invigoration  by  exercise  and  cuhure.     The  diversities  in  its 
strength  which  are  ultimately  seen  in  different  minds,  are 
the   result  doubtless  in   a  large  degree,    of  its  neglect  or 
cultivation,  and  the  energy  and  rapidity  with  which  it  acts, 
correspond  probably,  in  a  great  measure,  to  the  knowledge 
with  which  the  mind  is  furnished,  or  the  number  and  va- 
riety of  the  related  truths  with  which  it  is  familiar.     The 
will  seems,  indeed,  to  be  passive  in  regard  to  its  agency, 
except  so  far  as  an  effort  of  attention  is  requisite  in  order  to 
its  acting.     One  thought  suggests  another  ;  the  perception 
of  one  trutli  calls  up  a  whole  class  of  associated  relations; 
and  the  mind  is  in  that  manner  carried  forward  from  object 
to  object,  till  it  has  traversed  the  whole  circle  of  connexions 
and  resemblances ;    and  to  acquire  the  power  and  form  the 
habit  of  thus  maintaining  attention  to  objects  fixedly  and 
intently,   till    full   opportunity  is   enjoyed   for    all   related 
truths  and  subjects  to  present  themselves,  and  the  whole 
power  of  association  to  become  exhausted,   is  one  of  the 
happiest  attainments  in  menial  discipline.     The  secret  of 
efficient  investigation  lies  in  thus  fully  exploring  the  field, 
before  fixing  on  ultimate  conclusions ;  in  place  of  relapsing 
into  inaction,   after   gaining  a  few  glimpses  of  truth,    or 
yielding  to  specious  assumptions,  without  tracing  them  to 
their  legitimate  results.     This  attribute  thus  both  presents 


91 

the  chief  excitements  to  knowledge,  and  is  the  instrument  of 
its  attainment.  It  is  the  source  of  all  discoveries  in  abstract 
science,  and  progress  in  useful  and  ornamental  arts.  It 
forms  the  ground  of  the  peculiar  powers  of  the  mathemati- 
cian, the  poet,  the  logician,  and  the  orator,  and  gives  birth 
to  every  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  and  every  contri- 
vance of  systems  of  agency,  for  the  achievement  of  compli- 
cated results.  It  lies  at  the  foundation  likewise  of  religion, 
as  it  is  on  the  perception  of  the  relations  of  subjects  to 
rulers,  of  laws  to  rights,  and  actions  to  happiness,  that  the 
feeling  of  obligation  depends,  and  the  operations  of  con- 
science proceed. 

This  power  was  possessed  and  cultivated  in  a  superior 
degree  by  Mr.  Evarts.  His  clear  and  well  defined  percep- 
tions, eminently  tenacious  memory,  and  vigorous  capacity 
for  fixed  and  patient  attention,  happily  qualified  him  for  in- 
vestigation and  reasoning.  Comparison,  induction  and 
generalization,  were  the  congenial  and  spontaneous  pro- 
cesses of  his  mind,  and  the  acquisition  of  new  ideas  was 
thence  the  natural  and  almost  inevitable  consequence  of 
his  attention  to  objects.  It  is  in  this,  doubtless,  that  the 
ground  is  seen  of  the  facility  with  which  he  made  himself 
master  of  the  subjects  which  he  attempted  to  investigate ; 
the  perspicuity,  force,  methodical  arrangement,  and  logical 
accuracy,  which  mark  his  compositions ;  the  success  with 
which  he  treated  alike  the  practical  and  abstract  questions 
which  his  station  called  him  to  consider ;  and  the  skillful 
adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  the  sound  sense  and  practical 
wisdom  which  characterized  his  conversation,  writings,  and 
agency  at  large. 

III.  Another  characteristic  for  which  he  was  distinguish- 
ed, was  the  habit  of  founding  his  opinions  on  facts,  and  mak- 


92 

ing  his  decisions  the  results  of  investigation  :  a  most  essen- 
tial element  in  impartiality  and  independence  of  ihouglit ; 
but  which  unhappily  is  very  far  from  being  inseparably  an 
attendant  of  superior  quickness  in  the  perceptions  of  rela- 
tions. 

In  somp  minds  the  power  of  association  or  facility  in  per- 
ceiving connexions  and  resemblances,  seems  to  lead  to  er- 
roneous generalizations  and  the  formation  of  artificial  and 
baseless  hypotheses,  and  consequently  to  obstruct  and  circum- 
scribe, in  place  of  facilitating  their  progress  in  knowledge. 
The  history  of  theology,  as  well  as  philosophy,  presents  a 
multitude  of  melancholy  verifications  of  this  remark.  The 
errors  in  each,  indeed,  essentially  consist  in,  or  spring  from 
false  views  of  the  relations  of  objects,  or  the  connexions  of 
cfl'ects  with  their  causes,  and  are  founded  accordingly  on 
mere  assumptions  or  conjectures,  instead  of  facts.  To  the 
formation,  however,  of  habits  of  safe  andju&t  thought,  and 
correct  and  useful  reasoning,  it  is  indispensable  that  facts 
should  be  made  the  sole  guides  of  opinions,  and  knowledge 
the  foundation  of  determinations  and  judgments.  And 
obviously  in  order  to  this,  the  mind  must  be  disciplined  to  a 
prompt  and  spontaneous  submission  to  evidence.  To  some, 
however,  if  we  are  to  judge  from  their  history,  this  is  very 
far  from  being  an  easy,  or  grateful  task.  To  welcome  the 
access  of  truth,  whatever  may  be  its  relations  to  their  fa- 
vorite views ;  spontaneously  to  relinquish  opinions  at  the 
call  of  demonstration  ;  to  stand  unresisting  and  wiUing  spec- 
tators of  the  subversion  of  their  theories  when  shown  to  be 
false  and  pernicious,  and  thus  gladly  to  move  on  with  the 
progress  of  light,  is,  it  would  seem,  one  of  the  most  difiicult, 
distressing,  and  impossible  processes  which  they  can  l)c 
called  to  undergo.     The  dogmas  and  systems  of  thought 


93 

"which  they  have  struck  out,  or  endeavoured  to  sustahi,  they 
regard  as  a  portion  of  themselves,  and  most  Ultimately  in- 
volving their  being  and  character,  and  accordingly  adhere 
to  them  as  tenaciously  as  to  life,  and  sacrifice,  not  unfre- 
quently  for  their  support,  what  should  be  infinitely  dearer, 
their  reputation  for  candor,  integrity  and  discernment.  It 
would  be  incompatible,  in  their  judgment,  with  dignity,  to 
become  pupils  to  experience,  or  receive  instruction  from 
their  fellow-men.  It  would  be  to  acknowledge  that  they 
are  not  infallible,  to  recall  or  modify  any  of  their  doctrines  ; 
and  detract  from  their  reputation  to  grow  any  wis'sr.  Their 
schemes,  therefore,  because  they  are  theirs,  are  to  be  ad- 
hered to  at  all  events,  however  false,  ridiculous,  or  hurtful 
they  may  be,  or  whatever  may  be  the  consequences  to  truth 
and  the  interests  of  their  fellow-men.  The  weakness  and 
wickedness  of  thus  making  it  a  matter  of  honor,  incorrigi- 
bly to  grope  in  darkness  amidst  the  blaze  of  noon-day,  is 
the  deepest  disgrace  to  which  minds  of  any  pretensions  to 
superiority  can  degrade  themselves,  and  constitute  a  total 
disqualification  for  stations  of  influence.  They  proceed  on 
the  assumption,  that  they  have  in  fact  explored  the  whole 
field  of  truth,  discovered  all  its  possible  relations,  and  ad- 
vanced to  the  ultimate  limits  of  human  knowledge,  and  that 
accordingly  all  difiering  or  additional  light  is  to  be  re- 
jected, as  false  and  deceptive.  Those,  however,  who  con- 
sider the  brief  period  of  our  being  here,  the  fact  that  we  so 
frequently  err  in  our  apprehensions  even  of  those  topics 
with  which  our  familiarity  ought  to  render  us  the  best  ac- 
quainted, and  that  we  are  incessantly  and  almost  necessarily 
advancing  our  discoveries,  and  enlarging  our  knowledge  on 
every  subject  that  falls  under  our  habitual  notice,  will  feel 
but  little  inclined  to  adopt  such  assumptions.     In  the  inft- 


94 

»ite  periods  of  existence,  experience  and  observation  through 
nhich  we  are  hereafter  to  pass,  it  is  impossible  to  believe 
that  perpetual  and  immense  accessions  are  not  to  be  made 
to  our  knowledge  ;  and  that  even  of  those  subjects  of  which 
we  have  alread}'  attained  the  most  adequate  views,  our  ap- 
prehensions arc  not  to  be  still  further  enlarged  and  ad- 
vanced in  intensity.  It  is  clearly  the  part,  therefore,  of  wis- 
dom, to  maintain  the  attitude  of  learners  in  regard  to 
every  subject,  gladly  to  welcome  every  new  accession  of 
light,  and  spontaneously  and  conscientiously  to  submit  our- 
selves to  the  guidance  of  evidence.  It  is  one  of  the  most 
peculiar  and  noblest  characteristics  of  an  enlarged  and  up- 
right mind,  to  subject  itself  to  the  habit  of  thus  instinctively 
yielding  to  the  sway  of  truth,  to  constitute  by  its  modes  of 
reasoning  and  judging,  a  moral  incapability  of  resisting  the 
light  of  demonstration,  to  keep  its  conclusions  and  gene- 
ralizations subject  to  the  control  of  evidence,,  and  instantly 
to  ^ield  them  up  without  reluctance  or  regret,  when  the 
fotmdations  on  which  they  were  erected  are  shown  to  be 
inadequate  or  unsubstantial.  He  who  has  thus  gained  a 
mastery  over  his  spirit,  taught  his  powers  their  proper  of- 
fice, and  accustomed  them  to  fulfil  their  duty,  has  secured 
a  certainty  of  a  rapid  progress  in  wisdom.  The  worst  ob- 
stacles to  his  advancement  are  broken  down  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  strongest  safe-guards  reared  on  the  other, 
against  his  being  betrayed  into  the  rejection  of  truths  which 
have  already  gained  his  assent.  He  has  placed  himself  in 
a  position  in  which  the  universe  at  large  becomes  his  teacher, 
and  all  the  objects  by  which  he  is  surrounded,  and  influ- 
ences that  act  on  him.  are  rendered  channels  to  him  of  fresh 
information. 

This  was  pre-eminently  the  character  of  Mr.  Evarts.    Re- 
garding himself  as  destined  to  an  interminable  career  of  ex- 


1 


95 

istence,  activity  and  improvement,  he  assumed  tiie  station  o( 
a  learner,  opened  his  mind  ingenuously  to  the  access  of 
truth,  maintained  a  ceaseless  search  after  knowledge,  and 
accustomed  himself  to  a  prompt  and  conscientious  submis- 
sion to  the  sway  of  evidence  ;  the  only  position  obviously 
which  it  becomes  creatures  to  take — the  attitude  of  humility, 
candor,  integrity,  and  wisdom,  and  the  noblest  spectacle  of 
greatness  which  men  are  capable  of  exhibiting  to  each  other. 
He  was  accordingly  eminently  accustomed  to  be  guided  in 
his  judgments  by  the  light  of  facts,  to  erect  his  reasoning 
on  the  ground  of  evidence,  and  to  limit  his  conclusions  by 
the  extent  of  his  knowledge.  He  had  no  favorite  theories 
which  he  made  it  his  business  at  all  events  to  maintain  and 
propagate ;  no  ends  which  required  for  tlieir  attainment 
the  sacrifice  of  truth,  or  aid  of  dishonorable  arts  ;  none 
of  that  weak  and  ridiculous  self-conceit,  which  acts  on 
the  assumption  that  it  has  monopolized  the  wisdom  of 
the  age,  and  makes  the  relations  of  opinions  to  itself,  the 
sole  measure  of  their  truth  and  importance,  and  claims  and 
expects  implicit  and  universal  submission  to  its  dicta- 
lion.  It  is  accordingly  in  his  distinguished  exemption 
from  these  blemishes,  and  his  ardent  love  of  truth,  that 
one  of  the  principal  elements  is  seen  of  the  dignity  of  his 
character,  and  chief  grounds  of  his  superiority  in  know- 
ledge and  usefulness.  This  characteristic  was  indeed 
wholly  indispensable  in  a  station  like  that  which  he  occu- 
pied in  the  direction  of  novel  and  extraordinary  enter- 
prises, in  respect  to  which  almost  every  thing  was  to  be 
learned  ;  the  wisdom  of  measures  at  first  in  some  degree  con- 
jectural, was  to  be  tested  by  experience  ;  new  facts  at  every 
step  to  be  brought  to  his  knowledge,  and  fresh  light  cast  on 
the  principles   and  methods  on  which  such  undertakinirs 


95 

haay  be  most  .successfully  conducted.  Entrusted  as  he  was 
in  a  distinguished  sense,  with  the  guidance  of  these  vast 
enterprises,  his  agency  couhl  have  been  productive  of  no- 
thing but  infinite  mischief,  had  he  been  one  of  those  vain, 
opinionated,  obstinate,  unteachable  beings,  who  make  it  a 
matter  of  conscience  and  honour  not  to  be  instructed  by 
experience,  and  who  attempt  to  bend  the  laws  and  natures 
of  the  universe  to  their  schemes  of  agency,  in  place  of  con- 
foi-ming  their  systems  to  those  natures  and  laws.  It  is  one 
of  the  noblest  traits  of  wisdom,  that  it  fits  and  excites  its 
possessor  to  grow  wiser. 

IV.  His  conceptions  of  the  great  characteristics  of  hu- 
man nature,  and  the  principles  on  which  useful  influences 
are  to  be  exerted  over  men,  were  eminently  just. 

Accurate  and  enlarged  views  of  the  nature  of  man,  and 
the  manner  in  which  he  is  accustomed  to  be  affected  by  the 
various  species  of  influence  that  act  on  him,  are  essential  to 
success  in  eflforts  at  exerting  any  important  sway  over  his 
purposes  and  conduct.  Errors  here,  and  they  are  extremely 
common,  are  not  only  adapted  to  prevent  success,  but  will 
almost,  as  a  matter  of  course,  prove  productive  of  great  and 
irremediable  evils.  Men  are  not  to  be  enticed  into  religion 
by  flattery,  nor  awed  into  it  by  dictation  ;  nor  are  they  to 
be  reformed  by  humouring  their  passions,  aggravating 
their  prejudices,  or  provoking  their  resentments.  The 
communication  to  them  of  new  views,  is  the  only  method 
by  which  any  great  and  lasting  change  can  be  wrought 
in  their  principles  and  conduct ;  and  truth, — the  manifesta- 
tion to  them  of  their  relations  to  God  and  each  other,  and 
enforcement  on  their  moral  sensibilities,  of  the  infinite  per- 
suasions of  the  gospel,  the  only  instrument  by  which  they 
can  be  prompted  to  holiness. 


97 

Accui*ate  views  of  the  nature  of  men,  and  an  intimate  ac- 
quaintance with  them  as  they  exist  in  society,  were  pecu- 
liarly necessary  in  a  station  like  that  which  Mr.  Evarts 
was  called  to  fillj  which  led  him  to  an  extensive  intercourse 
with  those  of  every  diversity  of  sentiment  and  character, 
and  made  it  a  principal  object  of  his  agency,  to  unite  them 
in  methodical  and  permanent  eflbrts  for  tfeie  diffusion  of 
good.  Any  radical  misapprehension  of  the  principles  on 
which  such  undertakings  should  be  conducted,  would  inevi- 
tably have  involved  him  in  defeat.  To  have  approached 
those  whom  he  addressed  for  example,  with  the  mere  claims 
of  authority,  to  have  relied  on  appeals  to  their  selfishness, 
or  offered  ridicule  and  reproach  to  those  who  resisted  his 
solicitations,  yvould  have  been  merely  to  have  excited  their 
indignation  and  provoked  their  contempt.  To  misjudg- 
ment  like  this,  however,  he  was  eminently  superior.  He 
addressed  his  fellow  men  as  rational  beings,  who  are  to  be 
made  efficient  helpers  in  the  great  work  of'  benevolence 
only,  by  becoming  partakers  of  the  same  great  views  of  the 
nature  and  obligations  of  religion,  as  he  himself  entertained, 
and  thence  of  the  same  affections  as  were  the  foundation  of 
his  own  devotedness  to  that  cause.  He  made  persuasion 
accordingly,  mild,  dignified,  and  earnest,  the  sole  means 
of  Ml?  influence  over  them,  and  the  great  truths  of  religion 
the  sole  instrument  of  that  persuasion ;  and  his  success 
in  exciting  their  respect  and  interest,  convincing  their 
judgments,  and  engaging  their  co-operation,  corresponded 
to  the  wisdom  of  his  measures. 

V.  His  views  of  the  possibilities  of  usefulness  to  men 
were  large  and  enlightened. 

It  were  indeed,  apart  from -experience,  a  matter  of  just 

expectation,  from  their  intellectual  and  moral  nature,  that 

13 


98 

wise  and  skilful  efforts  to  enlighten  and  reform  them  must 
meet  with  success.  They  are  indisputably  capable  of  being 
instructed  in  the  great  truths  of  religion,  and  susceptible  of 
influence  from  its  moral  considerations.  Their  sensibilities 
are  precisely  those  which  the  truths  of  the  gospel  are 
adapted  to  excite,  and  consequently  when  brought  to  act 
on  them  in  their  full  force,  they  must  naturally  produce  fit 
and  powerful  effects. 

These  conclusions,  however,  from  the  adaptation  of  the 
moral  means  of  the  gospel  to  the  natures  of  men,  are  amply 
confirmed  by  experience.  All  wisely  directed  efforts  to  bring 
its  influence  to  bear  on  their  sensibilities,  have  proved  more 
or  less  successful,  and  their  success  has  probabl}^,  generally 
been  proportioned  to  the  skill  and  freedom  from  error  with 
which  they  have  been  conducted.  Whenever  they  have  failed, 
it  has  not  been  from  any  defect  in  the  truths  of  Christianity, 
or  want  of  adaptation  to  such  an  instrumentality,  but  from 
some  misjudgment  in  the  method  chosen  of  exhibiting  them, 
or  their  intermixture  with  ignorance,  prejudice,  or  error. 
When  carried  home  to  the  intellect,  conscience  and  heart, 
in  their  purity  and  power,  they  have  ever  proved  mighty  to 
the  pulling  down  of  the  strong  holds  of  sin,  and  turning 
men  from  the  power  of  Satan  unto  God.  Tiiis  great  fact 
of  experience,  and  law  of  the  divine  administration,^on- 
joined  with  the  express  promises  of  the  efficacious  co-opera- 
tion of  the  Holy  Spirit  with  the  instrumentality  of  his  word, 
forms  a  fit  ground  for  the  confident  expectation  of  great 
success  in  all  legitimate  endeavors  to  conduct  men  to 
knowledge  and  obedience.  It  is  the  dictate  of  sound  sense 
and  enlightened  philosophy,  as  well  as  the  part  of  obedient 
faith,  to  anticipate  a  distinguished  blessing  of  heaven  on 
wise  and  strenuous  efforts  to  carry  an  efficacious  influence 


99 

to  their  Jiearts  through  that  means.     The  cause  is  adapted 
to  the  effect,  was  devised  and  appointed  by  God  for  that 
instrumentality ;  the  great  work  of  applying  it  is  enjoined  on 
us  as  a  high  duty ;  and  the  efficacious  agency  of  the  Spirit 
is  promised  to  secure  its  success.     To  doubt  of  his  co-ope- 
ration, therefore,  and  of  that  success  in  the  fulfilment  of  this 
duty,   were    alike  to    distrust   his  veracity   and  question 
his  wisdom.     No  limits  indeed,  can  be  discerned  by  us  to 
the  possibilities  of  usefulness  through  this  instrumentality. 
There  are  instructions  in  the  gospel  adapted  to  every  exi- 
gency for  which   they  can  be  required,  truths   suited   to 
impress  every  sensibility  of  our  nature,  considerations  fitted 
to  counteract  and  disarm  every  temptation  that  ever  assails 
the  human  breast,  and  motives  that  are  adequate  to  awaken 
conscience  and  prompt  obedient  affections,  at  every  step  of 
our  progress  through  life ;  and  our  difficulty  lies  only  in 
discovering  fi-om  the  natu#  of  the  mind  and  its  accustomed 
modes  of  action,  what  those  motives  and  methods  of  apply- 
ing them  are.     Confidence  however  in  the  possibility  and 
likelihood  of  success  in  these  labours,  is  obviously  essential 
to  the  existence  of  efficient  inducements  to  undertake  them. 
With  what  spirit  or  perseverance  could  they  enter  on  such 
enterprises,  who  had  no  conviction  of  the.  adaptedness  of  the 
means  and  agency  which  they  were  to  employ  to  give  birth 
to  such  results,   and  no  reliance  on  the  divine  power  and 
purpose  to  give  efficacy  to  their  eflbrts ;  or  who  regarded  the 
power  of  God   and  the  efficaciousness    of  bis    appointed 
means,  as  circumscribed  within  narrow  and  uncertain  limits.? 
With  men  of  such  sentiments,  Mr.  Evarts  had  no  sym- 
pathy.    His  views  of  the  possibilities^  and  facilities  of  use- 
fulnesss  were  large  and  encouraging,   as  is  seen  firom  the 
nature  and  variety  of  the  undertakings  on  which  he  entered 


100 

for  that  purpose  ;  and  tlie  strenuous  and  persevering  eftbrts 
with  which  he  sought  their  achievement.  He  proceeded  in 
his  plans  and  exertions,  on  the  conviction  that  there  are 
remedies  for  all  the  evils  that  exist ;  and  that  it  is  the  busi- 
ness of  the  philanthropist  and  christian,  in  reliance  on  God, 
to  seek  and  applj'  them,  in  the  expectation  of  success. 

VI.  His  views  were  equally  just  of  our  obligations  to 
labour  fbr  the  welfare  and  salvation  of  our  fellow  men. 

There  are  maily  who  seem  to  regard  every  sacrifice  and 
exertion  for  that  end,  especially  such  as  involve  a  deviation 
from  the  usual  habitS  of  society,  as  little  less  than  a  gratui- 
tous and  supererogatory  effort  of  benevolence.  They  ac- 
cordingly seldom  venture  on  labours  of  that  nature,  except 
under  the  impulse  of  great  occasions,  and  with  extreme  cau- 
tion and  reluctance;  and  never  dream  of  making  the  difl'u- 
sion  of  good  a  business  of  life,  or  regarding  it  as  a  duty,  im- 
posed by  the  high  sanctions  of  i#&son,  humanity  and  reve- 
lation. 

Those,  however,  who  look  at  the  great  fact  that  it  is  the 
decree  of  God,  that  the  appointed  remedies  of  the  sin  and 
misery  which  fill  our  world,  are  to  be  applied  by  human 
instrumentality,  and  that  he  has  provided  and  placed  an 
infinite  store  of  those  remedies  within  our  reach,  and  en- 
joined us  to  employ  ourselves  in  their  application,  will  form 
a  very  different  estimate  of  our  obligations  respecting  this 
•  subject.  What,  if  all  these  considerations  do  not,  can  ever 
constitute  it  our  imperious  dut}'  to  labour  in  this  great  work  ? 
What,  if  all  this  does  not,  can  ever  render  us  responsible  for 
the  ruin  of  those  who  may  perish  in  consequence  of  our 
neglect  ?  The  Most  High,  in  making  these  provisions  for  re- 
moving and  remedying  the  sin  and  sufi'ering  which  ravage 
the  world,  in  appointing  us  his  instruments   in  applying 


101 

tiiem,  in  commanding  us  to  devote  ourselves  t^the  work, 
and  in  crowning  all  our  obedient  exertions  to  fulfil  it  with 
success,  has,  in  an  important  sense,  constituted  us  stewards, 
of  all  the  high  interests  with  which  our  agency  is  thus  con- 
nected, and  made  us  amenable  for  all  the  ill  consequences  of 
our  negligence.  He  has  deposited  with  us,  aS  it  were,  the 
destinies  themselves  of  our  fellow  men,  in  thus  making  it  pos- 
sible to  us  to  convey  to  them  the  knowledge  and  exert  on 
them  the  influence,  which  by  the  established  laws  of  his  ad- 
ministration, will  prove  the  instrument  in  a  multitude  of  in- 
stances of  their  present  and  everlating  well-being  ;  and  he 
will,  indubitably,  therefore,  exact  of  us,  a  rigid  responsibility 
for  our  agency.  It  is  not  to  be  believed  that  no  obligations 
are  imposed  on  us,  by  this  affecting  appointment  of  his  wis- 
dom ;  and  that  no  account  will  be  required  of  the  manner  in 
which  we  fulfil  or  neglect  this  high  trust. 

Had  no  specific  direction  been  given  to  that  effect,  it 
were  obviously  the  part  of  wise  and  benevolent  beings 
spontaneously  to  avail  themselves  of  such  a  proffered  instru- 
mentalitj",  and  gladly  to  carry  their  efforts  in  it  to  the 
utmost  extent  of  their  powers.  Actuated  by  such  a  spirit,  the 
promptings  of  authority,  it  might  be  expected,  could  hardly 
be  necessary  to  excite  them  to  it.  God  has,  however,  by 
the  injunctions  of  his  word,  as  well  as  the  arrangements  of 
his  providence,  made  it  an  essential  business  of  our  lives  to 
labour  for  the  happiness  and  salvation  of  our  fellow  men. 

Such  were,  in  an  eminent  degree,  the  vi^ws  with  which 
this  subject  was  regarded  by  Mr.  Evarts.  He  felt  that  a 
wide  and  momentous  influence  over  his  fellow  men  was  lodged 
in  his  hands  by  the  appointment  of  Providence ;  a  possi- 
bility, vast  and  almost  illimitable,  of  contributing  to  their 
present  and  everlasting  well-being;    that  he  was  entrusted, 


102 

in  a  sense^with  their  character,  their  happiness,  and  their 
destiny ;  and  he  acknowledged  and  responded  to  the  call 
of  duty,  yielded  to  it  the  interest  of  his  he.art,  and  made  its 
fulfilment  the  great  business  of  his  life.  Instead  of  imagin- 
ing that  a  few  occasional  exertions  carried  him  to  the  limits 
of  his  obligations,  and  absolved  him  from  all  necessity  for 
further  eflbrts,  he  rather  made  the  wants  and  necessities  of 
his  fellow  men,  and  the  possibilities  of  his  remedying  them, 
the  measure  of  his  wishes  and  aims ;  and  had  he  lived,  would 
have  continued  to  feel  the  pressure  of  responsibility,  and  the 
excitement  of  benevolent  motives,  as  long  as  any  of  the 
miserable  remained  to  be  relieved,  or  any  of  the  guilty  con- 
tinued to  need  salvation.  » 

VII.  His  views  of  divine  things  and  sense  of  his  relations 
to  God,  were  such  as  to  secure  to  them  a  predominating 
influence  over  him,  and  impart  to  his  religious  affections  an 
unusual  degree  of  energy  and  uniformity. 

The  nature  and  vigour  of  the  affections  which  are  cher- 
ished toward  God,  are  obviously  very  intimately  dependent 
on  the  apprehensions  that  are  entertained  of  his  character  and 
government,  and  our  relations  to  him.  They  must  mani- 
festly, as  far  as  they  extend,  be  essentially  just,  in  order 
that  he  may  in  reality  be  the  object  of  regard;  and  the  ar- 
dour of  the  aff*ection  which  they  excite,  must  correspond  es- 
sentially to  their  extent  and  clearness.  "The  farther  they  are 
enlarged  and  the  higher  they  arc  raised  in  vividness  and 
energy,  the  deeper  and  more  efficacious  are  the  impressions 
which  they  occasion.  Views  of  divine  things  that  are  feeble, 
indistinct,  and  extended  only  to  a  {ew  truths,  produce  but 
slight  emotion,  and  arc  inadequate  to  withstand  the  stronger 
influences  of  the  exciting  objects  of  sense,  which  it  is  their 
chief  office  to  counteract.     It  is  by  •  the  communication  of 


103 

just  apprehensions  of  the  great  truths  relating  to  God,  his 
government  and  ourselves,  with  such  vividness  and  energy, 
as  to  overbear  and  annihilate,  as  it  were,  all  other  influences, 
and  make   a  permanent  and  resistless  impression  on  the 
moral  sensibilities,  that  the  great  change  in  regeneration  is 
wrought.     And  the  nature,  extent,  and  intenseness  of  the 
views  imparted  at  that  crisis  by  the  Almighty  Spirit,  deter- 
mine essentially  the  distinctness  of  that  change,  and  are  the 
measure  of  the  ardor  of  the  new  affecti«ns  which  they  excite. 
The  efi'ect  of  these  new  and  overpowering  conceptions  is, 
to    change  the   whole  current  of  the  mind's  associations. 
The  highest  place  in  its  regard  being  given  to  God,  and  an 
intimate  sense  of  his  presence  infixed  in  it,  self  and  all  other 
objects  sink  down  into  their  proper   subordination,  come 
habitually  to  be  viewed  chiefly  in  their  relations  to  him,  and 
thence    become  the    means    perpetually   of   recalling  the 
thoughts  to  him,  by  the  manifestations  which  they  present 
of  his. power,  wisdom  and  benevolence.     The  habit  of  thus 
contemplating  objects  and  events  in  their  relations  to  God, 
and  being  transported  by  them  to  him,  is  one  of  the  most 
peculiar  characteristics  of  the  renewed  mind,  and  the  quick- 
ness, vigour  and  uniformity  of  these   associations,  are  in  a 
large  degree,  a  measure  of  its  piety.     As  the  ardour  of 
the  aflections  corresponds  to  the  accuracy  and  extent  of 
the  views  of  divine  things,  by  which   they  afe  excited,  so 
the  frequency  of  their  recurrence,  and  the  length  of  their 
continuance,  depends  much  on  the  vigour  and  vivacity  of  the 
associating  power,  by  which  they  are  suggested  to  the  notice 
from  their  connexions  with  the  current  objects  and  events  of 
life.     But  little  progress  can  be  made  in  religion,  except 
where  this  susceptibility  is  raised  to  vigour  and  habitual  acti- 
vity. Where  God  is  but  seldom  the  object  of  thought  through 


104 

the  day  or  week,  and  lils  works  and  providence  contempla- 
ted in  their  relations  to  him,  there  obviously  at  best  can  be 
but  little  piety.  It  is  the  characteristic  of  the  wicked, 
that  God  is  not  in  all  his  thoughts  ;  and  one  of  the  most 
distinguishing  peculiarities  of  his  children,  that  he  is  habit- 
ually present  to  them,  and  seen  and  recognised  in  all  his 
works.  The  most  indissoluble  of  the  connexions  that  sub- 
sist between  any  of  their  views,  are  those  which  unite  their 
perceptions  of  the  objects  and  events  around  them  with  him, 
and  the  quickest  and  most  resistless  of  their  associations, 
those  by  which  they  are  incessantly  transported  from  earth 
to  heaven. 

The  alacrity  and  vigour  of  this  associating  power,  is 
doubtless  in  a  great  degree  the  result  of  cultivation.  Like 
all  other  mental  susceptibilities,  it  is  greatly  cherished  and 
strengthened  by  habit,  and  often  instantaneously  receives  a 
powerful  excitement  and  confirmation  from  tliose  events  of 
providence,  which  revive  a  sense  of  dependence  on  God, 
and  evince  the  uncertainty  and  insufficiency  of  all  enjoy- 
ments but  those  of  religion.  The  task,  however,  of  main- 
taining it  in  its  freshness  and  superiority,  and  overpowering 
through  its  instrumentality  those  associations  to  which  they 
had  been  accustomed  antecedently  to  regeneration,  is  one 
of  the  most  difficult  which  the  recently  renewed,  are  called 
to  perform.  'Severe  struggles  are  often  required  to  recall 
those  apprehensions  of  divine  things,  which  disarm  tempta- 
tion, and  to  fasten  the  eye  on  them  in  such  fixedness,  as  to 
call  up  the  obedient  affections  which  they  are  accustomed 
to  excite,  and  with  sufficient  energy  to  counteract  the  influ- 
ence of  opposing  objects.  To  those  however  who  have 
been  longer  addicted  to  this  warfare,  and  whose  views  have 
been  enlarged,  and  associations  fixed,. it  is  comparatively  a 


105 

ivork  of  ease.  The  heart  learns  to  ascend  spontaneously 
as  it  were,  to  heaven  as  its  home,  and  the  thoughts  of  that 
world  with  which  it  has  become  familiar,  instinctively 
present  themselves,  at  the  recurrence  of  the  objects  with 
which  they  are  associated. 

The  cultivation  of  this  susceptibility  is  one  of  the  high- 
est duties  of  life  ;  and  their  subservience  to  it,  one  of  the 
most 'important  advantages  derived  from  conversation  on 
religious  topics,  meditation,  study,  and  the  acts  themselves 
of  devotion  ;  and  it  may  doubtless  be  carried  to  a  far  great- 
er degree^  than  is  usual  even  with  those  who  are  most  dis- 
tinguished for  piety.  Those  who  have  carefully  noticed  the 
characters  which  are  presented  in  the  Scriptures,  of  holy 
men  of  old,  cannot  have  failed  to  observe  that  an  intimate 
association  of  all  their  pursuits,  enjoyments,  sufferings  and 
hopes  with  God,  was  one  of  their  most  conspicuous  traits. 

Such  was  eminently  a  characteristic  hkewise  of  Mr. 
Evarts.  His  views  of  divine  things  and  sense  of  his  re- 
lations to  God,  were  so  just,  enlarged  and  vivid,  as  to  ren- 
der his  associations  with  them  quicker  and  stronger  than 
with  any  other  objects ;  and  to  give  them  consequently,  a 
distinguished  predominance  over  him.  He  was  accustomed 
accordingly  in  an  unusual  degree,  to  an  habitual  recogni- 
tion of  the  hand  of  God  in  all  the  events  of  providence  af- 
fecting his  condition  and  happiness,  to  prayerfulness,  thank- 
fulness for  blessings,  submission  under  trials,  patience  in 
suffering,  rehance  on  God  for  guidance  and  success  in  all 
his  efforts  to  advance  the  interests  of  humanity  and  religion, 
self-possession  in  prosperity,  and  humbleness  amid  the  de- 
monstrations of  his  great  and  acknowledged  usefulness. 

Vn.  These  predominating  characteristics  of  his  intellect 
and  heart,  formed  a  natural  ground  for  the  distinguished 

14 


106 

exemption    from    selfislmess    and    sinister    considerations, 
which  marked  his  official  career. 

To  one  over  whom  the  great  realities  of  religion  had  not 
acquired  a  thorough  supremacy,  and  habitually  adjusted 
his  principles,  passions,  and  habits,  to  his  relations  and  ob- 
ligations to  God,  a  station  like  that  to  which  he  was  called, 
would  naturally  offer  maiiy  and  powerful  temptations  to 
yield  to  selfish  affections,  and  allow  them  to  tinge  his  whole 
character.  There  are  few  wiio  are  so  entirely  inaccessible  to 
the  suggestions  of  vanity,  or  deaf  to  the  whispers  of  ambi- 
tion, as  never  to  be  betrayed  by  the  consciousness  of  influ- 
ence and  respect,  into  a  false  confidence  in  themselves,  or 
an  unwise  and  unauthorized  assumption  over  others.  In 
the  vain  and  arrogant  especially,  such  a  perfection  of  self- 
government  is  never  seen.  Instinct  with  those  odious 
affections,  they,  as  a  matter  of  course,  pollute  and  degrade 
with  their  egotism,  every  enterprise  even  on  which  they 
(enter  simply  as  agents  or  executors  of  the  Avill  of  others. 
They  are  accustomed  to  invest  themselves  personally  with 
the 'rights  which  they  are  simply  employed  to  represent,  to 
transmute  the  public  objects  they  are  appointed  to  sustain 
into  mere  private  interests,  and  to  appropriate  to  themselves 
the  credit  of  all  the  utility  and  applause  which  those  objects 
may  happen  to  occasion.  They  who  act  with  theni  accord- 
ingly, sink  down  in  their  eye,  into  the  rank  of  mere  re- 
tainers and  vassals;  and  they  who  venture  to  dissent  from 
their  judgment,  or  disapprove  of  any  of  their  recommenda- 
tions or  claims,  are  at  once  regarded  as  personally  hostile, 
and  denounced  as  incori'igible  enemies  likewise  of  re- 
ligion. Such  beings,  howevei^  are  obviously  as  weak  as 
they  are  vain,  and  seldom  lail,  in  the  end,  to  show  them- 
selves to  be  as  unprincipled  as  they  are  selfish.     Their  leal 


107 

has.  Its  whole  origin  in  that  affection  ;  and  the  expected 
subservience  of  their  labours  to  their  own  aggrandisement, 
is  the  measure  both  of  their  energy  and  duration.  Tiiey 
continue  to  bustle  and  clamour  with  the  utmost  diligence, 
as  long  as  they  succeed  in  attracting  public  notice,  and  sus- 
tain the  credit  of  disinterestedness  and  libeirality  ;  but  when 
the  public  eye  begins  to  penetrate  the  disguises  thrown  over 
their  character,  and  the  din  of  applause  dies  away,  their 
ardour  subsides  ;  and  like  mountebanks  who  find  it  neces- 
sary to  move  perpetually  from  place  to  place  to  find  new 
subjects  for  their  jugglery,  they  turn  immediately  to  other 
fields  for  the  gratification  of  their  selfishness.  Of  all  the 
odious  modifications  of  character  that  are  seen  in  society, 
this  is  one  of  the  most  disgusting,  and  unfit  to  be  intrusted 
with  any  agency  in  the  conduct  of  benevolent  institutions. 

To  weaknesses  and  follies  like  these,  Mr.  Evarts  was 
wholly  superior.  His  elevation  to  a  station  of  influence 
and  usefulness  did  not  jostle  him  from  his  proper  attitude, 
neither  changed  his  sentiments  respecting  himself,  nor 
altered  his  views  o-f  his  relations  to  God.  Its  only  efiect 
was  to  give  a  greater  intensity  to  his  feeling  of  responsi- 
bility, and  a  stronger  Impulse  to  every  Inducement  to  cir- 
cumspection and  wisdom  in  his  ponduct.  He  accordingly 
exhibited  in  all  his  agency,  a  disinterestedness,  and  main- 
tained a  dignity  eminently  becoming  his  station  as  a 
steward  intrusted  by  God  with  the  supervision  and  sup- 
part  of  enterprises  most  Intimately  Involving  the  Interests  of 
the  dh'Ine  kingdom,  and  devoted  himself  to  their  advance- 
ment with  an  exemption  from  personal  considerations,  and 
a  regard  to  God,  much  like  that  with  which  he  engaged  in 
acts  of  public  worship,  or  entered  on  the  duties  of  the  closet. 
He  maintained  an  appropriate  attitude  likewise  toward  his 


108 

fellow  men  in  liisofficialintercourse  with  them;  cmployjing 
only  the  great  persuasions  of  humanity  and  religion  to  in- 
terest thern  in  the  objects  for  which  he  sought  their  support; 
not  the  relations  which  those  objects  happened  to  sustain 
to  himself;  and  treating  their  benefactions  as  testimonies  of 
their  interest  in  those  objects,  and  as  gifts  to  God  ;  not 
as  tokens  of  homage  to  his  superiority,  or  tributes  exacted 
by  his  rights.  And  to  his  solicitations  of  aid  from  others, 
he  added  the  sanction  of  his  own  example ;  asking  no 
efforts  from  them  which  he  had  not  himself  already  made, 
and  proposing  no  sacrifices  to  which  he  was  not  himself 
accustomed  to  submit.  He  thus  diffused  over  his  labours 
at  large,  the  loveliness,  dignity,  and  energy  of  an  upright 
and  ardent  benevolence,  and  made  his  whole  agency  an 
act,  as  it  were,  of  religion, — a  sublime  example  of  disin- 
terestedness, zeal,  and  piety,  which  it  were  well,  not  only 
for  boastful  vanity  to  kneel  down  and  study,  and  ambitious 
selfishness  to  endeavour  to  comprehend  and  imitate,  but 
that  is  worthy  to  attract  the  regard,  and  command  the  ad- 
miration, of  all  who  aim  at  usefulness,  and  aspire  to  dis- 
charge the  duties  of  public  stations  with  blameles.sness,  dig- 
nity, and  effect. 

IX.  He  was  distinguished  by  an  equal  exemption  from 
the  spirit  of  sectarianism  and  partisanship.  He  made  it  his 
own  and  the  object  of  the  institution  with  which  he  was 
connected,  solely  to  disseminate  the  blessings  of  knowledge, 
civilization  and  religion,  not  to  advance  the  interests  of 
Congregationalism,  Presbytei-ianism,  or  any  other  denomi- 
national peculiarity ;  and  drew  the  inducements  on  which  he 
relied  to  engage  the  approval  and  co-operation  of  others, 
from  the  great  considerations  of  humanity  and  religion — the 
only  ground  obviously  en  which  such  undertakings  should 


1 09 

he  placed,  and  the  only  motives  for  their  support,  that  can 
have  any  efficient  and  lasting  influence.  He  was,  doubt- 
less, more  strongly  attached  to  that  branch  of  the  church 
with  which  he  was  connected  than  to  any  other,  but  gave  it 
only  that  subordinate  place  in  his  regard,  to  which  it  was 
entitled.  The  consideration  whether  the  labors  of  a  mis- 
sionary institution  will  make  men  Congregationalists,  Epis- 
copalians, or  Presbyterians,  is  of  very  slight  moment  com- 
pared with  the  question  whether  they  will  contribute  to  en- 
lighten them  in  the  knowledge  of  the  gospel,  and  conduct 
them  to  salvation. 

X.  These  views,  sentiments  and  habits,  which  formed  the 
great  essentials  of  his  character,  were  conjoined  with  em- 
inently just  apprehensions  of  the  dependence  of  all  human 
instrumentality,  on  the  divine  co-operation  for  success  ;  ap- 
prehensions which,  while  they  present  the  highest^  encou- 
ragements to  efforts,  lead  also  to  a  supreme  reliance  on  God. 
Legitimate  and  enlightened  views  of  our  dependence  on 
him,  recognize  the  fact,  that  the  eflects  which  are  to  be  ac- 
complished by  our  agency,  are  to  be  obtained  through  the 
instrumentality  of  the  means  which  lie  has  provided,  and 
required  us  to  employ  for  their  production,  as  well  as 
the  fact  of  his  supreme  dominion  over  all  his  works,  and 
ability  to  accomplish  all  his  will.  They  accordingly,  in 
place  of  damping  hope,  or  paralyzing  exertion,  are  adapted 
in  the- highest  degree  to  excite  to  efforts.  Instead  of  leav- 
ing us  to  rely  solely  on  our  own  weakness  and  incompe- 
tency, they  present  the  arm  of  Omnipotence  for  our  support, 
and  confirm  and  justify  our  expectations,  by  the  sanction 
and  aid  of  infinite  wisdom.  They  make,  in  short,  the  at- 
tributes of  God  the  basis  of  our  confidence,  and  thus  fur- 
nish the  highest  inducements  to  exertion,  and  the  strongest 
assurances  of  success. 


no 

The  influence  of*  these  views  was  happily  exemplified  in 
Mv.  Evarts,  who  was  alike  distinguished  for  an  habitual  re- 
cognition of  his  dependence  on  God,  for  reliance  on  him, 
and  for  the  cheerfulness,  energ}^  and  extent  of  his  labors  in 
his  cause.  He  was  equally  removed  on  the  one  hand,  from 
the  error  of  those  who  regard  God  as  having  abandoned  his 
empire  to  the  sway  of  his  subjects,  or  left  events  to  depend 
on  uncontrolled  causes ;  and  from  the  folly  of  those  on  the 
other,  who  doubt  the  dependence  on  him  of  his  works,  and 
the  possibility  of  his  controlling  the  conduct  of  his  crea- 
tures. Regarding  God  as  omnipotent  and  supreme  in  his 
sway  over  all  his  works,  and  human  instrumentality,  ex- 
erted in  diligence,  prayerfulness,  and  trust,  as  his  appointed 
channel  of  communicating  blessings  to  men,  he  devoted  him- 
self to  the  labors  of  his  station  with  pre-eminent  alacrity, 
cheerfulness  and  confidence  of  success,  and  in  place  of 
despair  or  embarrassment,  derived  his  highest  encourage^ 
ment  from  the  nature  of  his  dependence  on  God. 

Such  were  some  of  the  chief  elements  of  his  intellectual 
and  moral  character,  which  were  the  grounds  of  the  distin- 
guished respect  with  which  he  was  regarded,  and  causes  of 
his  eminent  usefulness ;  and  they  obviously  formed  a  fit  and 
adequate  foundation  for  such  an  influence,  and  entitled  him 
to  that  regard,  and  must  be  equally  possessed  and  cultivated 
by  all  who  would  emulate  him  in  dignity  and  beneficence, 
or  wish  their  fall  like  his,  to  excite  the  regrets  of  learning, 
benevolence  and  piety,  and  cause  the  blessings  of  communi- 
ties and  nations  to  follow  them  to  their  sepulchres. 

The  distinguished  dignity  and  success  with  which  Mr. 
Evarts  discharged  the  duties  of  his  ofiicial  station,  strongly 
illustrate  the  importance  of  placing  men  of  similar  compe- 
tence at  the  head  of  such  institutions.     The  duties  of  such 


ni 

statioivs  pre-eminently  require  vigorous  and  cultivated  potr" 
ers,  prudence,  integrity,  a  liberal  and  independent  spii'it, 
just  views  of  men,  and  promptness  and  skill  in  the  dispatch 
of  business.  It  was  his  energy,  knowledge,  good  taste,  wis- 
dom, and  superiority  to  selfish  and  worldly  aims,  that  en- 
abled him  to  command  the  respect  of  the  church,  to  render 
it  a  pleasure  to  the  friends  of  religion  to  co-operate  with 
him,  and  to  meet  the  various  exigencies  of  his  office  widi 
such  success.  Had  it  been  occupied  by  a  rash,  vain^ 
haughty,  and  ambitious  being,  the  institution,  in  place  of 
advancing  to  such  a  rank  in  dignity  and  usefulness,  would 
have  sunk  into  inefficiency,  or  become  a  mere  instrument  of 
mischief.  One  of  the  highest  duties,  therefore,  which  the 
directors  of  such  societies  owe  to  the  public,  is  to  place  men 
at  their  head,  whose  talents,  principles,  taste  and  manners, 
are. such  as  become  such  stations,  and  will  render  their 
agency  in  all  its  influences,  safe  and  propitious. 

He  presents  an  illustrious  example  of  that  species  of  in- 
fluence to  which  wise  men  may  with  propriet}'  aspire. 

The  object  at  which  he  aimed  was,  to  benefit  men  by 
communicating  to  them  useful  knowledge,  elevating  their 
principles,  and  guiding  them  to  salvation.  What  a  contrast 
to  the  aims  of  avarice,  ambition,  and  vanity,  which  struggle 
•solely  to  monopolize  every  good,  and  sacrifice  the  interests, 
happiness  and  salvation  of  those  who  stand  in  the  way  of 
their  gratification  !  What  a  contrast  between  the  effects  of 
his  agency  and  theirs  who  make  themselves  conspicuous 
in  politics,  war  and  much  of  the  literature  of  the  day  ! 
Their  career  is  fruitful  of  little  else  than  temptation,  injury, 
and  ruin,  not  unfrequently,  to  others.  They  carry  seduc- 
tion to  the  softer,  or  provocation  to  the  stronger  passions, 
violence  to  the  rights,  injury  to  the  persons,  and  ruin  to  the 


112 

souls  of"  men.  What  a  boundless  waste  of  time  and  cor- 
ruption of  principles  has  the  fame  of  many  of  the  distin- 
guished writers  of  the  present  century  cost  the  civilized 
world?  .What  an  infinite  sum  of  ignorance,  degradation, 
crime  and  misery,  result  from  the  career  of  a  Metternich  or 
Pplignac  ?  What  seas  of  blood  and  tears,  what  a  world  of 
su/Tcrings  and  death  are  the  price  of  the  triumphs  and  re- 
nown of  a  Cresar  or  Bonaparte  ?  They  sweep  like  tem- 
pests over  the  earth,  and  spread  it  with  devastation  and 
ruin.  The  influences  of  such  men  as  Mr.  Evarts  come 
like  benignant  showers  and  sunshine  to  repair  their  desola- 
tions, and  readorn  the  earth  with  verdure  and  beauty.  His 
agency  carried  no  temptation  to  the  passions  of  his  fellow- 
men,  no  corruption  to  their  principles,  no  ruin  to  their 
hopes ;  but  imparted  knowledge  the  most  needed,  spread  a 
salutary  influence  over  their  morals,  and  *guided  them  to 
heaven.  To  how  many  intellects  was  he  the  instrument  of 
thus  conveying  juster. apprehensions  of  God;  to  how  many 
consciences  of  imparting  a  salutary  impulse  to  duty ;  in 
how  many  hearts  of  touching  the  secret  springs  of  sympa- 
thy, and  calling  up  a  current  of  obedient  afl'eclions  !  In  how 
many  minds  were  causes  in  this  manner  lodged  in  con- 
nexion with  his  agency,  which  shall  continue  to  give  birth 
to  those  eflfects,  and  contribute  to  their  dignity,  holiness, 
and  usefulness  through  long  periods  yet  to  come  !  With 
what  difterent  emotions  must  he  and  such  beings  as  Hume, 
Voltaire,  and  Bonaparte,  survey  tlieir  respective  agencies  ! 
They  can  see  httle  else  than  degradation,  sin,  and  misery 
resulting  from  their  boundless  influence  here  ;  nothing  but 
shame  and  suflering  to  themselves,  and  perdition  to  others 
there.  The  fruits  of  his  are  knowledge,  happiness,  holiness 
and  salvation.     Arid  while  they  are,  perhaps,  assailed  at 


113 

every  step  of  their  progress,  by  the  execrations  of  new 
crowds  whom  their  agency  continues  to  beguile  to  ruin,  and 
futurity  promises  only  an  ever  swelling  tide  of  infamy  and 
suffering  ;  he  may  continue  to  receive  the  greetings  of  fresh 
multitudes  whom  his  labours  through  long  periods  yet  to 
come,  shall  contribute  to  bless  and  save.  Who  would  ex- 
change such  an  influence,  for  all  the  possessions  and  honours 
that  earth  can  give  ?  Such  are  the  influences  to  which  wis- 
dom may  aspire  ;  such  is  the  agency  at  which  it  becomes  a 
christian  to  aim. 

The  beneficent  career  of  Mr.  Evarts  presents  an  instruc- 
tive exemplification  of  the  possibilities  of  usefulness,  which 
the  present  condition  of  the  church  and  world  offers  to  all. 
His  is  to  be  traced,  not  to  any  such  splendor  of  endow- 
ments, as  is  seldom  equalled  or  never  surpassed  ;  nor  to  any 
such  advantages  of  condition,  as  never  fall  to  the  lot  of 
others ; — but  chiefly  to  the  wise  cultivation  of  his  powers, 
the  rectitude  of  his  principles,  and  his  zeal,  disinterestedness, 
and  diligence.  Let  others  cultivate  their  endowments  with 
a  similar  industry  and  wisdom,  furnish  themselves  with 
equal  acquisitions  of  useful  knowledge,  and  exhibit  as  dis- 
tinguished an  elevation  of  principle,  dignity  of  manners, 
fervor  of  piety,  and  generous  activity  in  the  cause  of  huma- 
nity and  religion  ;  and  they  will  find  no  greater  obstructions 
than  he  was  called  to  encounter,  to  as  eminent  a  respect 
and  as  beneficent  an  influence. 

It  is  consolatory,  at  the  fall  of  such  an  individual,  to 
reflect  how  easy  it  is  for  that  great  Being,  who  called  him 
into  existence,  and  conducted  him  through  his  bright  career, 
to  raise  up  others  to  fill  and  add  lustre  to  his  station ;  and 
that  amid  the  multitudes  scattered  through  our  land,  whom 

parental  piety  is  now  consecrating  to  God  and  instructim 

15 


114 

in  the  lessons  of  wisdom,  and  over  whom  science  is  shed- 
dine;  her  sahitary  light,  and  religion  her  redeeming  influ- 
ence, the  requisite  materials  are  preparing  to  sustain  and 
carry  forward  his  cause,  as  those  who  now  occupy  the  scene 
shall  successively  pass  away  ;  the  sacred  bands  are  training 
who  are  to  urge  on  the  commencing  dawn,  or  usher  in,  by 
their  instrumentality,  the  opening  glories  of  the  millenial 
morning,  and  witness  the  wonders  of  the  progress,  or  exult 
at  the  completion  of  the  work,  at  the  earlier  stages  of  which 
it  was  the  lot  of  Mr.  Evarts  to  exert  so  distinguished  an 
agency. 

Who  those  favored  beings  are,  it  is  not  now  the  gift  of 
mortals  to  discern.  They  are  among  those,  however,  it 
is  enough  to  know,  whom  piety  is  devoting  to  God ;  whom 
faithfulness  is  imbuing  with  the  holiest  instructions  ;  whom 
pure  examples,  pious  counsels,  and  affectionate  exhortations 
are  urging  to  the  Savior ;  whom  parental  love  is  daily, 
"  with  strong  crying  and  tears"  commending  to  Him  whose 
Spirit  requires  but  to  be  sought,  to  be  enjoyed ;  and  all 
whose  blessings  need  but  to  be  asked,  to  be  received. 


X 


<^^^M(^JU 


VIEW  S 


THEOLOGY, 


No.  X.     Vol..  III. 


MAY    1832. 


NEWYORK: 
JOHN  P.  HAVEN,  142  NASSAU-STREET, 

AMERICAN  TRACT  SOCIETV'S  HOUSE. 

1832. 


•y^ 


J.  SBTMOVR,  PRINTER, 

ANN-STREET,  CORNER  OF  NASSAU. 


CONTENTS. 


Art.  I. — Mr.  Coleridge's  Metaphysics      ....     118 

Art.  II. — The  Christian  Spectator's  Review  of  Dr. 

Fisk 156 

Art.  III. — A  Letter  to  Rev.  Joel  Hawes,  D.  D.  on 

Dr.  Taylor's  Theological  Views     .     .     217 


The  Views  in  Theology  will  continue  to  be  published 
semi-annually,  in  May  and  November,  and  be  devoted 
chiefly,  as  heretofore,  to  discussion  on  the  Doctrines  of 
Religion.  Four  numbers  will  form  a  volume.  Those  who 
desire  the  work,  will  please  to  give  notice  to  the  publisher, 
at  142  Nassau-street.  Ministers  and  theological  students 
of  whatever  denomination,  will  receive  it,  if  desired,  with- 
out charge. 


IS 


MR.  COLERIDGE'S  METAPIIYSICS. 


Among  the  events  of  the  age  that  may  be  regarded  as 
indicating  to  the  great  family  of  man  the  approach  of  a 
happier  era,  the  increasing  attention  to  the  study  of  human 
nature,  and  the  juster  views  that  are  beginning  to  prevail  on 
many  of  the  great  questions  that  respect  it,  hold  an  impor- 
tant rank.  Whether  the  instrumentality  of  this  branch  of 
knowledge  is  to  be  as  great  as  it  is  entitled  to  exert,  or 
not,  it  can  scarcely  admit  of  question  that  a  general  preva- 
lence of  correct  apprehensions  respecting  it,  must  naturally 
carry  with  it  a  speedy  and  wide  improvement  in  almost 
every  department  of  life.  Beside  its  propitious  influence 
on  education  and  manners,  it  would  also,  almost  necessa- 
rily, among  the  most  certain  of  its  benefits,  give  birth  to  a 
reformation  of  the  false  systems  of  government  which  con- 
tribute so  largely  to  perpetuate  the  degradation  and  misery 
of  the  rac  e;  as  well  as  to  correct  the  perversions  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  obstructions  to  its  influence,  which  those 
governments  in  so  many  instances  legalize  and  uphold. 
Precisely  in  proportion  as  just  views  of  ourselves,  and  the 
causes  that  influence  us  are  entertained,  the  conviction 
will  take  place  that  the  motives  that  spring   from   personal 

16 


120 

freedom  and  security,  from  knowledge  and  religion,  arc  the 
only  proper  and  cflicacious  instruments  of  restraining  evil 
passions  and  prompting  to  virtue  ;  not  those  that  have  their 
origin  in  ignorance,  dependence,  poverty,  and  wretched- 
ness, and  are  impressed  by  mere  force  or  superstition  :  and 
that  the  more  enlightened  men  are  in  all  the  great  branches 
of  knowledge  that  affect  their  well  being,  the  better  they 
comprehend  their  mutual  rights,  and  their  relations  and 
obligations  to  God,  and  the  more  amply  they  possess  in 
themselves  the  means  of  enjoyment ;  the  more  easily  arc 
they  controlled  by  mild  and  equitable  restraints,  and  made 
subservient  to  all  the  great  and  useful  ends,  for  which  the 
co-operation  of  numbers,  or  the  agency  of  communities  and 
governments  is  required.  And  when  these  shall  become 
the  fixed  convictions  of  the  authors  as  well  as  the  obeyers 
of  laws,  the  rod  of  oppression  will  be  voluntarily  relin- 
quished by  those  even  who  possessing  Unrestrained  power, 
have  heretofore  known  no  other  guide  than  the  caprices  of 
passion,  as  unsuited  to  the  objects  as  well  as  incompatible 
with  the  security  of  government,  and  kings  become  the 
fathers  of  their  subjects,  and  make  it  the  great  business  of 
their  station  to  educate  their  people  to  knowledge,  virtue, 
piety,  and  the  happiness  of  which  they  are  the  means,  as 
the  appropriate  and  sole  method  and  end  of  a  successful 
and  honorable  empire. 

The  prevalence  of  such  views  of  the  great  principles  of  our 
nature,  and  the  ends  of  our  being,  will  likewise  carry  with 
it,  with  equal  certainty,  a  reformation  of  those  artificial 
establishments  for  the  support  and  propagation  of  religion, 
that  are  the  ofi'spring  and  instruments  of  unwise  and  unequal 
governments,  and  which  making  like  them,  authority  and 
force  the  chief  means  of  their  inlliience,  usually  degenerate 


121 

into  nurseries  of  worldliness  and  superstition.  These  institu- 
tions are  in  truth  scarcely  less  incompatible  with  a  just  theory 
of  human  nature,  than  they  are  with  the  simplicity  and 
purity  of  the  gospel :  as  carrying  as  they  do,  in  their  nat- 
ural operation,  injury  and  irritation  to  the  community  ; 
calling  into  activity  the  passions  they  are  meant  to  subdue, 
and  arming  temptation  with  additional  energy,  instead  of 
counteracting  its  power;  they  necessarily  make  religion 
and  its  associated  interests  the  objects  to  a  great  degree  of 
aversion,  in  place  of  veneration  and  love. 

Whatever  the  relation  may  be,  however,  of  the  prevalent 
systems  of  metaphysics  to  the  existing  civil  and  ecclesiasti- 
cal institutions,  the  systems  which  have  for  a  long  period 
prevailed  on  this  subject,  arc  indisputably  fraught  with 
great  imperfections ;  excluding  many  essential  truths,  and 
involving  a  large  share  of  error.  And  the  methods  them- 
selves in  which  their  authors  and  adopters  have  conducted 
their  speculations,  have  been  such  as  almost  necessarily  to 
preclude  them  from  a  perfect  system  of  truth  :  one  class 
of  them  having  professedly  restricted  their  search  after  it 
within  the  circle  of  experience  and  observation,  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  important  aids  that  are  furnished  by  the  word 
of  God ;  and  the  other  having  made  it  their  chief  business 
to  construct  a  set  of  arbitrary  theories  for  the  explana- 
tion of  a  few  facts  and  doctrines  of  that  revelation,  without 
either  regarding  those  solutions  of  them  with  which  we  are 
furnished  by  the  scriptures  themselves  ;  or  the  coincident, 
though  often  feebler  explanations  that  are  announced  to  us 
by  the  voice  of  consciousness.  The  consequence  has  been 
that  these  systems  have  in  many  important  particulars  con- 
tradicted alike  the  voice  of  nature  and  inspiration,  and 
proved  as  inadequate  to  solve  many  of  the  events  of  ordi- 


122 

nary  experience,  as  the  peculiar  phenomena  of  a  religious 
life.  Of  the  fact  itself  that  the  current  systems  of  metaphy- 
sics are  thus  frauglit  witii  imperfection,  many  are  becoming 
deeply  sensible  ;  and  the  conviction  is  strongly  felt,  of  the 
desirableness  of  a  modification  of  the  science,  that  shall 
unite  the  light  of  revelation  with  that  of  experience,  and 
carry  us  forward  to  all  the  just  results  of  which  the  materi- 
als exist  in  those  sources.  Respecting  the  nature  of  these 
imperfections  however,  a  far  wider  variety  of  opinion  exists, 
and  the  expedients  that  are  proposed  for  their  remedy,  arc 
marked  by  an  equal  or  still  greater  diversity. 

Among  these,  the  suggestions  of  Mr.  Coleridge  in  his 
Aids  to  Reflection  and  Friend,  are  naturally,  from  his  lit- 
erary reputation,  and  the  recommendation  by  President 
Marsh,  with  which  they  are  accompanied,  attracting  a 
share  of  attention,  and  are  suited,  if  adopted,  to  introduce 
important  changes  in  the  systems  that  are  generally  receiv- 
ed on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic.  To  determine  their  claims 
to  such  an  influence,  will  not  render  any  consideration  ne- 
cessary of  a  large  portion  of  the  topics  of  which  those 
volumes  treat ;  which  though  highly  novel,  amusing,  and 
in  most  instances,  instructive,  have  no  direct  relation  to 
metaphysics.  I  shall  accordingly  limit  my  attention  to 
those  views,  which  both  the  author  and  editor  regard  as  in- 
volving important  improvements  on  the  prevalent  systems 
of  mental  science. 

I.  The  first  of  these  which  I  shall  notice,  to  which  both 
Mr.  Coleridge  and  President  Marsh  attach  a  very  high 
importance,  is  a  proposed  distinction  between  the  under- 
standing and  reason,  founded  as  it  would  seem  on  the  di- 
versity of  the  objects  towards  which  the  perceptive  power 
is  directed,  rather  than  on  any  dissimilarity  in  the  nature 
of  its  acts  themselves 


123 


The  ground  and  nature  of  this  distinction,  as  presented 
by  Mr.  Marsh  may  be  seen  from  the  following  passage  of 
his  essay  prefixed  to  the  Aids  to  Reflection. 

"  It  must  have  been  observed  by  the  reader  of  the  foregoing  pages, 
that  I  have  used  several  words,  especially  understanding  and  reason, 
in  a  sense  somewhat  diverse  from  their  present  acceptation  ;  and  the 
occasion  of  this  I  suppose  would  be  partly  understood  from  my 
having  already  directed  the  attention  of  the  reader  to  the  distinction 
exhibited  between  these  words  in  the  work,  and  from  the  remarks 
made  on  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  reason  in  its  common  use.  I 
now  proceed  to  remark,  that  the  ambiguity  spoken  of,  and  the  con- 
sequent perplexity  in  regard  to  the  use  and  authority  of  reason,  have 
arisen  from  the  habit  of  using,  since  the  time  of  Locke,  the  terms 
understanding  and  reason  indiscriminately,  and  thus  confounding  a 
distinction  clearly  marked  in  the  philosophy  and  in  the  language  of 
the  older  writers.  Alas !  had  the  terms  only  been  confounded,  or 
had  we  suffered  only  an  inconvenient  ambiguity  of  language,  there 
would  be  comparatively  little  cause  for  earnestness  upon  the  subject : 
or  had  our  views  of  the  things  signified  by  these  terms  been  only 
partially  confused,  and  had  we  still  retained  correct  notions  of  our 
prerogative,  as  rational  and  spiritual  beings,  the  consequences  might 
have  been  less  deplorable.  But  the  misfortune  is,  tlmt  the  powers 
of  understanding  and  reason  have  not  merely  been  blended  and  con- 
founded in  the  view  of  our  philosophy,  the  higher  and  far  more 
characteristic,  as  an  essential  constituent  of  our  proper  humanity, 
has  been  as  it  were  obscured  and  hidden  from  our  observation  in  the 
inferior  power,  which  belongs  to  us  in  common  with  the  brutes  that 
perish.  According  to  the  old,  the  more  spiritual,  and  genuine  phi- 
losophy, the  distinguishing  attributes  of  our  humanity — that  "image 
of  God"  in  which  man  alone  was  created  of  all  the  dwellers  upon 
earth,  and  in  virtue  of  which  he  was  placed  at  the  head  of  this  lower 
world,  was  said  to  be  found  in  the  reason  and  free-will.  But  under- 
standing these  in  their  strict  and  proper  sense,  and  according  to  the 
true  ideas  of  them,  as  contemplated  by  the  older  metaphysicians,  we 
have  literally,  if  the  system  of  Locke  and  the  popular  philosophy  of 
the  day  be  true,  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  of  these — neither 
reason  nor  free-will.  What  they  esteemed  the  image  of  God  in  the 
soul,  and  considered  as  distinguishing  us  specifically,  and  so  vastly 
too,  above  each  and  all  of  the  irrational  animals,  is  found,  according 


124 


to  this  system,  to  have  in  fact  no  real  existence.  The  reality  neither 
of  the  free-will,  nor  of  any  of  those  laws  or  ideas,  which  spring  from, 
or  rather  constitute,  reason,  can  be  authenticated  by  the  sort  of 
proof  which  is  demanded,  and  we  must  therefore  relinquish  our  pre- 
rogative, and  take  our  place  with  becoming  humility  among  our 
more  unpretending  companions." — Preliminary  Essay,  p.  xxxviii, 
xxxix. 

To  this  may  be  added  the  following  passages  from  Mr. 
Coleridge. 

"  The  definition  and  proper  character  of  man,  that,  namely,  which 
should  contra-distinguish  him  from  the  animals,  is  to  be  taken  from 
his  reason,  rather  than  from  his  understanding;  in  regard  that 
in  other  creatures,  there  may  be  something  of  understanding,  but 
there  is  nothing  of  reason."  "  To  describe  understanding  and  rea- 
son, each  by  its  characteristic  qualities. 

1.  Understanding  is  discursive.       1.  Reason  is  fixed. 

2.  The  understanding  in  all  its     2.  The  reason  in  all  its  decisions 
judgments,referstosome  other        appeals  to  itself  as  the  ground 
faculty,  as  its  ultimate  autho-         and  substance  of  their  truth, 
rity. 

3.  Understanding  is  the  faculty     3.  Reason  of  contemplation.  Rea- 
of  reflection.  son  indeed  is  far  nearer  to  sense 

than  tounderstanding,for  reason 
is  a  direct  aspect  of  truth  ;  an 
inward  beholding,  having  a  si- 
milar relation  to  the  intelligible 
or  spiritual,  as  sense  has  to  the 
material  or  phenomenal." 
"  The  understanding,  then,  (considered  exclusively  as  an  organ  of 
human  intelligence)  is  the  faculty  by  which  we  reflect  and  generalise. 
Take  for  instance,  any  object  consisting  of  many  parts,  a  house,  or  a 
group  of  houses ;  and  if  it  be  contemplated,  as  a  whole,  i.  e.  (as 
many  constituting  a  one,)  it  forms  what  in  the  technical  language  of 
psychology,  is  called  a  total  impression.     Among  the  various  com- 
ponent parts  of  this,  we  direct  our  attention  especially  to  such  as  we 
recollect  to  have  noticed  in  other   total  impressions.     Then  by  a 
voluntary  act  we  withhold  our  attention  from  all  the  rest  to  reflect 
exclusively  on  these,  and  these  we   henceforward  use  as  common 
characters,  by  virtue  of  which  the  several  objects  are  referred  to  one 


125 

and  the  same  sort.  Thus  the  whole  process  may  be  reduced  to 
three  acts,  all  depending  on,  and  supposing  a  previous  impression  on 
the  senses :  first,  the  appropriation  of  our  attention :  second,  (and  in 
order  to  the  continuance  of  the  first,)  abstraction,  or  the  voluntary 
withholding  of  the  attention;  and  third,  generalization  ;  and  these  are 
the  proper  functions  of  the  understanding ;  and  the  power  of  so  doing 
is  what  we  mean  when  we  say,  we  possess  understanding,  or  are 
created  with  the  faculty  of  understanding." 

"  Now  whether  in  defining  the  speculative  reason,  (i.  e.  the  reason 
considered  abstractedly  as  an  intellective  power,)  we  call  it "  the  source 
of  necessary  and  universal  principles,  according  to  which  the  notices 
of  the  senses,  are  either  affirmed  or  denied ;"  or  describe  it  as  the 
power  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  draw  from  particular  and  con- 
tingent appearances,  universal  and  necessary  conclusions;  it  is 
equally  evident,  that  the  two  definitions  differ  in  their  essentia! 
characters,  and  consequently  the  subjects  differ  in  kind." — Aids  to 
Reflection.p.  135, 142,  143,  145. 

"  Under  the  term  sense,  I  comprise  whatever  is  passive  in  our  being, 
without  any  reference  to  the  questions  of  materialism,  or  immate- 
rialism  ;  all  that  man  is  in  common  with  animals,  in  kind,  at  least, 
his  sensations  and  impressions,  whether  of  his  outward  senses,  or 
the  inner  sense  of  imagination.  This,  in  the  language  of  the  schools, 
was  called  the  vis  receptiva,  or  recipient  property  of  the  soul,  from 
the  original  constitution  of  which  we  perceive  and  imagine  all 
things  under  the  forms  of  space  and  time.  By  the  understanding, 
I  mean  the  faculty  of  thinking,  and  forming  judgments  on  the  notices 
furnished  by  the  sense,  according  to  certain  rules  existhig  in  itself, 
which  rules  constitute  its  distinct  nature.  By  the  pure  reason,  I 
mean  the  power  by  which  we  become  possessed  of  principle,  (tlie 
eternal  verities  of  Plato  and  Descartes,  and  of  ideas,  (n.  b.  not 
images,)  as  the  ideas  of  a  point,  a  line,  a  circle  in  mathematics;  and 
of  justice,  holiness,  free-will,  &c.  in  morals." — The  Friend,  p.  150 
note. 

Mr.  Coleridge  thus  distributes  the  acts  of  the  mind  into 
three  great  classes ;  those  of  sense,  of  understanding,  and  of 
reason :  the  first  comprising  its  sensations,  or  that  portion 
of  its  perceptions  that  is  immediately  excited  by  the  action 
of  external  objects  on  the  organs  ;  the  second  embracing  all 
its  thoughts  and  judgments  respecting  the  notices  of  exter- 


126 

iial  objects  which  it  has  obtained  from  the  senses,  or  those 
of  its  perceptive  acts  of  which  its  sensations  themselves,  and 
conceptions  of  external  things  are  the  objects  ;  and  tlie 
third,  consisting  wholly  of  supersensual  perceptions,  or 
ideas  of  beings,  actions,  relations,  and  truths,  that  have  no 
counterpart  in  sensation  ;  and  the  theory  for  which  he  con- 
tends is,  that  those  of  the  second  class  are  the  acts  of  an 
attribute  that  is  essentially  unlike  and  inferior  to  reason, 
and  common  to  us  with  the  brutes ;  and  that  those  of  the 
last  are  acts  of  a  wholly  superior  attribute,  that  is  peculiar 
to  moral  beings. 

To  this  distinction,  however,  it  seems  to  me  to  be  an  insupe- 
rable objection,  that  it  is  founded  on  a  mere  diversity  of  the 
objects  towards  which  the  perceptive  power,  or  rather  the 
mind  in  perception,  is  directed ;  and  not  on  any  essential 
dissimilarity  in  the  mode  of  its  acting.  It  is  employed  in  each 
instance,  by  his  own  representation,  in  thinking  and  judging 
— in  contemplating  or  reflecting  on  its  perceptions,  tracing 
their  relations,  and  forming  conclusions  respecting  them;  and 
the  sole  diflerence  is,  that  in  the  one  case  perceptions  derived 
from  sensation,  and  in  the  other,  supersensual  ideas  are 
the  objects  of  its  attention.  The  acts  themselves  are  in 
kind  as  clearly  alike  as  are  the  pleasurable  or  painful  emo- 
tions respectively,  which  involuntarily  spring  up  in  con- 
junction with  those  perceptions,  or  as  are  the  voHtions  that 
are  put  forth  under  the  excitement  of  those  emotions  ;  and 
to  regard  them  therefore  as  the  functions  of  difterent  attri- 
butes, simply  on  the  ground  of  that  dissimilarity  of  their 
objects,  were  as  unphilosophical  as  it  would  be,  for  a  similar 
reason,  to  regard  those  emotions  as  the  operations  of  difl'e- 
rent  faculties,  or  to  Impute  those  choices  to  two  distinct  and 
dissimilar  powei's  of  volition.     It   is  no  more  Indisputable 


127 

nor  obvious  that  the  successive  emotions  that  arise  cotenl- 
poraneously  with  those  perceptions,  have  their  origin  in 
the  same  susceptive  power,  nor  that  the  volitions  that  are 
put  forth  in  conjunction  with  them,  are  the  acts  of  the  same 
attributes,  nor  that  those  feelings  and  choices  are  exerted 
in  the  same  manner  toward  one  of  those  classes  of  its  per- 
ceptions as  toward  the  other,  than  it  is  that  it  is  the  same 
perceptive  faculty  that  contemplates  those  objects,  traces 
their  resemblances,  differences,  and  connexions,  and  reasons 
and  judges  respecting  them.  If  the  fact,  therefore,  that  the 
objects  toward  which  the  acts  of  understanding,  according 
to  Mr.  Coleridge's  distinction,  are  exerted,  differ  from  those 
which  are  the  objects  of  reason,  authorizes  their  designation 
by  difierent  terms,  there  is  then  an  equal  propriety,  for  the 
same  reason,  in  distinguishing  the  emotions  and  volitions 
likewise  into  different  classes,  according  as  the  objects  vary 
toward  which  they  are  exerted. 

The  similarity  of  the  mind's  agency  in  those  two  classes 
of  perceptions,  is  admitted  by  Mr.  Coleridge  himself  in  the 
following  passage : 

*'  Every  man  must  feel,  that  though  he  may  not  be  exerting  differ- 
ent faculties,  he  is  exerting  his  faculties  in  a  different  way,  when  in 
one  instance  he  begins  with  some  one  self-evident  truth,  (that  the 
radii  of  a  circle,  for  instance,  are  all  equal,)  and  in  consequence  of 
this  being  true,  sees  at  once,  without  any  actual  experience,  that 
some  other  thing  must  be  true  likewise,  and  that,  this  being  true, 
some  third  thing  must  be  equally  true,  and  so  on  till  he  comes,  we 
will  say,  to  the  properties  of  the  lever,  considered  as  the  spoke  of  a 
circle  ;  which  is  capable  of  having  all  its  marvellous  powers  demon- 
strated even  to  a  savage  who  had  never  seen  a  lever,  and  without 
supposing  any  other  previous  knowledge  in  his  mind,  but  this  one, 
that  there  is  a  conceivable  figure,  all  possible  lines  from  the  middle 
to  the  circumference  of  which  are  of  the  same  length  :  or  when,  in 
the  second  instance,  he  brings  together  the  facts  of  experience,  each 

17 


128 

of  which  has  its  own  separate  value,  neither  increased  nor  diminish- 
ed by  the  truth  of  any  other  fact  which  may  have  preceded  it ;  and 
making  these  several  facts  bear  upon  some  particular  project,  and 
finding  some  in  favor  of  it,  and  some  against  the  project,  according 
as  one  or  the  other  class  of  facts  preponderate :  as,  for  instance, 
whether  it  would  be  better  to  plant  a  particular  spot  of  ground  with 
larch,  or  with  Scotch  fir,  or  with  oak  in  preference  to  either.  Surely 
every  man  will  acknowledge,  that  his  mind  was  very  differently  employ- 
ed in  the  first  case  from  what  it  was  in  the  second,  and  all  men  have 
agreed  to  call  the  results  of  the  first  class  the  truths  of  science,  such  as 
not  only  are  true,  but  which  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  otherwise  : 
while  the  results  of  the  second  class  are  caWed/arAs,  or  things  o^  expe- 
rience :  and  as  to  these  latter  we  must  often  content  ourselves  with  the 
greater  probability  that  they  are  so,  or  so,  rather  than  otherwise — 
nay,  even  when  we  have  no  doubt  that  they  are  so  in  the  particular 
case,  we  never  presume  to  assert  that  they  must  continue  so  always, 
and  under  all  circumstances.  On  the  contrary,  our  conclusions  depend 
altogether  on  contingent  circumstances.  Now  when  the  mind  is  em- 
ployed as  in  the  case  first  mentioned,  I  call  it  reasoning,  or  the  use 
of  the  pure  reason  :  but  in  the  second  case,  the  understanding  or  pru- 
dence."— The  Friend  p.  134, 

"  Having  exposed  this  gross  sophism,  I  must  warn  against  an  op- 
posite error,  namely,  that  if  reason  distinguished  from  prudence, 
consists  merely  in  knowing  that  black  cannot  be  white,  or  when  a  man 
has  a  clear  conception  of  an  inclosed  figure,  and  another  equally 
elear  conception  of  a  straight  line,  his  reason  teaches  him  that  these 
two  conceptions  are  incompatible  in  the  same  object,  i.  e.  that  two 
straight  lines  cannot  include  a  space,  the  said  reason  must  be  a  very  in- 
signijicant  faculty.  But  a  moment's  steady  self-reflection  will  show  us 
that  in  the  simple  determination,  "  black  is  not  white,"  or  "  that  two 
straight  lines  cannot  include  a  space,"  all  the  powers  are  implied, 
that  distinguish  man  from  animals  ;  1st,  the  power  of  rc/Zecfion  ;  2nd, 
ofcomparison  ;  3d,  and  therefore  of  suspension  of  the  mind  ;  4th,  there- 
fore of  a  controlling  will,  and  the  power  of  acting  from  notions,  in- 
stead of  mere  images  exciting  appetites  ;  from  motives,  and  not  from 
mere  dark  instincts.  Was  it  an  insignificant  thing  to  weigh  the  pla- 
nets, to  determine  all  their  courses,  and  prophecy  every  possible  re- 
lation of  the  heavens  a  thousand  years  hence  ?  Yet  all  this  mighty 
chain  of  science  is  nothing  but  a  linking  together  of  truths  of  the 
same  kind,  as,  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part." — The  Friend  p.  136. 


129 

The  powers  of  reason,  which  are  here  represented  as  dis- 
tinguishing  men  from  animals,   are  thus    precisely  those 
which  both  he  and  Mr.  Marsh  exhibit  as  the  powers  of  the 
understanding ;  and  the  mode  in  which  they  are  exerted  in 
each  instance,  whether  images  furnished  by  the  senses,  or 
supersensual  notions  are  their  objects,  is  indisputably  pre- 
cisely the  same.     There  is  surely  as  much  reflection,  com- 
parison,  suspension  of  the   mind,  and  volition  from  per- 
ceptions that  are  not   "  images  exciting  appetites,"  in  the 
construction  of  a  steam-engine,  as  in  the  demonstration  of  a 
proposition  in  geometry  ;  and  the  relations  of  multitudes 
of  those  perceptions  or  their  objects,  their  resemblance,  dis- 
similarity, adaptedness  or  unadaptedness  to  ends,  are  seen 
with  as  clear  and  intuitive  a  certainty,  as  any  of  the  rela- 
tions of  geometry,  and  constitute  materials  for  propositions 
as  self-evident  and  universally  true,  in  all  similar  cases,  as 
are  the  simplest  propositions  or  truths  of  that  exact  science. 
But  these  gentlemen  have  themselves   demonstrated  the 
utter  futility  of  this  distinction,  by  placing  the  ideas  of  ge- 
ometry, which  are  derived  from  visual  images,  and  which 
therefore  by  their  definition  of  the  understanding,  belong 
exclusively  to  that  faculty,  among  the  functions  of  reason. 
The  elementary  ideas  of  geometry  are  conceptions  of  points, 
lines,   angles,  spaces,  and  quantities,  or  mere  abstractions 
or  generalizations  of  notices  that  are  derived  from  the  sen- 
ses, and  as  incapable  of  being  conceived  except  as  in  space, 
as  are   any  images  of  external   objects.      A  geometrical 
point,  line,  or  triangle,  such  as  the  definitions  describe,  is 
doubtless   a  purely  ideal  object,  having  no  exact  counter- 
part in  nature,  and  so  likewise,  as  truly,  is  every  abstrac- 
tion in  physics.     It  is  no  more  certain  or  apparent  that  such 
points,  lines,  and  angles  are  never  touched  or  seen,  than  it 


130 

is  that  no  abstract  ideas  of  material  forms  are  ever  objects 
of  the  senses. 

As  then  the  agency  of  the  mind  is  the  same  in  the  per- 
ception of  the  one  class  of  these  objects,  as  of  the  other, 
and  thence  by  every  just  rule  of  philosophizing,  the  powers 
exerted  in  each  class  are  to  be  regarded  as  the  same,  there 
not  only  is  no  ground  whatever  for  their  ascription  to  dif- 
ferent and  dissimilar  attributes  ;  but  every  legitimate  reason 
against  such  an  ascription ;  and  the  whole  question  re- 
specting the  propriety  of  the  distinction  proposed  by  Mi*. 
Coleridge,  sinks  into  a  mere  question  of  the  expediency  of 
bestowing  different  designations  on  different  instances  of  the 
same  species  of  agency,  when  the  objects  of  that  agency 
happen  to  differ  from  each  other  :  a  system  of  nomenclature, 
that  obviously  in  place  of  adding  simplicity  and  perspicuity  to 
the  science,  could  serve  no  other  purpose  than  to  overbur- 
then  it  with  an  infinite  mass  of  distinctions  without  differ- 
ences, and  convert  it  into  a  mere  complexity  of  useless  and 
senseless  terms. 

The  views  he  expresses  of  unfavorable  effects  that  have 
resulted  to  the  science  from  the  neglect  to  distinguish  the 
understanding  from  reason,  are  likewise  as  exceptionable 
as  the  grounds  themselves  are,  on  which  he  recommends  the 
adoption  of  that  distinction. 

The  error  of  Mr.  Locke  did  not  consist  in  denying  either 
our  capability  or  possession  of  that  species  of  perceptions 
which  Mr.  Coleridge  represents  as  the  peculiar  functions  of 
reason.  That  error,  so  far  as  it  has  existed  at  all,  was  of 
a  far  earlier  date,  and  unhappily  was  regarded  and  enforced 
with  characteristic  zeal  as  a  doctrine  of  revelation  by  those 
reformers  themselves  whom  Mr.  Coleridge  represents  as 
entertaining  a  philosophy  far  more  nearly  coincident  with 


131 


his  own,  than  with  that  of  the  popular  metaphysicians  of 
the  present  day.  Of  this,  the  following  passages  from 
Augustine,  Luther,  Melancthon,  and  Calvin,  present  suffi- 
cient evidence : 


"  We  have  thus  a  live-fold  sense ;  that  however  is  common  to  us 
with  the  brutes.  What  then  is  it  beyond  that,  that  belongs  to  us  ? 
Understanding,  reason,  judgment,  attributes  which  no  species  of 
brutes  possess.  It  is  in  respect  to  them  that  we  are  made  in  the 
image  of  God.  '  God  said.  Let  us  make  man  in  our  image  and  after 
our  likeness ;  and  let  them  have  dominion  over  the  fish  of  the  sea, 
and  over  the  fowl  of  the  air,  and  over  the  cattle,  and  over  every 
creeping  thing  that  creepeth  upon  the  earth.'  Why  was  he  invested 
■with  that  authority  ?  Because  of  the  image  of  God.  To  some,  ac- 
cordingly, it  is  said,  by  way  of  rebuke.  Be  ye  not  as  the  horse,  or  as 
the  mule,  which  have  no  understanding.  Yet  understanding  is 
widely  different  from  reason,  for  we  not  only  have  reason  before  we 
can  understand,  but  must  possess  it  in  order  to  be  capable  of  under- 
standing. Man  is  therefore  an  animal  capable  of  reason,  or  rather 
a  rational  animal,  of  whom  by  nature  reason  is  an  essential  attribute, 
and  who  always  possesses  it,  before  he  begins  to  understand."* 

"  After  he  had  said,  '  in  our  image,'  he  immediately  added, '  and 
let  them  have  dominion  over  the  fish  of  the  sea,  and  over  the  fowl  of 
the  air,'  and  over  all  other  irrational  animals  ;  for  the  very  purpose, 
undoubtedly,  of  giving  us  to  understand,  that  it  is  in  that  in  which 
he  excels  irrational  animals  that  the  image  of  God  in  which  he  was 


*  "  Est  ergo  in  nobis  sensus  quinque-pertitus :  sed  hunc  habent  et  bestije. 
Sed  tamen  amplius  quid  habemus7  Mentem,  rationem,  consilium,  quod  non 
habent  bestiae ;  non  habent  volucres,  non  habent  pisces  ;  in  eo  facti  sumus  ad 
imaginem  Dei.  Faciamus  inquit,  honiinem  ad  imaginem,  et  similitudinem 
nostram,  et  habeat  potestatem  piscium  maris,  et  volatilium  coeli,  et  omnium 
pecorum,  et  serpentium  quse  repunt  super  terram.  Unde  habeat  potestatem  7 
Propter  imaginem  Dei.  Unde  quibusdam  dicitur  increpando,  Nolite  esse 
sicut  equus  et  mulus  quibus  non  est  intellectus.  Sed  ahud  est  inteliectus, 
ahud  ratio.  Nam  rationem  habemus,  et  antequam  intelligamus ;  sed  intelligere 
non  valemus,  nisi  rationem  habeamus.  Est  ergo  animal  rationis  capax  :  verum 
ut  melius  et  citius  dicam,  animal  rationale,  cui  natura  inest  ratio,  et  antequam 
intelligat  jam  rationem  habet." — Augustini,  Ser.  XLIII.  3. 


132 

made  consists  ;  and  that  is  reason  itself,  understanding,  or  intelli- 
gence."* 

"  And  be  renewed  in  the  spirit  of  your  mind,  and  put  on  the  new 
man,  which  after  God  is  created  in  righteousness  and  true  holiness. 
Behold  what  Adam  lost  by  sin !  The  apostle  likewise  says.  Having 
put  off  the  old  man  with  his  deeds,  put  on  the  new  man,  which  is 
renewed  in  knowledge  after  the  image  of  him  that  created  him. 
This  image  that  was  impressed  on  the  spirit  of  his  mind,  Adam  lost 
by  sin."f 

"  By  the  statement  that  Adam  by  sin  lost  the  image  of  God  in 
which  he  was  created,  it  was  not  meant  that  it  was  wholly  obliterated 
from  his  mind,  but  that  it  was  so  deplorably  disfigured  as  to  need 
renovation."}: 

"  This  hereditary  sin  is  a  corruption  of  nature,  deep  indeed,  and 
dreadful  beyond  the  power  of  human  reason  to  comprehend,  but  still 
to  be  believed,  from  the  testimony  of  the  scriptures.  The  dogmas 
of  the  schoolmen  therefore  are  mere  smoke  and  error,  that  represent, 
in  contradiction  to  this  doctrine,  that  the  natural  powers  of  man 
remained  uncorrupted  and  uninjured  after  the  fall  of  Adam,  and  that 
his  reason  is  now  naturally  unimpaired  and  his  will  good,  as  philoso- 
phers teach."} 


*  "  Cum  dixissct,  ad  imaginem  nostram,  statim  subjunxit,  ct  haheat  potet- 
taiem  -piscium  maris,  ct  volaiilium  cceli,  et  ceterorum  animaliunt  rationis 
expertium ;  ut  videlicet  intelligamus  in  eo  factum  hominem  ad  imaginem  Dei, 
in  quo  irrationalihiis  animantibus  antcccllit.  Id  autem  est  ipsa  ratio,  vel 
mens,  vel  intelligentia,  vel  si  quo  alio  vocabulo,  commodius  appellatur." — Au- 
gustini,  de  Gencsi,  Lib.  III.  30. 

t"Ecce  quod  pcrdidit  Adam  per  pcccatum !  Hanc  imaginem  in  spiritu 
mentis  imprcssani,  pcrdidit  Adam  per  pcccatum." — De  Gencsi,  Lib.  VI.  37, 
38. 

t  "  In  sexto  libro  quod  dixi  Adam  imaginem  Dei,  secundum  quam  factus 
est,  perdidisse  pcccato,  non  sic  accipicndum  est,  tamquam  in  eo  nulla  reman- 
serit,  sed  quod  tarn  dcformis,  ut  reforniationc  opushaberet." — Avgustini,Iie- 
tractat.  Lib.  II.  Cap.  XXIV.  2d. 

§  "Hoc  pcccatum  haereditarium  tarn  profunda  et  tctra  est  corruptio  nature, 
ut  nullius  hominis  rationc  intelligi  possit,  sed  ex  scripturte  patefactione  agno- 


133 

'•  Original  sin  is  guilt  on  account  of  the  fall  of  the  first  pair,  and 
depravity  following  their  fall,  in  all  who  naturally  descend  from  them. 
That  depravity  consists  in  a  manifold  darkness  in  the  understanding 
in  regard  to  God,  and  in  concupiscence  repugnant  to  his  law,  and 
is  accordingly  not  merely  a  punishment  but  a  downright  sin,  and 
all  are  by  birth  obnoxious  on  account  of  it  to  eternal  wrath,  unless 
renewed  through  the  Son  of  God. 

"  Anselm's  well  known  definition — as  he  has  stated  it  at  large — is 
essentially  coincident  with  this.  Original  sin,  he  says,  is  a  want  of 
that  original  righteousness  which  ought  to  be  inherent.  For  original 
righteousness  was  not  a  mere  state  of  acceptance  with  God,  but  in- 
cluded likewise  a  perfection  of  powers  or  rectitude  by  which  man 
was  fitted  to  be  the  temple  of  God,  and  accorded  in  all  his  attributes 
to  the  divine  law."* 

"  His  saneness  of  understanding  and  rectitude  of  heart  were  like- 
wise taken  away,  and  that  constituted  the  corruption  of  his  natural 
gifts;  for  although  some  share  of  intelligence  and  judgment  remained 
along  with  the  pow^er  of  putting  forth  choices,  yet  it  was  far  too 
weak  and  dark  to  merit  the  name  of  a  sound  understanding.  As 
reason — whose  office  it  is  to  perceive,  distinguish  good  from  evil, 
and  judge — is  a  natural  gift,  it  could  not  be  entirely  obliterated;  but 


scenda  et  credenda  sit.  Q,uapropter  meri  sunt  errores  ut  caligines  contra  hunc 
articulum,  scholasticorum  doctorum  dogmata,  quibus  docetur  post  Adaj  lap- 
sum,  hominis  naturales  vires  mansisse  integras  et  incorruptas,  et  hominem 
naturaliter  habere  rationem  rectam,  et  bonam  voluntatem,  sicut  philosophi 
decent." — Lutheri,  Artie.  Smalcald.  I.  de  Peccato. 

*"Peccatum  originis  est  reatus  propter  lapsum  primorum  parentum,  eft 
pravitatem  secutam  lapsum  primorum  parentum  in  omnibus  propagatis  secun- 
dum naturam,  quae  pravitas  est  multiplex  caligo  in  mente  de  Deo,  et  concu- 
piscentia  repugnans  legi  Dei,  et  propterea  non  tantum  poena  est,  sed  vere  pecca- 
tum,  propter  quod  et  rei  sunt  seternse  irse  homines  nascentes,  nisi  renascantui 
per  filium  Dei. 

"  Vulgata  Anselmi  definitio  prorsus  idem  dicit  quod  nostra,  sicut  et  ipse 
earn  copiose  enarravit.  Peccatum  originis  est  carentia  justicia;  originalis, 
quae  debebat  inesse.  Nam  justicia  originalis  fuisset  non  tantum  acceptatio, 
sed  etiam  integritas  virium,  seu  rectitudo,  in  qua  fuisset  homo  templuniDei, 
et  fuisset  congruentia  in  omnibus  viribus  cum  lege  Dei." — Melanctlwni,  op. 
Epist.  ad  Rom.  Cap.  V. 


i34 

it  became  so  weakened  and  vitiated  as  to  appear  but  a  shapeless 


rum. 


The  same  views  are  likewise  exhibited  in  those  writings 
of  the  English  reformers  that  were  the  ground-work  of  the 
thirty-nine  articles. 

"  Tlie  image  of  God  in  man  was  so  obscured  in  the  beginning  by 
original  and  actual  sin,  and  his  natural  judgment  so  vitiated,  that  he 
is  no  longer  capable  of  distinguishing  either  what  becomes  him  as  a 
rational  being,  from  that  which  is  a  disgrace,  nor  justice  from  injua- 
tice."t 

"  For  truly,  albeit  the  light  of  reason  doth  abide,  yet  it  is  much 
darkened,  and  with  much  difficulty  doth  discern  things  that  be  infe- 
rior, and  pertain  to  this  present  life  ;  but  to  understand  and  perceive 
things  that  are  spiritual  and  pertain  to  everlasting  life,  it  is  unable. "| 

The  denial  to  us  of  all  capability  to  comprehend  "  the 
distinctively  spiritual  and  peculiar  doctrines  of  the  christian 
system,"  and  limitation  of  our  perceptive  and  moral  powers 
to  the  mere  forms  of  the  understanding,  or   *'  the  notices 


*  "  Rursum  sanitas  mentis  et  cordis  rectitudo  simul  fuerunt  ablata ;  atque 
haec  est  naturalium  donorum  corruptio.  Nam  etsi  aliquid  intelligentiac  et 
judicii  residuum  manet  una  cum  voluntate,  neque  tamen  racntem  integram  et 
sanam  dicemus,  qua;  et  debilis  est,  et  multis  tcnebris  immcrsa,  et  pravitas 
voluntatis  plus  satis  nota  est.  Q.uum  ergo  ratio,  qua  discernit  homo  inter  bonum 
et  malum,  qua  intelligit  et  judical,  nuturale  donum  sit,  non  potuit  in  totum 
deleri ;  sed  partim  debilitata,  partim  vitiata  fuit,  ut  deformes  ruiniE  appare- 
ant." — Calvini  Instil.  Lib.  II.  Cap.  II.  12. 

t"  Imago  Dei  in  hominc  per  peccatum  originis  et  consuetudinem  malem 
adeo  in  initio  obscurata  est,  et  judicium  naturale  adeo  vitiatum,  ut  homo  ipse 
non  satis  intelligat  honestum  turpi  quid  intersit,  nee  justum  injusto."— Ca<e- 
thismus  Brevis,  1553. 

t  A  Necessary  Erudition  of  any  Christian  Man,  published  in  1543. 


135 

furuislied  by  sense,"  to  the  exclusion  of  supersensual  ideas  j 
thus  neitlier  originated  nor  had  any  connexion  with  the 
philosophy  of  Locke,  but  was  transmitted  to  us  by  a  bishop 
of  the  fifth  century,  and  has  occupied  a  conspicuous  station 
in  all  the  theological  systems  that  have  enjoyed  any  exten- 
sive prevalence,  from  that  to  the  present  day. 

The  error  of  Mr.  Locke  on  this  subject  consisted,  as  I 
have  already  remarked,  not  in  formally  denying  our  pos- 
session either  of  the  attribute  or  the  ideas  of  reason,  but 
solely  in  representing  sensation  and  reflection  on  the  ope- 
rations of  our  minds,  as  the  sole  sources  of  our  knowledge  ; 
a  doctrine  that,  doubtless,  if  the  phrase,  "  the  operations  of 
the  mind,"  is  interpreted  according  to  the  system  of  Hume, 
as  denoting  only  ideas  that  are  derived  from  sensation  and 
reflective  acts  that  respect  them — involves  a  denial  to  us  of 
all  purely  spiritual  or  supersensual  ideas,  and  leaves  our 
capacity  for  them,  if  we  possess  any,  an  unexex'cised  and 
latent  attribute.  It  obviously,  however,  was  not  regarded 
by  Mr.  Locke  himself,  nor  his  immediate  followers,  as  in- 
volving that  consequence,  as  neither  he  nor  they  ever  repre- 
sented us,  or  suspected  themselves  of  representing  us,  as 
destitute  of  reason,  nor  denied  us  the  possession  of  any  of 
the  classes  of  ideas  which  Mr.  Coleridge  exhibits  as  the 
peculiar  functions  of  that  attribute.  No  intimations  are  to 
be  found  on  his  pages  that  he  regarded  us  as  incapable  of 
ideas  of  morality,  of  the  soul,  or  of  God.  On  the  contrary, 
the  most  decisive  indications  every  where  abound,  not  only 
that  he  did  not  regard  his  principles  as  authorizing  such 
conclusions,  but  that  he  in  truth  employed  the  term  reflec- 
tion in  a  far  more  comprehensive  sense  than  his  definition 
expressed — as  comprising  all  the  supersensual  perceptions 
that   take   place    by    suggestion    conjunctively    with    the 

!8 


136 

tlioughts  and  judgments  of  the  mind  respecting  the  notices 
derived  from  sensation,  as  well  as  those  notices  themselves, 
and  the  operations  of  the  mind  in  respect  to  them  ;  and 
regarded  his  theory  accordingly,  as  furnishing  a  just  and 
adequate  solution  of  all  the  phenomena  of  reason  as  well  as 
understanding,  of  which  we  are  conscious.  The  repeated 
notice  of  this  fact  by  "  the  Scottish  metaphysicians,"  and 
particularly  its  demonstration  at  large  by  Mr.  Stewart,  in 
his  history  of  philosophy,  render  a  repetition  of  it  unne- 
cessary to  those  who  are  familiar  with  their  pages.  It  is 
seen  with  sufficient  certainty  from  the  following  passages  : 

"  External  material  things,  as  the  objects  of  sensation,  and  the 
operations  of  our  minds  within,  as  the  objects  of  reflection,  are  to  me 
the  only  originals  from  whence  all  our  ideas  take  their  beginnings. 
The  term  ojjeralions,  here  I  use  in  a  lai-ge  sense,  as  comprehending 
not  barely  the  actions  of  the  mind  about  its  ideas,  but  some  sort  of 
passions  arising  sometimes  from  them,  such  as  is  the  satisfaction  or 
uneasiness  arising  from  any  thought." 

"  In  time,  the  mind  comes  to  reflect  on  its  own  operations,  about 
the  ideas  it  has  got  by  sensation,  and  thereby  stores  itself  with  a 
new  set  of  ideas,  which  I  call  ideas  of  reflection.  These  are  the 
impressions  that  are  made  on  our  senses  by  outward  objects  that  are 
extrinsical  to  the  mind  ;  and  its  own  operations,  proceeding  from 
powers  intrinsical  and  proper  to  itself,  which  when  reflected  on  by 
itself,  becoming  also  objects  of  its  contemplation,  are,  as  I  have  said, 
the  original  of  all  knowledge.  Thus  the  first  capacity  of  human  in- 
tellect is,  that  the  mind  is  fitted  to  receive  the  impressions  made  on 
it;  either  through  the  senses  by  outward  objects,  or  by  its  own 
operations  when  it  reflects  on  them.  This  is  the  first  step  a  man 
makes  toward  the  discovery  of  any  thing,  and  the  groundwork 
wliereon  to  build  all  those;  notions  which  ever  he  shall  have  naturally 
in  the  world.  All  those  sublime  thoughts  which  tower  above  the 
clouds,  and  reach  as  high  as  heaven  itself,  take  their  rise  and  footing 
here  :  in  all  that  great  extent  wherein  the  mind  wanders  ;  in  those 
remote  speculations  it  may  seem  to  be  elevated  with,  it  stirs  not  one 
jot  beyond  those  ideas  which  sense  or  reflection  have  ofl^ercd  for  its 
Contemplation." — Locke's  Essay,  Book  II.  Chap.  1. 


137 

His  real  intention  in  these  passages,  if  they  are  to  be  inter- 
preted by  the  general  scope  of  his  representations,  indispu- 
tably was  simply  to  state  first  that  all  ideas  are  operations  of 
the  mind  in  contradistinction  to  innate  or  connatural  percep- 
tions ;  and  next,  that  consequently  they  are  all  either  occa- 
sioned by  the  action  of  external  objects  on  the  senses,  or 
else  have  their  origin  in  the  natural  action  of  the  mind  on 
itself,  in  that  part  of  its  agency,  which  takes  place  inde- 
pendently of  the  immediate  influence  of  external  objects. 
His  language  in  fact  does  not,  taken  literally,  limit  the 
materials  for  reflection  to  the  mere  perceptive  acts  of  the 
mind  excited  by  the  senses  :  as  he  enumerates  among  them 
likewise  the  emotions  and  passions  which  are  immediately 
consequent  on  those  perceptions. 

Of  the  fact  itself,  that  a  large  portion  of  our  ideas  relate, 
as  Mr.  Coleridge  represents,  to  supersensual  objects,  no 
doubt  can  exist.  Such  indisputably  are  our  ideas  of  imma- 
terial beings,  and  their  mental  actions  and  relations.  These 
have  their  counterpart,  as  far  as  they  have  any  whatever  in 
our  experience,  in  our  supersensual  consciousness  only,  and 
not  in  sensation. 

That  a  great  proportion  of  them  likewise  arise  in  the 
mind  independently  of  the  immediate  agency  of  the  senses, 
is  equally  indisputable.  They  are  perceptions  of  the  relations 
of  its  ideas  themselves,  or  the  supersensual  objects  which 
they  respect,  in  place  of  external  objects,  or  sensations  of 
them  ;  and  are  suggested  by  those  ideas  or  objects,  in  a 
manner  analogous  to  that  in  which  the  agency  of  external 
objects  gives  birth  to  sensations. 

Multitudes  of  our  thoughts  likewise  that  are  excited 
through  the  instrumentality  of  the  senses,  have  no  counter- 
part whatever  in  the  sensations  to  which  they  sustain  that 


13B 

relation.  In  reading  the  twenty-fifth  chapter  of  Matthew, 
the  sole  objects  that  meet  the  eye  are  a  white  surface  and 
twenty  or  thirty  dark  figures  of  difierent  forms  and  sizes, 
arranged  on  it  in  parallel  lines.  What,  however,  can  be 
more  distantly  unlike  them,  than  the  sublime  successions  of 
thought  and  emotion  that  are  raised  by  their  images  ? 

There  is  obviously  no  one  class  of  ideas  or  perceptions, 
that  has  the  exclusive  office  of  suggesting  other  classes ; 
but  the  suggesting  agency  is  common  to  them  all.  Onr 
supersensual  ideas  are  perhaps  as  frequently  the  antece- 
dents of  sensual  recollections  and  their  resemblances,  as 
the  latter  are  of  the  former  :  the  mind  is  incessantly  passing 
indeed  from  the  one  to  the  other,  and  deriving  from  their 
perpetually  varying  conjunctions,  new  discoveries  of  their 
relations,  and  experiencing  new  modifications  of  thought 
and  emotion  under  their  agency. 

In  all  these  diversified  acts,  however,  the  perceptive  fa- 
culty is  as  unquestionably  the  same,  as  the  susceptive  and 
voluntary  powers  respectively  are,  that  give  birth  to 
the  emotions  and  volitions  that  are  conjoined  with  those 
acts  ;  and  no  classification  of  them  accordingly  can  be  of 
any  significance  that  aims  at  any  thing  more  than  to  dis- 
tinguish them  into  classes,  according  to  the  objects  toward 
which  they  arc  exerted,  or  the  causes  to  whose  promptings 
they  owe  their  existence.  For  such  a  purpose,  they  may 
doubtless  be  distributed  with  propriety  into  those  of  the 
senses,  **  the  relics  of  the  senses,"  and  the  supersensual,  or 
into  those  that  are  occasioned  by  the  action  of  external 
objects  on  the  senses,  and  those  that  spring  up  from  the 
excitement  of  the  mind's  own  operations,  and  are  transfused 
by  the  agency,  though  unfelt  yet  real,  of  the  infinite  Spirit 
or  subordinate  spiritual  beings. 


139 

II.  His  doctrine  respecting  the  will,  is  fraught  with 
error  of  a  still  more  serious  nature.  Its  import  is  suffi- 
ciently seen  from  the  following  passages  from  Mr.  Marsh's 
Preliminary  Essay  and  the  Aids  to  Reflection. 

"  Let  it  be  understood  then,  that  by  the  prevailing  system  of  meta- 
physics, I  mean  the  system  of  which  in  modern  times  Locke  is  the 
reputed  author,  and  the  leading  principles  of  which  with  various  mo- 
difications, more  or  less  important,  but  not  altering  its  essential 
character,  have  been  almost  universally  received  in  this  country. 
In  the  minds  of  our  religious  community  especially,  some  of  its 
most  important  doctrines  have  become  associated  with  names  justly 
loved  and  revered  among  ourselves,  and  so  connected  with  all  our 
theoretical  views  of  religion,  that  one  can  hardly  hope  to  question 
their  validity  without  hazarding  his  reputation,  not  only  for  ortho- 
doxy but  even  for  common  sense.  To  controvert  for  example  the 
prevailing  doctrines  with  regard  to  the  freedom  of  the  will,  the 
sources  of  our  knowledge,  the  nature  of  the  understanding  as  con- 
taining the  controlling  principles  of  our  whole  being,  and  the  univer- 
sality of  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  even  in  connexion  with  the 
arguments  and  the  authority  of  the  most  powerful  intellect  of  the  age, 
may  even  now  be  worse  than  in  vain." 

"  According  to  the  system  of  these  authors,  as  nearly  and  distinct- 
ly as  my  limits  will  permit  me  to  state  it,  the  same  law  of  cause  and 
effect,  is  the  law  of  the  universe.  It  extends  to  the  vioral  and  spirit- 
ual, if  in  courtesy,  these  terms  may  still  be  used,  no  less  than  to  the 
properly  natural  powers  and  agencies  of  our  being.  The  acts  of  the 
free-will  are  predetermined  by  a  cause  out  of  the  will,  according 
to  the  same  law  of  cause  and  effect  wliich  controls  the  changes  in 
the  physical  world.  We  have  no  notion  of  power,  but  uniformity  of 
antecedent  and  consequent.  The  notion  of  a  power  in  the  will  to 
act  freely,  is  therefore  nothing  more  than  an  inherent  capacity  of 
being  acted  upon  agreeably  to  its  nature,  and  according  to  a  fixed 
law,  by  the  motives  which  are  present  in  the  understanding.  I  feel 
authorized  to  take  this  statement  partly  from  Brown's  philosophy, 
because  that  work  has  been  decidedly  approved  by  our  highest  theo- 
logical authorities,  and  indeed  it  would  not  be  essentially  varied,  if 
expressed  in  the  precise  terms  used  by  any  of  the  writers  most  usual- 
ly quoted  in  reference  to  these  subjects." 

"  Turn  the  matter  as  we  will — call  these  correlatives,  viz,  the 


140 

inherent  susceptibilities,  and  the  causes  acting  on  them  from  without, 
nafurn},  or  moral,  or  spiritual — so  long  as  their  action  and  reaction, 
or  the  law  of  reciprocity,  which  constitutes  their  specific  natures,  is 
considered  as  the  controlling  laio  of  our  wkole  being,  so  long  as  we 
refuse  to  admit  the  existence  in  the  will  of  a  power  capable  of  rising 
above  this  law,  and  controlling  its  operation  by  an  act  of  absolute 
self-determination,  so  long  we  shall  be  involved  in  perplexities  both 
in  morals  and  religion.  At  all  events,  the  only  method  of  avoiding 
them  will  be  to  adopt  the  creed  of  the  necessitarians  entire,  to  give 
man  over  to  an  irresponsible  nature  as  a  better  sort  of  animal,  and 
resolve  the  will  of  the  Supreme  Reason  into  a  blind  and  irrational 
fate." — Preliminary  Essay,  p.  xxviii. — xxxiii. 

"The  doctrine  of  modern  Calvinism,  as  laid  down  by  Jonathan 
Edwards  and  the  late  Dr.  Williams,  which  represents  a  will  abso- 
lutely passive,  clay  in  the  hands  of  a  potter,  destroys  all  will,  takes 
away  its  essence  and  definition  as  effectually  as  in  saying,  this  circle 
is  square,  I  should  deny  the  figure  to  be  a  circle  at  all.  It  was, 
in  strict  consistency,  therefore,  that  these  writers  supported  the 
necessitarian  scheme,  and  made  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  the 
law  of  the  universe,  subjecting  to  its  mechanism  the  moral  world  no 
less  than  the  material  or  physical.  It  follows  that  all  is  nature. 
Thus,  though  few  writers  use  the  term  spirit  more  frequently,  they 
in  effect  deny  its  existence,  and  evacuate  the  term  of  all  its  proper 
meaning.  With sucha  system, not  thewitof  man,nor  allthe  theodices 
ever  formed  by  human  ingenuity  before  and  since  the  attempt  of  the 
celebrated  Leibnitz,  can  reconcile  the  sense  of  responsibility,  nor  the 
fact  of  the  difference  in  kind  between  regret  and  remorse." 

"This  is  the  essential  attribute  of  a  will,  and  contained  in  the 
very  idea,  that  whatever  determines  the  will,  acquires  this  power 
from  a  previous  determination  of  the  will  itself.  The  will  is  ulti- 
mately self-determined,  or  it  is  no  longer  a  will,  under  the  law  of 
perfect  freedom,  but  a  nature,  under  the  mechanism  of  cause  and 
effect.  And  if  by  an  act,  to  which  it  had  determined  itself,  it  has 
subjected  itself  to  the  determination  of  nature,  (in  the  language  of 
St.  Paul,  to  the  law  of  the  flesh)  it  receives  a  nature  into  itself,  and 
so  far  it  becomes  a  nature,  and  this  is  a  corruption  of  the  will,  and  a 
corrupt  nature.  It  is  also  a  fall  of  man,  inasmuch  as  his  will  is  the 
condition  of  his  personality  ;  the  ground  and  condition  of  the  attribute 
which  constitutes  him  man.  And  the  groundwork  of  personal  being 
is  a  capacity  of  acknowledging  the  moral  law  (the  law  of  the  spirit, 


141 

the  law  of  freedom,  the  divine  will,)  as  that  which  bhould,  of  itself, 
suffice  to  determine  the  will  to  a  free  obedience  of  the  law,  the  law 
working  thereon  by  its  own  exceeding  lawfulness.  This,  and  this 
alone,  is  positive  good  ;  good  in  itself,  and  independent  of  all  relations. 
Whatever  resists,  and  as  a  positive  force,  opposes  this  in  the  will,  is 
therefore  evil.  But  an  evil  in  the  will  is  an  evil  will ;  and  as  all 
moral  evil  (i.  e.  all  evil  that  is  evil,  without  reference  to  its  contin- 
gent physical  consequences)  is  <f  the  will,  this  evil  will  must  have 
its  source  in  the  will.  And  thus  we  might  go  back  from  act  to  act, 
from  evil  to  evil,  ad  infinitum,  without  advancing  a  step."— Aids  to 
Reflection,  pp.  105,  106.  172. 

The  self-determining  power  here  ascribed  to  the  will  is 
clearly  a  power  to  choose  independently  and  irrespectively 
of  motives  ;  to  exert  volitions  without  any  intelligent  reason 
or  object  whatever.  It  is  represented  by  Mr.  Marsh,  as  "  a 
power"  "in  the  will"  "  capable  of  rising  above"  the  influ- 
ence of  "  the  inherent  susceptibilities  and  the  causes  acting 
on  them  from  without,"  "  and  controlling  its  operations  by 
an  act  of  absolute  self-determination."  It  is  a  power  then 
of  choosing  in  absolute  exemption  from  all  influences  from 
without  itself,  whether  of  external  objects,  or  of  other  attri- 
butes of  the  mind  ;  and  therefore  without  hope,  fear,  love, 
hate,  desire,  aversion,  conscience,  judgment,  or  perception  ; 
and  that  is  in  total  independence  of,  and  disjunction  from 
all  other  mental  acts  and  faculties  ! 

Mr.  Coleridge  likewise  states  that  "the  will  is  ultimately 
self-determined,  or  it  is  no  longer  a  will  under  the  law  of 
perfect  freedom,  but  a  nature  under  the  mechanism  of  cause 
and  eflect,"  as  "  absolutely  passive"  as  «  clay  in  the  hands 
of  a  potter." 

This  is  not  merely  the  literal  import  of  their  representa- 
tion, but  is  the  only  import  that  can  give  to  that  power  such 
an  agency  as  to  exempt  it  from  the  objection  which  it  is 


142 

their  object  by  it  to  escape.  Unless  it  wholly  disenthrals 
the  mind  from  the  influence  of  motives,  and  sustains  it  in  a 
state  of  indiflerence,  it  has  no  more  claims  to  exemption 
from  the  objection  alleged  by  them  on  that  ground  against 
the  opposite  system,  than  that  system  itself  has,  and  no  more 
adaptation  to  subserve  the  end  for  which  it  is  employed. 

It  is  the  only  construction,  moreover,  that  places  their 
theory  in  contrast  to  that  of  President  Edwards,  whose 
doctrine  on  this  branch  of  the  subject  is  summarily,  that 
motives  are  the  reasons  of  the  mind's  choosing,  and  of  its 
choosing  in  the  manner  in  which  it  does.  As,  therefore, 
there  is  no  medium  between  the  doctrine,  that  the  mind 
chooses  for  a  reason,  or  that  it  does  not,  their  theory  of 
course  is — if  the  converse  of  his — ^that  volitions  are  put 
forth  without  reasons. 

In  place  of  these  the  views  which  I  have  heretofore  ad- 
vanced on  this  subject  are,  that  the  mind  is  the  efficient 
cause  of  its  voluntary  acts ;  that  it  never  exerts  its  efficiency 
except  in  the  presence  of  perceptions  and  emotions ;  that 
they  are  always  its  reasons  for  exerting  the  choices  which 
it  does  ;  that  there  is  to  God  a  certainty  beforehand  of  the 
whole  series  of  its  perceptions  and  emotions,  and  thence  of 
the  volitions  which  it  exerts  under  their  influence  ;  and  that 
he  can  vary  that  series  in  any  manner  he  pleases,  and 
through  that  means  give  birth  to  a  corresponding  variation 
in  the  volitions  that  are  put  forth  from  their  excitement. 

The  doctrine  is  thus  common  to  these  systems,  that  the 
mind  is  the  efficient  cause  of  its  volitions  ;  and  the  points  at 
which  their  difterences  commence,  and  to  which  all  their 
ultimate  contrariety  is  traceable,  are  the  questions  whether 
it  exerts  its  volitions  for  intelligent  reasons ;  and  whether 
to  exert  them  for  such  reasons,  can  invalidate  its  responsi- 


143 

bility :  as  on  the  one  hand  the  objection  of  these  gentlemen 
to  the  doctrine  that  the  mind  is  prompted  in  its  volitions  by 
motives,  is,  that  to  be  influenced  in  its  choices  is  incompat- 
ible with  its  responsibility ;  and  the  ground,  accordingly, 
on  which  they  recommend  the  theory  of  a  self-determining 
will  is,  that  it  is  exempt  from  that  objection :  and  as  on  the 
other,  to  admit  that  the  mind  exerts  its  choices  for  intelligent 
reasons,  is  to  admit  in  effect  the  whole  system  which  they 
oppose  ;  since  if  it  exerts  its  volitions  for  such  reasons,  then 
clearly  it  cannot  be  incompatible  with  its  nature  as  a  re- 
sponsible agent,  to  be  influenced  by  motives  ;  and  if  the 
influence  itself  of  motives  is  not  inconsistent  with  responsible 
choices,  then  a  previous  certainty  of  their  exerting  such 
an  influence  cannot  involve  any  such  inconsistency  ;  and 
the  whole  series  of  objections  to  the  scheme  I  have  endea- 
vored to  sustain,  is  at  once  wholly  abandoned. 

The  great  and  sole  question  then,  on  the  solution  of  which 
Mr.  Coleridge's  whole  system  on  this  subject  stands  or  falls, 
is  simply,  whether  the  mind  in  that  part  of  its  agency — its 
volitions — which  involves  all  its  morality  and  religion,  acts 
without  any  intelligent  reason  whatever — a  question,  the 
bare  statement  of  which  can  scarcely  be  made  without  ex- 
posing his  whole  scheme  to  ridicule,  and  superseding  the 
necessity  of  discussion  to  demonstrate  its  erroneousness. 
A  glance  at  some  of  the  most  obvious  considerations  with 
which  it  is  connected,  will  be  sufficient  to  determine  its 
character. 

There  is  seldom  a  better  test  of"  the  positive  science  and 
theoretical  insight"  of  the  advocates  of  a  repulsive  dogma, 
than  to  trace  its  relations  to  their  agency,  and  ascertain  to 
what  extent  they  succeed  in  verifying  its  principles  in  their 
practice.     If  applied  to  these  gentlemen,  their  labors  in  the 

19 


144 

present  instance  form  but  an  ill-matched  commentary  to 
their  doctrine.  For,  notwithstanding  their  conviction 
that  the  mind  acts,  and  must  act  in  its  volitions,  irrespectively 
of  all  influences — that  is,  of  reasons — or  prove  a  mere  ma- 
chine in  its  agency,  they  yet  proceed  forthwith,  and  make  it 
the  great  object  of  their  labors,  to  present  to  their  readers 
a  series  of  reasons  for  the  purpose  of  swaying  them  in  their 
choices  between  these  conflicting  systems  ;  and  apparently 
without  a  suspicion  that  their  efforts  must  either  prove  en- 
tirely uninfluential,  or  subvert  their  whole  theory.  True 
or  false,  then,  they  find  their  scheme  to  be  impracticable. 
They  cannot  print  a  sentence  nor  breathe  a  syllable  to  sus- 
tain its  representations,  or  commend  it  to  the  acceptance  of 
their  fellow-men,  without  becoming  its  assailants,  and  tram- 
pling all  its  pretensions  in  the  dust. 

Mr.  Coleridge  moreover  expressly  recognizes  and  admits 
the  fact,  that  the  Most  High  employs  a  system  of  means  to 
influence  men  in  their  volitions,  and  prompt  them  to  obedi- 
ent choices. 

"  By  the  phrase  '  in  Christ,'  I  mean  all  the  mpernatural  aids 
vouchsafed  and  conditionally  promised  in  the  christian  dispensation, 
and  among  them,  the  spirit  of  truth,  which  the  world  cannot  receive, 
were  it  only  that  the  knowledge  of  spiritual  truth  is  of  necessity  im- 
mediate and  intuitive;  and  the  world,  or  natural  man,  possesses  no 
higher  intuitions  than  those  of  the  pure  sense,  which  are  the  subjects 
of  mathematical  science.  But  aids,  observe  !  Therefore  not  by  the 
will  of  man  aione;  but  neither  without  the  will." — Aids  to  Reflec- 
tion, p.  105. 

He  thus  represents  the  Spirit  of  God  as  assisting  the 
mind  to  obedient  volition,  by  raising  it  to  an  "immediate 
intuition"  of  spiritual  truth  ;  or,  in  other  words,  presenting 
to  it  a  supernatural  array  of  motives  to  sway  it  in  its  choices. 


145 

He  must  be  considered,  therefore,  in  this  and  similar  pas- 
sages, as  virtually  pronouncing  his  system  to  be  erroneous, 
or  else  as  regarding  the  Most  High  as  employing  an  in- 
strumentality to  excite  us  to  holiness,  that  from  its  nature 
must  necessarily,  as  far  as  it  takes  effect,  render  us  incapa- 
ble of  a  responsible  agenc}'.  He  indeed — in  a  passage 
previously  quoted — expressly  places  "  the  power  of  acting" 
*'  from  motives,  and  not  from  mere  dark  instincts,''''  among  the 
peculiarities  by  which  man  is  distinguished  from  irrational 
animals,  and  openly  asserts  therefore  the  doctrine  which 
his  scheme  denies,  and  which  it  is  one  of  his  principal  ob- 
jects in  these  volumes  to  disparage  and  overthrow. 

But  beyond  this,  he  holds  that  the  will  has  disqualified 
itself  for  obedient  choices,  by  becoming  corrupt ;  or  has 
introduced  into  itself,  by  transgression,  a  principle  that 
insures  its  continuing  to  transgress,  until  extricated  from 
that  vassalage  by  the  aid  of  the  Spirit  of  truth. 

"  We  call  an  individual  a  bad  man,  not  because  an  action  is  con- 
trary to  law,  but  because  it  has  led  us  to  conclude  from  it  some 
principle  opposed  to  the  law  ;  some  private  maxim  or  by-law  in  the 
will,  contrary  to  the  universal  law  of  right  reason  in  the  conscience, 
as  the  ground  of  the  action.  But  this  evil  principle  again  must  be 
grounded  in  some  other  principle  which  has  been  made  determinant 
of  the  will,  by  the  will's  own  self-determination.  For  if  not,  it  must 
have  its  ground  in  some  necessity  of  nature,  in  some  instinct  or 
propensity  imposed,  not  acquired — another's  work,  not  our  own. 
Consequently,  neither  act  nor  principle  could  be  imputed  ;  and  rela- 
tively to  the  agent,  not  original,  not  sin." 

"  A  moral  evil  is  an  evil  that  has  its  origin  in  a  will.  An  evil 
common  to  all  must  have  a  ground  common  to  all.  But  the  actual 
existence  of  moral  evil  we  are  bound  in  conscience  to  admit :  and 
that  there  is  an  evil  common  to  all  is  a  fact :  and  this  evil  must 
therefore  have  a  common  ground.  Now  this  evil  ground  cannot 
originate  in  the  divine  will :  it  must  therefore  be  referred  to  the  will 


146 

of  man.     And  this  evil  ground  we  call  orig-inal  ein." — Aids  to  Re- 
flection, pp.  172,  173,  174. 

He  thus  represents  the  mind  as  having,  by  its  own 
agency,  produced  within  itself  a  permanent  principle,  that 
exerts  a  determinant  influence  on  it  in  all  its  choices,  and 
sways  it  perpetually  to  evil.  Whether  its  agency  is  physi- 
cal or  moral,  he  has  not  thought  proper  to  inform  us,  and 
it  is  of  no  significance  to  the  argument,  as  it  is  in  either 
case  wholly  contradictory  to  his  scheme.  It  is  not  an  act, 
but  first  the  efiect  of  an  act,  and  then  the  cause  or  deter- 
miner of  all  subsequent  volitions,  preceding  them  in  exist- 
ence, and  constituting  the  ground  of  their  being  what  they 
are,  and  exerts  precisely  such  an  influence,  therefore,  as  his 
theory  represents  as  incompatible  with  a  responsible  agency. 
He  obviously  exhibits  it  as  essentially  the  same  as  the  de- 
praved disposition  ascribed  to  the  mind  by  the  teachers  of 
physical  depravity,  and  represented  as  the  source  whence 
its  volitions  flow,  and  the  cause  that  they  are  what  they 
are  ;  and  it  is  obnoxious  accordingly  to  all  the  objections 
which  embarrass  that  theory. 

He  expresses  his  conviction,  indeed,  that  this  principle 
is  not  the  result  of  the  divine  agency,  and  that  its  nature  is 
wholly  unknown  and  incomprehensible  by  us  ;  statements, 
the  accuracy  of  which,  however — were  it  admitted  that  that 
principle  exists — it  is  a  matter  of  some  difliculty  to  perceive. 
Does  the  mind,  though  utterly  ignorant  of  the  nature  of 
this  principle,  still  intentionally  give  birth  to  it,  with  a  full 
perception  of  the  terrific  sway  which — unless  intercepted 
by  a  supernatural  interposition — it  is  to  exert  over  all  its 
subsequent  agency  ?  Was  Mr.  Coleridge  ever  conscious 
of  exerting  such  a  volition  ?     Or   is  the  principle  a  mere 


147 

consequence  of  the  mind's  volition,  wholly  unanticipated, 
and  unavoidable  by  itself?  But  if  so — as  it  is  not  an  act, 
but  an  abiding  quality — is  it  not  indisputably  a  mere  phy- 
sical attribute  ?  Who,  then,  is  the  cause  of  it — God  or  the 
soul  ?  Is  the  mind  endowed  with  the  extraordinary  power 
of  changing  its  own  physical  nature,  and  adding,  dimin- 
ishing, or  varying  its  attributes  at  pleasure  ?  If  not,  I 
suspect  it  will  be  a  matter  of  extreme  difficulty  to  avoid  the 
conclusion,  that  either  no  such  change  is  ever  introduced 
into  the  mind's  nature  in  conjunction  with  its  agency,  or 
that  it  is  wrought  solely  by  the  same  Almighty  hand  that 
gave  to  it  its  original  constitution. 

The  theory  of  a  self-determining  will,  then — whatever 
may  be  its  relations  to  fact — is  indisputably  precisely  the 
converse  of  that  on  which  Mr.  Coleridge  acts,  completely 
contradictory  to  several  of  his  most  essential  doctrines,  and 
as  incapable,  therefore,  of  reconciliation  with  his  as  with 
the  system  which  he  assails  ;  and  if  carried  by  him  to  its 
legitimate  results,  must  work  as  entire  a  revolution  in  his 
faith  and  practice,  as  it  could  if  adopted  in  their  views  and 
agency  who  now  reject  it — a  fact,  that  both  demonstrates 
that  there  exists  somewhere  in  the  circle  of  his  speculations 
an  egregious  deviation  from  truth,  and  presents  a  strong 
presumption  that  it  is  in  this  boasted  article,  so  incapable 
of  exemplification  in  practice,  that  the  fatal  error  lurks. 

If  we  look  at  its  relations  to  our  common  consciousness, 
we  find  still  more  decisive  and  abundant  evidences  of  its 
erroneousness. 

So  far  is  it  from  being  a  matter  of  universal  conscious- 
ness, as  it  should  be  on  his  system,  that  we  act  without 
reasons  in  all  our  voluntary  agency,  that  no  one  can  be 
found  ignorant  or  rash  enough  to  pretend,  unless  he  has  a 


148 

system  to  support,  that  he  ever  exerted  a  voluntary  act 
without  an  intelligent  reason  :  nor  any  evidences  in  the 
whole  range  of  history  that  such  an  act  was  ever  put  forth 
by  any  one  of  the  race. 

It  is  indisputably  certain  that  we  never  exert  volitions, 
except  in  the  presence  of  perceptions,  nor  are  capable  of 
exerting,  or  even  conceiving  them  as  exerted,  except  in 
their  presence.  To  choose  without  an  object  of  choice, 
were  to  choose  without  choosing.  Volition  without  a  per- 
ception, is  as  impossible,  as  volition  without  an  agent. 

But  that  is  no  more  a  matter  of  universal  consciousness, 
than  it  is  that  we  never  choose  without  a  reason  for  our 
choice.  To  put  forth  an  act  for  an  intelligent  reason,  is 
in  truth  the  definition  itself  of  volition.  That  reason  must 
of  course  be  present  to  the  mind  and  the  object  of  attention, 
when  it  acts  from  it ;  and  is  a  perception  therefore,  coexist- 
ing with  the  volition  of  which  it  is  the  reason.  The  mind 
never  rises  above  these  reasons  into  an  atmosphere  of  indif- 
ference, an  intellectual  vacuity,  and  puts  forth  choices  with- 
out object  or  aim.  That  were  to  act  like  a  machine,  in 
place  of  a  rational  agent. 

We  accordingly  recognize  the  fact  in  all  the  operations  of 
conscience,  that  the  moral  character  of  our  acts  depends  on 
the  intelligent  reasons  for  which  we  exert  them.  There 
are  not  only  millions  and  millions  of  actions  for  which  we 
feel  self-approbation  or  blame,  solely  on  that  ground,  and  in 
respect  to  which,  had  the  reasons  for  which  we  exerted 
them,  been  of  an  opposite  nature,  our  feelings  would  like- 
wise be  reversed,  but  no  exception  to  this  great  law  ever 
occurs  throughout  the  whole  succession  of  our  conscious- 
ness. He  who  in  putting  forth  an  act  for  the  purpose  of  un- 
lawfully destroying  life,  becomes  by  an  interposition  of 


149 

providence,  the  means  of  saving  it,  feels  as  guilty,  as 
though  he  had  accomplished  the  evil  at  which  he  aimed  : 
and  he  who  in  benevolently  endeavoring  to  save  life,  un- 
wittingly becomes  its  destroyer,  is  nevertheless  as  innocent, 
as  though  the  good  which  was  his  object,  had  been  achieved. 

We  universally  act  on  the  assumption  that  such  is  like- 
wise the  fact  with  all  other  moral  agents  whom  we  attempt 
to  influence.  All  our  efforts  to  sway  them  in  their  agency, 
are  employed  in  presenting  reasons  to  them  for  acting  in 
the  manner  we  desire ;  and  are  founded  on  the  conviction 
that  they  never  act  voluntarily,  except  from  intelligent 
reasons. 

We  universally  proceed  on  the  assumption  likewise,  in 
judging  the  agency  of  our  fellow  men,  that  the  virtue  or 
vice  of  their  actions,  depends  wholly  on  the  intentions  with 
which  they  act ;  and  though  their  visible  acts  and  their 
effects  are  precisely  the  same,  approve  or  condemn,  solely 
as  they  are  ascertained  to  have  been  exerted  with  a  selfish, 
or  benevolent  aim. 

And  finally  the  Creator  himself  recognizes  this  great  law 
of  our  agency  in  all  the  measures  of  his  administration, 
and  makes  it,  as  it  were,  the  whole  business  of  his  govern- 
ment, to  convey  to  us  reasons  to  control  us  in  our  choices ; 
dissuasives  from  sin,  and  inducements  to  obedience ;  and 
holds  us  responsible  for  the  intentions  with  which  we  act. 

Wherever  then  we  turn  our  eye,  this  is  seen  to  be  the 
sole  law  of  our  voluntary  agency,  recognized  and  proclaim- 
ed by  that  great  Being  who  gave  us  existence,  and  con- 
forms his  administration  to  our  nature  :  repeated  and  sanc- 
tioned by  every  created  spirit  that  passes  within  the  circle 
of  our  vision,  and  graven  in  living  characters  on  the  tab- 
lets of  our  consciousness.    No  agent  is  seen  within  the  wide 


150 

circuit  of  this  theatre,  whose  volitions  spring  up  out  of  a 
mere  vacuum,  without  cause  or  end  ;  whose  choices  are  no 
preferences  ;  whose  aims  have  no  objects  :  in  whom  will  has 
no  communion  with  intellect ;  whose  heart  like  a  being  with- 
out eyes,  is  shut  from  the  light  of  reason  ;  whose  attributes 
torn  and  disjoined  like  the  rent  limbs  of  a  slaughtered  vic- 
tim, can  only  convulse  and  palpitate  as  separate  existences  ! 
Our  powers  and  agency  in  short,  and  those  of  all  the  in- 
telligences around  us,  in  place  of  according  with  Mr.  Cole- 
ridge's system,  are  precisely  the  converse  of  what  the  theory 
of  a  self-determining  will  requires. 

If  traced  to  its  results  accordingly,  in  place  of  furnishing 
a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  phenomena  of  our  agency,  it 
presents  at  every  point  a  flagrant  contradiction  alike  to  all 
the  facts  of  consciousness,  and  all  the  measures  of  the  di- 
vine administration. 

Thus  volition,  if  its  representations  are  just,  can  obviou- 
sly be  nothing  better  than  a  mere  mechanical  and  reasonless 
agency,  as  empty  of  morality  as  the  motions  of  inanimate 
matter.  By  the  terms  of  the  system,  it  is  not  exerted  for 
any  conscious  reason,  but  springs  up  from  a  state  of  per- 
fect indifference,  and  unattended  by  a  solitary  pulse  of 
emotion  or  desire — a  mere  moral  singultus  or  spasm,  in- 
stead of  an  act  put  forth  for  an  intelligent  reason.  The 
mind  accordingly  must  be  completely  passive  in  regard  to 
it,  in  place  of  being  its  intentional  author,  and  can  sustain 
toward  it  no  higher  or  more  responsible  relation,  than  it 
does  to  suggestions  and  recollections  that  arise  in  it  inde- 
pendently of  its  will.  The  dissimilarity  of  these  two 
classes  of  acts  in  their  origin  and  relation  to  our  efficiency, 
is  obliterated  ;  and  instead  of  being  exempted  in  our  voli- 
tions from  external  influences,  we  are  utterly  stricken  from 


151 


the  rank  of  efficient  causes,  and  reduced  to  the  station,  in 
the  whole  of  our  agency,  of  mere  unintentional  and  help- 
less recipients  !  An  extraordinary  expedient  to  escape  the 
imagined  perplexities  of  the  system  which  represents  us  as 
acting  from  felt  reasons  in  our  clioices  !  The  representa- 
tion which  these  gentlemen  give  of  our  volitions,  is  the  de- 
finition itself  of  passivity,  and  debars  them,  if  carried  to 
its  legitimate  results,  from  the  possibility  of  demonstrating 
that  we  ever  sustain  the  relation  of  an  efficient  to  any  of 
our  acts. 

It  exhibits  all  legislative  acts,  whether  human  or  divine 
as  necessarily  destitute  of  all  efficacy  and  propriety.  They 
are  employed  entirely  in  presenting  to  us  reasons  to  influ- 
ence and  guide  us  in  our  voluntary  conduct.  But  what 
possible  agency  can  they  exert,  if  no  such  reasons  ever  do 
or  can  aflfect  our  volitions  ;  or  if,  as  far  as  they  affect  us, 
they  necessarily  render  us  incapable  of  a  responsible  agen- 
cy ?  On  the  scheme  of  these  gentlemen,  the  government 
of  the  Most  High  is  manifestly  as  empty  and  inefficacious  a 
pageant,  as  though  established  over  a  race  of  mere  brute 
beings  or  unconscious  vegetables. 

It  converts  religion  itself,  in  its  highest  and  holiest  acts, 
in  like  manner  into  a  mere  unmeaning  and  reasonless  farce] 
as  it  is  implied  in  its  representations,  that  there  is  nothing 
in  the  character,  relations,  or  agency  of  God,  that  is  either 
entitled  to,  or  can  be  a  reason  for  our  loving  or  serving 
him;  nor  any  thing  in  righteousness  that  can  be  a  reason 
of  our  preferring  it  to  sin,  or  in  sin  that  can  be  a  reason  of 
our  avoiding  it  in  place  of  righteousness ! 

It  involves  a  denial  of  the  truth  of  all  the  doctrines  and 
predictions  of  the  scriptures,  that  relate  to  the  future  actions 
of  men  ;  as  if  no  reason  whatever  exists  to  the  mind  itself, 

20 


152 

that  it  exerts  the  choices  which  it  does,  in  place  of  not  ex- 
erting any,  it  is  sufficiently  clear  if  it  is  their  efficient  cause, 
that  no  antecedent  certainty  whatever  can  exist,  of  its  ex- 
erting those  which  it  does ;  and  that  none  therefore  can 
be  possessed  by  the  Most  High,  that  they  will  be  exerted. 
The  definition  which  these  gentlemen  give  of  a  self-deter- 
mining power,  as  a  cause,  is  in  truth  a  logical  definition  of 
chance,  or  no  cause,  and  is  tantamount  to  an  assertion  that 
no  reason  whatever  exists  that  our  volitions  are  what  they 
are,  except  the  fact  that  they  are  ;  and  that  therefore  there 
neither  is  nor  can  be  any  certainty  of  their  existence,  until 
they  are  exerted.  But  what  are  we  to  think  on  this  scheme, 
of  the  representations  of  the  scriptures  respecting  the  agen- 
cy of  the  Holy  Spirit  ?  Is  the  influence  which  he  exerts 
on  us  for  the  purpose  of  exciting  us  to  obedience,  such  as 
necessarily  violates  our  moral  nature,  and  renders  us  inca- 
pable, by  its  very  presence,  of  responsible  choices  ?  Is 
conviction,  by  his  agency,  of  sin,  of  righteousness,  and  of 
judgment  to  come,  by  the  structure  of  our  constitution,  a 
disqualification  for  obedience  ;  and  the  doctrine  that  he 
sanctifies  us  through  the  truth,  both  morally  and  ph3'sically 
false  f  Or  are  we,  out  of  courtesy  to  the  philosophy  of 
these  gentlemen,  at  once  to  strike  from  our  creed  the  whole 
doctrine  of  a  spiritual  influence,  and  abandon  the  blessings 
and  hopes  of  which  that  influence  is  the  sole  source  ? 

This  theory  of  volition  denies  all  the  moral  excellence 
of  the  Supreme  Being,  as  well  as  of  his  creatures.  If  it 
belongs  to  the  nature  of  moral  agency  to  be  exerted  with- 
out any  intelligent  reason,  and  God  is  a  moral  agent, 
he  of  course  cannot  have  acted  from  any  such  reason  in 
any  of  his  volitions,  and  cannot,  therefore,  any  more  than 
his  creatures,  merit,  for  any  part  of  his  administration,  the 
praise  of  rectitude,  goodness,  or  wisdom ! 


153 

And  finally,  it  implies,  that  temptation  to  sin  diminishes, 
in  proportion  to  its  strength,  the  guilt  of  yielding  to  it,  and 
needs  only  to  become  triumphant  to  render  transgression 
innocent ;  and  that  excitements  to  holiness  destroy,  in  the 
exact  ratio  of  their  strength,  both  the  power  and  obligation 
to  be  holy,  and  wholly  divest  obedience  of  its  moral  excel- 
lence, whenever  they  become  successful ! 

Such  are  some  of  the  frightful  results  which  this  scheme 
obviously  involves.  Are  these  gentlemen  willing  to  adopt 
them  ?  They  undoubtedly  are  not.  They  have  no  alter- 
native, then,  but  either  to  deny  their  connexion  with  the 
premises  from  which  they  are  deduced,  or  else  the  just  im- 
putation to  them  of  those  premises.  To  demonstrate  that 
these  conclusions  are  not  involved  in  the  doctrine  that  the 
mind  acts  in  its  choices  without  any  intelligent  reasons,  I 
think  may  safely  be  pronounced  to  be  impossible  ;  and  to 
deny  that  that  doctrine  is  the  doctrine  of  a  self-determining 
will,  and  admit  that  the  mind  exerts  its  volitions  for  sucK 
reasons,  is  to  admit  the  theory  of  Edwards,  which  they 
reject,  and  denounce  as  so  irreconcilable  with  consciousness, 
and  subversive  of  religion. 

Notwithstanding  the  important  objections  to  which  Mr. 
Coleridge's  system  is  thus  obnoxious,  his  volumes  are  still 
not  without  value,  and  will  be  read  with  more  than  ordinary 
interest.  Those,  indeed,  who  from  his  literary  character, 
or  Mr.  Marsh's  recommendation,  anticipated  from  them 
any  important  advancement  of  the  science  of  which  they 
chiefly  treat,  must  be  wholly  disappointed.  The  only  devia- 
tion of  moment,  on  which  he  has  ventured,  from  doctrines 
that  have  long  been  held  by  many,  both  of  the  theologians 
and  metaphysicians  of  Great  Britain,  is  his  attempted  dis- 
crimination of  the  understanding  from  reason ;  and  that, 


154 

like  most  of  the  novelties  of  his  nomenclature,  and  much 
of  the  mystification  with  which  his  pages  abound,  is  trans- 
planted from  the  philosophy  of  Kant.  His  views  of  a  self- 
determining  will  are  at  least  as  old  as  the  Arminian  theory 
on  that  subject ;  and  his  doctrine  of  original  sin,  in  its 
essential  elements,  of  a  far  earlier  date.  His  essays  on 
truth,  however  just  in  sentiment,  have  neither  the  recom- 
mendation of  novelty  nor  perspicuousness,  and  fall,  in 
energy  and  impressiveness,  far  short  of  the  higher  class  of 
discourses  on  that  subject  from  the  pulpit,  to  which  the 
churches  both  in  this  and  that  country  are  accustomed. 
His  distinction  of  prudence  or  expediency  from  morality  or 
rectitude,  though  put  forth  with  the  air  of  a  discovery,  and 
perplexed  with  all  the  obscurity  of  an  original  thought,  is 
essentially  the  just  and  important  distinction  with  which 
the  world  has  long  been  familiar,  of  the  selfish  from  the 
benevolent,  or  the  worldly-wise  from  the  disinterestedly 
upright.  That  he  has  broached  no  novelties  on  these  latter 
subjects,  is  indeed  commendation,  in  place  of  reproach  ; 
and  though  he  has  failed  to  exhibit  them  with  the  clearness, 
and  invest  them  with  the  splendor,  which  were  to  be  ex- 
pected from  his  genius  and  learning,  it  is  yet  matter  of 
congratulation,  that,  while  so  many  of  the  gifted  and  po- 
pular writers  of  the  age  are  wasting  their  powers  on  subjects 
at  best  of  the  most  transitory  interest,  he  has  chosen  to  quit 
those  fields,  and  devote  to  these  high  themes  so  minute  a 
discussion. 

The  style  of  these  volumes  is  extremely  unequal ;  rising 
at  times  to  great  beauty  and  energy,  and  descending  at 
others  to  as  distant  an  extreme  of  inelegance  and  careless- 
ness. He  exhibits,  indeed,  an  extraordinary  facility  of 
abrupt  transition  from  the  sublime  to  the  ridiculous,  and 


155 

from  the  vigorous  to  the  feeble — faults,  the  more  reprehen- 
sible, that  he  is  so  easily  able  to  adorn  the  subjects  of  which 
he  treats  with  more  than  a  common  share  of  elegance. 
The  imperfections  of  his  style  and  methods  of  discussion, 
appear  to  result  in  some  degree  from  the  peculiarity  of 
his  genius.  His  pages  exhibit,  apparently,  but  very  im- 
perfect traces  of  the  mental  operations  which  they  profess 
to  represent.  He  gives  us,  often,  only  the  distant  and 
slightly-connected  points  of  his  excursions,  in  place  of  their 
continuous  outline — the  results,  rather  than  the  processes 
of  his  reasoning.  Thoughts,  images,  relations,  analogies, 
flashing  in  instant  succession  on  his  eye,  bear  him  onward, 
with  a  lightning  rush,  from  object  to  object,  and  scene  to 
scene,  and  dazzled  himself,  and  entranced  by  the  rapidity 
and  splendor  of  the  vision,  he  forgets  but  that  his  reader 
has  been  a  companion  of  his  flight,  and  reached  his  con- 
clusion by  a  similarly  delightful  process.  Preferable  as  it 
may  be  to  himself,  however,  thus  to  sport  at  will  at  a  dis- 
tance, or  soar  into  the  clouds,  it  may  be  well  to  recollect, 
that  if  the  dwellers  in  the  vales  and  on  the  rocks  are  to  be 
spectators  of  his  movements,  he  must  present  himself  more 
frequently  within  the  sphere  of  their  vision  ;  and  if  his 
footsteps  are  to  be  marked,  and  serve  as  guides  to  other 
adventurers,  it  would  essentially  contribute  to  the  facility 
of  tracing  them,  were  he  to  touch  the  earth  a  little  oftener. 


THE 

CHRISTIAN  SPECTATOR'S 
REVIEW  OF  DR.FISK. 


It  is  a  subject  of  congratulalion,  that  the  author  of  the 
article  in  the  Christian  Spectator,  for  December,  1831,  on 
the  doctrines  of  predestination  and  election,  in  which  he 
has  taken  occasion  to  express  his  views  on  several  of  the 
contested  topics  that  have  so  frequently  been  treated  in 
that  work  by  some  of  his  associates,  has  been  induced  to 
engage  in  the  discussion,  and  offer  his  sentiments,  in  respect 
to  which  many  have  hitherto  been  left  in  some  uncertainty, 
to  a  free  inspection  by  the  public. 

Those  subjects  have  become  themes  of  high  interest,  to 
the  clergy  particularly,  almost  throughout  the  country ;  and 
the  conviction  is  very  generally  felt  that  the  interests  of 
truth  and  the  welfare  of  the  church  require  their  discussion 
to  be  continued,  until  the  principles  of  the  adverse  parties, 
with  the  conclusions  which  they  involve,  shall  be  fully  de- 
veloped, and  the  public  put  in  possession  of  the  means  of 
an  impartial  and  accurate  judgment  respecting  them.  And 
the  discharge  of  this  office,  on  the  part  of  the  institution 
with  which  this  gentleman  is  connected,  obviously  cannot 
be  so  properly  devolved,  especially  at  the  present  stage  of 
the  controversy,  on  any  one  else,  as  on  himself.     His  asso- 


157 

ciate,  who  has  heretofore  taken  the  chief  part  in  the  dis- 
cussion, is  little  less  than  universally  regarded,  it  is  believed, 
as  hors  de  combat ;  having  so  thoroughly  written  himself 
down,  that  the  reputation  of  the  college,  as  well  as  the 
honor  of  religion,  requires  him  to  enact  his  labors  hereafter 
on  a  less  public  theatre,  where  the  spectators,  if  not  so  in- 
experienced as  to  allow  his  mistakes  to  pass  undetected, 
may  at  least  be  less  likely  to  reveal  them  to  the  general 
gaze.  If  such  had  not  hitherto  been  the  fact,  the  last 
stroke  required  for  his  prostration  is  given,  one  would 
imagine,  in  the  article  under  consideration-— in  the  open 
and  unhesitating  assertion  of  the  theory,  as  the  doctrine  of 
"  the  venerable  institution  of  Yale,"  that  the  sole  reason 
that  God  permits  the  existence  of  sin  in  his  empire,  is  an 
inadequacy  of  his  power  to  exclude  it  from  a  moral  system  ; 
an  assertion  in  direct  contradiction  to  Dr.  Taylor's  pre- 
tence, in  his  reply  to  Dr.  Woods,  that  he  had  neither 
taught  nor  held  that  doctrine  as  an  article  of  belief ;  uttered 
any  intimation  in  his  discussions  respecting  it,  of  his 
conviction  of  its  truth  ;  nor  employed  any  reasonings  or 
representations  that  could  authorize  its  imputation  to  him. 
That  doctrine,  then  so  solemnly  disclaimed  by  himself 
and  the  editor  of  the  Spectator,  and  of  the  ascription  of 
which  to  him  he  complained  as  an  injury,  the  perpetration 
of  which  must  inevitably  overwhelm  its  author  with  self- 
reproach  and  public  reprobation,  is  now  openly  avowed  as 
an  article  of  their  common  faith,  not  only  held  with  the 
fullest  confidence,  and  strenuously  maintained,  but  believed 
by  them  to  be  the  only  theory  that  can  solve  the  phenomena 
of  God's  administration,  and  vindicate  his  character ;  and 
regarded  as  so  superlatively  adapted  to  that,  as  to  render  it 
impossible  that  even  the  worst  enemies  of  his  government — 


158 

infidels  and  universalists — should  resist  the  light  of  its 
demonstration.  If  any  of  the  friends  of  religion  have  hith- 
erto found  themselves  unable  to  decide  on  that  gentleman's 
merits  as  a  controversialist,  I  commend  this  fact  to  their 
consideration. 

The  public,  then,  will  probably  be  as  willing  as  the 
friends  of  the  college  are  anxious,  to  be  spared  the  infliction 
of  any  further  instruction  from  him  on  these  themes ;  and 
if  discussed  therefore  by  either  of  the  theological  professors, 
at  least  with  any  probability  of  a  useful  influence,  it  must 
be  by  the  gentleman  who  has  now  undertaken  it.  From 
him,  however,  whatever  comes  will  doubtless  merit  and 
meet  a  respectful  reception. 

The  review  under  notice,  is  marked  accordingly  by 
traits  of  mind,  and  in  several  instances  of  sentiment,  of  a 
far  different  cast  from  those  which  have  characterized  that 
gentleman's  lucubrations.  He  makes  no  pretence  like  him, 
contradicted  by  professions  and  arguments  on  every  page, 
that  none  of  his  views  differ  in  any  essential  respect  from 
the  prevalent  doctrines  of  New-England,  but  frankly  ad- 
mits his  dissent  from  some  of  those  doctrines,  and  regards 
his  peculiarities  as  exempt  from  objections  to  which  they 
are  obnoxious.  Nor  does  he,  like  him,  after  professing  to 
reject  the  theory  of  physical  depravity,  immediately  turn  to 
its  assertion,  and  without  any  other  than  a  change  of  his 
terms,  re-affirm  every  principle  that  is  involved  in  that  doc- 
trine, and  re-sanction  all  the  arguments  that  are  employed 
for  its  support.  He  has  not  made  it  the  business  of  any  of 
his  pages  to  treat  of  a  selfish  principle  that  needs  to  be  sus- 
pended, by  a  purely  physical  agency,  before  any  of  the 
motives  that  gain  access  to  the  mind  can,  without  surmount- 
ing a  natural  impossibility,  either  prompt  it  to  obedience 


159 

or  restrain  it  from  transgression.  Nor  has  he  felt  himself 
under  a  necessity  of  attempting  to  sustain  his  cause  by  in- 
venting false  laws  of  interpretation,  or  false  claims  to  the 
sanctionof  authors  whose  systems  he  rejects. 

His  doctrinal  views,  in  some  respects,  likewise  exhibit 
an  equally  striking  contrast  to  those  which  it  has  been  a 
favorite  object  of  that  gentleman  to  sustain.  Unhappily, 
however,  he  has  repeated  and  sanctfoned  with  his  approba- 
tion the  chief  and  worst  of  the  errors  which  Dr.  Taylor 
has  made  it  his  business  to  teach, — that  the  reason  of  the  ad- 
mission of  sin  into  the  divine  kingdom,  is  a  physical  im- 
possibility of  excluding  it  from  a  moral  system ;  a  theory 
to  my  apprehension  so  palpably  at  variance  with  many  of 
the  main  principles  and  doctrines  of  his  own  system,  and 
fraught  with  so  fatal  a  contradiction  to  all  the  great  truths 
of  revelation,  as  to  render  a  free  and  full  development  of 
its  error,  essential  to  the  welfare  of  the  church. 

The  mode  in  which  he  exhibits  these  views,  is  sufficiently 
seen  from  the  following  passages. 

"  Now  the  great  difficulty  which  belongs  to  this  subject  arises, 
confessedly,  from  the  existence  of  sin.  We  ask  Dr.  F.  then,  whether 
he  believes  that  a  God,  who  forbids  all  sin,  who  would  have  all  men 
come  to  repentance,  does  yet  desire  or  prefer  the  existence  of  sin 
under  his  government  ?  Why,  then,  did  not  he  totally  exclude  it 
from  a  moral  system  ?  Does  Dr.  F.  know  that  this  could  have  been 
done  by  a  mere  intervention  of  divine  power?  He  strenuously 
maintains  that  God  is  not  the  sole  agent  in  the  universe;  that  there 
is  an  entire  and  complete  cause  of  moral  action  lying  out  of  him,  in 
the  existence  of  a  free  agent.  Such  an  agent,  then,  on  Dr.  F.'s 
principles,  has  pojoer  to  sin,  notwithstanding  any  amount  of  influence 
which  his  Maker  can  bring  upon  him  short  of  destroying  his  freedom. 
Does  Dr.  F.  know,  can  he  prove,  that  of  beings  who  have  thus  the 
power  to  sin,  any  moral  system  could  have  been  formed,  in  which  some 
of  these  beings  would  not  use  that  power  ?     Can  he  prove  that  the 

21 


160 

alternative  presented  to  God  in  creation,  was  not  tiiis, — no  moral 
system,  or  a  system  in  which  some  of  iiis  subjects  would  abuse  the 
high  prerogative  of  freedom,  and  rebel?" 

"  Can  Dr.  F.  prove  tlie  reason  of  the  admission  of  sin  to  be  any 
other  than  this,  that  God  could  not  exclude  all  sin  from  the  universe, 
and  yet  have  a  moral  system  ?  Dr.  F.  has  not  even  attempted  to  do 
it.  Let  him  prove,  then,  the  truth  of  this  gratuitous  assumption,  on 
which  his  whole  argument  is  founded,  and  he  may  then,  with  some 
show  of  reason,  maintain  that  a  purpose  on  the  part  of  God  to  admit 
sin  into  the  universe  necessarily  implies  his  preference  of  the  existing 
amount  of  sin  to  holiness  in  its  stead." 

"  Sin,  where  it  now  occurs,  may  be  regarded  by  him  as  an  evil, 
and  only  an  evil,  and  yet  (as  an  evil  unavoidable  as  to  his  preven- 
tion, in  a  moral  system,)  it  may  be  reduced  to  the  least  possible 
limits,  and  overruled  in  the  best  possible  manner.  In  reducing  an 
unavoidable  evil  to  the  least  possible  limits,  and  overruling  it  in 
the  best  possible  manner,  therefore,  God  would  show  that  he  prefers, 
not  the  existence  of  sin,  to  its  non-existence,  but  simply  its  existence 
to  the  non-existence  of  a  moral  kingdom  ;  and  its  existence,  where 
it  is  in  such  a  kingdom,  rather  than  any  where  else,  as  being  there 
the  least  possible  evil,  and  overruled  in  the  best  possible  manner." 

"  We  are  thrown  back,  then,  to  consider  the  other  branch  of  this 
argument,  viz.  the  assumption,  that  God,  as  omnipotent,  can  prevent 
all  moral  evil  in  a  moral  system.  Is  not  here  the  fallacy  ?  We 
know  that  a  moral  system  necessarily  implies  the  existence  of  free 
agents,  with  tlie  power  to  sin  in  despite  of  all  opposing  power.  This 
fact  sets  human  reason  at  defiance  in  every  attempt  to  prove,  that 
some  of  these  agents  will  not  use  that  power,  and  actually  sin. 
There  is,  at  least,  a  possible  contradiction  involved  in  the  denial  of 
this  ;  and  it  is  no  part  of  the  prerogative  of  omnipotence  to  be  able 
to  accomplish  contradictions.  But  if  it  be  not  inconsistent  with  the 
true  idea  of  omnipotence,  to  suppose  that  God  cannot  prevent  all 
sin  in  a  moral  system,  then  neither  is  it  inconsistent  with  his  goodness 
that  he  does  not  prevent  it ;  since  sin,  in  respect  to  his  power  of 
prevention,  may  be  incidental  to  the  existence  of  that  system  which 
infinite  goodness  demands.  It  is,  then,  in  view  of  this  groundless 
assumption  concerning  omnipotence,  that  we  see  the  reasoning  of 
the  universalist,  the  infidel,  and' the  atheist,  to  be  the  merest  paralo- 
gism, or  begging  of  the  question.  The  utter  impossibility  of  proving 
their  main  principle  is  so  obvious,  that  they  can  be  made  to  see  it, 
and,  we  hope,  to  acknowledge  it.     At  any  rate,  until  this  mode  of 


161 

refutation  be  adopted,  we  despair  of  the  subversion  of  their  cause  by 
reasoning.  By  that  mode  of  argument  which  assumes,  that  God 
prefers  sin  to  holiness,  tlie  main  pillar  of  their  conclusion,  viz.  that 
God  can  prevent  all  moral  evil  in  a  moral  system,  is  conceded  to 
them,  and  thus  they  are  only  confirmed  in  their  delusions.  When 
shall  the  defenders  of  the  truth  learn  the  difference  between  scrip- 
tural doctrines  and  groundless  theories  ?" — pp.  604.  607.  617. 


His  theory  thus  Is,  that  from  the  nature  of  free  agents, 
the  entire  exclusion  of  sin  from  a  moral  system  is  impossible 
to  the  Deity,  and  that  the  reason,  accordingly,  of  its  ad- 
mission into  the  present  system  is,  that  he  is  incapable  of 
preventing  it ;  or  if  it  is  thought  to  resemble  more  nearly 
the  form  in  which  the  reviewer  expresses  it, — that  from  the 
nature  of  free  agents  it  is  impossible  to  prove  that  the  entire 
exclusion  of  sin  from  a  moral  system  is  not  impracticable 
to  the  Deity,  and  that  the  true  inference,  therefore  from 
that  and  the  existence  of  sin  is,  that  an  impossibility  of  its 
prevention  is  the  reason  of  its  admission  into  the  present 
system.  That  this  is  the  just  construction  of  the  scheme,  I 
have  no  apprehension  that  either  the  reviewer,  or  any  one 
who  takes  the  trouble  to  examine  it,  and  has  the  least  com- 
petence to  determine  its  import,  will  deny.  It  is,  indispu- 
tably, not  merely  the  natural,  but  the  only  construction, 
that  either  the  language  or  reasoning  will  bear.  It  is 
equally  indisputable  that  the  reviewer  has  the  fullest  confi- 
dence in  its  coincidence  with  fact,  and  was  prompted  by 
that  conviction  to  give  it  publicity.  He  not  only  pronounces 
its  refutation  to  be  impracticable  to  human  reason,  and 
regards  it  as  furnishing  an  adequate  solution  of  the  pheno- 
mena of  the  divine  administration,  but  employs  it  for  that 
purpose,  and  to  refute  the  objections  of  infidels ;  assures  us 
that  he  "  despairs  of  the  subversion  of  their  cause"  by  any 


162 

other  hypothesis  ;  and  finally  declares,  that  there  is  no 
alternative  but  to  adopt  it,  or  to  assent  to  the  theory  which 
he  rejects,  that  "  sin  is  the  necessar}'  means  of  the  greatest 
good,"  and  is  for  that  reason,  therefore,  "  introduced 
into  our  system."  But  I  have  no  apprehension — I 
repeat  it — that  the  reviewer  will  deny  this  to  be  his 
theory ;  or,  after  having  presented  it  in  very  nearly  the 
language,  and  endeavored  to  sustain  it  by  the  reasons  that 
were  employed  respecting  it  by  his  associates,  and  with  the 
full  knowledge  of  the  construction  that  was  universally  put 
on  it  as  exhibited  by  them,  that  he  will,  in  imitation  of  their 
example,  resort  to  the  pretence,  for  the  purpose  of  escaping 
any  odium  that  may  attach  to  its  inculcation,  that  because 
he  has  not  in  so  many  words  affirmed  it  to  be  true,  and  the 
object  of  his  full  faith,  his  readers  have  no  right  to  regard 
him  as  believing  it,  and  having  taught  it  for  the  purpose  of 
leading  them  to  its  adoption.  There  is  not  a  proposition 
from  the  commencement  to  the  end  of  his  discussion,  in 
respect  to  which  such  a  pretence  could  wear  the  appearance 
of  a  more  flagrant  violation  of  truth,  or  more  shameless 
insult  to  his  readers.  Why  has  he  presented  it  to  the 
public,  if  he  has  no  faith  in  its  accuracy,  nor  wish  to  com- 
mend it  to  their  acquiescence  ?  What  is  the  object  or 
meaning  of  his  declaration,  that  until  his  mode  of  refuting 
the  objections  of  universalists,  infidels,  and  atheists,  by  this 
theory,  is  adopted,  he  despairs  of  the  subversion  of  their 
cause,  if  he  does  not  wish  his  theory  to  be  received  as  in- 
dubitably true,  and  employed  for  that  purpose  ?  Does  he 
wish  a  false  system  to  be  adopted  for  the  justification  of 
the  divine  government,  and  despair  of  its  vindication  by  any 
other  expedient  f  But  of  all  such  weak  and  dishonorable 
shifts,  he  is  wholly  incapable.     To  indulge  a  suspicion 


163 

that  it  can  be  otherwise,  were  to  traduce  his  intellect  and 
conscience.  He  has  put  forth  this  theory  for  no  other 
reason,  than  that  regarding  it  as  indisputably  vindicable, 
and  essentially  important,  he  wishes  to  contribute  to  its 
general  reception,  and  is  resolved,  instead  of  treacherously 
shrinking  from  responsibility,  to  maintain  it  with  the  frank- 
ness and  courage  that  become  a  religious  teacher  ;  or  dis- 
card it,  if  convinced  of  its  erroneousness,  and  not  otherwise, 
with  the  candor  and  integrity  that  befit  a  disciple  of  Christ. 

Such,  then,  being  the  import  of  the  theory,  and  the 
object  of  its  publication,  the  only  question  to  be  determined 
concerning  it  respects  its  truth. 

I.  The  first  objection,  then,  to  it  is,  that  it  represents 
our  volitions  as  exerted  without  any  intelligent  reasons 
whatever,  and  as  the  efiect,  consequently,  of  nothing  better 
than  a  mere  brute  or  senseless  mechanism. 

Its  representation  is,  that  God  cannot,  or  that  it  may  be  f 
that  he  cannot,  exert  such  an  influence  on  a  moral  being,  ! 
compatibly  with  his  freedom,  as  to  prevent  him  from  sin- 
ning ;  and  the  alleged  ground  of  that  position  is,  that  such 
a  being  must,  under  every  possible  preventing  influence, 
still  possess  the  power  to  transgress.  The  assertion,  that 
he  cannot  be  prevented  from  exerting  his  power  in  that 
manner,  obviously  involves  the  assumption,  therefore,  that 
he  may  be  determined  in  his  choices  by  his  mere  power  of 
volition,  independently  of  a  moral  influence ;  and  that  is, 
that  he  may  act  without,  or  irrespectively  of  any  seen  and 
felt  reason, — of  perceptions,  emotions,  love,  hope,  fear, 
desire,  or  any  modification  of  feeling  or  sensation  ! 

This  is,  clearly,  not  merely  the  natural,  but  the  only 
construction  of  the  reviewer's  reasoning,  that  can  give 
such  a  premise  to  his  argument  as  his  inference  requires. 


164 

If  a  moral  being  cannot  put  forth  choices  wholly  inde- 
pendently and  against  the  influence  of  motives,  it  cannot 
follow  from  the  fact  that  he  has  power  to  choose,  that  God 
cannot  exert  on  him  a  moral  influence,  that  shall  prevent 
him  from  sinning ;  unless  either  he  is  physically  incapable 
of  obedience,  or  God  is  incapable  of  determining  the  influ- 
ences that  reach  him.  That  the  first,  however,  can  be  the 
fact,  the  reviewer  will  not  grant.  He  specifically  rejects 
the  doctrine  of  the  mind's  incapacity  for  obedience. 

If,  then,  he  admits  that  it  cannot  exert  volitions  without 
perceptions  and  emotions — that  is,  seen  and  felt  reasons — 
he  must  likewise  admit  it  to  be  possible,  at  least,  that  such 
a  combination  and  series  of  motives  may  be  conveyed  to  it, 
as  to  prompt  it  to  obedience.  To  deny  it,  were  to  assert 
that  the  mind  may  possess  a  capacity  for  obedience  that 
can  never  be  excited  to  action  !  But  how  can  the  existence 
of  such  a  capacity  be  demonstrated  ?  Does  the  reviewer, 
then,  admit  both  that  the  mind  cannot  exert  volitions,  ex- 
cept for  seen  and  felt  reasons  ;  and  that,  having  a  capacity 
for  obedience,  such  motives  can  be  presented  to  it  as  to 
excite  it  to  exert  that  capacity  ? — then,  clearly,  he  cannot 
affirm  that  God  cannot  present  to  it  such  a  combination  of 
motives,  and  so  prevent  it  from  sin  ;  unless  he  denies  to 
him  the  power  of  controlling  the  causes  that  are  concerned 
in  giving  birth  to  its  perceptions  and  emotions,  and  thereby 
determining  the  motives  that  influence  it  in  its  agency ; 
and  that  were  to  deny  his  supremacy  over  his  works,  and 
exhibit  them  as  existing  and  acting  independently  of  his 
control ;  an  error,  the  mere  statement  of  which,  one  would 
hope,  must  be  sufficient  to  secure  its  rejection. 

The  reviewer  then,  indisputably  to  sustain  the  inference 
of  his  argument,  must  either  go  on  the  assumption  that 


165 

God  cannot  determine  the  influences  that  reach  moral 
agents ;  and  make  that  the  ground  of  his  assertion,  that 
God  cannot  prevent  them  from  sinning  ;  a  position  which 
I  shall  for  the  present  suppose  him  to  disclaim  : — or  else  he 
must  found  his  inference  on  the  assumption  I  have  imputed 
to  him,  that  moral  beings  may  be  determined  in  their  choices 
by  their  mere  power  of  volition,  and  therefore  exert  their 
actions  without  any  intelligent  reasons. 

That  this  is  the  true  construction  of  his  reasoning,  is 
shown  moreover  indisputably — if  any  additional  demon- 
stration of  it  can  be  necessary — by  the  fact  that  if  that 
position  is  in  truth  the  ground  of  his  argument,  his  infer- 
ence then  results  legitimately  from  his  premise.  For  if  it  is 
the  power  of  moral  agents,  and  not  their  perceptions  and 
emotions,  that  determines  them  in  their  choices,  and  they 
always  possess  the  power  of  sinning  under  all  preventing 
influences,  it  follows  incontroverlibly  that  God  can  never 
exert  on  them  such  an  influence  as  to  prevent  them  from 
sinning.  But  if  on  the  other  hand  that  position  is  dis- 
claimed, and  the  assumption  substituted  in  its  place,  that 
men  never  put  forth  choices  except  for  seen  and  felt  reasons, 
the  reasoning  becomes  wholly  inconclusive.  No  practised 
logician  would  willingly  rest  the  support  of  his  cause  on 
the  accuracy  of  such  an  argument  as  the  following.  Men 
are  determined  in  their  volitions  by  motives  solely,  and 
not  by  their  mere  power  of  putting  forth  choices  ;  they 
always  possess  the  power,  however,  of  sinning  under  every 
preventing  influence  that  can  be  exerted  on  them.  God 
therefore,  can  never  present  to  them  such  a  combination  of 
motives,  as  to  withhold  them  from  transgression  !  Or  more 
briefly  ;  though  men  always  possess  the  power  of  sinning, 
yet  they  are  determined  in  their  choices  by  motives  solely. 


166 

God,  therefore,  can  never  convey  to  them  such  a  combina- 
tion of  motives  as  to  prevent  them  from  sinning ! 

That  his  argument  then,  if  it  has  any  conclusiveness,  is 
founded  on  the  assumption  that  men  are  determined  in  their 
vohtions  by  their  mere  power  of  choosing,  and  not  by  the 
instrumentality  of  motives,  is  placed  beyond  the  possibility 
of  a  rational  doubt.  It  exhibits  their  agency,  therefore,  as 
exerted  without  any  intelligent  reasons.  Motives  are  the 
considerations  from  which  we  act, — the  perceived  and 
felt  reasons  for  which  we  choose,  and  put  forth  the  choices 
that  we  do.  To  choose,  therefore,  without  them,  or  in- 
dependently and  irrespectively  of  them,  were  to  act  with- 
out either  perception  or  feeling,  without  intellect  or  heart ; 
the  definition  itself  of  a  wholly  unintelligent  agency — 
a  mere  brute  and  unconscious  mechanism  !  An  extraor- 
dinary theory  truly  to  be  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  ex- 
plaining the  phenomena  of  the  moral  universe,  and  vindi- 
cating the  most  High  from  the  objections  of  infidels  !  It 
will  require  more  than  a  common  share  of  courage,  I  can- 
not but  think,  coolly  to  look  this  scheme  in  the  face,  and 
claim  for  it  the  sanction  of  common  sense  and  revelation ; 
and  an  equal  share  of  ingenuity,  to  point  out  any  parti- 
cular, in  which  it  can  be  any  more  eligible  for  that  or  any 
other  useful  purpose,  than  the  doctrines  of  divine  efficiency 
and  physical  depravity,  erroneous  as  they  are,  over  which 
he  regards  it  as  enjoying  so  many  triumphant  advantages. 

II.  But  this  great  element  of  his  system,  is  not  only 
itself  thus  totally  erroneous,  but  is  likewise  fraught  with 
the  direct  and  instant  subversion  of  the  great  doctrines  of 
divine  prescience  and  foreordination,  Avhich  it  is  his  chief 
object,  in  the  article  under  consideration,  to  vindicate  and 
sustain. 


167 

He  admits  indeed,  and  asserts,  not  only  that  God  fore- 
knows all  the  events  of  our  agency,  but  that  it  is  by  his 
determination  respecting  his  own,  that  he  constitutes  the 
certainty  that  those  events  are  to  take  place.  His  repre- 
sentation in  his  theory  however,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  that 
our  mere  power  of  putting  forth  volitions,  is  the  sole  de- 
terminer of  our  choices.  If  such  then  be  the  fact,  it  follows 
that  it  is  solely  by  his  purpose  of  giving  that  power — the 
determiner  of  choices — that  the  Most  High  constitutes  a 
certainty  of  our  actions,  and  that  his  foresight  of  that  power 
accordingly,  is  the  sole  medium  of  his  foreknowledge  of 
our  agency. 

It  is  demonstrably  certain,  however,  that  the  mere  power 
of  volition,  which  always  remains  identically  the  same,  can 
never  be  the  ground  of  any  such  foresight.  The  same 
identical  power,  uninfluenced  and  unchanged  in  its  rela- 
tions, cannot  be  the  cause  of  such  diversified  effects  as  our 
actions,  nor  of  any  effect  whatever.  Our  mere  power  of 
volition  never  gives  birth  to  effects,  nor  can,  independently 
of  perceptions.  It  is  never  exerted,  nor  can  be,  except  in 
the  presence,  and  from  the  excitement  of  motives.  To 
choose  without  motives,  were  to  choose  without  an  object, 
and  that  were  to  choose  without  a  choice.  As  therefore, 
without  perceptions,  the  mere  power  of  putting  forth  choi- 
ces, can  never  exert  volitions  ;  so  that  mere  power  contem- 
plated irrespectively  of  perceptions,  can  never  be  the 
ground  of  a  foresight  of  choices  ;  and  if  that  therefore  is  the 
sole  medium  of  the  divine  foresight,  it  is  demonstrably  cer- 
tain that  the  Most  High  cannot  foresee  the  events  of  our 
agency.  The  reviewer's  theory  accordingly,  by  represen- 
ting that  power  as  the  sole  medium  of  foresight,  cuts  off 
the  possibility  of  a  foreknowledge  of  our  actions,  and  sub- 

22 


168 

verts  at  a  stroke  the  doctrines  of  prescience  and  foreordina- 
tion,  which  it  is  his  object  to  sustain. 

This  feature  likewise  of  his  theory  is  obnoxious  to  the 
objection  of  representing  our  agency  as  exerted  without 
any  intelligent  reasons.  To  assume  that  God  can  foreknow 
the  events  of  our  agency,  through  our  mere  power  of  voli- 
tion, is  to  assume  that  he  can  foresee  them, — irrespectively 
of  the  reasons,  perceptions,  and  emotions, — for  which  we 
put  forth  our  acts.  But  that  is  to  assume  that  he  could 
foresee  those  acts,  were  no  such  reasons  for  their  exertion 
to  exist  in  our  minds  ;  and  that  were  to  suppose  that  those 
acts  might  be  exerted  by  us,  without  any  such  reasons ; 
and  that  were  to  suppose  that  our  choices  may  be  put  forth 
by  a  mere  self-determined  will,  without  intellect  or  heart, 
and  be  the  effect  accordingly  of  a  mere  senseless  and  me- 
chanical impulse. 

In  whatever  relation  then  this  representation  of  his  theory 
is  contemplated,  it  is  seen  to  be  erroneous.  He  must  either 
abandon  it,  or  not  only  give  up  the  doctrines  of  presci- 
ence and  foreordination,  but  deny  that  there  is  either  any 
morality  in  our  actions  to  be  a  theme  of  disputation,  or  any 
moral  government  over  us  that  can  require  to  be  vindicated. 

III.  His  theory  is,  however,  not  only  wholly  Inconsistent 
with  the  fact  and  possibility  of  the  divine  foresight  of  our 
agency,  but  is  likewise  directly  contradictory  to  and  subver- 
sive of  all  the  representations  and  arguments  which  he  em- 
ploys in  vindication  and  proof  of  the  doctrines  of  presci- 
ence and  foreordination. 

His  theory,  as  we  have  seen,  exhibits  our  mere  power  of 
volition  as  the  sole  medium  of  the  divine  foresight  of  our 
agency.  In  his  statements  and  reasonings,  however,  in  expla- 
nation and  support  of  the  fact  of  that  prescience  and  of 


169 

foreordination,  he  specifically  represents  the  measures  of 
God's  providential  and  moral  government^  as  the  medium 
through  which  he  both  lays  the  foundation  of  the  certainty, 
and  foresees  it,  that  we  are  to  exert  the  actions  that  we  do. 

"  The  truth  we  would  affirm  is  this,  that  God,  in  resolving  on  his 
own  works  in  eternity,  predetermined  the  particular  train  of  events, 
which  should  take  place  in  his  kingdom." — p.  605. 

"  Nor  will  he  deny,  that  God  can  exert  some  influence  over  such 
agents  through  those  laws  of  providence  and  of  moral  government 
which  He  may  institute.  Admitting  this,  then,  he  cannot  deny  that 
God  has  a  choice  or  purpose  as  to  what  particular  system  of  such 
agents  He  shall  create,  or  what  particular  mode  of  providence  and 
moral  government  He  shall  institute  ;  and  of  course  he  cannot  deny 
that  God  may  in  this  manner  determine  what  events  shall  actually 
occur  in  his  kingdom,  without  producing  the  volitions  of  his  moral 
subjects,  by  any  direct  and  immediate  acts  of  his  creative  omnipo- 
tence,"—p.  606. 

"  As  to  the  manner  in  which  this  selection  is  carried  into  effect  in 
regeneration,  Calvinists  maintain  that  it  involves  no  compulsion; 
that  it  consists  simply  of  those  means  (including  the  influences  of  the 
spirit)  which  God  uses  with  sinners  to  bring  them  to  the  obedience 
of  the  truth.  And  we  would  only  ask  Dr.  F.  whether  (in  employing 
these  means  in  the  manner  he  does)  God  did  not  foresee,  what  in- 
dividuals would  comply  and  be  saved?  We  ask  again,  whether  in 
purposing  to  employ  these  means  in  the  manner  he  does,  God  did 
not  purpose  that  those  individuals  should  comply  and  thus  be  saved .''" 
—p.  620. 

"  But  our  question  relates  to  another  fact :  How  come  particular 
persons  to  be  believers  ?  Does  God  actually  in  his  government,  in- 
duce persons  to  submit  and  believe  ?  Does  he  do  any  thing  which 
he  foresees  will  actually  secure  the  submission  and  faith  of  those 
very  persons,  who  become  submissive  believers  ?  In  other  words, 
the  question  is  not  whether  justification  is  dependent  on  the  existence 
of  faith  :  but  whether  God  by  the  dispensations  of  providence  and 
grace,  actually  secures  all  existing  faith  ?  That  he  does,  we  hold  to 
be  a  fact,  and  the  great  fact  involved  in  what  is  said  in  the  scriptures 
on  the  subject  of  election." — p.  622. 

•'  But  then  these  are  the  very  persons  who  God  foreknew  (when 


170 

he  resolred  on  his  works  of  mercy,)  would  be  induced  to  believe, 
and  whom  in  carrying  forward  those  works,  he  prepares  for  glory. 
It  was  to  he  believers,  and  not  as  believers,  that  he  chose  them,  under 
the  guidance  of  his  (scientia  media   foreknowledge." — p.  628. 

"But  we  have  another  inquiry.  Why  do  given  sinners  repent? 
Is  there  no  ground  of  certainty,  but  what  lies  simply  in  their  powers 
of  agency  ?  For  we  think  Dr.  F's.  system  necessarily  involves  this. 
Does  God  use  no  influences  and  means  to  induce  sinners  to  come  to 
him  with  voluntary  submission  and  accept  of  life  .'  Are  these  influ- 
ences and  means  brought  to  bear  alike  on  all  nations  and  on  all  indi- 
viduals.-' We  object  therefore  to  this  scheme  that  it  does  not  em- 
brace the  whole  truth. — p.  631. 

From  these  passages, — and  a  multitude  of  others  of  like 
import  might  be  added  from  the  article, — it  is  thus  seen  that 
in  his  statements  and  reasonings  respecting  the  divine  purpo- 
ses and  foresight,  he  represents  God's  providential  and 
moral  administration,  and  not  the  mere  gift  to  his  subjects 
of  the  power  of  volition,  as  the  medium  through  which  he 
lays  the  foundation  of  the  certainty  and  his  foresight  of  the 
events  that  transpire  in  his  empire.  All  his  explanations 
and  arguments  accordingly  in  vindication  of  the  doctrine 
of  prescience  and  foreordination,  are  founded  on  that  repre- 
sentation, and  dependent  for  their  accuracy  on  its  coinci- 
dence with  fact.  In  direct  contradiction  however  to  this, 
the  representation  of  his  theory  respecting  moral  agency 
is,  that  the  mere  power  of  volition  is  the  sole  determiner  of 
choices  ;  that  that  power  accordingly  is  the  sole  medium 
of  the  divine  foresight  of  actions  ;  and  therefore  that  it 
was  by  his  purpose  to  give  existence  to  that  power,  that  he 
laid  the  foundation  of  the  certainty  of  the  actions  of  which 
it  is  to  prove  the  cause,  and  of  his  prescience  of  their  ex- 
istence. The  two  representations  are  thus  the  direct  con- 
verse of  each  other.     One  or  the  other  of  them  of  course 


171 

must  be  false  ;  and  in  consistency,  one  or  the  other  must 
be  given  up.  If  he  adheres  to  his  theory,  he  subverts  by 
it  every  fact  and  argument  on  which  he  reposes  his  proof 
and  vindication  of  the  purposes  and  foreknowledge  of  God  ; 
and  must  therefore  abandon  them,  or  believe  them  without 
evidence.  If  he  adheres  to  those  doctrines  and  the  expla- 
nations and  proofs  which  he  employs  to  sustain  them,  he 
must  then  reject  his  theory  respecting  power,  or  continue  to 
maintain  it  against  his  own  principles.  If  he  continues  to 
maintain  the  doctrine  that  God  determines  the  actions  of  his 
subjects  through  the  measures  of  his  providential  and  moral 
administration,  how  can  he  still  allege  their  power  of  voli- 
tion as  proof  that  God  cannot  prevent  them  from  sinning  ? 
If  he  continues  to  maintain  that  theory,  and  allege  that 
power  as  proof  that  God  cannot  prevent  them  from  sin- 
ning, thereby  assuming  that  power  is  the  sole  determiner 
of  choices,  how  then  can  he  still  continue  to  assume  and 
assert  in  proof  of  foresight  and  foreordinatlon,  that  God 
determines  the  agency  of  his  creatures  through  a  moral  in- 
strumentality ? 

IV.  Should  the  reviewer,  to  escape  these  difficulties, 
abandon  his  assumption  respecting  power,  and  take  the 
ground  on  which  his  reasonings  respecting  the  divine  fore- 
knowledge proceed,  that  men  act  only  from  motives,  and 
are  determined  in  their  agency  solely  through  their  instru- 
mentality ;  his  doctrine  that  God  cannot  prevent  sin  in 
the  instances  in  which  it  takes  place,  will  still  continue  to 
be  perplexed  with  as  great  and  fatal  difficulties  as  on  the 
other  scheme. 

To  deny  that  God  can  prevent  a  being  who  sins,  from 
transgressing,  while  it  is  held  that  motives  are  the  sole  de- 
terminers of  choices,  is  clearly  to  deny,  either  that  he  can 


172 

determine  the  moral  influences  that  reach  that  being ;  or 
else  the  possibility  of  conveying  to  him  such  an  influence, 
as  to  constitute  a  successful  excitement  to  obedience.  But 
to  place  the  impossibility  of  his  being  prevented  from  sin, 
on  the  assumption  that  God  cannot  determine  the  motives 
that  reach  him,  is  to  deny  the  universality  of  God's  provi- 
dence over  us  and  the  causes  of  our  perceptions,  and  ex- 
hibit ourselves  and  those  causes,  as  independent  of  his  sway. 
Will  the  reviewer  openly  espouse  this  doctrine,  and  attempt 
to  maintain  it  against  the  clearest  teachings  of  inspiration, 
and  decisions  of  reason ;  or  thus  again  contradict  his  own 
express  admission  and  assertion,  that  God  does  in  fact 
determine  all  events,  and  render  them  certain  by  the  mea- 
sures of  his  providential  and  moral  administration  ?  If  it 
is  a  fact,  that  the  mode  in  which  men  act,  is  determined 
by  the  perceptions  of  which  they  are  the  subjects,  and  that 
God  by  his  own  agency  constitutes  a  certainty  of  all  the 
events  that  transpire  in  his  empire,  he  of  course  determines 
in  that  manner  the  whole  train  of  their  perceptions.  The 
reviewer  then  must  either  give  up  the  position  on  which  so 
many  of  his  arguments  are  founded,  that  God  determines 
all  events  by  the  measures  of  his  own  agency  ;  or  else  must 
admit  that  he  can  and  does  determine  the  whole  train  of 
their  perceptions,  and  therefore  grant  that  an  impossibility 
of  determining  the  moral  influences  that  reach  them,  can 
never  be  to  him  a  ground  of  inability  to  prevent  them  from 
sinning. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  admitting,  both  that  motives  are 
the  sole  determiners  of  choices,  and  that  God  determines 
the  motives  that  influence  his  creatures,  he  still  maintains 
that  God  cannot  prevent  them  from  sinning ;  it  must  be  on 
the  assumption,  either  that  he  cannot  convey  any  difiering, 


173 

or  at  least  more  propitious  succession  of  perceptions  to  their 
minds ;  or  else  that  they  are  physically  incapable  of  being 
excited  to  obedience  by  any  conceivable  moral  influence. 
In  granting,  however,  that  God  actually  determines  the 
whole  train  of  perceptions  that  takes  place  in  their  minds, 
he  grants  that  he  has  an  entire  control  over  all  the  agents 
and  causes  that  are  concerned  in  giving  existence  to  those 
perceptions.  But  if  he  has  an  absolute  control  over  all 
those  causes,  and  yet  cannot  give  existence  through  them 
to  such  a  species  and  succession  of  perceptions  as  to  prompt 
to  obedience  in  any  instance  where  sin  is  now  exerted  ;  it 
must  be  on  the  ground,  either  that  in  those  instances,  those 
causes  are  not  capable  of  being  controlled  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  be  made  the  instruments  of  producing  a  different 
species  of  perceptions ;  or  that  he  cannot  create  any  dif- 
ferent or  additional  instruments  of  exciting  perceptions  ; 
or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  that  his  creatures  in  those  cases 
are  not  capable  of  being  the  subjects  of  a  different  series ; 
or  else  finally,  that  no  different  series  that  he  could  occa- 
sion, could  in  those  instances  prove  a  less  temptation  to  sin. 
Will  the  reviewer  then  take  the  ground,  that  it  is  physically 
impossible  to  God  that  the  causes  that  are  now  concerned 
in  giving  birth  to  our  perceptions  in  the  instances  in  which 
we  sin,  should  be  made  the  instruments  of  producing  a 
different  series  ?  That  were  to  represent  it  either  as  phy- 
sically impossible  to  him  to  vary  his  agency  over  those 
causes,  or  else  by  any  such  variation,  to  vary  their  agency  I 
— as  physically  impossible  to  him  therefore — if  the  repre- 
sentation may  be  presumed  to  be  as  applicable  to  other 
instances  of  his  agency,  as  to  those — not  to  prevent  all  the 
sin  which  he  does  prevent ;  and  not  to  give  birth  to  all  the 
holiness  to  which  he  does  give  birth  !     But  that  were  not 


174 

only  to  represent  his  works  as  independent  of  him,  but  to 
deny  him  the  power,  which  tlie  reviewer  claims  for  every 
dependent  agent,  of  doing  otherwise  than  he  does,  and  of 
acting  freely  and  not  from  the  impulse  of  unavoidable 
necessity ! 

Will  he  then  place  the  alleged  impossibility  of  God's 
preventing  sin  in  those  instances,  on  the  ground,  that  he 
cannot  in  those  cases,  give  existence  to  any  additional  causes 
of  influence  over  us ;  or  diminish  the  number  of  those  to 
which  he  has  already  given  existence ;  or  that  in  those  in- 
stances no  variation  in  those  causes,  could  give  birth  in  us 
to  any  difiering  or  more  propitious  set  of  perceptions  ?  To 
deny  that  God  could  create  any  differing  or  additional 
causes,  were  to  deny  his  omnipotence,  or  else  his  wisdom 
to  contrive  them  !  To  deny  that  he  could  diminish  the 
number  or  vary  the  nature  of  those  which  constitute  his 
present  system  of  instrumentality  in  those  instances,  were 
to  deny  his  power  over  them,  and  represent  them  as  self- 
existent  !  To  deny  again,  that  a  variation  in  the  causes 
by  which  our  perceptions  in  those  cases  are  excited,  would 
prove  the  ground  of  a  corresponding  change  in  our  percep- 
tions, were  to  deny  either  that  those  causes  are  the  real 
reasons  of  our  perceptions,  and  that  were  again  to  deny 
that  God  determines  them  through  his  moral  and  providen- 
tial instrumentality — or  else  to  represent  us  in  those  in- 
stances, as  physically  incapable  of  any  other  series  than 
that  of  which  we  are  the  subjects ;  and  that  were  to  deny 
the  possibility  of  our  fulfilling  a  great  proportion  of  the 
duties  which  God  enjoins  and  we  now  neglect, — such  as 
knowing  him  better,  thinking  of  him  more  frequently,  form- 
ing a  juster  estimate  of  ourselves,  and  to  run  again  into 
the  perplexities  of  physical  depravity,  which  the  reviewer 


175 

so  justly  denounces  and  is  so  anxious  to  escape.  Or, 
finally,  to  assume  that  even,  were  any  different  or  suppo- 
sable  perceptions  to  be  produced  in  us  in  those  instances, 
they  still  could  not  prove  any  thing  better  than  an  equal 
temptation  to  us,  were  to  revert  again  to  the  assumption, 
that  our  perceptions  are  not  the  real  reasons  of  our  exert- 
ing the  choices  which  we  do,  and  to  place  the  whole  ground 
of  their  existence  and  nature,  in  either  a  self-determining 
will,  a  depravity  of  the  physical  constitution,  or  else  the 
direct  efficiency  of  God  ! 

Turn  which  way  he  will,  then,  the  reviewer  can  never 
reconcile  the  doctrine,  that  God  is  the  determiner  of  per- 
ceptions, and  perceptions  the  determiners  of  choices,  with 
the  doctrine  that  he  cannot  prevent  us  from  sin  in  the  in- 
stances in  which  we  transgress  ;  nor  extricate  himself,  if  he 
professes  to  hold  both,  from  the  most  fatal  self-inconsistency, 
and  contradiction  to  the  scriptures.  Whether  he  attempts 
to  advance  or  recede,  to  turn  to  this  hand  or  to  that,  he  is 
instantly  met  with  the  necessity  of  either  trampling  some 
of  his  own  principles  in  the  dust,  or  assailing  some  attribute 
of  his  Creator,  or  some  indisputable  and  essential  doctrine 
of  his  word  ! — a  distressing  predicament  for  a  theory  that 
claims  the  merit  of  so  easily  and  satisfactorily  solving  the 
whole  phenomena  of  the  moral  universe,  as  resistlessly  to 
command  the  assent  and  admiration  of  even  the  blindest 
and  most  prejudiced  enemies  to  the  truth  ! 

V.  Should  the  reviewer,  convinced  of  their  untenable- 
ness,  reject  both  the  position,  that  power  is  the  determiner 
of  choices,  and  the  doctrine  that  God  cannot  control  the 
moral  influences  that  reach  his  creatures,  and  prefer  to 
place   his  denial  that  he  could  wholly  exclude  sin  from  a 

23 


176 

moral  system,  on  the  assumption  that  it  is  incompatible  with 
infinite  benevolence  to  permit  the  existence  of  sin  that  could 
be  prevented ;  without  attempting  to  offer  any  explanation 
of  the  nature  of  the  obstacle  to  its  prevention  ;  he  will  still 
find  himself  beset  with  equally  insurmountable  difficulties. 

Were  there  no  other,  it  would  form  a  sufficient  objection 
to  such  a  method  of  establishing  his  doctrine,  that  it  takes 
for  granted  the  main  position  which  it  should  be  its  object 
to  sustain.  But  the  reviewer  has  debarred  himself  from  it, 
by  the  admission,  that  God  gave  existence  to  the  present 
system,  with  a  full  foresight  that  it  was  to  involve  the  sin 
that  takes  place  in  it.  And  as  he  admits  that  he  gave  ex- 
istence to  it  voluntarily,  he  of  course  admits  that  he  might 
have  prevented  the  sin,  at  least  by  not  creating  the  system. 
If,  then,  to  create  and  uphold  a  system,  in  which  sin  exists 
that  might  have  been  prevented,  is  inconsistent  with  infinite 
benevolence,  the  reviewer,  in  place  of  vindicating  the  Most 
High,  by  such  an  assumption,  would  verify  the  objection 
against  him,  which  it  is  his  object  to  escape. 

But  he  not  only  admits  that  God  gave  existence  to  the 
present  system  with  a  full  knowledge  that  its  results  were 
to  be  what  they  are,  but  claims  likewise  that  he  is  vindicable 
for  it,  on  the  ground  that  a  greater  amount  of  good  is 
gained  by  it  ultimately,  than  could  have  been  secured  by 
any  other  agency  ;  and  thereby,  again  debars  himself  from 
the  assumption  that  it  must  necessarily  be  incompatible 
with  infinite  benevolence,  that  sin,  that  could  be  prevented,^ 
should  be  permitted  to  exist. 

"  But  if  it  be  not  inconsistent  with  the  true  idea  of  omnipotence, 
to  suppose  that  God  cannot  prevent  all  sin  in  a  moral  system,  then 
neither  is  it  inconsistent  with  his  goodness  that  he  docs  not  prevent 
it  -,  since  sin,  in  respect  to  his  power  of  prevention,  may  be  incidental 


171 

to  the  existence  of  that  system,  which  infinite  goodness  demands." — 
p.  617. 

If,  then,  as  he  thus  represents,  infinite  goodness  demands 
the  existence  of  a  moral  system,  although  it  is  to  involve  such 
an  amount  of  sin,  when  there  is  no  other  method  of  securing 
the  good  which  it  is  to  contain,  he  of  course  cannot  assume 
that  the  permission  of  sin  that  might  have  been  prevented, 
must  necessarily  be  incompatible  with  that  goodness,  and 
then  claim  that  the  reason  of  its  pei'mission  must  demon- 
stratively be,  that  it  is  impossible  to  the  Most  High  to 
prevent  it !  The  voluntary  permission  of  sin  cannot  be 
consistently  vindicated  by  gratuitously  assuming  its  com- 
patibility  with  the  demands  of  goodness ;  while  a  gratuitous 
assumption  of  its  incompatihility  with  that  goodness,  is 
made  the  ground  of  the  inference  that  it  cannot  have  been 
voluntarily  permitted  ! 

In  whatever  relation,  then,  the  reviewer's  theory  is  con- 
templated, the  most  abundant  evidence  is  seen  of  its  hopeless 
and  utter  error.  It  misrepresents  our  nature  and  agency. 
It  is  fraught  with  a  denial  of  the  attributes  and  works  of 
God.  It  contradicts  the  doctrines  of  his  word.  It  subverts 
the  reviewer's  own  doctrines  and  reasonings,  and  involves 
him  in  endless  and  inextricable  inconsistencies. 

Were  it,  therefore,  even  admitted  to  be  true,  it  could 
never,  as  I  shall  now  proceed  to  show,  in  the  humblest 
degree,  subserve  the  ends  for  which  it  was  devised. 

VI.  It  does  not  yield  him  any  such  peculiar  advantages 
as  he  claims,  for  the  vindication  of  God's  benevolence  in 
the  admission  of  sin  into  his  empire. 

The  ground  on  which  he  places  the  justification  of  the 
Most  High  for  giving  existence  to  a  system  of  mingled 


178 

good  and  evil  like  the  present,  is  that  precisely  on  which 
it  is  placed  by  the  theory  which  I  have  heretofore  endea- 
vored to  sustain, — that  he  secures  by  it  a  greater  sum  of 
good  than  he  could  by  any  other  course  of  agency.     The 
reviewer  admits  that  he  gave  existence  to  the  system  volun- 
tarily, and  with  a  full  foresight  of  its  evil  as  well  as  good 
results  ;  and  that  he  might  therefore  have  precluded  those 
evils  from  existence,  by  not  creating  the  system  :  and  the 
ground  accordingly  on  which  he  justifies  him  in  its  creation 
is,  that  goodness  demands  the  existence  of  the  system  in- 
volving the  greatest  amount  of  good,  notwithstanding  the 
evil  which  it  may  include.   The  difference  therefore  between 
his  theory  and  that  which  he  rejects,  respects  solely — as  far 
as  this  consideration  is  concerned, — the  medium  of  the  per- 
mission and  prevention  of  sin  ;  not  the  fact  nor  reason  of 
its  voluntary  admission,  nor  the  possibility  of  its  prevention; 
he  holding,  that  the  power  of  volition  is  the  medium  of  its 
admission  ;  that  in  giving  existence  to  free  agents,  the  Most 
High  deprived  himself  of  the  power  of  withholding  them 
from  transgression  ;  and  that  accordingly  the  sole  method 
of  precluding  its  existence  was,  to  abstain  from  their  crea- 
tion : — whilst  the  representation  I  have  offered  is,  that  the 
measures  of  his  providential  and  moral  administration  are 
the  medium  of  its  permission,  and  that  its  exclusion  was  to 
have  been  secured  therefore  by  such  a  modification  of  those 
measures,  as  to  have  diminished  temptation  and  increased 
excitements  to  obedience.     If  therefore  the  assumption  on 
which  the  vindication  of  the  admission  of  sin  is  placed  in 
each, — that  it  secures  the  greatest  good, — is  legitimate ;  it  is 
obviously  as  legitimate  on  the  theory  which  he  rejects,  as 
on  that  which  he  maintains.    If  the  permission  of  sin  which 
might  be  prevented,  is  compatible  with  infinite  goodness, 


179 

when  a  greater  good  is  secured  by  its  permission,  than 
could  be  gained  by  any  other  agency ;  it  is  of  course  as 
truly  compatible  with  it,  whether  the  mode  of  its  permission 
be  such  as  I  have  supposed,  or  such  as  he  represents.  If 
its  prevention  could  not  have  been  accomplished  without  a 
sacrifice  of  the  greatest  good,  the  Most  High  was  clearly 
under  no  more  obligation  to  prevent  it,  on  the  one  suppo- 
sition than  on  the  other. 

Perhaps,  however,  the  reviewer  will  assume,  that  as  on 
his  theory  the  choice  of  the  Most  High  lay  simply  between 
a  system  of  good  and  evil  like  the  present,  and  a  total  ex- 
clusion of  moral  beings  from  existence  ;  he  may  be  supposed 
to  be  vindicable  for  giving  it  existence,  rather  than  not 
create  a  moral  system  ;  but  that  were  he  able  as  the  oppo- 
site theory  represents,  to  give  existence  to  a  system  which 
should  involve  no  sin  whatever,  goodness  would  require  his 
preference  of  that,  although  it  might  not  enable  him  on  the 
whole,  to  gain  so  large  an  amount  of  good.  But  to  say 
nothing  of  the  difficulty  of  perceiving  how,  if  the  inter- 
mixture of  such  a  share  of  evil  as  the  present  system  in- 
cludes, is  no  insuperable  objection  to  his  goodness  in  giving 
existence  to  the  system,  it  could  any  more  form  such  an 
objection,  were  the  mode  of  its  permission  admitted  to  be 
such  as  I  have  supposed  :  it  is  a  sufficient  obstacle  to  the 
assumption  in  question,  that  if  the  reviewer  makes  it,  he 
abandons  in  it  the  ground  on  which  he  has  placed  his  jus- 
tification of  God  in  creating  the  present  system, — that  evil 
as  it  is,  it  secures  the  greatest  good, — and  thereby  deprives 
himself  of  the  possibility  of  vindicating  that  act.  What 
other  valid  principle  for  that  purpose  can  he  possibly  adopt  ? 
What  other  imaginable  relation  between  the  good  and  evil 
of  a  system,  can  render  its  creation  justifiable  ?     Can  the 


180 

reviewer  determine  what  the  exact  proportions  are,  of  the 
good  and  evil  of  the  present  system,  and  to  what  extent 
their  relations  might  be  changed,  without  rendering  its  crea- 
tion incompatible  with  infinite  goodness  ?  Can  any  other 
system  than  such  as  secures  the  greatest  good,  be  conceived 
to  be  compatible  with  the  greatest  benevolence  ?  Would 
not  the  choice  of  an  inferior.  In  preference  to  the  greatest 
good,  let  his  reason  for  It  be  what  it  might,  constitute  a 
resistless  demonstration  of  his  want  of  infinite  goodness  ? 
The  reviewer  therefore,  cannot  adopt  the  assumption  to 
which  I  have  supposed  him  to  resort,  without  both  aban- 
doning the  only  ground  on  which  the  permission  of  sin  can 
be  conceived  to  be  compatible  with  that  goodness,  and  di- 
rectly impeaching  the  divine  benevolence,  of  llmitedness 
and  Imperfection. 

In  whatever  light  then  his  theory  is  contemplated,  it 
clearly  cannot  yield  him  any  advantages  for  the  vindication 
of  the  divine  government,  that  are  not  enjoyed  in  an  equal 
degree  at  least,  on  the  system  which  I  have  maintained  ;  a 
system  which  is  recommended  moreover  by  the  incompa- 
rable advantage,  that  it  is  not  attended  by  any  of  the  num- 
berless difliculties,  by  which  his  is  so  fatally  beset. 

VII.  It  yields  him  no  such  peculiar  advantage  as  he 
claims  for  it,  in  reconciling  the  divine  aversion  to  sin,  and 
prohibition  of  it,  with  its  voluntary  permission. 

He  regards  his  theory  as  not  only  having  the  merit  of 
neither  openly  nor  impliedly  representing  the  Most  High 
as  desiring  the  sin  which  he  permits,  in  preference  to  holi- 
ness in  its  stead ;  but  as  being  the  only  theory  that  has 
any  pretensions  to  that  recommendation. 


181 

"As  to  his  power,  the  argument  assumes  that  God  can,  by  his 
omnipotence,  exclude  sin,  and  its  consequent  suffering,  from  a  moral 
system.  Those  who  admit  this  assumption  have,  therefore,  no  plea 
left  for  the  divine  benevolence,  except  to  assert,  that '  sin  is  the  ne- 
cessary means  of  the  greatest  good  ;'  and  that  for  this  reason  it  is 
introduced  into  our  system,  and  will  always  be  continued  there,  by  a 
being  of  infinite  benevolence." — p.  616. 

"  Nor  can  the  foreordination  of  God,  with  respect  to  the  universe, 
be  shown  to  involve  the  position,  that  he  prefers  the  existence  of  the 
sin  which  takes  place,  to  holiness  in  its  stead,  on  any  other  ground,  (as 
we  said  before)  than  the  mere  assumption  that  he  can  prevent  all  sin, 
in  such  a  kind  of  universe.  Those  Calvinists  who  yield  to  this  as- 
sumption, and  affirm  that  the  Father  of  all  voluntarily  introduces 
into  the  system  the  sin  which  he  could  pi-event,  do,  in  our  opinion, 
embarrass  the  present  doctrine  with  the  unavoidable  inference, 
(urged  by  Dr.  F.)  of  the  insincerity  of  God  in  the  public  expression 
of  his  will,  made  to  his  whole  kingdom  in  his  law." — p.  607. 

His  representation  thus  is,  that  all  those  who,  rejecting 
his  theory,  regard  God  as  intentionally  permitting  the  sin 
that  takes  place,  are  obnoxious  to  the  charge  of  at  least 
virtually  exhibiting  him  as  desiring  that  sin,  in  preference 
to  holiness  in  its  stead ;  a  representation,  however,  that  is 
not  only  wholly  at  variance  with  fact,  but  that,  if  admitted 
to  be  true,  renders  him  as  obnoxious  to  that  charge  as  are 
any  of  those  against  whom  he  directs  it. 

He  founds  that  representation  on  the  assumption,  obvi- 
ously, that  a  permission  of  sin  that  might  be  prevented, 
could  not  be  accounted  for  on  any  other  supposition  than 
a  preference  of  it  to  holiness  in  its  stead  j  or  that  such  a 
permission  of  it  must  necessarily  be  regarded  as  demonstra- 
tive of  a  desire  of  its  existence.  "  Those  Calvinists,"  he 
says,  "  who  affirm,  that  the  Father  of  all  voluntarily  intro- 
duces into  the  system  the  sin  which  he  could  prevent,  do,  in 
our  opinion,  embarrass  the  present  doctrine  with  the  un- 


182 

avoidable  inference  of  the  insincerity  of  God  in  the  public 
expression  of  his  wilV  "  in  his  law."  If  such,  however,  is 
the  fact,  his  own  scheme  clearly  has  no  more  claims  to  ex- 
emption from  that  objection,  than  the  Calvinistic  theory 
has.  For,  as  he  regards  the  Most  High,  as  has  already 
been  seen,  as  having  voluntarily  given  existence  to  the 
present  system,  with  a  full  foresight  that  its  moral  character 
was  to  be  what  it  is,  he  admits  that  he  has  intentionally 
permitted  all  the  sin  that  has  taken  place,  and  that  he 
might  have  prevented  it.  If  such  a  permission  of  it,  then, 
is  demonstrative  of  a  desire  of  its  existence,  in  preference 
to  holiness  in  its  stead,  his  theory  is  obnoxious  to  the  charge 
as  truly  as  is  that  of  the  Calvinists,  of  conveying  a  repre- 
sentation embarrassed  with  the  unavoidable  inference,  that 
the  Most  High  desires  the  sin  which  he  permits,  and  is 
therefore  insincere  in  the  prohibitions  and  requirements  of 
his  law. 

He  has,  on  the  principle  on  which  he  proceeds,  rendered 
himself  obnoxious  to  that  charge,  likewise,  by  representing 
the  Most  High  as  voluntarily,  in  many  instances,  continuing 
individuals  in  life,  when  he  foresees  that  they  will  only 
make  his  forbearance  the  occasion  of  continued  and  greater 
sin. 

"  God  knew,  in  sending  the  gospel  to  the  Jews  and  gentiles,  that 
many  would  refuse  to  hear  the  voice  of  Christ,  would  harden  their 
hearts,  and  thus  render  the  gospel  a  savor  of  death,  by  perverting 
the  design  of  that  forbearance,  which  spared  tiieir  lives.  Yet,  for 
the  sake  of  extending  mercy  to  those  who  he  foresaw  would  be  in- 
duced to  comply  with  the  call,  he  resolved  to  spare  the  lives  of  those 
who  would  thus  resist,  and  present  to  them  also  the  sincere  call  of 
his  grace." — p.  628. 


183 

If  the  principle,  then,  on  which  he  alleges  the  charge  in 
question  against  others,  is  authorized,  his  own  system 
stands  convicted  as  clearly  as  theirs,  of  impeaching  God  of 
insincerity,  and  representing  him  as  desiring  the  sin  which 
he  permits,  in  preference  to  the  holiness  which  he  requires. 

But  the  principle  on  which  he  founds  this  imputation, 
not  only  thus  subjects  him  to  the  inference  which  he  em- 
ploys it  to  fasten  on  others,  but  is,  unhappily,  identically 
that  on  which  the  universalists,  whom  his  theory  is  so  easily 
to  confute,  build  their  expectation  of  a  future  termination 
of  evil  in  the  divine  kingdom  ;  and  is  adapted,  if  adhered 
to,  to  carry  him  to  a  similar,  or  some  other  equally  excep- 
tionable conclusion.  For  if,  as  he  assumes,  to  permit  sin 
that  can  be  prevented,  would  be  demonstrative  of  a  desire 
of  that  sin,  it  follows  clearly  that  God  cannot  forever  con- 
tinue beings  in  existence  who  will  only  continue  to  sin, 
unless  he  actually  desires  the  existence  of  the  sin  which  they 
will  commit.  If,  then,  he  has  no  such  desire,  and  thence 
cannot  permit  any  sin  which  he  can  prevent,  it  follows  that 
be  cannot  continue  to  uphold  beings  in  existence  who  will 
continue  to  sin ;  and  will,  therefore,  either  bring  all  to 
holiness  and  salvation,  or  annihilate  all  such  as  do  not  be- 
come obedient. 

The  assumption,  however,  on  which  he  founds  this  im- 
putation, is  manifestly  erroneous  ;  and  if  adhered  to,  would 
not  only  preclude  the  possibility  of  reconciling  the  existence 
of  sin  in  the  empire  of  God,  with  his  preference  of  holiness 
in  its  place,  but  involve  a  denial  of  his  attributes  and 
agency. 

As  sin  has  actually  taken  place  in  his  kingdom,  it  has 
of  course  either  taken  place  by  his  permission,  when  he 
might  have  prevented  it,  and  therefore  demonstrates  on  the 

24 


184 

reviewer's  assumption,  that  he  desires  it ;  or  else  it  could 
not  have  been  prevented  by  him,  and  has  not  therefore 
taken  place  by  his  permission.  But  to  assert  that  it  could 
not  have  been  prevented  bj^  him,  and  has  not  taken  place 
by  his  permission,  were  to  assert  both  that  he  could  not 
have  prevented  the  beings  who  exert  it,  from  existence, — 
and  that  were  to  assert  that  he  is  neither  their  voluntary 
preserver  nor  creator ;  and  that  he  has  not  foreseen  its  ex- 
istence,— and  that  were  to  deny  his  foreknowledge.  As  then 
the  reviewer's  assumption,  if  adhered  to,  will  thus  carry 
him  irresistibly  either  to  that  impeachment  of  God  which  he 
aims  to  escape  by  it,  or  else  to  a  denial  of  his  foresight  and 
creating  and  providential  agency,  it  is  manifestly  erroneous. 
He  has  indeed  himself  virtually  abandoned  it,  and  pronoun- 
ced its  erroneousness,  by  placing  his  own  vindication  of  the 
Most  High  in  the  permission  of  sin,  on  directly  the  opposite 
assumption,  and  claiming  and  asserting  that  God  in  fact 
voluntarily  gave  existence  to  the  present  system  solely  for 
the  sake  of  the  good  which  he  gains  by  it,  and  not  from 
any  desire  of  the  sin  which  it  involves. 

'  •  «  God  then,  for  any  thing  that  has  been  shown  to  the  contrary, 
may  have  predetermined  tlie  existence  of  tiie  sin  whicli  now  takes 
place  in  his  kingdom,  not  for  the  reason  tliat  lie  prefers  sin  (where  it 
occurs)  to  holiness  in  its  stead,  but  simply  for  tliis  reason,  that  lie 
chooses  to  do  the  most  he  can  for  the  good  of  a  moral  system, — 
to  prevent  sin  and  promote  holiness,  to  the  greatest  extent  possible 
in  such  a  kind  of  system."  "  Thus  God  may  have  foreordained  the 
existence  of  the  present  universe  (though  involving  a  certain  amount 
of  sin,)  with  the  sincere  and  real  preference  that  the  subjects  he  cre- 
ates, should  obey  his  laws  rather  than  transgress." — p.  607. 

In  statements  and  reasonings  of  this  kind,  and  they 
abound  in  the  article,  he  thus  formally  recognizes  and  as- 
serts the   possibility  of  a  voluntary  permission  of  sin  that 


185 

might  be  prevented,  without  any  desire  of  that  sin ;  and  gives 
up  accordingly  the  principle  on  which  he  rests  his  charge 
against  those  who  dissent  from  his  theory,  of  impeaching 
the  divine  sincerity ;  and  the  admission  of  that  possibility, 
together  with  the  assumption  on  which  the  reviewer  pro- 
ceeds in  that  passage,  that  he  voluntarily  permits  it  because 
he  secures  a  greater  good  by  its  permission  than  he  could 
gain  by  its  prevention,  is  obviously  the  only  ground  on 
which  any  satisfactory  solution  of  its  permission  can  be  giv- 
en. If  the  Most  High  cannot  be  vindicated  in  its  voluntary 
permission,  there  is  clearly  no  alternative  but  to  yield  either 
to  an  impeachment  of  his  character,  or  a  denial  of  his  em- 
pire and  attributes.  To  deny  that  he  gave  and  continues 
the  existence  of  the  present  system,  were  to  deny  that  he 
is  its  creator  and  preserver.  To  deny  that  he  gave  it  exitence 
with  a  full  foresight  of  all  its  evil  as  well  as  good  results, 
were  to  deny  his  foreknowledge.  To  deny  that  he  could 
have  refrained  from  giving  it  existence,  were  to  deny  that 
he  was  voluntary  in  its  creation.  To  deny  therefore  that 
the  voluntary  permission  of  sin  that  might  be  prevented,  can 
be  consistent  with  a  sole  desire  of  holiness  in  its  stead,  were 
in  so  many  words  to  deny  him  the  possession  of  that  desire, 
and  impeach  him  of  a  preference  of  the  sin  that  exists.  As 
then  it  is  indisputable,  if  God  is  the  creator  and  sustainer 
of  the  present  system,  that  he  has  voluntarily  permitted  sin 
which  he  might  have  prevented,  it  is  equally  clear,  if  he  is 
infinitely  good,  that  such  a  permission  of  it  is  not  necessarily 
incompatible  with  a  sole  desire  that  that  sin  should  not  be 
exerted  by  his  creatures,  and  a  preference  of  holiness  in  its 
place.  Thus  manifest  is  it,  that  the  assumption  on  which 
the  reviewer  made  his  charge  against  those  who  reject  his 
theory,  is  both  false  in  fact,  and  if  admitted  to  be  true,  as 
fatal  to  himself  as  to  them. 


186 

Were  he,  on  the  other  hand,  to  abandon  that  assumption 
and  admit  the  possibility  of  a  voluntary  permission  of  sin, 
without  a  preference  of  its  existence,  it  is  still  equally  clear 
that  his  scheme  can  yield  him  no  such  peculiar  advantages 
as  he  claims  for  the  reconciliation  of  that  permission,  with 
the  divine  aversion  to  sin  and  prohibition  of  it.  In  placing 
it  on  that  ground  indeed,  he  would  do  nothing  less  than 
adopt  several  of  the  main  elements  of  that  view  respecting 
it,  which  has  heretofore  been  advanced  by  myself — that  it 
is  voluntarily  permitted ;  that  the  reason  of  its  permission 
is,  that  a  greater  good  is  gained  by  its  permission  than 
could  be  secured  by  its  prevention  ;  and  that  its  permission 
for  such  a  reason  is  consistent  with  a  preference  of  holiness 
in  its  place  ;  and  no  other  difference  accordingly  would  re- 
main between  the  systems,  than  respects  the  medium  of  its 
permission — the  question  whether  the  mere  gift  to  his  crea- 
tures of  the  power  of  choice,  is  that  medium,  or  the  mea- 
sures of  his  moral  and  providential  government — a  problem 
the  determination  of  which  obviously  can  have  no  influence 
on  the  question  at  issue,  whether  or  not  the  actual  reason 
of  its  permission  is  a  preference  of  it  to  holiness  in  its  place. 
If  its  voluntary  permission  itself  is  not  inconsistent  with  a 
preference  of  holiness  in  its  stead,  how  can  the  mere  mode 
of  that  permission  possibly  render  it  such  ?  or  what  imagi- 
nable reason  can  be  offered  that  it  should  be  either  more 
or  less  so,  whether  an  act  of  providence  is  the  medium  of 
its  permission,  or  an  act  of  creation  ? 

No  such  reason,  it  is  clear,  can  be  offered,  unless  it  proceeds 
on  either  an  expressed  or  involved  assumption,  that  God  is 
responsible  only  for  the  consequences  of  his  legislative  and 
providential  agency  ;  not  for  the  results  of  his  creative 
acts  !   And  it  is  on  that  accordingly  that  the  reviewer's  vin- 


187 

dication  of  God  in  the  admission  of  sin  into  his  kingdom,  in 
fact  ultimately  rests !  God  manifests  his  desires  and  incurs 
responsibility,  only — the  virtual  representation  of  his  theory 
is, — by  the  moral  and  providential  influences  to  which  his 
creatures  are  subjected  ;  not  by  their  creation  !  He  may 
call  into  existence  by  a  creative  act,  a  universe  of  agents,  with 
a  full  foresight  that  he  cannot  prevent  them  from  sinning, 
and  that  they  will  give  birth  to  precisely  that  amount  of 
evil,  which  exists  in  the  present  system,  without  subjecting 
himself  to  any  suspicion  of  desiring  their  transgressions, 
because  he  secures  by  it  a  greater  good,  than  he  could 
otherwise  gain :  but  to  permit  them  to  sin  to  a  similar  ex- 
tent, by  a  providential  act,  though  for  identically  the  same 
reason,  would  be  wholly  incompatible  with  a  preference  of 
holiness  !  But  he  is  not  only  responsible,  its  representa- 
tion is,  for  all  the  results  of  his  moral  and  providential  ad- 
ministration, but  chargeable  also  with  a  preference  of  all 
the  evils,  if  there  are  any,  of  which  they  are  the  occasions  ! 
Of  ignorance  and  temptation  therefore  not  only,  but  of  sin 
likewise,  inasmuch  as  sin  has  abounded  in  consequence  of 
the  institution  of  law  !  And  it  is  to  escape  this  implica- 
tion, which  attaches  itself  thus  indissolubly  to  the  very 
principle  which  he  employs  to  avoid  it,  that  the  reviewer 
adopts  his  theory  of  a  self-determining  will,  in  order  that 
by  throwing  man  without  the  circle  of  the  divine  control, 
he  may  exculpate  the  Creator  from  responsibility  for  his 
transgressions !  God  moreover,  on  this  scheme,  is  not  to 
be  regarded  as  manifesting  any  of  his  moral  attributes  or 
feelings  in  the  contrivance  and  creation  of  his  works. 
They  are  to  be  seen  only  in  his  acts  of  legislation  and 
providence  !     No  inference  then   respecting  his  purposes, 


188 

wishes  or  character,  is  to  be  derived  from  liis  works  them- 
selves ;  no  homage  consequently  is  to  be  offered  to  his 
wisdom  and  benevolence  as  Creator  and  Preserver.  The 
mere  contrivance  and  creation  of  the  means  of  happiness, 
are  never  to  awaken  admiration  or  thankfulness.  Nothing 
but  the  act  of  placing  them  within  our  reach,  or  conveying 
them  to  our  hands,  can  be  entitled  to  excite  our  love,  or 
prompt  our  praise  !  Such  are  some  of  the  peculiar  advan- 
tages for  illustrating  the  divine  consistency  in  the  permis- 
sion of  sin,  which  the  reviewer  enjoys  on  the  assumption 
that  God  cannot  be  regarded  as  desiring  its  existence,  if 
permitted  by  an  act  of  creation ;  but  may  and  must,  if  a 
providential  agency  is  the  medium  of  its  permission  :  that 
its  permission  by  an  act  of  creation  were  justifiable,  but 
culpable  by  an  act  of  providence  ! 

No  such  errors  or  perplexities  embarrass  that  view  of 
the  subject  which  I  have  heretofore  endeavored  to  sustain. 
The  first  element  of  that  theory  is,  the  doctrine  that  the  obe- 
dience which  God  requires  from  men, — an  obedience  in 
that  series  of  conditions  in  which  they  are  placed  by  his 
providence, — would,  if  rendered,  secure  the  greatest  good  : 
and  tliat  that  accordingl}'  is  the  reason  that  he  desires  and 
requires  it  from  them — an  assumption  obviously  that  not 
only  expressly  excludes,  but  is  wholly'  incompatible  with 
the  doctrine  that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good.  If  the  obedience  which  God  requires,  and  men 
might  render,  would  secure  that  good,  tliere  of  course  can  be 
no  natural  necessity  of  sin  in  order  to  its  attainment.  The 
supposition  of  such  a  necessity  becomes  a  contradiction  and 
absurdity.  This  theory,  therefore,  not  only  expressly  re- 
jects the  doctrine  of  such  a  natural  necessity  of  sin,  but  re- 
jects it  consistently ;  and  no  ingenuity  of  the  reviewer  nor  any 


189 

one  else  who  may  choose  to  assail  it,  can  ever  veriiy  against 
it  the  charge  of  involving  that  implication. 

VIII.  His  theory,  in  place  of  yielding  him  any  advanta- 
ges in  the  vindication  of  election,  is  obviously  not  only  in- 
compatible with,  but  wholly  subversive  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  scriptures  on  that  subject. 

It  involves,  in  its  representation  that  choices  are  exerted 
without  any  intelligent  reasons,  a  virtual  denial  that  there 
is  any  morality  in  our  actions ;  and  thence  that  there  is  any 
sin  from  which  men  can  need  to  be  saved,  or  holiness  to 
which  they  can  be  elected. 

It  involves  a  similar  denial  likewise,  that  there  are  any 
means  of  grace,  or  moral  instruments  by  which  God  can 
bring  men  to  a  compliance  with  the  gospel.  If  power  is 
the  determiner  of  choices,  motives  of  course  are  not ;  and 
if  no  moral  actions  can  be  exerted,  no  means  can  exist  for 
their  excitement ;  and  the  whole  system  of  God's  moral 
administration,  which  is  professedly  employed  in  conveying 
to  his  subjects  inducements  to  obedience,  and  restraints 
from  sin,  is  a  mere  useless  and  unmeaning  pageant.  But 
if  there  are  neither  any  means  of  holiness,  nor  any  holi- 
ness itself,  there  clearly  can  be  no  election  through  such 
means  to  holiness,  nor  any  predestination  to  holiness  itself. 

It  consequently  involves  a  denial  that  any  of  the  influen- 
ces which  God  exerts,  are  or  can  be  the  reasons  that  the 
elect  become  obedient.  If  no  means  exist  by  which  they 
can  be  determined  in  their  choices,  and  there  are  no  reasons 
that  their  volitions  are  what  they  are,  except  such  as  lie  in  a 
self-determined  will ;  then  of  course  none  of  the  influences 
which  God  exerts  on  them,  can  be  the  reasons  of  their  put- 
ting forth  the  obedient  volitions  which  they  do. 

It  likewise  involves,  in  its  exhibition  of  the   power  of 


190 

choice  as  the  sole  medium  of  foresight,  a  similar  denial  of 
the  divine  prescience  and  foreordination  ;  and  thence  again 
subverts  the  whole  system  of  election.  If  God  neither  does 
nor  can  determine  nor  foresee,  the  events  that  transpire  in 
the  agency  of  those  who  become  obedient,  he  of  course 
cannot  have  predestined  them  to  their  obedience,  nor  to  the 
pardon  and  salvation  that  are  consequent  on  it.  A  simple 
election  of  individuals  without  foresight,  or  any  certain  con- 
nexion between  the  choice  and  the  salvation  to  which  they 
were  chosen,  would  amount  to  nothing  more  than  that  mere 
desire  of  their  salvation  which  is  expressed  In  the  oilers 
and  requirements  of  the  gospel  in  respect  to  all,  non-elect 
as  well  as  elect. 

It  involves  a  similar  denial  also,  of  the  certain  persever- 
ance In  holiness  of  those  who  become  obedient.  If,  as  it 
teaches,  the  powers  of  free  agents  are  such  that  God  can 
neither  prevent  them  from  sinning,  nor  foresee  their  agency, 
there  clearly  can  neither  be  any  certainty  to  him,  nor  to 
them,  that  any  of  those  who  become  obedient  will  continue 
so  unto  the  end.  No  certain  connexion  either  does  or  can 
exist,  by  the  terms  of  the  theory,  between  their  present  and 
future  choices,  or  between  his  purposes  and  agency,  and 
their  final  character.  Their  future  actions  are  to  be  the 
sole  eflfect  of  a  mere  self-determined  will,  whose  operations 
there  are  no  means  either  of  controlling  or  foreseeing. 

Were  the  reviewer,  however,  to  abandon  those  elements 
of  his  theory  which  Involve  these  conclusions,  and  limit  it 
to  the  ground  on  which  most  of  his  statements  and  reason- 
ings respecting  election  are  placed, — that  God  determines 
and  foresees  the  agency  of  his  creatures,  through  the  mea- 
sures of  his  providential  and  moral  administration,  his  views 
will  still  continue  to  be  embarrassed  with  difficulties  equally 
insurmountable. 


191 

His  doctrine  that  God  cannot  prevent  the  sin  that  takes 
place,  leads  him  virtually  to  exhibit  election,  as  a  mere  pur- 
pose to  bestow  pardon  and  life — gifts  that  are  consequent 
on  obedience — on  those  who  he  foresees  will  become  obe- 
dient to  the  g-ospel. 

**  And  we  would  only  ask  Dr.  F.  whether  (in  employing  these 
means  in  the  manner  he  does)  God  did  not  foresee  what  individuals 
would  comply  and  be  saved  ?  We  ask  again,  whether  in  purposing 
to  employ  these  means  in  the  manner  he  does,  God  did  not  purpose, 
that  those  individuals  should  comply  and  thus  be  saved  ?  Now  what 
is  this  but  a  personal  election  to  salvation  ?"  p.  620. 

"  It  is  the  purpose  on  the  part  of  God  to  carry  forward  his  works 
of  grace,  such  as  they  are,  in  the  very  manner  he  does,  in  foresight 
of  the  exact  results  they  will  have  in  inducing  men  to  comply  with 
the  conditions  of  salvation  and  be  saved — a  purpose  adopted  for  the 
sake  of  obtaining  the  best  possible  results  to  his  kingdom,  by  the 
whole  work  of  redemption."  p.  624. 

"  The  passage  in  our  view,  therefore,  is  an  unanswerable  testimony 
to  the  fact,  that  God,  by  deciding  on  his  present  measures  of  grace, 
chose  from  among  the  lost  the  heirs  of  salvation."  p.  626. 

"  Whatever  degree  or  kind  of  influence  is  used  with  them  to  favor 
their  return  to  him  at  any  given  time,  is  an  act  of  grace  toward 
them  forfeited  by  previous  sin  ;  to  which  they  have  no  claim  injus- 
tice, and  which  at  the  time  is  as  strongly  favorable  to  their  conver- 
sion as  it  can  be  made,  amid  the  obstacles  which  a  world  of  guilty 
and  rebellious  moral  agents  oppose  to  God's  works  of  grace."  p.  632. 

''  Sin  where  it  now  occurs  may  be  regarded  by  him  as  an  evil,  and 
only  an  evil,  and  yet  (as  an  evil  unavoidable  as  to  his  prevention 
in  a  moral  system)  it  may  be  reduced  to  the  least  possible  limits." 
p.  607. 

Thus,  while  on  the  one  hand,  he  exhibits  election  as 
God's  purpose  "  to  carry  forward  his  works  of  grace,  such 
as  they  are,  in  the  very  manner  he  does,  in  foresight  of  the 
exact  results  they  will  have  in  inducing  men  to  comply  with 
the  conditions  of  salvation," — he  holds  on  the  other,  that 

25 


19!^ 

at  every  step  of  his  progress,  he  actually  carries  those  means 
of  prevention  from  sin  and  conversion  to  holiness,  to  the 
utmost  possible  extent  in  respect  to  the  non-elect,  as  well  as 
to  the  elect ;  so  that  no  sin  transpires  in  the  agency  of  either 
except  such  as  he  is  incapable  of  preventing.  No  discri- 
mination then  whatever  takes  place  between  the  elect  and 
non-elect,  in  respect  to  his  "  measures  of  grace,"  or  the 
means  of  salvation  themselves  !  The  one  class  is  elected 
to  their  enjoyment,  as  truly  and  in  precisely  the  same  man- 
ner as  the  other ;  they  are  carried  with  each  to  the  utmost 
limit  of  possibility  ;  and  that  all  are  not  saved,  is  simply, 
so  far  as  God  is  concerned,  because  he  cannot  convert  them. 
His  discrimination  between  them  then,  commences  subse- 
quently to  the  gift  to  them  of  those  means,  and  must  be 
wholly  founded  accordingly  on  a  foresight  of  their  results ! 
— the  identical  doctrine  of  the  Arminians,  which  it  is  his 
object  in  his  statements  and  reasonings  on  the  subject  to 
subvert !  If,  moreover,  the  divine  discrimination  between 
them  thus  commences  subsequently  to  the  obedience  of  the 
elect,  then  it  results  again  likewise,  that  the  measures  of 
God's  government  and  agency,  are  not  in  truth  the  reasons 
of  their  differing  in  character,  but  that  the  one  becomes 
holy  and  the  other  continues  in  sin,  is  to  be  ascribed  solely 
to  their  self-determining  will. 

His  theory,  thus,  in  place  of  yielding  him  any  peculiar 
facilities  for  the  vindication  of  election,  carries  him  inevita- 
bly to  the  Arminian  error  of  exhibiting  it  as  a  mere  pre- 
destination of  foreseen  believers  to  the  rewards  that  are 
consequent  on  obedience,  instead  of  an  election  of  sinner* 
unto  holiness,  and  those  rewards  ! 


193 

IX.  It  is  fraught  with  no  such  superior  adaptation,  as 
he  ascribes  to  it,  for  the  subversion  of  infidel  and  atheistic 
objections. 


"  It  may  be  useful  to  turn  our  attention  for  a  moment  to  the  nature 
of  the  reasoning  here  alluded  to.  The  universalist  does  not  (if  we 
rightly  judge)  derive  his  doctrine,  in  the  first  place,  from  the  oracles 
of  God,  but  rather  from  the  attributes  of  God ;  and  then  labors  to 
interpret  the  scriptures  in  accordance  with  his  doctrine.  The  argu- 
ment on  which  he  relies  as  the  real  basis  of  his  faith,  is  the  following : 
God,  as  infinitely  benevolent,  must  be  disposed  to  prevent  sin,  with 
all  its  evils.  God,  as  omnipotent,  can  prevent  sin  in  all  his  moral 
creatures.  God,  therefore,  will  hereafter  prevent  all  sin,  and  thus 
render  all  his  creatures  happy  for  ever. 

"  The  infidel  reasons  exactly  in  the  same  manner,  and  comes  to 
the  same  conclusion.  But,  then,  he  has  discei-nment  enough  to  see 
that  the  scriptures  contain  the  doctrine  of  future  endless  punishment. 
He,  therefore,  discards  the  divine  origin  of  the  book,  as  inculcating 
a  doctrine  so  obviously  false,  and  inconsistent  with  the  perfections 
of  God. 

"  As  a  specimen  of  atheistical  reasoning  on  this  subject,  a  friend 
has  put  into  our  hands  a  card,  engraved  in  an  attractive  style,  and 
said  to  have  been  printed  in  New-York,  and  extensively  circulated, 
by  a  club  of  atheists  in  that  city.  It  contains  the  following  words: 
'  God  either  wills  that  evil  should  exist,  or  he  does  not.  If  he  wills 
the  existence  of  evil,  where  is  his  goodness  ?  If  evil  exists  against 
his  will,  how  can  he  be  all-powerful?  And  if  God  is  both  good  and 
omnipotent,  where  is  evil?     Who  can  answer  this  ?' 

"  Now  it  is  manifest,  that  these  several  conclusions  of  the  univer- 
salist, the  infidel,  and  the  atheist,  are  ail  derived  from  substantially 
the  same  premises.  If  the  premises  are  admitted  to  be  true,  the 
conclusion  follows  with  all  the  force  of  absolute  demonstration.  The 
premises  are,  briefly,  that  the  permanent  existence  of  evil  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  goodness  and  the  power  of  God.  Hence  the  atheist 
infers,  in  view  of  existing  evil,  and  the  want  of  evidence  that  it  will 
ever  end,  that  there  is  no  omnipotent,  benevolent  being — there  is 
no  God.  The  universalist  and  the  infidel  maintain  the  eternal  ex- 
istence of  evil  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  perfections  of  God,  and 
hence  infer,  that  ultimately  all  evil  will  be  excluded  from  the  system  ; 


194 

the  one  explaining  away  the  plainest  declarations  of  the  Bible,  and 
the  other  denying  the  divine  origin  of  the  book. 

"  Here,  then,  the  advocate  of  truth  is  bound  to  show,  that  there 
is  a  fallacy  in  these  premises.  Where,  then,  does  the  fallacy  lie? 
The  premises  rest  on  two  attributes  of  God,  his  power  and  his  be- 
nevolence. As  to  his  power,  the  argument  assumes  that  God  can, 
by  his  omnipotence,  exclude  sin  and  its  consequent  sutfering  from  a 
moral  system.  Those  who  admit  this  assumption  have,  therefore,  no 
plea  left  for  the  divine  benevolence,  except  to  assert  that  '  sin  is  the 
necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good ;'  and  that  for  this  reason  it  is 
introduced  into  our  system,  and  will  always  be  continued  there,  by  a 
being  of  infinite  benevolence.  But  can  this  be  proved  ?  Is  this 
supposition  consistent  with  the  sincerity  of  God  as  a  lawgiver,  the 
excellence  of  his  law,  the  known  nature  and  tendency  of  sin  and 
holiness,  and  the  unqualified  declarations  of  the  divine  word,  that 
'  sin  is  the  abominable  thing  which  his  soul  hateth,'  that  he  '  would 
have  all  men  be  saved  and  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  truth,'  &c.  ? 
Can  this  be  consistent  with  his  actually  preferring  the  existence  of 
all  the  sin  in  the  system  to  holiness  in  its  stead  ?  For  ourselves,  we 
must  say,  that  we  regard  the  success  of  any  attempt  to  make  men 
believe  this,  as  utterly  and  for  ever  hopeless.  Our  confident  antici- 
pation is,  that  universalism,  infidelity,  and  atheism,  in  tiiis  land  and 
through  the  world,  will  only  go  on  to  new  triumphs,  so  long  as  tlieir 
overthrow  is  left  to  depend  on  the  truth  of  the  position,  that  God  prefers 
Bin  to  holiness  in  any  of  his  moral  creatures.  We  are  thrown  back, then, 
to  consider  the  other  branch  of  this  argument, viz.  the  assumption,  that 
God,  as  omnipotent,  can  prevent  all  moral  evil  in  a  moral  system.  Is  not 
here  the  fallacy  ?  We  know  that  a  moral  system  necessarily  implies 
the  existence  of  free  agents,  with  the  power  to  sin  in  despite  of  all 
opposing  power.  This  fact  sets  human  reason  at  defiance,  in  every 
attempt  to  prove  that  some  of  these  agents  will  not  use  that  power, 
and  actually  sin.  There  is  at  least,  a  possible  contradiction  involved 
in  the  denial  of  this  ;  and  it  is  no  part  of  the  prerogative  of  omnipo- 
tence to  be  able  to  accomplish  contradictions.  But  if  it  be  not  in- 
consistent with  the  true  idea  of  omnipotence,  to  suppose  that  God 
cannot  prevent  all  sin  in  a  moral  system,  then  neither  is  it  inconsistent 
with  his  goodness  that  he  docs  not  prevent  it  ;  since  sin,  in  respect 
to  his  power  of  prevention,  may  be  incidental  to  the  existence  of 
that  system  which  infinite  goodness  demands.  It  is,  then,  in  view 
of  this  groundless  assumption  concerning  omnipotence,  that  we  see 
the  reasoning  of  the  universalist,  the  infidel,  and  the  atheist,  to  be 


195 

the  merest  paralogism,  or  begging  of  the  question.  The  utter  im- 
possibility of  proving  their  main  principle  is  so  obvious,  that  they 
can  be  made  to  see  it,  and,  we  hope,  to  acknowledge  it.  At  any 
rate,  until  this  mode  of  refutation  be  adopted,  we  despair  of  the 
subversion  of  their  cause  by  reasoning.  By  that  mode  of  argument, 
which  assumes  that  God  prefers  sin  to  holiness,  the  main  pillar  of 
their  conclusion,  viz.  tliat  God  can  prevent  all  moral  evil  in  a  moral 
system,  is  conceded  to  them,  and  thus  they  are  only  confirmed  in 
their  delusions.  When  shall  the  defenders  of  the  truth  learn  the  diffe- 
rence between  scriptural  doctrines  and  groundless  theories?  When 
will  they  see  that  a  zeal  for  the  one  leads  them  to  attach  truth  to 
the  other,  and  thus  inadvertently  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  worst 
of  errors?"— Note,  pp.  616,  617. 

The  assumption  of  the  infidel,  as  the  reviewer  exhibits 
it,  thus  is,  that  a  benevolent  and  all  powerful  being  could 
never  permit  the  existence  of  sin.  From  its  actual  exist- 
ence, therefore,  he  infers  that  there  is  no  such  being.  This 
conclusion  the  reviewer  pronounces  to  be  unanswerably 
just,  if  the  premises,  that  the  voluntary  permission  of  evil 
is  inconsistent  with  infinite  goodness  and  power,  are,  as  he 
himself  holds,  admitted  to  be  true ;  and  the  method  which 
he  employs  to  evade  it  is,  the  denial  that  God,  as  a  moral 
and  providential  ruler,  has  power  to  prevent  the  sin  that 
takes  place,  although  he  had  as  creator.* 


*  There  are  two  classes  of  persons  whose  attention  I  take  leave  to  solicit  to 
this  fact :  one,  who,  while  they  profess  to  act  wiih  the  most  certain  knowledge 
protest  that  neither  "the  Dwight  professor  of  theology,"  nor  the  editor  of  the 
Spectator,  has  ever  taught  or  held  this  doctrine,  although  they  have  advanced 
It  m  almost  identically  the  same  language  as  the  reviewer,  and  employed  it 
for  the  same  purpose,  and  that  the  imputation  of  it  to  them  is  a  calumny 
the  other,  who  credulously  believe  and  repeat  those  protestations.  It  may  be 
wise  m  them  to  pause  and  inquire  what  conclusions  respecting  them,  those 
will  probably  find  themselves  obliged  to  adopt,  wlio  take  care  to  form  their 
opinions  from  facts,  in  place  of  the  prompted  asseverations  of  subservient  par- 
tisans.   The  coincidence  of  the  system  which  those  gentlemen  have  so  long 


196 

This  theory,  however,  even  admitting  it  to  be  true,  ob- 
viously has  no  such  adaptation  as  he  ascribes  to  it,  to  repel 


labored  to  disseminate  with  that  exhibited  in  the  article  under  notice,  is  suffi- 
ciently seen  from  the  following  passages  from  Dr.  Taylor's  sermon,  and  their 
reply  to  Dr.  Woods. 

"The  error  lies  in  the  gratuitous  assumption,  that  God  could  have  adopted 
a  moral  system,  and  prevented  all  sin,  or,  at  least,  the  present  degree  of  sin." 
"  On  the  supposition  that  the  evil  which  exists  is,  in  respect  to  divine  preven- 
tion, incidental  to  the  best  possible  system,  and  that  notwithstanding  the  evil, 
God  will  secure  the  greatest  good  possible  to  him  to  secure,  who  can  impeach 
either  his  wisdom  or  his  goodness  because  evil  exists  7  I  say,  then,  that  as 
ignorance  is  incompetent  to  make  an  objection,  and  as  no  one  knows  that  this 
supposition  is  not  a  matter  of  fact,  no  one  has  a  right  to  assert  the  contrary, 
or  even  to  think  it." — Dr.  T'aylor's  Sermon,  p.  29. 

"This  is  the  task,  then,  which  devolves  on  Dr.  Woods,  viz.  to  prove  that 
God  could  have  kept  all  sin,  or  the  present  degree  of  sin,  out  of  a  universal 
moral  system. 

"  Now  we  say,  that  this  is  a  task  which  Dr.  Woods  cannot  accomplish,  and 
for  this  very  obvious  reason,  that  the  nature  of  the  case  absolutely  precludes 
all  proof,  being  one  which  viai/  involve  a  palpable  self-contradiction.  It  will 
not  be  denied,  that  free  moral  agents  can  do  wrong,  under  every  influence  to 
prevent  it.  The  possibiliti/  of  a  contradiction  in  supposing  them  to  be  prevented 
from  doing  wrong,  is  therefore  demonstrably  certain.  Free  moral  agents  can 
do  wrong  under  all  possible  preventing  influence.  Using  their  jiowers  as 
they  mmj  use  them,  they  will  sin  ;  and  no  one  can  show  that  some  such 
agents  will  not  use  their  powers  as  they  may  use  them.  But  to  suppose  them 
to  use  their  powers  as  they  may  use  them,  and  yet  to  suppose  them  to  be 
prevented  from  sinning,  would  be  to  suppose  them  both  to  sin  and  to  be 
prevented  from  sinning  at  the  same  time,  which  is  a  contradiction." — Chris- 
tian Spectator,  September  1830,  p.  563. 

"  For  if  God  can  secure  universal  holiness,  and  if  universal  holiness  would 
result  in  the  highest  happiness,  then  why  docs  not  God  secure  universal  ho- 
liness? This  is  the  question  for  Dr.  W.  to  answer.  No  alternative  remains, 
but  either  to  admit  that  sin,  in  respect  to  the  divine  prevention,  is  incidental 
to  the  best  system,  or  to  adhere  to  the  position  that  sin,  in  every  instance  of 
its  occurrence,  is  on  the  whole  better  than  holiness  in  its  stead." — p.  555. 

"  And  what,  too,  we  ask,  is  the  comparative  bearing  of  the  two  schemes  on 
atheism,  infidelity,  universalism,  arminianism,  &c.  ?  Which  scheme  is  it 
that  furnishes  the  supposed  infallible  principle,  that  an  omnipotent  and  bene- 
volent God  could  prevent  all  evil  if  he  would,  and  thus  supports  the  inference 
of  one,  that  therefore  there  is  no  such  God  ;  the  inference  of  another,  that 
the  book  which  reveals  so  clearly  the  eternal  misery  of  so  many  of  his  crea- 


197 

the  objections  of  infidels.  So  far  is  it  from  it,  that  it  ex- 
pressly admits,  and  assumes  the  very  position  which  the 
infidel  makes  the  ground  of  his  inference  against  the  divine 
existence,  that  God  voluntarily  permits  all  the  evil  that 
exists,  by  giving  and  continuing  existence  to  the  beings 
who  exert  it,  when  he  might  prevent  it ;  and  rests  his  vin- 
dication of  the  Most  High  in  it,  on  the  ground  that  he 
secures  a  greater  good  than  he  could  otherwise  gain ;  the 
identical  ground  on  which  they  whom  the  reviewer  opposes, 
place  their  vindication  likewise  ;  with  the  sole  difference, 
that  he  exhibits  the  medium  of  that  permission  as  an  act  of 
creation,  while  they  regard  it  as  an  act  of  providence ! — a 
difference  that  obviously  cannot,  in  the  humblest  degree, 
afiect  the  validity  of  the  objection  in  question. 

If  the  existence  of  evil  that  might  be  prevented,  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  goodness  and  power  of  God,  it  were  absurd 
to  suppose  that  it  must  not  be  as  truly  and  palpably  so, 
whether  the  mode  of  its  permission  is  the  gift  of  a  power  of 
volition  that  cannot  be  controlled,  or  a  dispensation  of  provi- 
dence that  leaves  its  subjects  to  misuse  the  power  of  choice 
in  the  exercise  of  a  disobedient  agency.  The  theory  there- 
fore not  only  does  not  overthrow,  as  the  reviewer  imagines, 
the  infidel's  inference,  nor  approach  toward  its  subversion, 
but  instead  of  that,  expressly  admits  and  asserts  that  position 
from  which,  by  his  own  representation,  the  atheistic  con- 
clusion "  follows  with  all  the  force  of  absolute  demonstra- 
tion ;"  and  places    it  in  his  opponent's  power  therefore  to 


tures,  is  not  from  Him  ;  and  the  inference  of  a  third,  that  this  book  does  not 
and  cannot  contain  such  declarations ;  or  of  a  fourth,  that  the  decrees  or 
purposes  of  God  do  not  extend  to  all  actual  events?     Whose  philosophy  or 

rather  theology  is  it,  that  furnishes  the  premises  for  these  conclusions?" p 

569. 


198 

turn  round  and  claim  that  from  his  own  concession,  the 
inference  against  the  existence  of  an  all-powerful  and  be- 
nevolent Being-,  is  demonstrably  just !  Such  are  the  bril- 
liant results  of  this  boasted  theory,  which  is  so  resistlessly  to 
overthrow  infidelity  and  atheism  !  Such  the  lauded  achieve- 
ments of  the  innocent  philosophy  of  religion,  of  which  we 
hear  so  much  of  late,  which  only  employs  itself  in  constru- 
ing the  facts  of  revelation,  never  in  misrepresenting  or 
subverting  doctrines  !  "  When  shall  the  defenders  of  the 
truth  learn  the  difference  between  scripiural  doctrines  and 
groundless  theories  ?  When  will  they  see  that  a  zeal  for  the 
one  leads  them  to  attach  truth  to  the  other,  and  thus  inad- 
vertently to  prepare  the  way  for  the  worst  of  errors  ?"  p.  607. 
So  much  for  his  argument  respecting  power.  But  what 
reply  does  his  theory  ofler  to  that  part  of  the  infidel's  ob- 
jection which  respects  the  divine  goodness  ?  Not  the  slight- 
est whatever.  It  does  not  even  pretend  to  refute  or  obviate 
it,  but  boldly,  without  the  faintest  show  of  argument,  takes, 
as  has  been  seen,  the  whole  point  in  question  for  granted, 
that  "  goodness  demands'^  instead  of  forbids  the  existence 
of  a  system  like  the  present,  in  which  evil  exists,  because, 
he  assumes,  that  evil  cannot  be  prevented  without  giving 
up  the  system.  He  and  his  associates  seem,  inconsiderate 
alike  of  the  nature  of  the  objection  they  were  to  answer,  and 
the  import  of  their  own  theory,  to  have  imagined  that  if 
they  could  only  divest  God  of  his  control  over  the  beings 
whom  he  voluntarily  creates  and  upholds,  and  reduce  him  as 
a  moral  and  providential  ruler,  to  a  level  with,  or  inferior- 
ity to  his  enemies,  they  would  of  course  be  disarmed 
of  objection,  and  forced  by  necessity  to  treat  him  with  re- 
spect !  They  appear  to  have  wholly  forgotten  that  the 
atheistic  objection  is  directed  against  the  goodness  of  God, 


199 

as  well  as  against  his  power,  or  rather,  that  it  is  solely 
against  that,  that  it  is  aimed, — that  if  the  permission  of  sin  is 
granted  or  proved  to  be  compatible  with  infinite  goodness, 
no  question  whatever  can  need  to  be  asked  respecting  the 
practicability  of  its  prevention.  God's  infinite  goodness,  if 
he  possesses  it,  doubtless  guides  him  in  his  exertions  of  pow- 
er. His  power  therefore,  solely  employed  in  executing 
the  choices  of  his  goodness,  of  course  will  not  prevent  the 
existence  of  evil,  however  capable  it  may  be  of  it,  unless 
that  prevention  is  required  by  his  goodness.  The  whole 
question  therefore  in  effect,  respects  the  compatibility  with 
his  goodness  of  a  permission  of  evil ;  and  that  being  the 
fact,  their  mere  denial  of  his  power  to  exclude  it  from  the 
present  system,  clearly  cannot  contribute  any  thing  toward 
demonstrating  that  compatibility.  No  relationship  whatever 
subsists  between  the  two  propositions.  Nor  can  their  denial 
of  his  power,  as  a  moral  and  providential  ruler,  to  prevent 
it,  lend  any  aid  toward  a  demonstration  that  his  permission 
of  it,  as  a  creator,  is  compatible  with  his  goodness.  The 
pretence  that  such  an  expedient  can  meet  or  make  any  ap- 
proach toward  meeting  the  point  at  issue,  is  superlatively 
absurd. 

The  peculiar  advantage  of  the  reviewer's  theory  thus  is 
that  while  it  concedes  on  the  one  hand,  what  b}'  his  own  ad- 
mission, gives  the  atheistic  inference  "  all  the  force  of  ab- 
solute demonstration,"  it  rehes  on  the  other  for  the  subver- 
sion of  that  inference,  on  a  gratuitous  assumption,  without 
an  effort  at  proof,  of  the  whole  point  in  question, — die  false- 
hood of  the  premise  from  which  that  inference  is  drawn!  a 
sagacious  expedient  truly  to  demonstrate  "  tiie  reasoning  of 
the  infidel  and  the  atheist  to  be  the  merest  paralogism,  or 
begging  of  the  question,"  and  "  the  utter  impossibility  of 

26 


-^ 


200 

proving  their  main  principle"  to  be  "  so  obvious  that  they 
can  be  made  to  see  it,  and  we  hope  to  acknowledge  it !" 
p.  617. 

This  theory,  however,  not  only  has  no  such  adaptation 
as  is  claimed  for  it  by  its  friends,  to   meet  the  objections 
of  infidels,  but  is  demonstrably  irreconcilably  contradicto- 
ry, both  to  the  main  attributes  of  God  and  the  doctrines  of 
his  word,  and  must  inevitably  carry  its  disciples  to  their  de- 
nial, if  they  follow  it  to  its  legitimate  results.     The  foun- 
dation on  which   the  whole  scheme  rests,  is  the  assumption 
that  men  are  determined  in  their  choices  by  their  mere  pow- 
er of  choosing,  instead  of  the  instrumentality  of  motives. 
That  however  is  equivalent  to  the  assumption  that  they  nev- 
er act  in  their  volitions  from  intelligent  reasons,  that  God 
has  therefore  no  means  of  controlling  or  determining  their 
agency,  and  cannot  exert  any  influence  whatever  over  them. 
But  if  such  is  the  fact,  what  conclusions  are  we  to  form  re- 
specting the  Scriptures,  which  not  only  expressly  claim  for 
him  the  power  which  this  theory  denies,  but  represent  him 
as  actually  employing  a  vast  system  of  instruments  for  the 
purpose  of  swaying  them  in  their  conduct ;  as  having  estab- 
lished and  as  carrying  forward  a  moral  and   providential 
government  over  them,  that  reaches  all  the  events  in  their 
agency,  and  as  intending  to  sustain  it  throughout  the  end- 
less ages  of  their  future  existence  ;  as  having  given  his  Son 
to  open  the  way  for  the  employment  of  an  extraordinary 
system  of  measures  to  reclaim  them  from  sin  ;  as  having 
sent  down,  and  as  sending  his  Spirit  to  strive  with  and  con- 
vert them;  and  as  having  pledged  his  attributes  forever  to 
redeem  and  maintain  in  holiness  and  happiness,  multitudes 
from  our  race  which  no  man  can  number  ?  Are  these  repre- 
sentations credible  on  the  reviewer's  scheme  ?     They  cer- 


201 

tainly  are  not.  Employ  means,  that  are  no  means — insti- 
tute a  government  that  is  not  a  government — exert  influ- 
ence^ that  are  not  influences — contrive  and  carry  on 
through  endless  ages  an  infinite  system  of  measures  to  pre- 
vent or  save  from  sin  and  confirm  in  righteousness, — when 
there  is  neither  any  such  thing  as  righteousness,  sin,  nor 
moral  agency — and  when  nothing  can  take  place  except  by 
the  blind  impulse  of  fate,  chance,  or  a  senseless  mechanism  ! 
The  representations  of  the  scriptures  cannot  possibly  be  true 
if  this  theory  is  correct,  and  no  alternative  is  left  therefore, 
if  this  is  held,  but  to  reject  not  only  those  doctrines  which 
it  contradicts,  but  the  whole  volume  of  revelation,  as  a  weak 
and  treacherous  fable.  Open,  undoubting,  zealous  infideli- 
ty, if  there  is  any  such  thing  as  logic,  or  a  clear  and  indis- 
putable connexion  of  a  conclusion  with  a  premise,  is  the 
result  to  which  this  hypothesis  will  carry  its  disciples  if  they 
follow  its  principles  to  their  just  consequences  !  It  is  not 
a  mere  misconception,  but  a  total  subversion  of  Christiani- 
ty ;  as  much  more  distantly  advanced  in  error  than  Univer- 
salism  or  Unitarianism,  as  they  are  distant  deviations  from 
the  gospel  of  the  grace  of  God. 

Thus  manifest  is  it,  that  this  theory  in  place  of  gaining 
the  end  for  which  it  is  employed  in  the  contest  with  infidels, 
treacherously  surrenders  to  their  hands  the  citadel  of  truth, 
and  yields  to  them  the  triumph  which  it  boasts  of  gaining 
for  the  cause  of  God  ! 

X.  He  is  equally  in  error  in  the  apprehension  that  any 
necessity  existed  for  resorting  to  any  such  new  expedient 
as  he  has  adopted,  in  order  to  evade  the  difficulties  of 
the  subject ;  or  that  among  the  various  theories  that  had 
before  been  ofiered  respecting  it,  no  one  enjoyed  the  merit 


202 

of  meeting  its  exigencies  without  involving  the  exception- 
able consequences  to  which  he  represents  them  as  univer- 
sally obnoxious. 

The  great  problem  which  it  is  the  object  of  all  discus- 
sion on  the  subject  to  solve,  respects  the  compatibility  of 
the  existence  of  evil  in  his  creatures,  with  the  power,  wis- 
dom, and  benevolence  of  the  Deity.  Evil  itself,  moral  and 
physical,  confessedly  exists  to  a  vast  extent,  and  is,  the 
scriptures  assure  us,  forever  to  continue  and  accumulate. 
And  it  exists  too,  it  is  equally  certain,  as  has  already  been 
seen, — with  his  full  foresight  and  by  his  voluntary  permis- 
sion. No  attempted  explanation  of  its  existence  can  pos- 
sess the  slighest  show  of  accuracy  or  adaptation  to  the  end 
for  which  it  is  devised,  that  does  not  proceed  on  that  con- 
viction. To  undertake  to  exculpate  the  Supreme  from  re- 
sponsibility for  its  existence,  by  assuming,  as  the  reviewer 
and  his  associates  have  done,  that  the  causes  of  its  exist- 
ence are  not  within  the  compass  of  his  control,  is  only  to 
traduce  in  place  of  vindicating  his  attributes,  and  to  deny 
instead  of  justifying  his  government. 

It  is  obviously  an  essential  requisite  of  a  theory  on  the 
subject,  therefore,  in  order  that  it  may  enjoy  any  pretence 
of  meeting  its  exigencies,  that  it  sliould  be  compatible  with 
the  attributes  both  of  God  and  men — that  it  should  con- 
template the  evil  that  exists,  as  taking  place  with  his  fore- 
sight and  voluntary  permission — that  it  should  assign  a 
reason  for  its  permission  that  is  consistent  alike  with  his 
preference  of  the  obedience  which  he  requires,  with  his  infinite 
goodness,  and  with  their  responsibility — and  finally,  that  all 
its  various  positions  should  not  merely  be  exempt  from  in- 
consistency with  tiie  representations  of  the  scriptures,  but 
should  both  be  obviously  sanctioned  by  the  volume  of  in- 


203 


spired  truth,  and  indisputably  and  palpably  coincident  with 
all  the  great  principles  and  measures  of  the  divine  admin- 
istration. 

These  various  requisites  are  united,  I  cannot  but  believe, 
in  that  view  of  the  subject  which  it  has  been  my  object  in 
several  previous  disquisitions  to  illustrate  and  sustain.* 

The  prime  element  of  that  theory,  is  the  doctrine  that 
God  places  each  and  all  of  his  moral  creatures  in  that  series 
of  conditions  in  which,  on  the  one  hand,  the  obedience  he 
requires  would,  if  rendered,  secure  the  greatest  good,  and  in 
which,  on  the  other,  if  that  obedience  is  not  rendered,  the 
sin  that  is  exerted  in  its  place  may  be  overruled  so  as  to  se- 
cure an  equal  good;  that  the  fact  that  the  obedience  which 
he  requires  would,  if  rendered,  constitute  and  prove  the  in- 
strument of  that  good,  is  the  ground  of  his  placing  them  in 
that  series  of  circumstances,  and  desiring  and  requiring 
from  them  that  obedience;  and  that  the  reason  according- 
ly of  his  voluntarily  permitting  them  to  sin,  as  they  do,  in 
place  of  preventing  them,  is,  that  no  other  obedience  than 
that  which  he  enjoins  could,  if  rendered,  constitute  and  be- 
come the  means  of  as  great  a  sum  of  good,  as  the  obedi- 
ence he  requires  would  have  involved,  and  as  his  present  ad- 
ministration, through  its  displays  of  grace  and  justice,  is  the 
instrument  of  gaining. 

The  first  question  then  to  be  determined  respecting  this 


Those  who  may  desire  a  wider  view  of  the  questions  which    the  subiect 
involves  than  the  limits  of  the  present  article  allow  me  to  exhibit  arr^r 
red  to  a  Refutat.on  of  the  views  respecting  .t.  entertained  b,    the  advocate      f 
Dr  Emmons' Theory,  published  in  1821 ;   and  to  No.  I.  p.  10(.-No  II  p  1 
-24.,  and  No.  VII.  p.  305-337  of  the  present  work.  ^ 


204 

theory,  is  whether,  as  it  represents,  God  places  his  moral 
creatures  in  that  series  of  circumstances,  in  which  the  obe- 
dience he  requires  from  them,  would,  if  rendered,  secure  the 
greatest  good  ;  a  doctrine,  it  seems  to  me,  that  can  scarcely 
admit  of  disputation.  What  other  conception  of  the  sub- 
ject can  either  the  attributes  of  God,  or  the  representations 
of  his  word  authorize  us  to  form  ;  or  what  other  can  enjoy 
the  faintest  show  of  reason  for  its  support  ?  What  consid- 
eration can  possibly  justify  the  inference,  that  were  they 
who  transgress,  to  obey  universally  in  the  instances  in  which 
diey  sin,  that  obedience  would  not  prove  the  means  of  se- 
curing the  greatest  good  ?  Does  not  the  Most  High  indis- 
putably place  each  of  his  creatures  in  that  succession  of 
conditions,  in  which  the  complete  fulfilment  of  their  obli- 
gations would  constitute  a  greater  sum  of  good,  than  their 
obedience  in  any  other  series  of  conditions  could  ?  Does 
not  he  require  from  them  at  every  stage  of  their  existence, 
precisely  that  service  which  is  supremely  demanded  alike 
by  his  rights  and  benevolence,  and  by  their  obligations  and 
well-being  ?  And  would  not  a  service  that  met  all  these  re- 
quirements, be  supremely  glorious  to  him,  and  propitious 
to  them  ?  Does  not  the  supposition  that  he  places  them  in 
any  other  series  of  circumstances,  and  requires  from  them 
any  other  than  such  a  service,  obviously  amount  to  an  im- 
peachment of  his  purity  and  goodness,  and  plunge  into  the 
difficulties  which  it  is  its  object  to  avoid  ? 

Such,  however,  is  not  the  inference  of  reason  merely,  but 
the  representation  likewise  of  the  scriptures.  The  language 
of  Paul  is,  "  the  law  is  holy,  just  and  good," — such  as  ac- 
cords with  the  dictates  of  infinite  purity,  meets  and  ex- 
presses the  rights  both  of  God  and  men,  and  fulfils  the 
desires  of  boundless  benevolence-     But  if  obedience  to  it 


205 

would  thus  meet  all  those  rights,  and  accomplish  the  wishes 
of  that  goodness,  it  of  course  would  constitute  precisely 
such  a  good  as  is  the  object  of  his  desire.  The  adoring 
acknowledgment  of  the  Psalmist  likewise  is,  "  the  law  of 
the  Lord  is  perfect,  converting  the  soul ;  the  statutes  of 
the  Lord  are  right,  rejoicing  the  heart;  the  commandment 
of  the  Lord  is  pure,  enlightening  the  eyes  ;  the  judgments 
of  the  Lord  are  true  and  righteous  altogether ;"  and  his 
prayer  accordingly  was,  not  that  he  might  render  a  better 
obedience  than  that  which  was  required  of  him,  but  that  he 
might  be  cleansed  from  secret,  and  kept  back  from  presump- 
tuous transgressions  of  that  perfect  law  which  was  estab- 
lished over  him ;  and  that  thereby  the  words  of  his  mouth 
and  the  meditation  of  his  heart  might  be  acceptable  in  the 
sight  of  his  strength  and  Redeemer.  And  such  is  the  im- 
port not  merely  of  a  few  scattered  passages  of  the  sacred 
word,  but  the  impression  made  by  all  its  representations, 
and  the  conviction  universally  of  the  pious  derived  from 
experience.  No  being,  I  venture  to  believe,  ever  yet  felt 
in  an  act  of  perfect  obedience,  that  he  could  have  rendered 
any  other  service  more  befitting  his  relations  to  God,  than 
that  which  accomplished  the  divine  requirements,  or  received 
a  fitter  reward,  than  that  which  is  annexed  by  the  Most 
High  to  such  an  obedience. 

But  if  it  is  thus  indisputably  clear  that  he  requires  from 
his  creatures  precisely  that  obedience  which  would,  if  ren- 
dered, secure  the  greatest  good,  then  the  next  element  of 
the  theory  in  question — that  he  desires  from  them  the  exer- 
tion of  that  obedience,  follows  likewise  with  an  equally 
indisputable  certainty.  There  not  only  is  no  ground  what- 
ever left  for  any  other  conclusion ;  but  manifestly  no  other 
can  be  compatible  with  either  his  wisdom,  his  purity,  or  his 


206 

benevolence.  To  suppose  him  not  to  desire  that  obedience, 
were  in  so  many  words  to  suppose  him  not  to  desire  the 
greatest  good,  and  impute  imperfection  alike  to  his  goodness 
and  wisdom. 

Such  being  the  certainty  of  this  branch  of  the  theory, 
the  next  point  to  be  determined  respecting  it  is,  whether  as 
it  assumes,  the  sin  that  is  permitted  to  be  exerted,  is  so  over- 
ruled as  to  secure  as  great  an  amount  of  good  as  would 
have  been  the  result,  had  all  his  creatures  rendered  the 
obedience  which  he  requires. 

No  certainty,  it  is  manifest,  exists,  that  the  converse  is 
the  fact,  nor  any  adequate  materials  for  the  discovery  that 
it  can  be  such  ;  as  no  voice  from  heaven  has  announced  it, 
and  no  finite  eye  can  ever  look  through  the  whole  train  of 
events,  and  discern  by  such  an  inspection,  that  the  present 
system  does  not  in  fact  involve  as  great  a  sum  of  good,  as 
would  have  resulted,  had  the  sin  that  exists  never  transpired. 
But  besides  this  negative  consideration,  the  government  of 
the  Most  High  clearly  exhibits  all  those  marks  that  are  re- 
quisite to  form  a  fit  ground  for  the  inference,  that  the  evil 
that  takes  place  will  be  so  overruled,  as  to  gain  as  great  a 
sum  of  good  as  would  have  been  secured,  had  none  of  that 
evil  obtained  existence.  An  administration  in  order  to  se- 
cure that  result,  must  obviously  involve  a  system  of  measures 
remedial  and  counteractive  of  the  evil  that  takes  place,  and 
likewise  furnish  the  means  of  a  higher  degree  of  holiness 
and  happiness  to  those  of  its  subjects  that  continue  or  be- 
come holy,  tiian  they  could  otherwise  enjoy.  And  such  is 
indisputably  the  character  of  the  government  which  God  is 
in  fact  carrying  on  toward  the  guilty  and  their  sin.  He  has 
availed  himself  of  their  transgressions,  to  make  a  variety 
of  such  extraordinary  and  brighter  exhibitions  of  his  power, 


M 


207 


wisdom,  and  benevolence,  as  to  unfold  to  his  obedient  crea- 
tures new  and  larger  sources  of  knowledge  and  excitements 
to  love,  and  raise  them  to  intenser  degrees  of  holiness  and 
beatitude,  than  they  could  have  otherwise  obtained  ;  has 
redeemed  and  is  redeeming  multitudes  innumerable  of  the 
guilty,  forever  from  the  empire  and  punishment  of  sin  ;  and 
finally,  by  his  displays  of  justice  toward  those  who  continue 
disobedient,  is  counteracting,  measureably  at  least,  the  hurt- 
ful influences  of  their  rebellion,  and  making  it  the  means 
of  binding  his  obedient  subjects  more  firmly  in  allegiance. 
All  the  necessary  elements  are  furnished  by  his  administra- 
tion therefore,  for  the  conclusion  that  he  will  thus  in  fact 
secure  by  it  as  great  a  sum  of  holiness  and  happiness  as 
would  have  been  obtained  had  none  of  the  evil  he  is  em- 
ployed in  counteracting,  taken  place  ;  and  that  conclusion 
is  moreover  distinctly  sanctioned  by  the  representations  of 
the  sacred  word,  in  its  exhibitions  of  the  infinite  joy  of  God 
in  the  results  of  his  empire,  especially  in  the  work  of  re- 
demption ;  of  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  with  the  fruits  of  his 
mediation  ;  of  the  adoring  wonder  with  which  that  work  is 
contemplated  by  the  angelic   hosts ;  of  the  ascriptions  to 
him  by  the  redeemed  at  its  consummation,  of  "  blessing- 
and  glory,  and  wisdom,  and  thanksgiving,  and  honor,  and 
power,  and  might ;"  of  his  perfect  and  illustrious  triumph 
over  all  the  malicious  eflbrts  of  his  enemies  against  his  hap- 
piness and  glory,  which  were  obviously  incompatible  with 
their  actually  having  wrested  from  him  the  attainment  of  the 
greatest  possible  good  ;  and  finally,  of  its  perpetual  and 
exulting  celebration  of  the  work  of  redemption  as  a  brighter 
and  more  stupendous  manifestation  of  both  his  wisdom  and 
goodness,  than  is  formed  by  all  his  other  works.     These 
ascriptions  and  exultations  clearly  bear  no  indications  that 

27 


208 

his  reign  is  but  partially  successful  in  its  aim  ;  a  merely 
disguised  defeat ;  but  exhibit  it  as  an  unmixed  triumph,  that 
leaves  no  room  to  his  enemies  to  boast  of  success  in  any 
attempt  to  baffle  his  wisdom,  or  disappoint  his  benevolence, 
and  make  the  impression  resistlessly,  that  they  must  sink 
away  under  the  conviction,  that  while  they  have  involved 
themselves  in  hopeless  suffering  and  infamy,  neither  their 
misery  nor  guilt  have  diminished  the  aggregate  sum  of  obe- 
dience or  enjoyment  within  his  empire,  but  have,  in  place 
of  that,  only  become  the  instrument  of  raising  his  other 
subjects  to  a  higher  eminence  in  holiness,  confirming  them 
in  their  allegiance,  and  exalting  them  to  richer  and  more 
glorious  rewards. 

But  if  this  position  is  thus  clear,  it  then  follows  with 
equal  certainty  that  it  is  not  incompatible  with  supreme 
benevolence  to  permit  the  sin  that  exists.  If  it  is  overruled 
by  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
prove  the  means  of  adding,  as  much  as  it  detracts  from  the 
aggregate  of  holiness  and  happiness,  its  permission  clearly 
cannot  involve  any  incompatibility  with  that  goodness  and 
wisdom. 

The  remaining  question  to  be  decided  respecting  this 
theory  is,  whether,  as  it  assumes,  God, — inasmuch  as  men  do 
not  obey  in  the  conditions  in  which  they  are  placed, — had 
any  other  alternative  than  either  to  permit  them  to  sin  as  he 
does,  and  thereby  secure  the  greatest  good  through  the 
remedial  measures  of  his  present  administration  ;  or  else  to 
debar  himself  from  the  greatest,  and  limit  himself  to  the 
attainment  of  only  an  inferior  good,  by  wholly  preventing 
them  from  sin  ;  or,  which  is  tlie  same  tiling,  whetlier  he 
could  have  placed  them  in  any  otiier  series  of  circumstances, 
in  which  he  could  have  secured  from  them  an  obedience 


209 

both  perfect  and  involving-  as  great  a  sum  of  good  as  that 
which  is  obtained  by  the  present  system  of  things ;  a  pro- 
blem of  still  easier  solution  than  the  former. 

The  only  change  in  their  condition  by  which  they  could 
have  been  secured  in  perfect  obedience,  must  obviously 
have  been  such  as  should  have  diminished  temptation,  and 
multiplied  and  heightened  inducements  to  holiness ;  a  pro- 
cess which,  inasmuch  as  the  value  of  an  obedience  depends, 
measurably  at  least,  on  the  extent  of  the  opposing  influences 
against  which  it  is  rendered,  would  necessarily  have  dimin- 
ished the  value  of  their  obedience,  and  rendered  the  system 
at  large  of  proportionally  less  worth  than  that  which  now 
exists.  As  then  it  is  thus  clear,  that  he  could  not  have 
changed  their  condition  in  such  a  manner  as  to  have  secured 
from  them  a  perfect  obedience,  involving  as  high  an  ex- 
pression of  devotedness  to  him,  or  worthy  of  as  large  a 
measure  of  his  approval,  and  thereby  securing  as  great  a 
sum  of  holiness  and  happiness,  as  the  obedience  he  requires 
would  involve  ;  it  is  clear  that,  inasmuch  as  they  do  not 
render  that  required  obedience,  he  has  no  alternative,  in 
order  to  secure  the  greatest  good,  but  to  leave  them,  as  he 
does,  to  transgress.  And  such  being  the  fact,  the  conclusion 
follows  with  equal  certainty,  that  his  permission  of  the  sin 
that  takes  place,  instead  of  being  incompatible  with,  is  ab- 
solutely required  by  his  goodness,  and  is  itself  a  proof,  in 
place  of  an  objection,  to  the  perfection  of  his  wisdom  and 
benevolence. 

In  these  three  positions,  then — that  the  obedience  which 
he  requires,  would,  if  rendered,  secure  the  greatest  good  ; 
that  the  sin  which  he  permits  is,  together  with  the  obedience 
that  is  exerted,  actually  made  the  instrument  of  attaining 
that  good ;  and  that  no  other  system  of  agency  from  his 


210 

creatures,  except  either  that  which  he  requires,  or  that  which 
they  exert,  could  prove  the  means  of  gaining  an  equal  sum 
of  holiness  and  happiness  ; — we  thus  have  all  the  requisite 
materials  for  the  reconciliation  of  his  permission  of  the  evil 
that  takes  place,  with  his  purity,  his  sincerity,  his  wisdom, 
and  benevolence  ;  a  reason  both  of  his  desiring  and  requiring 
the  obedience  which  he  enjoins,  and  permitting  the  evil 
which  he  forbids,  that  is  at  once  consistent  with  those  per- 
fections, coincident  with  the  representations  of  his  word,  and 
accordant  with  the  nature  and  responsibility  of  his  subjects  ; 
and  that  is,  consequently,  wholly  free  both  from  the  objec- 
tions to  which  the  doctrine  that  sin  is  naturally  necessary 
as  a  means  of  the  greatest  good,  is  obnoxious,  and  the 
equally  insuperable  difficulties  which  perplex  the  reviewer's 
theory,  that  the  prevention  of  the  sin  that  takes  place  is 
impracticable  to  God  as  a  moral  and  providential  ruler. 

From  these  considerations,  then,  it  is  sufficiently  seen, 
that  the  reviewer  was  no  less  mistaken  in  the  impression, 
that  the  foregoing  views  are  chargeable  with  any  of  the 
errors  which  he  represents  as  the  common  character  of  all 
that  differ  from  his  own,  than  he  was  in  the  assumption  that 
the  hypothesis  which  he  has  advanced  has  any  such  adap- 
tation as  he  claims  for  it  to  obviate  the  perplexities  of  the 
subject. 

Such  are  some  of  the  difficulties  with  which  his  system 
is  embarrassed.  A  variety  of  others,  of  scarcely  inferior 
moment,  might  also  be  pointed  out,  had  not  the  discussions 
in  the  preceding  article,  and  in  those  portions  of  the  eighth 
and  ninth  numbers  that  treat  of  this  subject,  rendered  it 
unnecessary. 

The  great  questions  involved  in  this  controversy,  it  is 
sufficiently  apparent  from  the  foregoing  discussion,  are  not 


211 

of  mere  ordinary  interest,  but  vitally  important ;  and  the 
decisions  that  are  formed  respecting  them  by  the  teachers 
of  religion  must  exert  a  momentous  influence  on  the 
churches  and  religion  of  our  country.  The  subjects  to 
which  they  relate — the  attributes  of  God,  the  reality  and 
nature  of  his  government,  the  doctrines  of  his  word,  the 
nature  of  the  mind,  the  laws  of  its  agency,  the  causes  that 
influence  it — if  any  are  entitled  to  that  rank,  are  funda- 
mental :  and  the  problems  which  it  is  the  object  of  the  con- 
troversy to  solve,  whether  God  is  almighty  as  a  moral  and 
providential  ruler  as  well  as  creator,  or  weak  and  liable  to 
perpetual  frustration  ;  whether  he  is  wholly  able  or  wholly 
unable  to  prevent  moral  beings  from  sinning  ;  whether  he 
can  or  cannot  determine  and  foresee  the  events  of  their 
agency,  and  thence  whether  his  predictions,  threatenings, 
and  promises,  are  true  or  false  ;  whether  his  rational  crea- 
tures are  moral  agents  or  machines  ;  the  subjects,  or  not, 
of  a  moral  government ; — indisputably  involve  all  that  is 
essential  in  Christianity ;  and  the  scheme  that  affirms  the 
one  is  as  diverse  from  that  which  asserts  the  other,  as  light 
is  from  darkness,  and  truth  from  falsehood.  None  but  an 
idiot  can  confound  them,  or  fail  to  see  that  the  question 
between  them  is  nothing  less  than  the  question — of  two 
wholly  dissimilar  and  contradictory  systems,  which  is  it  that 
is  the  gospel  of  the  grace  of  God,  and  which  therefore  is  it 
that  wholly  contradicts  and  subverts  that  gospel  f 

Dr.  Taylor,  I  am  aware,  incapable  of  defending  his 
theory,  and  left  without  any  other  expedient  to  extricate 
himself  from  difficulty,  while  he  continues  unwilling  to  make 
a  frank  and  honorable  recantation  of  his  errors,  is  accus- 
tomed to  claim,  that  the  questions  between  him  and  his 
opponents,  are  mere  questions  of  philosophy  ;  that  the  great 


213 

facts  and  doctrines  of  the  gospel  are  held  alike  by  each  ; 
that  the  differences  between  them  relate  solely  to  the  expla- 
nation of  these  facts  ;  and  that  differences  of  that  nature, 
therefore,  ought  not  to  be  made  the  ground  of  excluding 
him  from  the  ranks  and  confidence  of  the  orthodox ; — a  pre- 
tence more  false  and  absurd,  if  possible,  than  the  elements 
themselves  are,  of  his  theory. 

It  proceeds  on  the  assumption,  or  is  rather  an  open  as- 
sertion, that  if  men  jprofessedly  admit,  or  do  not  formally 
deny,  the  facts  or  doctrines  of  the  gospel,  it  is  of  no  essential 
importance  what  theories  they  entertain  and  teach,  of  their 
causes  and  nature  ;  a  principle,  against  which  there  is  not 
a  doctrine  or  fact  of  religion  that  can  stand  for  an  instant. 
On  that  assumption,  the  difference  between  the  pharisees 
and  the  Son  of  God  himself  was  of  no  such  serious  moment 
as  he  regarded  it ;  and  ought  neither  to  have  received  from 
him  so  tremendous  a  denunciation,  nor  even  to  have  ex- 
cluded them  from  his  charity.  For  they  held  to  the  fact 
of  the  expulsion  of  devils  from  the  possessed  in  connexion 
with  his  instrumentality,  as  truly  as  he  himself  did.  They 
only  differed  from  him  in  their  philosophy  of  that  fact; 
ascribing  the  miracle  to  Beelzebub,  instead  of  the  finger  of 
God ! — quite  an  unessential  particular,  according  to  the 
pretence  on  which  "  the  Dwight  professor  of  theology  in 
Yale  College"  is  now  relying  for  his  vindication.  The 
judaizing  teachers,  likewise,  who  beguiled  the  Galatians, 
agreed  with  the  apostle  in  respect  to  the  fact  that  a  method 
of  justification  is  revealed  in  the  gospel:  they  only  differed 
from  him  in  their  philosophical  views  of  that  justification  ; 
regarding  it  as  founded  on  the  merit  of  works,  in  place  of 
grace  through  faith.  How  wholly  unjustifiable  was  it  in 
the  apostle,  therefore,  to  pronounce  a  curse  on  any  one, 


213 

though  an  angel  from  heaven,  who  should  preach  any  other 
gospel  than  that  which  he  had  preached  !  He  could  never 
have  indulged  himself  in  such  a  presumptuous  and  unchar- 
itable denunciation  of  those  who  differed  from  him  "  in  these 
matters,"  had  he  possessed  the  "  Catholicism"  of  Dr. 
Taylor,  and  been  as  anxious  as  he  is  for  its  "reciproca- 
tion !" 

The  differences,  in  like  manner,  between  the  orthodox 
and  unitarians,  in  respect  to  the  divine  nature,  ought  never, 
on  this  principle,  to  be  made  a  ground  of  their  separation. 
The  latter  do  not  deny  the  existence  of  God :  they  only 
differ  from  the  scriptures  and  the  orthodox  in  their  views 
of  his  nature  !     They  do  not  deny  the  being  and  mission 
of  Jesus  Christ:  they  only  entertain  a  different  philosophy 
respecting  his  nature,  character,  and   mediation  !     They 
do  not  differ  from  them  in  respect  to  the  fact  that  there  is 
a  Holy  Spirit :  they  only  annex  a  totally  different  signi- 
fication to  the  term,  or  hold  a  wholly  different  philosophy 
respecting  the  object  which  it  is  employed  to  designate  ! 
Why,  on  Dr.  Taylor's  assumption,  should  the  orthodox  be 
so  fastidious  as  to  withhold  from  them  the  right  hand  of 
fellowship,  or  so  unreasonable  as  to  suspect  and  impeach 
them  of  heresy  ?     Or  why,  any  more,  on  this  principle, 
should  any  serious  alienation  exist  of  the   orthodox  from 
universalists  ?     Universalism  is  nothing  more  than  a  phi- 
losophical theory  of  the  mode  of  our  future  existence  ;  or, 
in  other  words,  of  the  species  of  perceptions,  emotions,  and 
choices,  that  are  to  constitute  the  consciousness  and  agency 
of  the  race  in  the  coming  world  !     How  innocent !     Who 
but  a  bigot,  if  Dr.  Taylor's  assumption  is  correct,  could 
ever  think  of  branding  such  a  harmless  speculation  with 


214 

the  odious  name  of  heresy,  and  denouncing  its  propagators 
as  subverters  of  the  truth  of  God  ? 

There  is  not  a  heresy  in  the  church  that  may  not  thus, 
on  this  plea,  shield  itself  from  censure.  They  do  not,  any 
of  them,  profess  to  be  deviations  from  the  facts  or  doctrines 
of  revelation.  They  are  only  philosophical  statements  or 
theories  of  those  doctrines  or  facts.  Nor  is  there,  on  the 
other  hand,  a  solitary  fact  or  doctrine  of  Christianity  that 
this  principle  may  not  be  made  the  instrument  of  totally 
misconstruing  and  denying. 

The  term  philosophy  is,  obviously,  used  by  Dr.  Taylor 
in  this  instance,  synonymously  with  metaphysics ;  and  the 
questions,  accordingly,  which  this  philosophy  is  authorized 
and  employed  to  determine,  are  questions  that  relate  to  the 
nature  of  God,  of  intelligent  creatures,  of  moral  agency, 
the  causes  that  influence  beings  in  their  choices,  moral 
relations,  obligations,  holiness,  sin,  and  all  facts,  doctrines, 
and  statements  in  which  these  are  in  any  degree  concerned  ! 
If,  therefore,  as  he  assumes,  it  is  compatible  with  a  full  title 
to  the  charity  and  confidence  of  the  orthodox,  to  adopt  any 
speculative  theory  whatever  on  these  subjects  that  any  one 
may  choose,  there  clearly  is  not  a  fact  nor  truth  of  the 
word  of  God,  that  may  not  thus  innocently  and  instantly 
be  wholly  misrepresented  and  denied  ! 

No  questions,  therefore,  more  vital  to  Christianity  can 
be  propounded,  than  those  which  this  controversy  involves, 
nor  any  on  the  decision  of  which  more  momentous  interests 
depend.  If  the  theory  of  the  reviewer  and  his  associates  is 
scriptural,  the  doctrines  of  the  orthodox  on  these  subjects 
indisputably  are  not.  If  the  doctrines  of  the  orthodox  are 
coincident  with  fact  and  revelation,  the  scheme  of  these 


215 

gentlemen  is  not;  but  is  directly  and  palpably  subversive 
of  the  whole  system  of  Christianity. 

The   only  method,  it  is  equally  clear,   of  settling  the 
question  respecting  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  these  systems, 
is  that  of  faithfully  developing  the  principles  on  which  they 
rest,  tracing  them  to  their  legitimate  results,  and  comparing 
them  with  the  decisions  of  reason   and  revelation.     If  the 
reviewer,  accordingly,  and  those  who  act  with  him,  desire 
to  sustain  their  views,  and  shield  themselves  from  the  charge 
and  conviction  of  having  departed  from  the  truth,  they  have 
no  other  method  than  openly  and  directly  to  meet  the  ob- 
jections with  which  they  are  assailed. 

The  stale  and  impotent  expedient  to  which  Dr.  Taylor 
has  chosen  to  resort,  of  protesting  that  he  is  not  heretical; 
of  wondering  why  he  is  suspected  of  having  abandoned  the 
orthodox  faith  ;  of  professing  that  he  still  believes  the  doc- 
trmes  which  he  openly  or  impliedly   denies  ;   without  a 
solitary  effort  to  show  how  his  doctrines  and  professions 
can  be  consistent  with  each  other,  or  in  what  manner  the 
objections  that  are  alleged  against  his  theory  can  be  suc- 
cessfully answered;    may    serve    temporarily,    indeed,    to 
hoodwink  the  ignorant  and   credulous,  and   assist  a  few 
reckless  partisans  in  continuing  the   cry  of  persecution ; 
but,  to  all  intelligent  and  upright  minds,  it  only  carries  a 
deeper  conviction  that  his  protestations  are  unworthy  of 
confidence  ;  and  that  it  is  a  consciousness  alone  of  his  ina- 
bility to  give  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the  allegations  against 
his  scheme,  that  leads  him  to  adopt  so  weak  and  unmanly 
a  method  for  his  vindication. 

Will  the  reviewer,  then,  deem  it  due  to  himself,  to  the 
honor  of  the  institution  with  which  he  is  connected,  to  the 
anxieties  and  interests  of  the  church,  to  the  well-being  of 

28 


216 

souls,  to  his  responsibilities  to  God,  openly  and  thoroughly 
to  meet  the  questions  at  issue  between  us,  in  the  method  I 
have  recommended,  if  he  chooses  any  further  to  discuss 
them  ?  I  trust  he  will :  through  what  medium  I  care  not, 
or  in  what  mode,  let  truth  but  be  his  object,  as  I  doubt  not 
it  will,  and  pertinent  and  manly  argument  the  instrument 
of  its  discovery  and  demonstration.  He  will  enjoy,  he  may 
assure  himself,  the  certainty  of  numerous  and  attentive 
readers.  The  eyes  of  not  only  a  great  proportion  of  the 
clergy  in  the  nation,  but  of  multitudes  of  others  also  of  the 
intelligent,  both  without  and  in  the  church,  will  trace  his 
pages  with  a  keen  and  anxious  scrutiny ;  and  should  he 
accomplish  a  demonstration  that  the  objections  are  un- 
founded that  are  offered  against  his  views,  and  the  fears 
that  are  entertained  of  their  pernicious  tendency,  causeless 
and  unjustifiable,  it  will  be  hailed  with  cordial  congratula- 
tions  to  him,  and  fervent  thanksgivings  to  God* 


A  LETTER  TO 
REV.  JOEL  HA  WES,  D.  D. 

ON  DR.  TAYLOR'S  THEOLOGICAL  VIEWS. 


DEAR  SIR, 

The  Letter  lately  addressed  to  you  by  Rev.  Nathaniel 
W.  Taylor,  D.  D.  of  New-Haven,  professing  to  exhibit  a 
statement  of  his  opinions  on  the  topics  that  have  so  long 
been  in  controversy  between  him  and  the  orthodox,  and 
published  with  the  Letter  from  you  to  him  to  which  it  was  a 
reply,  in  the  Connecticut  Observer,  for  the  purpose  of 
calming  the  prevalent  apprehensions  respecting  iiis  doctri- 
nal views,  has  not  proved  the  means  to  me  of  that  entire 
satisfaction  on  the  subject  which  it  appears  to  have  yielded 
to  you;  nor  does  it  seem  to  possess  any  such  adaptation 
as  you  impute  to  it,  to  produce  those  results  with  re- 
spect to  others,  which  it  was  his  object  to  achieve.  The 
interest  you  manifest  in  the  subject,  and  the  readiness  you 
exhibit  to  lend  your  aid  in  the  removal  of  doubts  and  mis- 
apprehension respecting  it,  induce  me  to  offer  to  you  a 
frank  exposition  of  some  of  the  inadequacies  as  they  ap- 
pear to  me,  of  the  method  which  he  has  chosen  to  shield 
himself  from  the  suspicion  of  heresy,  and  the  difficulties 


218 

which  still  perplex  his  claims  to  be  ranked  among  the  or- 
thodox ;  and  to  solicit  from  you,  if  consistent  with  your 
judgment,  a  public  exhibition  of  the  means,  if  there  are 
any,  by  which  those  difficulties  are  to  be  satisfactorily 
overcome. 

The  first  topics  to  which  I  take  leave  to  invite  your 
attention,  are  the  ends  themselves  which  it  was  the  object 
both  of  his  and  your  Letter  to  accomplish.  Of  these,  the 
chief  was  to  counteract  and  remove  the  impressions  that 
exist,  that  he  has  become  the  adopter  and  propagator  of  a 
set  of  theological  views,  that  in  the  judgment  of  the 
churches  of  New-England,  are  erroneous,  and  fraught  with 
danger  to  the  cause  of  truth  and  piety.  Your  language  to 
him  is — 

"  You  are  quite  aware  that  there  are  not  a  few  in  the  community 
who,  from  some  cause  or  other,  are  apprehensive  that  you  are  not 
sound  on  those  doctrines  ;  and  much  alarm  has  been  expressed,  lest 
as  a  teacher  of  theology,  you  should  introduce  heresy  into  our 
churches."  "  I  cannot  but  feel  that  you  owe  it  to  yourself,  to  the  In- 
stitution with  which  you  are  connected,  and  to  the  christian  com- 
munity in  general,  to  make  a  frank  and  full  statement  of  your  views 
of  the  doctrines  above  mentioned."  "A  clear  and  full  expression 
of  your  sentiments  on  this  point  cannot  fail,  I  am  confident,  to  re- 
lieve the  minds  of  many  who  are  now  suspicious  of  your  orthodoxy." 

Dr.  Taylor  likewise  remarks — 

"  For  some  reason  or  other,  an  impression  has  been  made  to  some 
extent,  that  I  am  unsound  in  the  faith.  This  impression,  I  feel 
bound  to  say,  in  my  own  view,  is  wholly  groundless  and  unauthorized. 
You  think,  however,  that  I  '  owe  it  to  myself,  to  the  institution  with 
which  I  am  connected,  and  to  the  christian  community,  to  make  a 
frank  and  full  statement  of  my  viewsof  some  of  the  leading  doctrines 
of  the  gospel,  and  that  this  cannot  fail  to  relieve  the  minds  of  many 
who  are  now  suspicious  of  my  orthodoxy.' 


219 

"Here  I  must  be  permitted  to  say,  that  the  repeated  and  full 
statements  of  my  opinions,  which  I  have  already  made  to  the  public, 
would  seem  to  be  sufficient  to  prevent  or  remove  such  suspicions. 
The  course  you  propose,  however,  may  furnish  information  to  some 
who  may  desire  it  before  they  form  an  opinion,  as  well  as  the  means 
of  correcting  the  misrepresentations  of  others.  I,  therefore,  readily 
comply  with  your  request,  and  submit  to  your  disposal  the  following^ 
statement  of  my  belief  on  some  of  the  leading  doctrines  of  the  gos- 
pel." 

The  existence  extensively  of  suspicions  that  he  has  be- 
come "  unsound  in  the  faith,"  is  thus  admitted  by  each  of 
you,  and  alleged  as  the  reason  of  your  soliciting,  and  his  of- 
fering to  the  public  this  restatement  of  his  opinions.  That 
the  suspicion,  or  rather  conviction,  in  fact  exists,  that  he 
has  at  least  virtually  abandoned  and  become  an  assailant  of 
many  of  the  most  essential  truths  of  the  gospel,  and  exists 
far  more  extensively  than  the  language  of  either  of  the  Let- 
ters implies,  I  take  it,  neither  needs  demonstration  nor  ad- 
mits of  dispute.  It  is  a  matter  of  general  notoriety.  That 
conviction  is  common  as  far  as  I  am  able  to  judge,  not  only 
to  very  nearly  the  whole  body  of  the  orthodox  Congregation- 
al clergy  of  New-England,  and  those  members  of  their 
churches  who  have  made  his  sentiments  a  subject  of  exami- 
nation, but  with  still  fewer  exceptions  proportionally  to  the 
ministers  and  members  of  the  Presbyterian  church.  Apart 
from  his  pupils,  the  number  of  those  who  have  openly  espou- 
sed his  peculiar  views,  is  certainly  small.  The  pretences 
which  have  frequently  been  made  that  the  great  body  of  the 
influential  ministers  in  New-England,  and  many  of  the  most 
distinguished  in  the  middle  and  western  churches,  have  be- 
come his  disciples,  are  known  to  be  wholly  unauthorized  ; 
and  the  most  even  that  can  be  alleged  in  proof  that  many 
of  those  among  the  leading  ministers  in  Connecticut  who 


220 

are  claimed  as  his  partisans  and  supporters,  are  in  any  sense 
his  adherents,  is,  it  is  believed,  that  they  have  not  hitherto 
become  his  open  assailants,  but  have  chosen  rather  to  wait 
for  a  further  developement  of  his  principles,  and  cherished 
and  expressed  the  hope  that  he  might  ultimately  exhibit 
some  such  modification  or  explanation  of  them  as  to  show 
that  they  are  not  incompatible  with  the  orthodox  system. 
And  the  doubts  moreover  that  still  exist  whether  he  has  be- 
come essentially  unsound  in  the  faith,  are  not  doubts,  it  is 
well  known,  whether  the  system  he  has  publicly  advanced, 
is  erroneous  and  subversive  of  the  gospel,  but  doubts  solely 
whether  he  holds  and  inadcates  that  system  with  a  percep- 
tion and  adoption  of  the  results  tchich  it  legitimately  involves; 
and  doubts  too,  not  that  are  excited  by  the  nature  of  the 
terms  in  which  he  has  advanced  his  theory,  or  the  reasoning 
which  he  has  employed  in  supporting  it,  but  that  are  found- 
ed on  the  perpetual  and  vehement  protestations  with  which 
he  has  assailed  the  public  ear,  since  his  speculations  began 
to  subject  him  to  general  censure,  that  he  does  not  differ  in 
his  sentiments  from  the  received  doctrines  of  the  orthodox  ! 
Let  it  but  be  frankly  admitted  by  him  that  his  theory  is 
what  it  clearly  is,  is  the  object  of  his  full  faith,  and  is  car- 
ried by  him  to  its  legitimate  consequences;  and  no  uncertain- 
ty with  the  churches  at  large  would  remain  for  an  instant, 
that  his  faith  has  become  essentially  unsound.  That  such  is 
the  fact  indeed  indisputably  both  to  his  conviction  and  yours, 
is  placed  wholly  out  of  question  by  the  object  and  structure 
of  the  Letters  themselves  ;  as  both  of  you  professedly  build 
your  expectation  of  a  useful  influence  from  their  publication, 
on  the  assumption  that  could  he  but  produce  a  general 
conviction  that  he  continues  truly  to  hold  the  orthodox 


221 

system,  it  would  at  once  render  him  the  object  of  universal 
approbation  and  confidence !  a  result  you  clearly  could  not 
have  anticipated — a  conviction  he  would  never  have  attempt- 
ed to  produce,  were  it  not  seen  and  felt  that  that  system 
continues  to  be  generally  held.  If  the  great  body  of  those 
who  guide  general  opinion  have  become  the  adopters  and 
propagators  of  his  peculiar  speculations,  what  possible 
necessity  could  exist  for  resorting  to  such  an  expedient  to 
sustain  himself  in  public  estimation  ;  or  how  can  the  slight 
and  disgrace  which  this  zealous  reprofession  of  orthodoxy 
virtually  casts  on  the  scheme  which  he  has  so  often  pretended 
he  has  induced  those  guides  of  general  opinion  to  adopt,  be 
compatible  with  the  hope  of  his  continuing  to  retain  their 
respect  and  confidence  ?  The  boasts  so  zealously  circulated 
through  the  land  by  himself  and  his  adherents,  tliat  the 
great  body  of  the  distinguished  clergy  have  become  his 
disciples,  are  thus  abundantly  contradicted  by  the  very 
object  of  these  Letters,  and  the  fact  disclosed  by  himself, 
that  he  feels  that  in  place  of  gaining  a  general  currency  for 
his  theory,  he  has  no  other  method  left  of  extricating  him- 
self from  an  almost  universal  reprobation  to  which  it  has 
subjected  him,  but  that  of  reproducing  the  belief — in  spite 
of  all  the  influences  which  his  speculations  have  exerted — 
that  he  is  still  a  firm  believer  in  the  orthodox  system  ! 
Here  it  is  accordingly,  that  the  whole  secret  lies  of  bis 
laboring  to  throw  a  veil  over  his  real  sentiments,  and  recover 
his  hold  of  general  confidence  by  these  frequent  professions 
of  the  doctrines  which  his  system  undermines  and  denies, 
and  passionate  complaints  of  injustice  and  persecution  in 
the  imputation  to  him  of  that  scheme.  Nothing  of  this 
kind,  rely  on  it,  would  ever  have  been  heard  from  him,  had 
his  theory   met   a  welcome  and   general  reception,  and 


222 

"  entitled"  him,  in  the  judgment  of  the  public,  "to  the  praise 
which  our  admiration  confers  on  the  highest  intellectual 
attainments  ;"  nor  any  of  the  weak  and  treacherous  preten- 
ces to  which  he  has  resorted  to  shield  himself  from  responsi- 
bility for  its  principles  and  consequences,  that  he  has  never 
positively  affirmed  it  to  be  true.  I  appeal  to  you  whether 
such  is  not  indisputably  the  fact,  both  with  respect  to  him 
and  the  public ;  and  put  it  to  you,  were  he  now  to  avow 
and  maintain  his  sentiments  on  the  chief  theme  of  his  peculiar 
speculations, — were  he  openly  and  without  reserve  to  admit 
and  assert  what  he  has  so  zealously  taught  and  still  teaches, 
that  the  nature  of  moral  agency  is  such,  that  there  are  no 
means  of  proving  that  God  can  prevent  a  moral  being  from 
sinning  ;  that  his  inability  to  prevent  it,  is  the  sole  reason  of 
his  admission  of  sin  into  the  system ;  and  that  God's  plan 
does  not  include  any  events  except  those  of  his  own  agency ; 
and  affirm  that  he  fully  understands  the  principles  on  which 
these  assumptions  are  founded,  and  sees  and  holds  the  results 
to  which  they  are  adapted  to  carry  him, — whether  the 
orthodox  ministers  and  churches,  both  of  New-England  and 
the  whole  country,  would  not,  without  a  dissenting  voice, 
pronounce  him  fatally  erroneous,  and  debar  him  at  once 
from  their  confidence  and  communion. 

The  fact  then  is  indisputable,  that  his  peculiar  specula- 
tions have  not  gained  the  approval  of  the  clergy  and  churches 
at  large  ;  that  the  apprehension  very  generally  prevails, 
that  those  speculations  are  essentially  erroneous  ;  and  that 
the  doubts  that  are  still  felt  whether  he  has  really  abandoned 
the  orthodox  faith,  are  not  doubts  whether  the  system  which 
he  has  taught  and  still  teaches,  is  fraught  with  essential 
error,  but  doubts  simply — created  by  his  mere  profession  of 
continued  orthodoxy — whether  he  in  fact  intelligently  holds 


the  scheme  which  he  has  long  publicly  taught,  which  he 
has  never  retracted,  and  which  he  still  continues  to  main- 
tain ! 

The  continued  prevalence  of  these  suspicions,  after  the 
long  series  of  years  that  has  passed  since  their  first  excite- 
ment, and  the  repeated  assurances,  which,  as  he  states,  he 
has  given  that  he  still  continues  to  adhere  in  every  essential 
particular  to  the  orthodox  faith,  implies  obviously  and  re- 
sults from  a  deep  and  settled  distrust,  either  of  the  integrity 
of  his  professions  or  the  soundness  of  his  intellect.  If  they 
who  indulge  these  suspicions,  felt  an  undoubting  confidence 
in  his  uprightness  and  sincerity  on  the  one  hand,  and  his 
perspicacity  on  the  other  ;  they  of  course  could  not  in  the 
face  of  such  solemn  protestations,  continue  to  be  beset  with 
apprehensions,  or  impressed  with  a  resistless  conviction 
that  his  faith  is  in  fact  the  direct  converse  of  his  professions, 
or  at  best  extremely  inconsistent  with  them.  The  removal 
of  this  distrust  in  his  testimony,  was  accordingly  another 
principal  object  sought  by  the  publication  of  his  Letter. 

These  then  were  the  difficulties  by  which  he  was  prompted 
to  this  appeal  to  the  public — a  widely  diffused  and  deeply 
seated  distrust,  both  of  the  truth  of  his  professions  and  the 
accuracy  of  his  doctrinal  views  ;  and  these  the  objects  at 
which  he  aimed  in  the  publication — to  conciliate  the  confi- 
dence of  the  churches  in  the  veracity  of  his  testimony,  and 
the  soundness  of  his  theological  creed  : — a  most  humiliating 
condition  truly,  both  to  him  and  the  institution  with  which 
he  is  connected  ;  a  felt  and  confessed  degradation  without 
a  parallel  in  the  history  of  our  churches  !  These  suspicions, 
it  should  be  recollected,  have  now  continued  to  be  enter- 
tained through  a  space  of  some  six  or  seven  years,  by  great 
numbers  of  the  most  intelUgent  and  disinterested  ministers 

29 


224 

and  christians  in  the  land  ;  by  multitudes  who  have  made 
his  published  speculations  on  which  they  are  chiefly  founded, 
the  subject  of  the  most  careful  consideration  ;  by  many 
with  whom  he  has  had  the  most  ample  opportunity 
by  conversation,  correspondence,  or  through  the  mediation 
of  his  friends,  fully  to  restate  and  explain  the  import  of  his 
theories  ;  and  all  this  too,  notwithstanding  he  has  repeatedly 
presented  them  to  the  public  through  the  press,  with  such 
corrections  or  modifications  as  he  thought  proper  to  give 
them  ;  repeatedly  been  called  on  to  furnish,  if  in  his  power, 
a  satisfactory  answer  to  the  objections  to  which  they  are 
thought  to  be  obnoxious  ;  repeatedly,  as  he  himself  states, 
appeared  before  the  churches  to  counteract  these  suspicions 
by  a  solemn  assertion  of  his  continued  adherence  to  the 
orthodox  doctrine ;  and  finally,  notwithstanding  the  great 
body  of  the  orthodox  clerg}'  have  refrained  from  openly 
denouncing  or  assailing  him,  and  waited  with  eminent 
patience  and  lenity,  with  the  anxious  wish,  that  he  might 
either  so  modify  his  theory,  or  retract  it,  as  to  save  them 
from  the  necessity  of  formally  excluding  him  from  their 
ranks  !  And  yet  after  the  long  and  uninterrupted  enjoy- 
ment of  all  these  distinguished  advantages  for  his  vindica- 
tion, and  although  aided  by  the  co-operation  of  several 
devoted  and  active  partisans,  by  the  instrumentality  of  a 
long-established  and  widely  circulated  periodical,  and  the 
pretty  unscrupulous  employment  of  all  the  arts  and  devices 
that  fear  could  suggest,  or  ingenuity  contrive  ;  these  suspi- 
cions have  not  only  continued  to  maintain  an  unabated 
prevalence,  but  to  gain  a  deeper  hold  on  the  general  mind, 
and  reduced  him  at  length  to  the  degrading  necessity  of 
appearing  in  a  newspaper  to  reprotest  to  the  public,  that 
m  his  "  oum  view,''''  they  ought  not  to  indulge  these  obsti- 


225 

nate  apprehensions  that  he  has  become  unsound  in  the 
faith ! 

Such  being  the  ends  which  it  was  his  object  to  accom- 
plish, the  next  question  to  which  I  solicit  your  notice,  respects 
the  adaptation  for  that  purpose  of  the  expedient  which  he 
has  chosen. 

The  impression  that  will  be  produced  by  the  Letters  will 
doubtless  depend,  to  a  considerable  degree  at  least,  on  the 
views  that  may  happen  to  be  entertained  respecting  the  pro- 
cess by  which  you  were  probably  prompted  to  address  to 
him  your  Letter ;  whether  as  both  yours  and  his  implies, 
you  were  induced  to  solicit  from  him  this  renewed  profes- 
sion of  his  faith,  by  the  unbiassed  dictate  of  your  own 
judgment,  without  any  prompting  or  solicitation  from  him ; 
or  whether  a  consultation  had  previously  taken  place  be- 
tween you  on  the  subject,  and  it  was  merely  or  chiefly  to  a 
suggestion  or  wish  from  him,  that  your  Letter  owes  its  ex- 
istence. Were  the  latter  the  fact,  the  whole  expedient,  you 
cannot  but  be  aware,  must  naturally  be  contemplated  by 
the  public  "  under  entirely  another  aspect."  It  will  then 
be  seen  that  in  place  of  enjoying  the  calm  self-possession 
which  he  labors  to  exhibit,  and  regarding  the  assailants 
and  disapprovers  of  his  system  with  the  careless  indiflerence 
which  he  is  accustomed  to  afiect ;  he  is  in  fact  deeply  sen- 
sible that  the  perplexities  of  his  condition  have  become  ex- 
treme, alarmed  at  the  extent  and  strength  of  the  dissatisfac- 
tion that  exists  with  respect  to  his  doctrines,  and  anxious  to 
avail  himself  of  any,  even  poor  expedient,  that  may  serve  to 
buoy  up  his  reputation  and  reassure  his  hopes.  That  the 
suspicion  in  fact  exists  pretty  generally  that  the  correspond- 
ence is  thus  the  result  of  antecedent  arrangement,  and  pro- 
bably of  his  solicitation,  you  are  doubtless  well  apprised  ; 


226 

and  are  equally  aware,  that  not  a  few  things  have  occurred 
durhig  the  progress  of  his  theological  difficulties,  that  are 
highly  adapted  to  suggest  and  give  confidence  to  that  sus- 
picion. As  then  the  views  that  are  formed  on  this  point, 
will  naturally  affect  very  deeply  the  sentiments  with  which 
the  Letters  will  be  regarded,  and  as  a  knowledge  of  their 
origin  is  thus  obviously  essential  to  a  just  estimate  of  the 
influence  they  are  entitled  to  exert ;  allow  me  to  solicit  from 
you,  whatever  it  may  be,  an  undisguised  and  full  exposition 
of  the  fact.  Did  any  correspondence  or  consultation  then, 
take  place  between  you  on  the  subject,  or  between  yourself 
and  any  one  acting  with  his  knowledge  or  on  his  behalf, 
antecedently  to  the  composition  of  the  Letters  ?  Was  it  at 
the  solicitation,  suggestion,  or  with  the  previous  knowledge 
and  acquiescence  of  Dr.  Taylor,  expressed  to  you  directly 
or  indirectly,  that  you  addressed  to  him  your  Letter  ?  Was 
the  project  of  such  a  publication  determined  on  or  suggested 
antecedently  to  his  visit  to  your  city,  to  which  you  refer ; 
during  that  visit,  or  subsequently?  If  antecedently,  as 
there  may  be  those  who  will  even  suspect  that  that  visit 
took  place  likewise  with  a  reference  to  such  a  publication, 
will  you  allow  me  to  ask  whether  or  not  such  was  the  fact ; 
and  if  it  was,  whether  the  character  of  the  discourses  he 
then  preached  was  likewise  a  subject  of  consultation  ;  and 
whether  they  were  prepared  or  selected  with  any  reference 
to  this  correspondence  ? 

The  object  of  distrust  as  he  is,  you  will  doubtless  perceive 
that  an  explicit  answer  to  these  interrogatories  is  as  essential 
in  order  that  justice  may  be  rendered  to  him,  as  it  is  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  public.  If  you  can  return  to  them  an 
unqualified  assurance,  that  neither  any  suggestions  were 
offered  to  you  by  him  or  his  friends,  that  you  would  yield 


227 

him  this  opportunity  to  reprofess  his  adherence  to  the  or- 
thodox system  ;  nor  any  consuhation  or  arrangement  took 
place  between  you  respecting  it,  antecedently  to  the  com- 
position of  the  Letters  ;  you  will,  at  least,  yield  him  the 
advantage  of  escaping  one  among  the  numerous  suspicions 
with  which  his  protestations  are  otherwise  likely  to  be  ob- 
structed. 

But  let  its  origin  have  been  vi'hat  it  might,  what  adapta- 
tion— the  more  important  question  is — has  his  Letter  itself  to 
accomplish  the  effect  for  which  it  was  designed — the  removal 
of  the  existing  distrust  in  his  doctrines  and  testimony  ? 

And  what  adaptation,  in  the  first  place,  to  that  end,  has 
the  mere  repetition  of  the  declaration,  which,  as  he  states, 
he  has  already  often  made,  that  he  continues  to  adhere  to 
the  orthodox  faith  ?     That  declaration,  by  his  own  conces- 
sion,  has   hitherto   proved   inefficacious.     Why   should  it 
exert  any  better  influence  now  ?     It  presents  no  new  reason 
for  confidence  in  his  testimony  or  doctrines.     What  rational 
ground,  then,  does  it  furnish  for  the  expectation  that  it  will 
relieve  the  minds   of  those  who   have  hitherto  continued 
suspicious  of  his  orthodoxy  ?     Is  it  not  adapted  rather  to 
produce  precisely  the  opposite  result  ? — to  re-excite  and 
confirm  the  conviction,  that  it  is  felt  both  by  him  and  his 
friends,  that  he  has  no  adequate  method  of  meeting  the 
charges  with  which   he  is  assailed ;  that  he  is  reduced  to 
the  hopeless  expedient  of  simply  asserting  his  innocence, 
without  attempting  its  proof?     What  is  the  course  which  a 
man,  conscious  of  the  uiijustifiableness  of  such  charges,  and 
of  his  competency  to  refute  them,  would  naturally  take  for 
his  exculpation  ?     Would  he  restrict  himself  to  mere  un- 
supported  asseverations  ? — asseverations,  the  total  distrust 
of  which  was  one  of  the  grounds  of  the  necessity  of  some 


228 

more  convincing  proof  of  the  position  they  were  employed 
to  demonstrate  ?  Would  he  obstinately  persevere  in  with- 
holding all  proof  of  those  declarations,  and  in  withholding 
it  against  the  most  earnest  solicitations  from  his  assailants, 
for  its  production  ?  Such,  certainly,  is  not  the  usual  course 
of  the  upright  and  intelligent.  When  a  man  refuses  to 
furnish  appropriate  evidences  of  his  innocence,  the  fair  and 
necessary  inference  is,  that  he  has  neither  any  proofs  of  his 
innocence,  nor  any  innocence  to  prove ;  and  that  it  is  his 
consciousness  that  such  is  the  .fact,  that  is  the  ground  of  his 
employing  the  poor  means  of  his  own  doubted  testimony, 
in  preference  to  the  strong  demonstration  of  undeniable 
facts,  to  exculpate  himself  from  suspicion. 

As  it  is  the  professed  object  of  his  Letter  to  remove  the 
suspicions  and  fears  of  the  church  respecting  his  faith,  it 
was  of  course  to  be  expected  that  he  would  make  it  his 
chief  aim,  to  present  a  "  clear  and  full  expression  of  his 
sentiments"  on  those  points,  in  regard  to  which  he  is 
thought  to  have  fallen  into  the  most  essential  error.  You, 
accordingly,  represent  it  as  the  object  of  your  Letter,  to 
draw  from  him  such  "  a  statement  of  his  views  respecting 
some  of  the  leading  doctrines  of  the  Bible,"  as  should  serve 
"  to  allay  apprehension,"  and  allude  particularly  to  the 
subject  of  divine  influence  and  human  dependence. 

Dr.  Taylor,  likewise,  after  stating  his  faith  in  respect  to 
some  of  those  doctrines,  and  intimating  his  conviction  that 
it  must  satisfy  the  candid  that  all  fears  of  his  introducing 
heresy  into  the  churches  are  groundless  ;  at  length  proceeds 
to  ask,  "  whether,  after  all,  there  are  not  some  points  on 
which  he  difiers  from  his  brethren  generally  ;  or,  at  least, 
from  some  of  them  ?"  and,  after  granting  that  there  are, 
then  professes  to  state  "  briefly  but  frankly,"  both  what  he 


229 

does  not,  and  what  he  does  believe,  on  those  "  topics  ol" 
diflerence."  The  import,  accordingly,  of  all  this  clearly 
is,  that  the  points  which  he  then  proceeds  to  treat,  are  the 
points,  and  all  the  points,  in  respect  to  which  he  is  regarded 
as  having  fallen  into  essential  error. 

In  place  of  this,  however,  he  has  in  fact  taken  no  formal 
notice  whatever  of  the  great  "  topic  of  difference"  on  which 
the  principal  charges  against  him  are  founded,  and  especially 
the  imputation  of  arminianism  !  Where  can  you  point  to  a 
sentence  in  his  Letter,  in  which  he  clearly  exhibits  his  views 
in  regard  to  the  doctrine  advanced  by  him  in  his  Concio 
ad  Clerum,  and  Reply  to  Dr.  Woods,  that  from  the  nature 
of  moral  ageney  it  is  impossible  to  prove  that  God  can,  by 
any  influence  he  can  exert,  wholly  exclude  evil  from  a 
moral  system,  or  prevent  a  moral  being  from  sinning  ;  that 
that  impossibility  is  the  reason  of  its  admission  into  the 
present  system  ;  and  that  God's  plan,  accordingly,  includes 
only  the  events  of  his  own  agency,  in  distinction  from  their 
consequences  ?  His  peculiar  views  on  the  first  and  second 
of  these  points  may  be  easily  deduced,  indeed,  by  those 
who  are  familiar  with  his  speculations,  from  some  of  his 
statements  which  I  shall  hereafter  notice ;  but  they  are  only 
indirectly  and  covertly  expressed.  His  theories,  however, 
and  representations,  on  the  former  of  these  subjects,  you 
are  aware,  were  the  chief  grounds  of  the  objections  urged 
against  him  by  Dr.  Woods,  and  the  topics  on  which  he 
solicited  him,  if  possible,  to  furnish  the  church  with  satis- 
factory explanations  ;  and  these,  with  his  representations 
respecting  the  divine  plan,  were  likewise  the  main  grounds 
of  the  objections  that  were  offered  against  him  in  the  eighth 
and  ninth  numbers  of  this  work.  How,  then,  can  this 
profession  of  his  faith,  which  has  thus  no  direct  relation  to 


230 

the  chief  topics  in  respect  to  which  information  is  needed, 
give  satisfaction  to  the  churches,  and  convince  them  that 
he  holds  none  of  the  errors  on  those  subjects  which  he  is 
regarded  as  liolding  ?  How  can  such  a  statement  of  his 
sentiments  respecting  one  set  of  positions,  demonstrate  that 
he  does  not  still  hold  those  exceptionable  views  in  regard 
to  others,  which  he  has  heretofore  zealously  taught,  and 
has  never  disclaimed  nor  retracted  ?  What  are  the  impres- 
sions which  his  omission  of  these  important  topics  must 
naturally  make  ?  Will  the  public  be  likely  to  regard  it  as 
having  happened  unintentionally,  or  ascribe  it  to  a  sheer 
ignorance  on  his  part  of  the  nature  of  the  errors  imputed  to 
him,  or  the  grounds  of  their  imputation  ?  Is  it  usual  for 
those  who  stand  accused  before  the  community  of  specific 
crimes  or  misdemeanors,  to  remain  ignorant  of  the  nature 
of  the  allegations  that  are  publicly  offered  against  them  ; 
or  to  forget  to  produce  any  proofs  of  their  innocence,  when 
professing  to  exculpate  themselves  from  those  charges  ? 
Will  not  the  conviction  take  place  irresistibly,  that  this 
omission  was  the  work  solely  of  design  ;  and  that  his  pre- 
tences of  fully  and  frankly  meeting  in  his  Letter  all  the 
suspicions  under  which  he  is  laboring,  were  framed  for  the 
purpose  of  misleading  his  readers  ?  But  what  can  have 
been  the  reason  of  his  attempting  to  palm  on  the  church 
this  deceptive  profession,  as  a  full  statement  of  his  views  on 
all  the  "  topics  of  difference"  between  himself  and  the  or- 
thodox ?  Is  it  that  he  is  afraid  fairly  to  meet  these  subjects, 
and  make  the  public  acquainted  with  his  real  sentiments  in 
regard  to  them  ? — that  he  is  conscious  that  the  inferences 
that  have  been  drawn  from  his  principles,  are  legitimate, 
and  cannot  be  avoided  except  by  abandoning  his  theory  ? 
Is  not  the  inference  irresistible,  either  that  he  holds  those 


231 

principles,  with  a  full  conviction  that  tliey  involve  the  re- 
sults that  are  ascribed  to  them,  and  that  his  reluctance,  ac- 
cordingly, to  expose  his  sentiments  without  disguise  to  the 
general  eye,  is  founded  on  his  knowledge  that  it  would 
verify  the  suspicions  which  his  theory  has  excited,  and  lead 
inevitably  to  his  expulsion  from  the  ranks  of  the  orthodox ; 
or  else  that  he  feels  unable  either  to  vindicate  his  principles 
from  those  inferences,  or  to  acquiesce  in  those  inferences 
themselves  ;  and  that  his  silence,  therefore,  results  from  an 
unwillingness  to  make  a  frank  acknowledgment  and  retrac- 
tion of  his  errors  ?  If  he  feels  that  he  cannot  vindicate  his 
principles  from  those  objections,  and  regards  them,  there- 
fore, as  involving  the  errors  that  are  ascribed  to  them  ;  why, 
if  upright  and  conscientious,  does  he  not  publicly  abandon 
his  theory,  and  endeavor  to  arrest  the  pernicious  influence 
it  is  exerting  ?  And  if  he  both  holds  that  theory,  with  a 
conviction  that  it  involves  the  conclusions  that  are  drawn 
from  it,  and  that  they  are  vindicable,  why  does  he  not 
openly  avow  and  defend  them  ?  Let  this  feature  of  his 
Letter,  then,  be  contemplated  in  what  light  it  may,  how 
can  it  exert  any  other  influence  than  to  strengthen  the  dis- 
trust that  already  exists  of  his  professions,  and  deepen  the 
conviction  that  he  holds  the  erroneous  doctrines  which  his 
theory  is  thought  to  involve  ? 

It  clearly  became  him,  in  professing  fully  and  frankly  to 
meet  the  suspicions  that  exist  respecting  his  theological 
views,  not  only  to  give  an  explicit  statement  of  his  faith  on 
every  theme  of  which  he  has  treated  in  his  public  discus- 
sions, that  has  been  made  the  subject  of  objection  ;  but  also 
to  point  out  the  manner  in  which  he  reconciles  those  of  his 
theories  and  representations  which  are  regarded  as  contra- 
dictory to  each  other ;  and  show  how  it  can  be,  that  he 

30 


232 

intelligently  holds  what  he  now  professes,  and  has  often 
professed,  cotemporaneously  with  an  equally  full  faith  in 
those  of  his  speculations,  which  subvert  many  of  those 
doctrines. 

Among  the  various  allegations  urged  against  him,  incon- 
sistency, you  are  aware,  is  not  the  least  conspicuous.  The 
fact  that  his  theoretical  views  are  palpably  contradictory  to 
the  orthodox  system,  is  the  chief  ground  of  the  apprehen- 
sion and  conviction,  that  he  does  not  in  truth  continue  to 
adhere  to  that  system.  He  has  accordingly  been  urged 
by  this  class  of  the  difficulties  that  embarrass  his  specula- 
tions and  professions,  almost  more  than  by  any  other.  He 
has  been  solicited  for  example,  to  show  how  he  reconciles 
his  admission  "  that  the  eternal  purposes  of  God  extend  to 
all  actual  events,  sin  not  excepted,  or  that  God  foreordains 
whatsoever  comes  to  pass ;"  with  his  equally  confident  repre- 
sentation, that  "  God's  plan"  "  does  not  include  sin  as  an 
integral  part  of  it,  but  consists  only  of  what  God  does.^^ 
It  is  certainly  no  easy  task  to  see  how  these  two  professions 
can  be  consistent  with  each  other.  Does  God  foreordain 
events  which  his  plan  does  not  include  ?  Does  he  frustrate 
his  plan  by  his  own  decrees  and  agency  .''  He  has  likewise 
been  urged  to  show  if  possible,  how  his  doctrine  that  the 
nature  of  free  agency  is  such,  that  God  cannot  prevent  a 
moral  being  from  sin,  can  consist  with  the  doctrine  which 
he  professes  to  believe,  that  God  can  and  does  foreordain 
and  foresee  the  events  of  his  creatures'  agency,  and  actually 
prevents  multitudes  of  them  from  sin,  through  the  influen- 
ces of  his  Spirit,  and  will  hereafter  forever  maintain  them 
in  obedience.  It  is  clearly  no  easy  matter  to  see  that  the 
principles  which  he  has  advanced  on  these  subjects,  differ 
in  any  essential  particular,  beyond  the  mere  terms  in  which 


233 

they  are  expressed,  from  the  Arminian  doctrine  of  a  self- 
determining  will.  He  has  accordingly  been  pressed  with 
solicitations,  if  there  is  any  such  difference,  to  point  it  out, 
and  demonstrate  that  his  theory  does  not  involve  him  in  all 
that  contradiction  to  those  doctrines  of  the  gospel  which  he 
professes  to  hold,  which  that  system  involves ;  or  to  show, 
if  his  system  and  that  are  identically  the  same,  by  what 
process  it  is  that  it  can  be  proved,  that  he  is  not  an 
Arminian. 

These  topics,  however,  it  cannot  have  escaped  your  no- 
tice, are  so  wholly  omitted  in  his  Letter,  that  a  stranger  to 
his  theological  discussions,  would  scarcely  gain  from  it  the 
slightest  conception  that  he  had  ever  advanced  such  doctrines, 
or  that  any  such  difficulties  embarrass  his  professions. 
How  then,  when  thus  wholly  deficient  on  the  most  essential 
"  topics  of  difference,"  is  his  Letter  to  relieve  the  appre- 
hensions or  convictions  that  exist  respecting  his  faith  ? 
How  is  his  professed  belief,  "that  the  eternal  purposes  of 
God  extend  to  all  actual  events,  sin  not  excepted,"  to  prove 
that  he  does  not  still  hold  that  God's  plan  "  does  not  include 
sin  as  an  integral  part  of  it,  but  consists  only  of  what  God 
rfoes,"  and  therefore  does  not  extend  to  any  of  the  events 
of  his  creatures'  agency  ?  The  mere  inconsistency  of  these 
two  representations  does  not  demonstrate  it,  for  he  made  a 
similar  profession  of  his  belief  in  the  universal  purposes  of 
the  Most  High,  in  his  article  on  Dr.  Bellamy  and  Reply 
to  Dr.  Woods,  in  which  he  advanced  and  labored  to  sus- 
tain the  latter  doctrine.  As  he  has  thus  actually  avowed 
these  two  contradictory  systems  in  conjunction  with  each 
other,  his  belief  of  the  former  can  no  more  prove  that  he 
does  not  hold  the  latter,  than  his  belief  of  that  can  prove 
that  he  does  not  hold  the  former.     His  mere  profession 


234 

then  that  he  believes  that  the  eternal  purposes  of  God  ex- 
tend to  all  events,  or  that  he  foreordains  whatsoever  comes 
to  pass,    does   not  furnish  a  particle  of  evidence  that  he 
does  not  also  equally  believe  precisely  the  opposite  doctrine. 
In  like  manner  his  professed  belief  of  the  scriptural  doc- 
trines of  foreordination,  election,  the  Spirit's  influence,  and 
perseverance,  does  not  furnish  any  evidence  whatever  that 
he  does  not  still  hold  the  theory  he  has  advanced  respecting 
the  nature  of  moral  agency  and  the  divine  inability  to  pre- 
vent beings  from   sinning,  which   subverts  all  those  doc- 
trines ;  for  he  professed  those  doctrines  likewise  in  the  arti- 
cle in  which  he  taught  that  theory.     None  of  his  profes- 
sions therefore  advance  a  step  toward  proving  that  he  does 
not  still  hold  the  whole  mass   of  the  erroneous   sentiments 
which  he  has  heretofore  advanced,  and  all  the  exceptiona- 
ble conclusions  to  which  they  are  adapted  to   carry  him. 
For  aught  they  demonstrate,  he  may,  and  doubtless  does 
yet  believe  and  teach  principles  involving  an  open  and  di- 
rect denial  of  every  essential  doctrine  of  religion  that  re- 
lates either  to  God's  purposes  and  agency,  or  the  nature, 
obligations,  and  actions  of  his  moral  creatures  !     How  then 
can  they  have  any  adaptation  to  relieve  the  apprehensions 
that  exist  respecting  his  faith  on  these  subjects  ?  or  prove 
to  the  candid  that  he  is  not,  "  as  a  teacher  of  theology,  in- 
troducing heresy  into  our  churches?" 

He  however  has  not  merely  omitted  all  notice  of  the 
objections  that  are  alleged  against  his  peculiar  views,  but 
has  intimated  that  the  suspicions  that  exist  respecting  his 
doctrines,  are  not  only  wholly  groundless  and  unjustifiable, 
but  are  entertained  without  any  known  or  assignable  reason. 
He  remarks  in  reference  to  the  friendly  character  of  your 
Letter : 


235 

"  This  expression  df  fraternal  confidence,  is  grateful  to  me,  nof 
because  I  ever  supposed  that  we  differed  in  our  views  of  the  great 
doctrines  of  the  gospel,  but  because  for  some  reason  or  other,  an  im- 
pression has  been  made  to  some  extent,  that  I  am  unsound  in  the 
faith  :" 

And  adds,  after  stating  the  eleven  articles  of  his  creed — 

"  Such  is  my  faith  in  respect  to  some  of  the  leading  doctrines  of 
the  gospel.  These  doctrines  I  preach,  these  I  teach  in  the  theological 
department  of  this  Seminary,  these  I  have  repeatedly  published  to 
the  world.  With  what  truth  or  justice,  any  regard  me  as  a  '  teacher 
of  theology  introducing  heresy  into  our  churches,'  the  candid  can 
judge." 

The  import  of  this  plainly  is,  that  he  not  only  has  no 
consciousness  of  having  given  occasion  for  suspicion  that 
he  has  become  unsound  in  the  faith,  nor  knowledge  of  any 
specific  ground  on  which  that  suspicion  is  founded  ;  but 
that  the  views  that  are  exhibited  in  the  eleven  articles  of 
his  creed,  are  the  views,  and  the  only  views,  he  has  ever 
expressed  on  the  topics  to  which  they  relate  ;  and  that  if 
any  therefore  suspect  him  of  error,  they  must  found  their 
suspicion  on  his  holding  and  teaching  those  doctrines  ! 

What  now  are  the  impressions  which  these  extraordinary 
intimations  may  be  expected  to  excite  ?  Is  it  to  be  believed, 
that  they  even,  who  may  happen  to  be  wholly  unacquainted 
with  the  history  of  the  suspicions  that  exist  respecting  him, 
can  regard  it  as  likely  that  they  have  arisen  wholly  without 
cause,  or  maintained  so  long  an  existence  not  only  without  an 
adequate  foundation,  but  against  the  most  decisive  evidence 
of  their  utter  unjustifiableness  ?  Men  are  doubtless  not 
unfrequently  falsely  suspected  and  accused  of  indiscretions 
and  immoralities,  and  sometimes  sufier  for  long  periods  under 
such  imputations,  before  they  succeed  in  accompHshing  a 


236 

vindication  of  themselves.  But  what  instance  was  ever 
known  of  a  false  suspicion  of  theological  error,  like  that 
under  which  he  professes  to  have  fallen ; — a  suspicion  rais- 
ed and  maintained  through  long  periods,  without  any  as- 
signable reason  ?  What  instance  was  ever  known  of  a 
minister  losing  his  reputation  for  07YAoc?oa:^,  without  having 
given  any  occasion  for  it,  by  the  avowal  even  of  opinions 
that  are  thought  by  his  accusers  to  be  erroneous  f  If  such, 
however,  is  indeed  the  fact  with  Dr.  Taylor,  why  does  he 
not  call  upon  those  who  suspect  and  accuse  him,  to  do  him 
the  justice  to  make  known  the  grounds  of  their  apprehen- 
sions, and  place  it  within  his  power  to  protect  himself  from 
such  causeless  imputations  ?  This  surely  would  be  the 
natural  course  for  one  who  unexpectedly  found  "  an  impres- 
sion" existing  "  for  some  reason  or  other,"  he  knew  not 
what,  that  he  had  become  "  unsound  in  the  faith."  He 
would  immediately  challenge  his  traducers  to  meet  him  face 
to  face,  and  putting  their  accusations  to  the  strong  trial  of 
evidence,  at  once  exculpate  himself,  and  defeat  and  disgrace 
them,  by  revealing  the  groundlessness  of  their  charges. 
How  is  it  then  that  Dr.  Taylor, — if  as  conscious  of  inno- 
cence as  he  seems  to  wish  the  public  to  believe  him  to  be 
— does  not  take  this  natural,  simple,  and  infallibly  efficacious 
course,  and  extricate  himself  at  once  from  misapprehension, 
and  crush  the  attempts  of  those  "  individuals"  by  whom, 
"  much  pains  has  been  taken"  "  to  make  the  impression," 
that  he  has  "  departed  from  the  true  faith  ?"  No  trace  of 
any  wish  to  call  those  individuals  to  such  a  test,  is  discov- 
erable in  his  Letter  !  In  place  of  challenging  or  soliciting 
their  testimony,  he  prefers  to  place  his  vindication  wholly 
on  his  own  ;  and  on  the  strength  of  the  assurance,  that  in 
his  "0M)»  weej/5"  the  "  impression"  that  "has  been  made  to 


237 

some  extent,"  that  he  is  "  unsound  in  the  faith,"  is  "  wholly 
groundless  and  unauthorized,"  has  the  courage  to  expect 
that  the  candid  will  in  all  truth  and  justice,  give  an  unhesi- 
tating verdict  in  his  favor  ! 

Whatever  airs,  however,  of  innocence  or  ignorance,  he 
may  choose  to  exhibit,  all  those  who  have  any  knowledge 
of  the  history  of  his  theological  difficulties,  cannot  but  be 
aware  that  no  pretence  could  have  been  put  forth  by  him, 
more  flagrantly  contradictory  to  fact,  or  involving  a  grosser 
afljrout,  than  this,  to  the  intelligence  of  his  readers  ;  that 
the  suspicions  and  convictions,  which  have  been  expressed 
and  diffused  through  the  community  respecting  the  errone- 
ousness  of  his  faith,  have  been  founded  expressly  and 
solely  on  the  sentiments  which  he  has  publicly  advanced, 
and  advanced  too  as  deviations  from  the  views  that  gene- 
rally prevail ;  and  that  the  passages  in  his  published  works 
in  which  those  sentiments  are  contained,  have  been  quoted 
at  large  by  each  of  his  assailants,  and  openly  and  exclu- 
sively made  the  ground  of  their  allegations  ;  and  yet  in  the 
face  of  this  fact,  he  has  the  coolness  to  intimate  that  he  is 
not  aware  of  any  specific  reason  for  the  prevalent  suspicion 
that  he  has  become  unorthodox ;  and  to  appeal  to  the  arti- 
cles of  his  professed  creed,  and  his  assurance  that  they  are 
what  he  believes  and  teaches  and  preaches,  as  demonstrative 
that  he  is  not,  "  as  a  teacher  of  theology,  introducing  heresy 
into  our  churches."  ! 

What  then  are  the  sentiments  with  which  this  feature  of 
his  Letter  will  be  likely  to  be  regarded  by  the  churches  ? 
Will  it  raise  or  depress  their  conviction  of  his  innocence  ; 
and  strengthen  or  diminish  their  confidence  in  his  candor  ? 

There  are  beside  these  indirect  intimations  and  assump- 
tions, a  number  of  positive  statements  hkewise  in  his  Letter, 


238 

that  seem  far  more  adapted  to  confirm,  than  diminish,  the 
doubts  and  dissatisfaction  that  are  felt  respecting  his  creed. 
Some  of  the  theoretical  views  which  he  now  professes  to 
entertain,  wear  an  air  of  extreme  dissimilarity,  to  the  repre- 
sentations he  has  heretofore  given,  of  the  subjects  to  which 
they  relate.     The  following  is  a  conspicuous  example. 

"  The  question  is  not  whether  God,  all  things  considered,  has  pur- 
posed the  existence  of  sin,  rather  than  to  prevent  it ;  but  for  what 
reason  has  he  purposed  it.  Some  affirm  this  reason  to  be,  that  sin  is 
the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good.  Now  what  I  claim,  and 
all  that  I  claim  is,  that  no  one  can  prove  this  to  be  the  reason  why 
God  has  purposed  the  existence  of  sin,  and  that  some  other  may  be 
the  true  reason,  without  affirming  what  the  true  reason  is." 

The  asseveration  in  this  passage,  taken  in  connexion  with 
the  virtual  representation  of  the  whole  Letter,  that  the  views 
he  now  holds  and  avows,  are  those  which  he  has  held  and 
avowed  through  the  whole  period  during  which  he  has  been 
suspected  of  error — a  representation  he  must  of  course  be 
understood  to  have  made  in  good  faith ;  as  otherwise  this 
statement  of  his  present  belief  can  furnish  no  evidence  that 
he  has  not  heretofore  been  as  heretical  as  suspicion  conceives 
him  to  be — thus  is,  that  he  neither  now  pretends,  nor  has 
ever  pretended,  either  to  deny  that  God  purposes  the  exis- 
tence of  sin,  nor  to  state  what  the  true  reason  is,  that  its 
existence  is  purposed  or  permitted.  By  what  process  this 
representation  is  to  be  reconciled  with  his  denial  on  the  one 
hand,  in  his  review  of  Dr.  Bellamy,  that  God  purposes  the 
existence  of  sin,  or  that  sin  is  any  "part  of  God's  scheme 
or  plan  ;"  or  on  the  other,  with  the  theory  advanced  by  him 
in  that  review  and  in  his  Concio  ad  Clerum,  that  the  true 
reason  that  its  existence  is  permitted  is,  that  God  is  unable 
to  prevent  it  without  giving  up  the  system  ;  it  is  no  easy 
matter  to  discover. 


! 


239 

The  theory  he  has  advanced  on  the  former  of  these  sub- 
jects is,  "  that  the  system  or  plan  which  God  adopted,  (in 
distinction  from  the  sin  which  is  its  consequence,)  is  the  neces- 
sary means  of  the  greatest  good  ;"  and  that  *'  this  plan" 
"  does  not  include  sin  as  an  integral  part  of  it,  but  consists 
only  of  what  God  f/oes."  The  system  or  plan  of  God  then, 
according  to  this  theor}',  includes  nothing  except  the  acts 
and  immediate  effects  of  his  own  agency,  or  the  system  of 
worlds  and  beings,  to  which  he  gives  existence,  with  his 
a^ts  towards  it  as  preserver  and  governor,  and  has  no  refer- 
ence whatever  to  any  of  the  agency  of  his  creatures  !  He 
expressly  excludes  from  it  both  their  sinful  and  obedient 
actions,  with  their  evil  and  good  rewards  ;  exhibiting  sin 
and  evil  as  consequences  of  the  system,  and  holiness  and 
happiness  as  ends  of  which  the  system  is  the  means.  This 
theory  he  not  only  advanced  and  labored  to  maintain,  but 
had  the  courage  to  assert  and  attempt  to  show,  that  it  was 
held  and  taught  by  Dr.  Bellamy,  in  his  treatise  respecting 
the  permission  of  sin.  But  if  God's  plan  only  includes  the 
material,  sensitive  and  intelligent  existences  which  constitute 
the  universe,  with  the  events  of  his  own  agency  toward 
them,  and  has  no  reference  whatever  to  the  actions  of  his 
moral  creatures ;  it  is  clear  that  he  cannot  have  foreordain- 
ed "  all  actual  events,  sin  not  excepted,"  nor  "purposed  the 
existence  of  sin."  That  were  to  make  his  purposes  more 
extensive  than  his  scheme,  and  to  foreordain  an  infinite 
multitude  of  events  that  are  not  included  in  his  plan  ! 

How,  then,  after  having  so  long,  so  confidently,  and  so 
zealously  taught  this  theory,  are  we  to  regard  the  declara- 
tion he  now  makes,  that  no  question  exists  between  him  and 
his  opponents,  whether  God  has  purposed  the  existence  of 
sin,  but  simply  what  the  reason  is  for  which  he  purposed  it  ? 

31 


240 

Does  he  mean  it  as  a  denial  that  he  has  hold  and  taught 
that  theory  ?  What  then  are  the  sentiments  with  which  such 
a  denial  must  be  regarded?  Who  after  it,  could  ever  feel 
that  any  reliance  could  safely  be  placed  on  his  testimony  ? 
Or  are  we  to  regard  him  as  continuing,  as  heretofore,  to 
hold  both  of  these  docirines,  contradictory  as  they  are  to 
each  other  ?  What  proof  then  does  his  mere  profession  of 
the  last  furnish  that  he  is  not,  as  a  teacher  of  theology,  intro- 
ducing the  heresy  into  our  churches,  which  is  involved  in 
the  former  ? 

It  is  equally  difficult  to  reconcile  his  representation  in 
this  passage,  that  he  has  never  pretended  to  teach  what  the 
true  reason  is  of  the  admission  of  sin  into  the  divine  king- 
dom, with  the  fact  that  he  has  heretofore  made  it  the  great 
and  almost  sole  object  of  his  speculations  on  that  subject, 
to  show  that  the  true  reason  of  its  permission  is,  that  from 
the  nature  of  free  agents,  it  is  impossible  to  God  to  exclude 
it  from  the  system  ;  that  it  is  "  necessarily  incidental"  to  a 
system  of  such  agents ;  and  "  enters"  into  it  in  the  same 
manner  as  "  friction  enters  into  machines,  as  necessarily  in- 
cidental to  their  very  existence."  This  theory  he  has  not 
only  formally  and  confidently  advanced,  as  possibly  true, 
and  defied  his  opponents  to  demonstrate  it  to  be  erroneous  ; 
but  has  positively  affirmed  that  sin  is  "  necessarily  inciden- 
tal to  the  system,  so  far  as  relates  to  God' s prevention  of  it  ;^^ 
that  "  he  could  not  have  the  si/stem  without  the  sin  ;"  asserted 
that  there  is  no  medium  between  assenting  to  this  hypoth- 
esis and  adopting  the  doctrine  which  he  rejects,  that  sin  is 
the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good;  and  employed 
and  relied  on  it  as  the  only  theory  by  which  it  is  possible 
to  vindicate  the  divine  administration. 

In  place  of  having  merely  claimed  that  no  one  can  prove 
that  the  true  reason  of  the  permission  of  sin  is,  that  it  is  a 


241 

necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good,  he  has  asserted, 
without  qualification  or  reserve,  that  no  one  can  prove  that 
an  impossibility  of  preventing  it,  is  not  the  true  reason  of 
its  permission  ;  and  claimed  that  no  one  has  a  right  "  to 
assert"  "  that  this  supposition  is  not  a  matter  of  fact,"  "  or 
even  to  think  it."     His  language  is, 

"  It  was,  then,  on  this  supposition, '  necessarily  incidental'  to  the 
system,  so  far  as  relates  to  God's  prevention  of  it.  He  could  not 
have  the  system  without  the  sin.  And  as  this  system  was  the  best, 
he  chose  it, '  though  it  would  not  entirely  exclude  moral  evil.'  We 
have,  then,  the  exact  position  of  '  Dr.  Taylor  and  his  associates,'  aa 
stated  formerly  in  the  Christian  Spectator.  It  may  be  that  sin  as 
to  God's  preventing,  not  our  committing  it,  is  a  necessary  incident 
to  a  moral  system." 

"  This  is  the  task,  then,  which  devolves  on  Dr.  Woods,  viz.  to 
prove  that  God  could  have  kept  all  sin,  or  the  present  degree  of  sin, 
out  of  a  universal  moral  system. 

"  Now  we  say  that  this  is  a  task  which  Dr.  Woods  cannot  accom- 
plish, and  for  this  very  obvious  reason,  that  the  nature  of  the  case 
absolutely  precludes  all  proof,  being  one  which  may  involve  a  palpa- 
ble self-contradiction."  "  No  one  can  prove  that  God  could  prevent 
all  sin,  or  the  present  degree  of  it,  in  a  moral  system." — Christian 
Spectator,  Sept.  1830.  pp.  544.  562. 

"  On  the  supposition  that  the  evil  which  exists  is,  in  respect  to 
divine  prevention,  incidental  to  the  best  possible  system,  and  that, 
notwithstanding  the  evil,  God  will  secure  the  greatest  good  possible 
to  him  to  secure,  who  can  impeach  either  his  wisdom  or  his  goodness 
because  evil  exists  ?  I  say,  then,  that  as  ignorance  is  incompetent 
to  make  an  objection,  and  as  no  one  knows  that  this  supposition  is 
not  a  matter  of  fact,  no  one  has  a  right  to  assert  the  contrary,  or 
even  to  think  it." — Dr.  Taylor's  Sermon,  p.  29. 

His  representation,  then,  that  he  has  never  claimed  any 
thing  on  this  subject,  except  that  it  cannot  be  proved  that 
a  necessity  of  sin,  as  a  means  of  the  greatest  good,  is  the 
reason  of  its  admission,  and  "  that  some  other  may  be  the 


242 

true  reason,"  without  undertaking  to  show  "  what  the  true 
reason  is" — -if  this  is  the  representation  which  he  meant  to 
convey — in  place  of  according  with  fact,  is  in  open  and 
utter  contradiction  to  it.     Is  this,  then — that  he  has  never 
put  forth  any  other  claim  on  this  subject  than  that  which  he 
here  makes — the  representation  which  it  was  his  object  in  the 
passage  to  express  ?    There  clearly  is  no  other  construction 
of  it  that  will  not  involve  him  in  equal  or  superior  difficul- 
ties.    Will  he  rely  for  his  exculpation  on  the  circumstance, 
that  his  language  is  "  what  I  claim^  and  all  I  claim  is" — 
not  what,  and  all  that  I  have  claimed  heretofore — and  that 
his  declaration,  therefore,  may  relate  solely  to  his  preten- 
sions at  the  moment  in  which  the  assertion  was  penned,  and 
not  to  those  which  he  had  put  forth  at  preceding  periods .'' 
But   to   suppose   that  to   have   been   the    sense   in  which 
he  employed  the  language,  were  to  divest  his  whole  pro- 
testation of  all  title  to  confidence,  and  convert  it  into  a 
base   and  hypocritical  farce.      What  possible   value   can 
attach  to  this  reprofession  of  orthodoxy,  if  it  relates  only 
to  that  portion  of  time  which  was  employed  in  the  compo- 
sition of  the  Letter  ?     If  it  has  no  reference  to  any  other 
period,  by  what  logic  is  it  that  it  can  prove  that  his  faith 
has  not  heretofore  been  as  erroneous  as  it  is  suspected  to 
have  been,  and  is  not  as  erroneous  again  now  ?    Or  how  can 
it  yield  any  assurance,  even  to  those  who  may  rely  on  his 
testimony,  that  he  is  not,  "  as  a  teacher  of  theology,  intro- 
ducing heresy  into  our  churches  f"     Unless,  then,  he  meant 
the  passage  in  question  as  an  explicit  assertion,  that  he  has 
not,  during  the  progress  of  his  discussions  on  this  subject, 
undertaken  to  show  what  the  true  reason  is  of  the  admission 
of  sin  into  the  universe,  it  clearly  cannot  have  been  meant 
for  any  thing  better  than   sheer  deception,  and  renders 


243 

his  whole  Letter  similarly  deceptive  and  false ;  and  if  he 
designed  it  as  such  an  assertion,  it  is  as  clearly  an  open 
and  total  contradiction  to  the  most  conspicuous  fact  in  the 
history  of  his  speculations,  and  offers  to  his  readers  as 
startling  a  violation  of  truth,  as  the  denial  could  that  he  has 
ever  given  publicity  to  any  speculations  on  the  subject  of 
theology. 

Suppose  it,  however,  to  have  been  in  truth  his  object  in 
the  passage  to  state,  that  all  that  he  now  claims  is,  that  no 
one  can  prove  a  necessity  of  sin  as  a  means  of  the  greatest 
good,  "  to  be  the  reason  why  God  has  purposed  the  exist- 
ence of  sin,  and  that  some  other  may  be  the  true  reason," 
without  attempting  to  show  what  that  reason  is  ;  how,  then, 
is  his  representation  to  be  reconciled  with  the  belief  ex- 
pressed by  him  in  that  part  of  the  Letter  to  which  the  note 
refers,  "  that  an  omnipotent  God  would  be"  able  '*  to 
secure  more  good  by  means  of  the  perfect  and  universal 
obedience  of  his  creatures,  if  they  would  render  it,  than  by 
means  of  their  sin ;"  and  "  that  it  may  involve  a  dishonorable 
limitation  of  his  power,  to  suppose  that  he  could  not  do  it  ?" 
If  he  thus  believes,  that  a  perfect  and  universal  obedience 
would  prove  the  means  of  a  greater  sum  of  good,  than  is, 
or  can  be  made  to  result  from  the  present  system  of  events, 
how  does  he  account  for  the  fact  that,  as  he  professes  both 
in  the  note  and  in  the  body  of  the  Letter  to  believe,  the 
present  system  is  ^^  purposed,''^  and  foi'eordained  by  the 
Most  High  ;  unless  it  be  by  the  assumption  that  he  is  not 
able  to  exclude  the  sin  that  exists  from  the  system  ?  Does 
he  doubt  or  deny  the  perfection  of  God's  wisdom  and  be- 
nevolence, and  regard  him  as  purposing  a  system  of  partial 
and  limited  good,  in  preference  to  one  involving  the  highest 
sum  of  holiness  and  happiness  ?     That  were  to  contradict 


244 

the  boasted  adaptation  of  his  theory  to  vindicate  those  at- 
tributes from  the  objections  of  infidelity,  and  exhibit  the 
character  and  government  of  God  in  their  "  unimpaired 
perfection  and  glory."  If,  then,  he  regards  the  Most  High 
as  infinitely  wise  and  benevolent,  he  clearly  cannot  account 
for  his  purposing  the  existence  of  sin,  which,  according  to 
his  belief,  renders  the  aggregate  good  of  the  system  less 
than  it  would  be  without  that  sin ;  unless  it  be  by  the  hy- 
pothesis which  he  has  heretofore  employed  for  that  purpose, 
that  God  is  not  omnipotent,  or  able  wholly  to  exclude  sin 
from  a  moral  system ;  and  that  it  is  an  impossibility  of  ex- 
cluding it,  therefore,  that  is  the  true  reason  of  his  purposing 
and  permitting  that  which  actually  exists.  There  is, 
clearly,  no  other  method  by  which,  in  consistency  with  the 
views  he  exhibits  in  this  passage,  he  can  vindicate  the  Most 
High. 

The  question  now,  therefore,  is,  whether  he  does  not  still, 
as  heretofore,  employ  it  for  that  purpose,  teach  it  to  his 
pupils,  and  continue  to  claim,  with  his  accustomed  confi- 
dence, that  no  one  can  prove  it  to  be  erroneous,  nor  has 
any  right  either  to  deny  or  dispute  its  accuracy  ?  To 
suppose  that  he  does  not,  is  to  suppose  that  he  openly  ad- 
mits the  validity  of  the  infidel's  assumption,  that  the  per- 
mission of  evil  is  incompatible  with  infinite  goodness  and 
power ;  and  then  leaves  the  divine  administration  under  the 
imputation  which  that  assumption  implies,  without  attempt- 
ing its  vindication  !  If  that  is  the  course  which  he  is  now 
taking,  the  direct  converse  of  that  which  he  has  heretofore 
pursued,  what,  again,  becomes  of  the  vaunted  adaptation 
of  his  theory  to  exculpate  the  divine  conduct  from  the  ob- 
jections of  its  enemies?  or  how  can  it  demonstrate  that  he 
is  not,  "  as  a  teacher  of  theology,"  introducing  not  only 


245 

heresy,  but  infidelity  and  atheism,  into  the  church  ?  If,  on 
the  contrary,  however,  as  is  undoubtedly  the  fact,  he  still 
holds  and  teaches  that  theory,  and  employs  it  to  account 
for  and  justify  the  permission  of  sin;  what  then  becomes  of 
his  assertion,  that  he  does  not  undertake  to  show  what  the 
true  reason  is  of  its  permission  ? 

Will  he  rely  on  the  circumstance,  to  extricate  himself 
from  these  difficulties,  that  his  statement  is,  that  what  he 
claims  and  all  that  he  claims  is,  that  some  other  than  a 
necessity  of  sin,  as  a  means  of  the  greatest  good,  may  be 
the  true  reason  of  its  being  purposed,  "  without  affirming 
what  the  true  reason  is  ?"  To  resort  to  that,  however, 
were  again  to  multiply,  in  a  tenfold  degree,  in  place  of 
lessening  the  perplexities  of  his  condition.  The  question 
is  not,  whether  he  has  formally  affirmed  what  the  true  rea- 
son is  of  the  permission  of  sin,  but  simply  whether  he  has 
not,  in  his  speculations  on  that  subject,  assigned  a  specific 
reason  of  its  permission  ;  put  forth  as  high  and  numerous 
claims  for  the  accuracy  of  his  theory,  as  are  put  forth  in 
favor  of  any  other  hypothesis  ;  proceeded  on  the  assumption 
and  conviction  of  its  truth ;  and  endeavored  to  lead  others 
to  its  adoption  ?  The  fact  that  he  has  not  expressly 
affirmed  it  to  be  true,  does  not  demonstrate  that  he  does 
not  believe  and  teach  it.  Affirmations  and  denials  are  not 
the  usual  or  proper  means  of  settling  such  metaphysical  or 
theological  questions.  He  has  not,  so  far  as  I  am  aware, 
affirmed  the  truth  of  any  other  article  of  his  creed,  or  meta- 
physical theory,  which  he  holds  and  inculcates.  He  has 
merely  expressed  his  helief  of  them.  If  the  want  of  his 
affirmation,  therefore,  of  the  truth  of  the  theory  on  this 
subject,  which  he  has  so  long  taught,  and  still  teaches,  is 
proof  that  he  does  not  in  fact  hold  it ;  the  similar  want  of 


246 

liis  affirmation  of  the  other  articles  of  his  faith,  is  an  equal 
proof  that  he  does  not  hold  them.  To  resort,  therefore,  to 
such  a  quibble,  were  not  only  to  evade  the  real  question  at 
issue,  which  is  solely  whether  he  has  not  advanced  a  theory 
representing  that  an  impossibility  of  its  prevention  is  the 
true  reason  of  the  admission  of  sin  into  the  system  ;  but 
were  to  render  his  profession  wholly  equivocal  on  every 
other  point  of  which  he  treats  in  the  Letter,  and  leave  the 
real  nature  of  the  doctrines  which  he  teaches  more  uncertain 
even  than  it  was  antecedently  to  this  profession  of  his  faith. 

In  whatever  light  then  his  statement  in  this  passage  is 
regarded,  it  has  no  adaptation  to  "  allay  apprehensions" 
respecting  his  doctrines  and  testimony.  If  he  meant  by  it 
any  thing  else  than  a  denial  that  he  has  taught,  and  still 
teaches,  that  a  physical  impossibility  to  God  of  preventing 
the  sin  that  exists,  is  the  true  reason  of  its  permission  ;  his 
meaning  must  be  such  as  to  render  his  whole  profession  a 
treacherous  farce ;  and  if  he  meant  it  as  such  a  denial,  it  is 
a  contradiction  to  fact  so  flagrant  and  enormous,  as  must 
forever  divest  his  testimony  of  all  title  to  confidence. 

His  professions  in  the  following  passage  are  perplexed  by 
an  equal  share  of  difficulties. 

"  I  do  not  believe  that  the  grace  of  God  can  be  truly  said  to  be 
irrciistibfe,  in  the  primary  proper  import  of  this  term.  But  I  do  be- 
lieve, that  ill  all  cases  it  may  be  resisted  by  man  as  a  free  moral  agent, 
and  that  when  it  becomes  effectual  to  conversion,  as  it  infallibly  does 
in  the  case  of  all  the  elect,  it  is  unresisted." 

If  every  free  agent  may,  as  he  here  teaches,  in  all  cases 
resist  the  grace  of  God,  and  will  infallibly  resist  it  success- 
fully when  he  resists  at  all ;  and  if  when  not  resisted,  that 
grace  is  infallibly  efficacious  :  it  then  follows  on  the  one 


247 

hand,  that  grace  exerted,  infallibly  prevents  sin  in  every 
instance  when  it  is  not  resisted  ;  and  on  the  other  therefore 
— taking  his  representation  here  in  connexion  with  the  doc- 
trine he  has  heretofore  taught,  that  God  carries  his  prevent- 
ing influences  in  all  instances  to  the  utmost  limit  of  his 
power — that  sin  is  never  exerted  except  when  resistance 
from  the  sinner  renders  it  impossible  for  God  to  prevent  it ; 
and  thence  finally,  that  an  impossibility  of  preventing  it,  is 
in  all  instances  the  true  reason  of  its  being  permitted. 

But  I  have  quoted  the  passage  for  the  purpose  of  solicit- 
ing your  notice  to  the  representation  which  it  presents, 
that  the  Spirit  of  God  may  be  successfully  resisted  in  all 
cases,  and  that  he  never  does  nor  can  exert  an  efficacious 
influence,  unless  the  mind  first  spontaneously  relinquishes 
its  resistance,  and  submits  itself  to  his  sway !  a  theory  in- 
volved likewise  in  his  speculations  in  a  former  publication 
respecting  "  the  suspension  of  the  selfish  principle."  How 
can  the  doctrine  of  efficacious  grace,  or  of  the  divine  fore- 
ordination  and  foresight  of  the  agency  of  creatures,  consist 
with  this  scheme  f  If  no  means  lie  within  the  power  of  God 
by  which  he  can  bring  them  to  submit  to  the  influences  of 
his  Spirit,  what  medium  is  there  through  which  he  can  fore- 
see their  submission  to  that  influence,  or  definitively  predes- 
tine them  to  salvation  through  sanctification  of  the  Spirit 
and  belief  of  the  truth  ?  Or  what  countenance  can  this 
scheme  claim  from  the  word  of  God  ?  Are  there  any  indi- 
cations in  that  volume  that  God  is  thus  dependent  on  men 
for  an  opportunity  to  exercise  his  grace  in  saving  them  from 
sin  ? — any  promises  of  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit  that  are 
limited  by  the  condition  that  men,  by  the  spontaneous  "  sus- 
pension of  the  selfish  principle,"  place  it  within  his  power 
to  exert  on  them  a  gracious  influence  ? — or  any  examples  of 

32 


248 

prayers  by  prophets  or  apostles,  that  God  would  give  them 
repentance,  if  peradventure  they,  by  first  abandoning  their 
resistance,  should  yield  him  an  opportunity  to  confer  on 
them  that  gift  ? 

But  what  accordance  has  this  theory  with  the  views  of  the 
orthodox,  or  with  the  phenomena  of  conviction  and  conver- 
sion that  characterize  the  revivals  in  our  country  ?  Are  the 
Calvinistic  clergy  of  New-England  accustomed  to  place  their 
hope  of  success  on  the  possibility  that  their  people,  un- 
prompted from  above,  will  relinquish  their  resistance  to  the 
grace  of  God,  and  yield  themselves  the  willing  subjects  of 
the  Spirit's  influences,  if  he  vouchsafe  to  bestow  them  ?  Have 
you  ever  known  a  revival  of  religion  that  had  its  origin  in 
such  a  spontaneous  suspension  of  opposition  and  selfishness, 
antecedently  to  the  Spirit's  intervention  ? 

But  how  is  this  branch  of  his  theory  to  be  reconciled 
with  those  of  the  eleven  articles  of  his  creed  which  relate 
to  this  subject  ?  How,  if  the  Spirit  can  exert  no  influence 
on  the  heart  until  its  resistance  has  ceased,  can  it  be,  as  he 
professes,  "  that  the  necessity  of  the  influence  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  in  regeneration  results  solely  from  the  voluntary  per- 
verseness  of  the  sinner^  s  heart,  or  disinclinationio  serve  God"  ? 
or  how,  as  he  continues  to  profess,  can  the  actual  salvation 
of  the  sinner  be  suspended  on  the  sovereign  will  of  God 
in  giving  his  spirit,  if  in  place  of  that,  it  is,  as  this  scheme, 
implies,  wholly  suspended  on  the  sinner's  self-determining 
will  ? 

What  resemblance  to  the  distinction  between  common 
and  special  grace  which  Calvinists  are  accustomed  to  main- 
tain, has  the  representation — construed  by  his  theory — which 
he  presents  of  it?  which  is,  "that  the  renewing  grace  of  God 


249 

is  special  (in  distinction  from  that  which  is  common  and  is 
resisted  hy  the  sinful  mind,^^)  not  because  of  its  differing  in 
any  respect  from  that,  but  solely  because  the  sinner,  by  first 
suspending  his  resistance,  permits  it  infallibly  to  secure  his 
conversion.  Or  what,  interpreted  by  this  scheme,  is  the 
meaning  of  that  specification  of  his  faith  in  which  he  states 
that  he  does  "  not  believe  that  the  grace  of  God  is  necessary, 
as  Arminians  and  some  others  maintain,  to  render  man  an 
accountable  agent,  and  responsible  for  rejecting  the  offers  of 
eternal  life  ?"  Is  it  any  thing  else  than  this ;  that  as  man  is 
already  in  his  judgment  an  agent  of  such  a  nature  that  God 
cannot  exert  a  gracious  influence  on  him,  except  by  his  own 
spontaneous  consent,  therefore  he  does  not  believe  the  gift  of 
that  gracious  influence  to  be  necessary  to  render  his  nature 
such,  that  God  cannot  exert  on  him  a  gracious  influence 
except  by  his  spontaneous  consent ! 

How  indeed  is  it,  if  this  theory  is  true,  that  he  continues 
to  believe  that  any  necessity  whatever  exists  for  the  influ- 
ences of  the  Spirit?  If  the  opposition  of  the  mind  must  be 
wholly  suspended  before  the  Spirit  can  exert  an  efficacious 
influence,  and  is  actually  suspended  in  every  instance  of 
conversion,  without  his  agency ;  why  may  not  a  mere  moral 
influence,  presented  without  his  intervention,  prove  ade- 
quate to  regeneration  ?  What  need  can  there  be  of  a  super- 
natural agency,  if  there  is  no  opposition  to  be  overcome  ? 
if  the  mind  is  in  equilibrio,  and  no  more  open  to  a  suc- 
cessful excitement  from  temptation,  than  from  inducements 
to  obedience  ?  How,  on  his  principles,  can  it  be  proved 
that  the  instances  of  conversion  which  are  supposed  to  have 
taken  place  during  his  visit  at  Hartford,  to  which  you  refer, 
were  not  wholly  occasioned  by  the  sermons  of  which  you 
speak,  without  any  supernatural  aid  ? 


250 

Or  how,  finally,  are  this  and  other  articles  of  his  faith  to 
be  reconciled  with  the  doctrine  of  the  following  passage  ? 

"  I  do  not  believe  that  we  are  authorized  to  assure  the  sinner,  as 
Arminians  do  and  some  others  also,  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  always 
ready  to  convert  him.  But  I  do  believe,  that  we  are  authorized  to 
assure  any  sinner,  that  it  may  be  true  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  now 
ready  to  convert  him, — '  that  God,  peradventxjre,  will  now  give  him 
repentance,'  and  that  thus,  in  view  of  the  possible  intervention  of 
divine  influence,  we  remove  what  would  otherwise  be  a  ground  of 
fatal  discouragement  to  the  sinner,  when  we  exhort  him  to  immedi- 
ate repentance." 

We  have  thus  in  the  first  place  in  this  passage,  his  belief 
that  it  may  be  true  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  not  always  ready 
to  convert  the  sinner  ;  conjoined  with  his  conviction  how- 
ever of  the  propriety  of  assuring  the  sinner  for  his  encourage- 
ment, •'  to  suspend  the  selfish  principle,"  of  the  possibility 
of  "  the  intervention  of  divine  influence"  in  his  behalf — 
next  in  the  former  passage,  the  doctrine  that  the  Spirit  can 
do  nothing  in  the  work  of  conversion  until  the  sinner  first 
of  his  own  sovereign  will,  permits  him  to  exert  a  successful 
influence  ;  and  finally,  by  implication  at  least  in  the  passages 
before  quoted,  the  doctrine  which  he  has  on  former  occa- 
sions more  openly  taught,  that  God  carries  his  efibrts  to 
prevent  sin  in  every  instance  to  the  utmost  extent  of  his 
power,  and  that  the  sole  reason  that  it  is  ever  permitted  is, 
that  he  is  incapable  of  preventing  it ! 

Will  the  orthodox  be  likely  to  receive  this  wretched  jum- 
ble of  errors  and  inconsistencies,  as  a  just  representation  of 
their  faith  on  these  subjects .'' 

A  number  of  the  statements  of  the  Letter  are  extremely 
equivocal,  contradictory,  and  absurd.    A  sufiicient  exempli- 


251 

fication  of  these  characteristics,  is  furnished  by  the  follow- 
ing passage. 

"  I  also  believe  that  such  is  the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  that  it 
becomes  the  occasion  of  universal  sin  in  men  in  all  the  appropriate 
circumstances  of  their  existence,  and  that  therefore  they  are  truly 
and  properly  said  to  be  sinners  by  nature." 

The  first  question  to  which  I  solicit  your  notice  in  regard 
to  this  passage,  respects  the  meaning  of  the  statement,  that 
the  nature  of  the  mind  is  the  occasion  of  its  sinning.  Is  it 
that  its  powers  and  susceptibilities  are  the  occasions  of  its 
sinning,  in  distinction  from,  and  irrespectively  of  the  moral 
influence  under  which  they  are  exerted  ?  If  so,  wherein 
does  his  theory  on  this  subject,  differ  from  the  doctrine  of 
physical  depravity  respecting  the  cause  of  our  sinning  ?  Or 
how  is  it  to  be  reconciled  with  his  belief,  that  "  regeneration 
is  a  moral  change"  simply,  and  «'  that  the  necessity  of  the 
influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit"  in  it,  "  results  solely  from  the 
voluntary  perverseness  of  the  sinner's  heart.?"  How  can  it 
be  that  the  nature  of  the  mind  is  the  sole  ground  of  its  sin- 
ning, and  its  voluntary  acts  the  sole  ground  of  its  need  of 
the  Spirit's  regenerating  influences  f  If  its  nature  is  the 
occasion  of  its  sinning,  what  have  its  circumstances  to  do 
in  determining  the  nature  of  its  moral  acts  ?  If  its  nature 
is  the  occasion  of  its  putting  forth  the  choices,  which  it  does 
when  it  sins,  is  not  its  nature  likewise  the  occasion  of  its 
exerting  the  acts  which  it  does  when  it  obeys,--and  may  it 
not  therefore  be  as  «  truly  and  properly  said"  to  be  obedient 
"  by  nature  ?" 

In  the  next  place,  I  take  leave  to  inquire,  whether  men 
ever  exist  in  circumstances  that  are  not  "  the  appropriate 
circumstances  of  their  existence  ?"     And  if  they  do  not, 


252 

whether  all  the  circumstances  in  which  they  exist,  are  occa- 
sions of  their  sinning  ;  or  whether  in  other  words — as  the 
passage  must  then  mean, — they  never  exert  any  obedience  ? 
If  they  do  not,  what  then  becomes  of  the  doctrines  which 
Dr.  Taylor  professes  respecting  election,  atonement,  rege- 
neration, perseverance  ?  If  men  ever  do  exist  in  circum- 
stances that  are  not  "  the  appropriate  circumstances  of  their 
existence,"  who  is  it  that  places  them  in  those  circumstances  ; 
God,  ot  themselves  ?  And  which,  or  what  are  they  ?  Are 
they,  as  the  passage  must  then  imply — those  in  which  they 
yield  obedience  ?  What  then  is  it  that  constitutes  the  in- 
appropriateness  of  those  circumstances  ?  A  change  of  their 
nature  ?  How  can  that  be  a  circumstance  of  their  existence  ? 
Is  it  "  the  suspension  of  the  selfish  principle  ?"  How  can 
that  be  a  circumstance,  or  at  most  an  inappropriate  circum- 
stance of  their  existence  ?  Is  it  then  the  influences  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  ?  But  can  it  be  an  inappropriate  circumstance 
for  men  to  enjoy  his  renewing  influences  ?  What  answer  can 
be  returned  to  these  inquiries,  that  can  give  to  the  passage 
any  adaptation  to  allay  apprehension  respecting  his  doc- 
trines, or  demonstrate  that  he  is  not  introducing  erroneous 
sentiments  into  the  churches  ? 

An  additional  obstacle  to  satisfaction  with  the  statements 
of  his  Letter,  is  furnished  by  a  peculiar  rule  of  interpreta- 
tion which  he  has  heretofore  advanced,  and  employed  to 
vindicate  himself  from  the  imputation  of  inconsistency  and 
error — a  rule  which  renders  his  professions  wholly  equivocal, 
and  places  it  beyond  the  power  of  his  readers  to  know  with 
certainty,  that  his  meaning  is  in  any  instance  that  which  his 
language  is  apparently  intended  to  convey.  This  rule 
is,  that  terms  that  are  used  in  difibrcnt  meanings  in  diflerent 
applications,  can  never  themselves  furnish  any  certainty, 


253 

even  from  the  manner  in  which  they  are  employed,  of  the 
meaning  they  are  designed  to  express  ;  and  that  the  inter- 
preter therefore  must  be  guided  in  his  construction  of 
them  by  the  views  which  he  himself  entertains  of  the  sub- 
ject, in  respect  to  which  they  are  used.  This  rule  he  de- 
vised and  employed  to  demonstrate,  that  he  had  not  departed 
in  his  speculations  respecting  the  nature  of  depravity,  from 
the  views  of  President  Edwards  and  Dr.  Dwight,  and  it 
is  on  its  legitimacy  that  the  success  of  his  efforts  for  that 
purpose  are  wholly  dependent ;  a  rule  obviously,  that  will 
enable  him  with  equal  ease  to  demonstrate  that  his  senti- 
ments coincide  in  every  particular  with  those  of  every  other 
individual,  orthodox  or  heretical,  who  has  ever  presented  to 
the  world  a  system  of  theological  speculation.  If  this  rule 
then  is  still  held  and  employed  by  him,  when  his  perplexi- 
ties require  it — and  no  evidence  exists  that  it  is  not — not  the 
slightest  certainty  is  furnished  by  any  of  his  professions  in 
this  Letter,  that  he  holds  the  views  that  his  language  is 
apparently  employed  to  express.  Even  the  most  unexcep- 
tionable orthodox  and  explicit  of  his  statements,  instantly 
become,  under  its  application,  utterly  indeterminate  and 
equivocal ;  and  he  may  at  any  moment  modify  under  its 
sanction,  disavow  or  wholly  reverse  them,  without  any 
grosser  violence  to  truth,  or  affront  to  decorum,  than  that 
of  which  he  has  heretofore  repeatedly  been  guilty. 

These  considerations  then,  render  it  sufficiently  appa- 
rent, that  the  course  he  has  taken  in  his  Letter,  has  no 
adaptation  whatever  to  extricate  him  from  the  difficulties 
of  his  condition;  that  in  place  of  that,  its  natural  and  re- 
sistless influence  will  be,  to  sustain  and  confirm  the  suspi- 
cions that  exist  respecting  his  faith,  and  to  fix  the  convic- 
tion in  the  genei'al  mind,  that  he  is  wholly  unwilling  fairly 


254 

to  meet  the  question  at  issue  between  him  and  the  orthodox  ; 
either  because  he  feels  that  he  must  then  acknowledge  the 
justice  of  the  charges  which  are  alleged  against  him,  and 
avow  doctrines  which  he  knows  must  at  once  divest  him  of 
public  confidence,  and  drive  him  from  his  station  ;  or  else 
because  he  is  conscious  that  he  has  fallen  into  inconsisten- 
cies and  absurdities,  from  which  he  cannot  extricate  himself 
except  by  a  formal  apology  which  he  has  not  the  candor 
to  make ;  and  advanced  principles  which  he  is  convinced 
are  false  and  dangerous,  but  which  he  has  not  the  integrity 
and  courage  to  recall.  I  put  it  to  you,  sir,  whether  any 
other  hypothesis  can  adequately  explain  the  phenomena  of 
his  course  ;  whether  the  ascription  to  him  of  frankness, 
conscientiousness,  uprightness,  an  anxious  wish  to  lead  the 
community  to  a  just  judgment  respecting  his  sentiments, 
and  a  supreme  love  of  truth,  and  readiness  to  sacrifice  to 
its  interests  the  advantages  of  place,  the  suggestions  of 
pride,  and  the  aspirations  of  ambition,  would  not  convert 
his  theological  history  into  an  inexplicable  enigma  ! 

To  extricate  himself  from  the  suspicions  and  imputations 
to  which  he  has  subjected  himself,  will  require  a  far  differ- 
ent measure  from  a  mere  profession  of  an  orthodox  creed. 
Those  suspicions  and  charges  are  not  the  offspring  of  con- 
jecture, or  cherished  without  reason ;  but  are  founded  on 
the  views  which  he  has  sent  forth  to  the  world  as  important 
deviations  from  the  prevalent  system,  and  long  and  stren- 
uously labored  to  demonstrate  and  defend ;  and  views  too 
that  by  his  own  virtual  concession,  form  a  just  ground  for 
the  distrust  and  dissatisfaction,  of  which  they  have  proved 
the  occasion ;  for  he  implies  in  his  Letter,  that  were  he  a 
holder  and  disseminator  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  Armi- 
nian  system,  he  should  be  justly  obnoxious  to  the  charge  of 


255 

an  essential  departure  from  the  orthodox  faith  ;  and  it  is 
his  inculcation  of  the  great  element  of  that  system — the 
theory  of  a  self-determining  will,  and  the  contingency  of 
choices — -that  is  the  chief  ground  of  the  apprehension  and 
dissatisfaction  that  exist  respecting  his  views.  To  demon- 
strate here  at  large  that  he  holds  and  inculcates  that  theory, 
is  rendered  unnecessary  by  the  proofs  of  it  that  have  been 
presented  in  preceding  numbers. 

He  alleges,  as  you  are  aware,  the  fact  that  a  being  in 
order  to  continue  to  be  a  responsible  agent,  must  possess 
the  power  of  sinning  under  every  preventing  influence  that 
God  can  exert  on  him  ;  as  proof  that  it  may  be  that  God 
can  never  exert  on  him  such  an  influence,  as  to  prevent 
him  from  sinning:  a  theory  plainly  that  represents  the  acts 
exerted  by  agents  under  God's  preventing  influence,  as 
wholly  contingent  or  uncertain  ;  that  they  may  he  sinful,  as 
he  expressly  says,  against  and  in  spite  of  that  influence; 
that  God  accordingly  cannot  determine  them  by  any  agency 
that  he  can  exert ;  that  they  may  be  determined  therefore 
by  that  mere  power  of  choosing  by  which  they  are  exerted ; 
and  that  is,  that  the  mind  may  be  self-determined,  or  may 
put  forth  its  choices  irrespectively  of  all  the  moral  influen- 
ces to  which  it  is  subjected  ;  and  that  is,  without  any  in- 
telligent or  conscious  reasons.  Is  not  this  indisputably 
the  import  of  his  theory  ? — the  only  construction  of  which 
it  is  susceptible  in  any  consistency  with  its  terms,  the 
reasoning  which  is  adopted  for  its  support,  and  the  infe- 
rences which  it  is  employed  to  sustain  ?  Is  it  not  so  clearly 
and  irrefutably  its  just  construction,  as  not  to  admit  of  any 
decent  question  ? — as  to  have  deterred  and  abashed  him 
from  even  attempting  to  disprove  it  ?  If  not,  why  has  he 
riot  refuted  it,  and  by  that  means  at  once  extricated  him- 

33 


'256 

self  from  the  charges  founded  on  it  ?  Or  why,  allow  itie  to 
ask,  if  you  regard  him  as  able  to  disprove  it,  did  you  not 
suggest  to  him  that  mode  of  vindicating  himself  from  sus- 
picion, and  recommend  to  him  by  that  summary  measure  to 
drive  the  whole  body  of  his  antagonists  forever  from  the  field  ? 
This  would  surely  have  been  not  only  the  most  certain 
method  of  achieving  both  his  and  your  object,  but,  permit 
me  to  believe,  a  far  more  creditable  one,  than  to  resort  as 
you  have,  to  intimations  that  no  known  or  assignable  rea- 
sons exist,  for  the  imputations  which  are  made  against  his 
faith. 

His  theory,  then,  is  nothing  else  than  the  Arminian 
dogma  of  a  self-determining  will ;  and  such  being  the 
fact,  which,  I  now  take  leave  to  ask,  is  there,  of  the 
eleven  articles  of  his  creed — with  the  exception,  at  most,  of 
the  first — which  it  does  not  directly  and  wholly  subvert  ? 
Need  I  prove  to  you  that  there  is  not  one  ? — that  to  talk  of 
foreordination,  grace,  atonement,  regeneration,  moral  sua- 
sion, the  Spirit's  influence,  election,  perseverance,  holiness, 
or  sin,  on  that  scheme,  is  the  starkest  absurdity  ? — that  there 
is  not  a  doctrine  or  statement  of  the  divine  word,  that  has 
any  relation  to  God's  purposes  respecting  future  events  in 
the  agency  of  his  creatures,  that  is  not  converted  by  it  into 
a  solecism  ?  How,  if  all  the  future  actions  of  men  are  un- 
certain, can  God  foreordain,  predict,  or  foresee  them  ? 
How  institute  and  carry  on,  through  a  long  succession  of 
ages,  a  system  of  remedial  measures,  predicated  on  the 
certainty  and  foresight,  that  the  whole  race  are  to  be  sin- 
ners ?  How  determine  on  that  system  before  the  foundation 
of  the  world,  and  decide  definitively  on  the  individuals  who 
are  to  be  saved  through  its  instrumentality  ?  How  can  it 
be  certain  that  the  renewed  will  persevere  in  holiness,  if 


257 

their  future  actions  are  wholly  contingent  ?  How  can  the 
Holy  Spirit  accomplish  the  work  of  renovation,  if  volitions 
are  exerted  irrespectively  of  all  influences  ?  How  can  there 
be  obedience  or  transgression,  guilt  or  atonement,  if  choices 
are  exerted  without  any  intelligent  reasons  ?  His  theory 
thus  strikes  fatally  at  the  whole  system  of  truth ;  blots  mo- 
rality itself,  religion,  obligation,  and  intelligence,  alike 
from  existence ;  and  converts  the  whole  moral  universe  into 
a  complication  of  senseless  and  irresponsible  machinery ! 
And  yet,  after  having  presented  this  system  to  the  church, 
with  all  the  parade  of  a  great  discovery ;  after  having 
vaunted  its  adaptation  to  free  the  question  respecting  the 
existence  of  evil,  from  its  "  distressing  perplexity,"  and  ex- 
hibit the  divine  government  in  its  "  unimpaired  perfection 
and  glory;"  after  having  boasted  of  its  rapid  dissemination, 
and  claimed  the  great  body  of  the  intelligent  and  influential 
in  the  ministry  as  its  disciples ;  and  finally,  after  having 
been  repeatedly  called  by  his  opponents  to  the  notice  of 
these  objections  to  it ;  he  now  has  the  boldness  to  stand 
forth,  and  announce  to  the  church,  that  he  feels  "  bound  to 
say,"  that  in  his  "  own  view,"  the  "  impression  that,"  "  for 
some  reason  or  other,"  "  has  been  made  to  some  extent," 
that  he  is  "  unsound  in  the  faith,"  is  "  wholly  groundless 
and  unauthorized  ;"  and  to  appeal  to  the  candid,  whether 
there  can  be  any  just  reason  for  the  belief  that,  as  a  teacher 
of  theology,  he  is  introducing  heresy  into  the  churches  ! 

If,  then,  any  doctrine  can  be  named  in  the  whole  circle 
of  error,  that  involves  a  subversion  of  Christianity,  that  is 
indisputably  the  fact  with  respect  to  his  theory  ;  and  if 
there  is  any  false  doctrine  in  the  whole  catalogue  of  heresies, 
the  promulgation  of  which  by  him,  could  authorize  the 


258 

conviction  that  he  has  become  unsound  in  thd  faith,  that 
conviction  is  justified  by  his  inculcation  of  this. 

A  far  different  expedient  from  those  which  he  has  here- 
tofore employed  for  his  vindication,  will  likewise  be  requi- 
site, to  reproduce  a  general  confidence  in  the  candor  of  his 
professions.     The  deep  distrust  of  which  he  has  become 
the  subject,  like  the  apprehensions  that  are  felt  respecting 
his  doctrines,  is  not  the  work  of  whim  or  prejudice,  but  the 
.  natural  and  necessary  result  of  the  course  which  he  has 
chosen  to  pursue  for  the  defence  of  himself  against  objection  ; 
of  the  false  and  profligate  principles  of  interpretation  which 
he  has  employed  to  vindicate  his  representations  respecting 
the  doctrines  of  Edwards,  Bellamy,  and  Dwight ;  of  the 
open  and  flagrant  misrepresentations  of  which  he  has  been 
guilty  of  their  sentiments,  for  the  purpose  of  shielding  him- 
self from  the  charge  of  having  abandoned  their  theological 
views ;  of  the  contradictory  representations,  which  he  has 
at  different  times  given,  of  the  same  subjects,  and  the  alter- 
nate avowal  and  disavowal  of  his  peculiar  views,  as  they 
have  promised  to  advance  or  obstruct  his  reputation  ;  of 
his  express  and  solemn  denial,  in  several  instances,  when 
pressed  with  unexpected  difficulties,  of  some   of  the  most 
conspicuous  and  important  facts  in  the  history  of  his  theo- 
logical   speculations  ;    and  finally,    of  the   total   absence, 
throughout  the  whole  period  of  his  controversies,  of  every 
indication  of  candor,  a  willingness  and  wish  fairly  to  meet 
the   difliculiies  that  perplex   his    theory,  a   readiness  and 
anxiety  to  be  set  right  whenever  he  has  erred,  a  preference 
of  truth  to  self  and  the  interests  of  party.     Wiiat  other  con- 
troversialist ever  exhibited  a  more  total  destitution  of  these 
traits,  than   Dr.  Taylor  ?     Can  you  point  to  a  single  con- 
cession that  has  been  made  by  him  during  the  whole  course 


259 

of  his  discussions  on  these  subjects ;  or  the  faintest  mani- 
festation of  a  desire  to  correct  either  his  doctrines  or  stote- 
ments,  even  when  the  most  resistless  demonstration  has 
been  furnished  of  their  erroneousness  ?  Can  you  designate 
a  single  objection  to  his  scheme  that  has  been  frankly  and 
fairly  met  by  him ;  or  a  solitary  attempt  that  he  has  made 
to  justify  himself,  in  which  he  has  not  been  guilty  of  incon- 
sistency, evasion,  chicane,  or  downright  misrepresentation  ? 
If  you  can,  I  recommend  it  to  you  forthwith  to  make  it 
known.  You  cannot  render  a  higher  service  to  him,  or 
yield  a  more  unexpected  gratification  to  the  church. 
What  other  effect,  then,  could,  or  ought  to  have  resulted, 
from  this  extraordinary  course,  than  the  forfeiture,  by  which 
he  is  now  so  fatally  embarrassed,  of  general  confidence  in 
his  professions  ?  There  is  not  an  individual  in  the  church, 
whose  testimony  such  a  career  would  not  have  rendered 
utterly  distrusted  and  worthless.  It  were  a  reproach  to  the 
upright  and  intelligent,  not  to  discriminate  between  such  a 
system  of  proceedure,  in  "a  teacher  of  theology,"  and  the 
candor,  supreme  love  of  truth,  and  unsullied  integrity,  that 
not  only  become,  but  are  essential  to  so  sacred  and  respon- 
sible an  office.  It  is  a  reproach  to  those  who  still  sustain 
him,  that  they  continue  to  overlook  or  apologize  for  his 
confessed  obliquities,  and  treat  him  and  the  public  as  though 
no  adequate  cause  existed,  for  the  disapprobation  that  is 
felt  and  manifested,  of  his  doctrines  and  conduct. 

As  then  the  dissatisfaction  that  exists  respecting  him,  is 
thus  founded  on  facts  that  are  wholly  indisputable,  and 
that  have  been  made  public  by  himself  and  widely  dissem- 
inated through  the  community ;  it  is  manifest  that,  while 
they  remain  unchanged,  no  mere  asseverations  of  his  can 
have  any  adaptation  to  remove  or  diminish  it.     If  he  wishes 


260 

to  dispel  the  thick  clouds  in  which  he  has  become  involved, 
and  reinstate  himself  in  the  general  respect,  he  has  no  other 
expedient  for  it  but  candidly  and  unanswerably  to  refute 
the  objections  that  are  alleged  against  him  ;  or  else,  admit- 
ting them  to  be  irrefutable,  publicly  to  offer  such  a  retrac- 
tion of  his  speculative,  and  apology  for  his  practical  errors, 
as  integrity  dictates,  as  is  enjoined  by  the  gospel,  and  as 
the  wellbeing  of  the  church  requires. 

It  is  that  you  may  lend  your  aid  to  the  achievement  of 
this  result,  that  I  offer  to  your  notice  these  considerations  ; 
and  urge  you,  if  in  your  power,  to  meet  the  objections  that 
are  alleged  against  him,  in  such  a  manner  as  they  should 
be  met,  to  accomplish  his  vindication,  and  entitle  him  to 
the  approval  and  support  of  the  orthodox  ;  or  should  you 
find  it  impracticable  to  render  him  that  service,  to  suggest 
to  you  the  propriety  of  your  doing  the  justice  to  those  who 
urge  against  him  those  objections — and  whom  you  have  taken 
it  upon  yourself  in  your  Letter  to  impeach — to  admit  that 
tiieir  objections  are  legitimate,  and  that  the  facts  on  which 
they  are  founded,  form  a  just  and  necessary  ground  for  all 
the  distrust  and  disapprobation  of  which  they  have  rendered 
him  the  object. 

In  giving  publicity  to  your  Letters,  you  have  relinquish- 

« 
ed  the  station  of  a  mere  spectator,  and  assumed  that  of  a 

judge  of  the  merits  of  his  controversies ;  and  in  the  satis- 
faction which  you  have  expressed  with  his  professions,  and 
the  intimations  in  which  you  have  indulged,  that  no  known 
reason  exists  for  the  disapprobation  with  which  he  is  regard- 
ed ;  you  have  in  effect  exhibited  those  who  assail  and  dis- 
trust him,  as  guilty  not  only  of  causelessly  suspecting  and 
opposing  him,  but  of  cherishing  their  doubts  and  maintain- 
ing their  opposition  against  conspicuous  and  demonstrative 


261 

evidences  of  his  innocence  and  title  to  unqualified  appro- 
bation. The  fair  inference  from  your  Letters  is,  that  you 
regard  it  as  abundantly  clear,  that  the  "  impression"  that 
"  has  been  made  to  some  extent"  that  he  is  "  unsound  in 
the  faith,"  "  is  wholly  groundless  and  unauthorized."  If  such 
is  indeed  the  fact,  those  whom  you  thus  impeach  are  indu- 
bitably guilty  of  enormous  injustice,  and  merit  all  the 
rebukes  and  reprobation  which  a  general  disapproval  can 
inflict ;  and  if  it  is  not  the  fact,  you  are  as  indubitably 
guilty,  in  thus  traducing  them,  of  a  degree  of  injustice 
as  much  greater,  as  the  number  of  individuals,  the  intelli- 
gence and  the  respectability  are  greater,  which  your  impu- 
tations affect.  It  concerns  you  then  most  intimately,  as 
well  as  them,  to  determine  beyond  disputation,  on  which 
side  it  is,  that  this  injustice  lies.  They  will  not  shrink  from 
a  fair  and  demonstrative  trial.  They  solicit  it ;  they  insist 
on  it ;  and  no  plea  that  you  have  not  designed  to  become  a 
participator  in  these  discussions,  no  reluctance  to  contro- 
versy, no  professional  employments,  after  the  step  you  have 
thus  gratuitously  taken,  can,  in  their  judgment,  form  a 
sufficient  apology  for  your  declining  to  meet  it.  If  you  were 
prompted  to  the  correspondence  by  his  solicitation,  rather 
than  your  own  wishes,  and  betrayed  into  the  impression 
you  express,  that  his  professions  may  justly  satisfy  the 
churches,  by  the  seeming  frankness  on  the  one  hand  of 
his  statements,  and  the  absence  from  his  Letter  of  an  open 
avowal  of  the  erroneous  sentiments  which  are  the  chief 
grounds  of  objection  to  him  ;  and  the  neglect  on  the  other, 
to  compare  this  representation  of  his  faith  with  the  doctrines 
he  has  heretofore  taught  and  still  teaches  ;  or  if  it  was  your 
object  in  giving  his  Letter  to  the  public,  to  place  him 
under  a  necessity  of  more  fully  vindicating  or  correcting 


262 

himself,  if  solicited,  rather  than  that  it  should  be  regarded 
as  furnishing  sufficient  ground  for  the  cessation  of  appre- 
hension respecting  him  ;  justice  to  yourself  would  seem  to 
require  that  it  should  be  known  that  such  was  the  fact. 

If  you  concur  with  him  in  his  doctrinal  peculiarities— 
which  it  would  seem  is  fairly  to  be  inferred  from  your 
allowhig  his  statement  to  pass  without  comment,  that  he 
never  supposed  that  you  differed  from  him  in  your  views  of 
the  great  doctrines  of  the  gospel — approve  the  course  he 
has  heretofore  taken  for  their  defence  and  propagation,  and 
spontaneously  lend  your  influence  to  sanction  and  uphold 
him  ; — it  is  likewise  essential  that  it  should  be  fully  known 
that  3'ou  sustain  toward  each  other  that  relation  ;  that  the 
eorrespondence  itself  and  the  value  of  your  approval,  may 
be  justly  appreciated.  What  favorable  influence  with  the 
churches  can  your  conviction  of  his  continued  orthodoxy 
be  entitled  to  exert,  if  in  place  of  adhering  to  that  system, 
you  have  yourself  become  his  disciple,  concurring  in  his 
cspculations,  sympathizing  with  his  perplexities,  and  second- 
ing the  means  he  is  employing  for  the  purpose  of  retaining 
his  hold  of  the  general  confidence  ?  And,  as  to  leave  the 
public  to  their  own  conjectures  from  the  Letters  in  regard 
to  your  doctrinal  views  and  sentiments  respecting  his  prin- 
ciples as  a  controversialist,  will  expose  you  to  the  imputa- 
tion of  regarding  his  practical  as  well  as  speculative  errors 
with  approbation — justice  again  to  yourself,  if  that  is  not 
the  fact,  requires  you  to  make  known  what  your  real  sen- 
timents respecting  them  are.  If  you  regard  his  views  as 
scriptural,  aAd  the  measures  to  which  he  resorts  for  his  vin- 
dication as  sanctioned  by  the  gospel,  kindness  to  his  oppo- 
nents as  well  as  to  him,  renders  it  your  duty  to  make  them 


'263 

acquainted  with  the  grounds  on  which  yon  rest  that  con- 
viction ;  and  if  you  are  not  a  convert  to  his  theories,  but 
regard  them  as  false  and  fraught  with  a  pernicious  influ- 
ence ;  your  obligations  to  your  fellow-men,  and  responsi- 
bilities to  God,  require  you  not  only  to  withhold  from  them 
your  sanction,  but  openly  to  express  your  dissent  from 
them,  and  to  endeavor  to  arrest  their  dissemination. 

Let  me  hope  then  that  you  will  regard  it  not  only  as  an 
indispensable,  but  as  a  grateful  task,  to  meet  these  exigen- 
cies ;  and  assure  you,  that  should  you  vindicate  yourself, 
on  whatever  ground  it  may  be  ;  should  you  exculpate  him  ; 
should  you  give  supremacy  to  the  truth  ;  you  will  meet  a 
generous  approval  from  his  opponents  as  well  as  friends, 
and  from  none  more  spontaneous  congratulations  than 
from 

THE    AUTHOR    OF 

VIEWS  IN  THEOLOGY. 


Rev.  J.  Hawes,  D.  D. 


VIEWS 


THEOLOGY. 


No.  XI.     Vol..  ZZZ. 


NOVEMBER,  1832. 


NEW-YORK: 
JOHN  P.  HAVEN,  148  NASSAU-STREET, 

AMERICAN  TRACT  SOClETVi?  HOU.SE. 

1882. 


O.  p.  SCOTT  ANB  CO.   PHINTKRS, 
■*WW-«TBEBT,  CORNEtt  Or  NASSAU. 


CONTENTS. 


Abt.  I. — The  Holy  Spirit's  Regenerating  Influences     269 

Art.  II.— The  Doctrines  of  Physical  and  Voluntary 

Depravity       « 303 

Art.  III. — Differences  of  Obedient  Acts  in  Excel- 
lence    .........,,,  366 


The  Views  in  Theology  will  continue  to  be  published 
semi-annually,  in  May  and  November,  and  be  devoted 
chiefly,  as  heretofore,  to  discussion  on  the  Doctrines  of 
Religion.  Four  numbers  will  form  a  volume.  Those  who 
desire  the  work,  will  please  to  give  notice  to  the  publisher, 
at  148  Nassau-street.  Ministers  and  theological  students, 
of  whatever  denomination,  will  receive  it,  if  desired,  with- 
out charge. 


THE  HOLY  SPIRIT'S 
REGENERATING  INFLUENCES. 


None  of  the  views,  perhaps,  which  it  has  been  the  object 
of  this  work  to  exhibit,  have  met  with  a  more  reluctant  acqui- 
escence, than  those  which  respect  the  instrumentality  of  moral 
means  in  the  great  work  of  regeneration.  Their  adoption, 
it  has  been  thought,  .nust  naturally  involve  a  modification 
of  several  other  branches  of  the  prevalent  system,  beside 
that  to  which  it  is  most  immediately  opposed,  and  carry 
along  with  it,  important  changes  in  the  methods  of  theolo- 
gical instruction;  and  grave  apprehensions  have  accordingly 
been  expressed  by  some  respecting  the  utility  of  their  incul- 
cation ;  and,  by  others,  still  graver  doubts  of  their  truth.  No 
adequate  grounds,  however,  for  those  apprehensions,  have, 
to  my  judgment,  been  exhibited,  nor  any  convincing  proofs 
that  this  portion  of  the  views,  on  which  I  have  taken  occa- 
sion to  dwell,  is  not  sustained  by  as  indubitable  evidence  as 
any  other  branch  of  the  system  to  which  it  belongs,  and 
fraught  with  as  just  claims  to  assent  and  avowal ;  nor  that, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  doctrine  which  it  is  its  object  to  su- 
persede, is  not  as  obviously  erroneous  as  any  of  its  asso- 
ciated positions,  and  as  fruitful  of  pernicious  influences.     It 

34 


270 


is  indubitably  a  subject  of  high  importance.  The  views 
which  are  formed  of  it,  necessarily  modify  essentially  our 
whole  theological  system,  and  extend  their  influence  to  our 
apprehensions  of  duty  and  sense  of  obligation.  It  merits 
therefore,  from  all,  a  patient  consideration,  and  impartial 
judgment. 

Whatever  conclusions  may  be  entertained  respecting  the 
truth  or  error  of  either  of  the  doctrines  on  the  subject,  no 
doubt  can  be  felt  that  they  are  inseparably  involved  in  the 
systems  to  which  they  respectively  belong,  and  that  which- 
ever of  them  is  sustained  or  overthrown,  must  carry  along 
with  it  the  support  or  subversion  of  the  scheme  of  which 
it  forms  a  part.  That  such  is  the  fact  with  the  system 
which  the  Calvinistic  churches,  generally,  have  heretofore 
entertained,  no  question  can  exist.  That  doctrine,  on  the 
one  hand,  not  only  specifically  denies  that  the  instrumen- 
tality of  moral  means  is  ever  employed  by  the  Spirit  of 
God  in  the  work  of  renovation,  but  represents  the  mind  as 
totally  incapable  of  being  regenerated,  even  by  his  influ- 
ences, through  their  instrumentality  ;  and,  affirms  on  the 
other,  that  it  is  changed  by  an  agency  that  is  wholly  inde- 
pendent and  exclusive  of  their  aid  ;  and  on  the  ground 
that  the  object  of  regeneration  itself  is,  to  remove  a  de- 
praved taste  or  disposition,  which,  by  the  necessity  of  its 
nature,  makes  all  the  moral  influence  that  reaches  the  mind, 
— no  matter  what  its  nature  may  be,  nor  by  what  agency  it 
may  be  brought  to  act  on  it, — inevitably  the  mere  instru- 
ment of  excitement  to  sin.  The  doctrine  is  thus  a  neces- 
sary inference  from  the  theory  of  a  constitutional  aversion 
to  holiness,  and  relish  for  transgression,  on  which  it  is 
founded,  and  must  stand  or  fall,  as  that  scheme  is  main- 
tained or  overthrown.     Tlie  intimacy  with  which  they  are 


271 


connected,  and  the  distinctness  with  which  they  are  taught, 
may  be  seen  from  the  following  specimens. 

"  It  has  been  extensively  supposed  that  the  Spirit  of  Grace  regen- 
erates mankind,  by  comniunicating  to  thein  new,  clearer  and  juster 
views  of  spiritual  objects."  "  Yet  it  appears  to  me  clear  that  this  ac- 
count is  not  scriptural  nor  just.  Without  a  relish  for  spiritual  objects, 
I  cannot  see  that  any  discoveries  concerning  them,  however  clear  and 
bright,  can  render  them  pleasing  to  the  soul.  If  they  are  unploas- 
ing  in  their  very  nature,  they  cannot  be  made  agreeable  by  having 
that  nature  unfolded  more  clearly.  He  who  disrelishes  the  taste  of 
wine,  will  not  relish  it  the  more,  the  more  dis^tinctly  and  perfectly  he 
perceives  that  taste.  To  enable  him  to  relish  it,  it  seems  indispensa- 
ble that  his  own  taste  should  be  changed,  and  in  this  manner  jilted  to 
realize  the  pleasantness  of  wine." 

"  But  the  great  difficulty  in  the  present  case  is  this  :  the  nature  of 
the  object  perceived  is  disrelished.  The  more  then  it  is  perceived, 
the  more  it  must  be  disrelished,  of  course,  so  long  as  the  present  taste 
continues.  It  seems  therefore  indispensable,  in  order  to  the  usefulness 
of  such  superior  light  to  tiie  mind,  that  its  relish  with  respect  to 
spiritual  objects,  should  first  be  changed.  In  this  case  the  clearer 
and  brighter  the  views  of  such  objects  are,  the  more  pleasing  they 
may  be  expected  to  become  to  the  mind." — Dvvight's  Theology,  Vol. 
II.  p.  422. 

"  It  is  impossible  that  a  new  disposition  should  be  produced  in  a 
natural  (I  may  add,  or  even  in  a  supernatural,)  way,  by  the  influence 
of  motives.  Motives,  as  objects  of  love  or  aversion,  occasion  the 
heart  to  act  according  to  its  existing  disposition;  and  there  their  power 
ends."  "  The  power  which  changes  tlie  heart,  is  innnediate,  acting- 
through  no  second  cause,  producing  its  effect  by  no  instrument." — 
Park-street  Lectures,  p.  154,  Ir>9. 

"  If  man  is  dead  in  the  moral  sense,  that  is,  has  lost  all  principles 
of  true  virtue  entirely,  he  is  as  absolutely  beyond  the  reach  of  all 
means  as  to  their  bringing  him  to  life  again,  as  one  that  is  dead  in 
the  natural  sense.  Moral  means  can  only  work  upon  such  moral 
principles  as  they  find  to  icork  upon.  They  catmot  produce  a  new  na- 
ture, new  principles  of  action,  any  more  than  natural  means  can 
make  new  life  for  themselves  to  work  upon,  in  a  dead  carcass." — 
Smalley's  Sermon  on  Natural  Ability. 


272 


The  representations  respecting  the  agency  by  which  regen- 
eration is  accomplished,  with  which  we  are  presented  in  these 
passages, — and  which  are  in  accordance  with  the  statements 
that  have  been  generally  made  in  the  Calvinistic  churches  of 
this  country — thus  obviously  have  their  whole  foundation  in 
that  theory  of  depravity,  with  which  they  are  connected.  The 
reason  alleged  by  their  authors,  for  regarding  the  doctrine  of 
renovation  through  the  instrumentality  of  truth,  as  thus  radi- 
cally erroneous  and  absurd,  is,  that  from  the  mind's  depraved 
taste,  all  motives  to  holiness,  even  if  presented  and  urged  by 
a  "  supernaturaV  ]:ower,  must,  from  the  necessity  of  their 
nature,  prompt  to  sin,  instead  of  holiness ;  that  they  can 
only  "  occasion  the  heart  to  act  according  to  its  existing 
disposition."  They  accordingly  formally  propound  the 
doctrine,  as  a  dictate  alike  of  reason  and  scripture,  that 
the  Spirit  renews  the  mind  by  an  agency  wholly  exclusive  of 
the  instrumentality  of  moral  means,  and  against  their  influ- 
ence ;  and  the  projiriety  of  their  inference  clearly  depends 
wholly  on  the  truth  of  the  theory  from  which  it  is  deduced. 
If  no  such  constitutional  taste,  as  their  scheme  represents, 
pertains  to  the  unrenewed  mind,  and  consequently  the  re- 
generating agency  is  not  employed  in  its  removal,  then  no 
such  ground  exists  as  they  allege,  for  the  denial  of  the  pos- 
sible and  actual  instrumentality  of  moral  means,  in  achiev- 
ing tliat  change ;  and,  accordingly,  the  abandonment  of 
their  theory  of  depravity,  should  carry  along  with  it  the 
relinquishment  also  of  their  inference  respecting  the  nature 
of  the  regenerating  influences.  To  continue  to  adhere  to 
the  inference,  after  the  premises  are  discarded,  is  to  attempt 
to  sustain  a  superstructure  without  a  foundation. 

There  is,  in  like  manner,  as  I  shall  have  occasion  here- 
after to  show,  an  equally  indissoluble  connexion  between 


273 


the  views,  which  I  have  advanced  respecting  the  nature  of 
the  mind,  and  the  conclusion,  that  regeneration  is  wrought 
through  the  instrumentality  of  a  moral  influence :  and  the 
adoption  of  the  one,  must,  in  all  logical  propriety,  involve 
the  inference  and  approval  of  the  other. 

What  now,  it  becomes  the  friends  of  these  systems,  impar- 
tially to  inquire,  are  their  respective  merits  ?  Which  of  the 
decisions  respecting  them,  rests  on  grounds  that  are  clearly 
vindicable,  and  entitled  to  assent  ?  To  me  the  reasons  on 
which  the  first  rests,  seem  utterly  inadequate  to  the  support 
of  so  momentous  a  superstructure,  and  the  difficulties  with 
which  it  is  beset,  to  be  insurmountable  obstacles  to  its  ra- 
tional adoption. 

I.  The  first  objection  to  the  doctrine,  that  regeneration 
is  wrought  by  an  influence  wholly  exclusive  of  moral  means, 
is,  that  it  is  predicated  on  the  llieory  of  a  specific  constitu- 
tional taste  for  sin  and  aversion  to  holiness,  that  necessarily 
renders  every  moral  influence  that  reaches  it,  no  matter  of 
what  perceptions  it  may  be  made  up,  a  mere  temptation  to 
sin  ; — a  theory  which  has  hitherto  been  "  assumed,"  as  one 
of  its  advocates  significantly  admitted,  never  proved  ;  and 
assumed  against  the  most  incontrovertible  and  essential 
facts.  Before  this  stupendous  system,  however,  of  inference 
and  assertion,  respecting  the  total  inadequacy  and  inappro- 
priateness  of  truth,  as  an  instrument  of  renewing  the  mind, 
and  the  necessity  of  a  physical  agency,  wholly  exclusive  of 
means,  to  accomplish  that  change,  can  offer  the  slightest 
claim  to  our  assent,  it  must  be  demonstrated  on  clear  and 
indisputable  ground,  that  a  taste  like  that  on  which  it  is  pre- 
dicated, actually  exists,  and  is  armed  with  the  terrific  power 
and  fraught  with  the  fatal  influence  which  are  ascribed  to 
it.     But  no  such  demonstration,  as  I  have  shown  in  a  former 


274 


number,  can  be  made  out,  without  placing  that  taste  among 
the  essentia!  attributes  of  our  nature,  and  involving  the  sys- 
tem accordingly,  in  all  the  odious  and  insuperable  difficul- 
ties which  perplex  the  scheme  of  physical  depravity.  The 
friends  of  this  doctrine,  therefore,  if  they  adhere  to  its  in- 
culcation, must  consent  to  encounter  those  difficulties,  like- 
wise, in  all  their  magnitude,  and  struggle  against  their 
pressure,  or  sink  beneath  their  weight. 

II.  The  next  difficulty  with  which  this  doctrine  is  press- 
ed, is,  as  miglit  be  expected  of  a  mere  inference  from  such 
a  theory,  that  it  does  not  enjoy  the  countenance  of  any 
specific  statement,  or  obvious  intimation,  on  the  page  of  re- 
velation. No  passage  can  be  adduced  from  the  volume  of 
inspiration,  presenting  the  faintest  indication  that  the  re- 
newal of  the  mind,  is,  and  must  be,  accomplished  by  an 
agency  that  wholly  supersedes  and  excludes  the  influence 
of  perceptions  and  emotions  !  The  passages  which  have 
hitherto  been  alleged  for  the  purpose,  have  only  served  to 
show  how  unauthorized  and  hopeless  a  task  they  undertake, 
who  attempt  to  sustain  the  doctrine,  by  authority  from  the 
word  of  God.  Of  the  glaring  misapplication  of  the  scrip- 
tures, and  inconclusive  reasoning  into  which  they  have 
fallen,  several  examples  were  noticed  in  the  first  number  of 
the  second  volume  of  this  work  ;  and  it  were  easy  to  add 
a  multitude  of  others.  They  all  mistake  a  simple  ascrip- 
tion to  the  Holy  Spirit,  of  tlie  renovation  of  the  mind,  or 
statement  that  his  agency  is  necessary  to  the  accomplish- 
ment of  that  change,  for  a  formal  assertion  that  his  agency 
is,  and  must  be,  of  that  particular  species  and  that  only, 
which  their  scheme  represents  him  as  exerting  ;  and  are, 
accordingly,  mere  assumptions  of  the  point  which  it  is  their 
business  to  demonstrate. 


275 

III.  It  is  at  direct  variance  with  the  representations  of 
the  scriptuits,  that  regeneration  is  accomplislied  through 
the  instrumentality  of  truth. 

*'  Of  his  own  will  begat  he  us  with  the  word  of  truth." 
This  is  a  direct  assertion  that  the  renovation  of  those  to 
whom  it  refers,  was  wrought  through  the  instrumentality  of 
truth  ;  and  it  forms  a  just  ground  for  the  conclusion  that 
such  is  universally  the  mode  of  its  production,  unless  it 
can  be  shown  from  some  other  equally  explicit  passage,  that 
in  other  instances  it  is  wrought  by  an  agency  that  dispenses 
with  the  presence  and  instrumentality  of  the  divine  word. 
To  maintain  without  any  such  authority',  in  the  face  of  this 
and  similar  declarations,  the  doctrine  of  a  mere  physical 
agency,  is  as  inconsistent  with  the  laws  of  logic,  as  it  is 
with  a  becoming  reverence  of  the  word  of  God.  There  is 
no  juster  rule  of  interpretation,  than  that  which  requires  us 
to  take  the  plain  statements  of  the  sacred  volume  as  our 
guide  in  all  our  conclusions  respecting  the  metaphysical 
truths  which  it  is  regarded  as  developing  ;  and  imperatively 
forbids  us  to  construct  theories  which  are  not  only  without 
authority  from  its  declarations,  but  oblige  us  to  disregard,  to 
limit,  or  to  modify  the  import  of  its  obvious  representations, 
in  order  to  make  room  for  the  results  of  our  logic,  or  the 
conceptions  of  fancy.  But  the  theory  in  question  is  clearly 
of  this  character.  It  not  only  cannot  claim  the  open  sanc- 
tion of  a  solitary  passage  of  the  sacred  word  ;  but  stands 
in  direct  contradiction  to  the  forecited  declaration  from  its 
pages,  and  is  held  and  inculcated,  not  because  it  is  seen 
indubitably  to  be  taught  in  the  scriptures,  but  because  it 
results  from  a  philosophical  theory. 

IV.  It  is  equally  without  authority  from  the  sacred 
volume,  in  its  representations  that  the  regenerating  influ- 


276 


ences  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  are  of  a  wholly  difTerent  nature 
from  those  which  are  employed  in  the  conviction  of  men 
previously  to  their  first  obedience,  and  in  their  sanctification 
subsequently  to  that  period. 

The  usual  representation  is,  that  his  renewing  agency 
is  solely  employed, — not  as  in  sanctification  in  communicat- 
ing to  the  mind  such  apprehensions  of  divine  things  as  are 
adequate  to  turn  it  to  penitence,  submission,  and  love, — 
but  in  implanting  in  it  a  constitutional  relish  for  holiness, 
by  which  the  moral  means  it  had  before  enjoyed,  on  their 
being  re-presented  to  its  notice,  naturally  produce  those 
effects.  Where,  however,  are  there  any  grounds  in  the 
word  of  God  for  these  distinctions  in  respect  to  the  nature 
and  effects  of  his  agency  f  Who,  that  looks  at  them  with  im- 
partialit}',  can  fail  to  see  that  they  are  mere  inferences  from 
the  philosophical  system  which  their  authors  entertain, 
without  any  sanction  whatever  from  ihe  volume  of  divine 
truth  ? 

V.  The  views  presented  by  this  theory  of  the  effect  ac- 
complished by  the  Holy  Spirit,  are  irreconcilable  with  the 
commands  and  exhortations  to  cease  from  sin  and  render 
immediate  obedience,  which  are  addressed  in  the  word  of 
God  to  the  unrenewed. 

The  Most  High  in  all  his  legislation  over  the  impenitent, 
obviously  proceeds  on  the  ground  that  the  obedience  re- 
quired, lies  wholly  within  their  power;  or  is  such  as  they 
are  fitted  by  tlieir  faculties  to  render  ;  and  it  is  on  their 
possession  of  that  imputed  capacity,  as  indisputably,  that 
the  rectitude  of  his  requirements  depends.  Were  they  con- 
stitutionally incapable  of  obedience,  his  administration, 
instead  of  beaming  with  the  glories  of  wisdom  and  btn?- 
volence,  would  violate  the  plainest  dictates  of  justice.     If 


277 

there  is  any  one  position  that  enjoys  the  sanction  of  com'* 
mon  sense,  and  the  clear  conviction  of  which  is  essential  to 
the  vindication  of  his  government,  it  is  that  he  contemplates 
his  creatures  in  all  the  measures  of  his  administration,  pre- 
cisely as  they  are  in  nature  and  condition,  and  adapts 
his  treatment  to  their  constitutions ;  that  he  neither  disre- 
gards in  his  requirements  the  extent,  nor  the  limits  of  their 
powers,  nor  makes  any  thing  else  than  their  capacities,  the 
measure  of  their  obligations.  To  represent,  as  some  have 
done,  that  his  government  is  not  conformed  to  the  nature 
of  man  as  he  now  exists,  but  wholly  transcends  his  ability ; 
is  to  accuse  it  of  infinite  injustice.  No  more  dread  im- 
peachment of  his  wisdom  and  goodness  can  be  offered,  than 
to  represent  him  in  all  the  acts  of  his  government,  as  legis- 
lating— not  over  the  race  of  beings  who  are  the  actual 
subjects  of  his  sway — but  only  over  a  merely  remembered 
nature,  essentially  unlike  in  powers  and  susceptibilities, 
that  once  glowed  for  a  few  hours  in  the  beauties  of  holiness 
beneath  his  smile  in  the  vales  of  Paradise,  and  then  at  the 
contaminating  touch  of  sin,  forever  vanished  from  existence. 
Such  is,  however,  in  truth,  the  representation  of  his  gov- 
ernment which  the  scheme  under  consideration  presents  ; 
as  it  exhibits  the  effect  which  it  is  the  object  of  the  Spirit's 
agency  to  produce,  and  to  which  the  Most  High  requires 
the  impenitent  themselves  to  give  birth,  as  lying  utterly 
without  the  reach  of  their  capacity. 

VI.  These  representations  of  the  nature  and  effects  of 
the  regenerating  agency,  do  not  receive  any  confirmation 
from  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  nor  support  from  the 
facts  that  fall  within  the  reach  of  observation,  but  are  as 
irreconcilable  with  these,  as  with  the  representations  of  the 
divine  word.   The  renewed  are  never  sensible  of  a  physical 

35 


27ff 

agency  breaking  up  as  it  were  the  foundations  of  their 
moral  constitution,  by  eradicating  one  taste  and  implanting 
another  in  its  place :  nor  ever  exhibit  to  others  any  indica- 
tions of  their  having  undergone  so  momentous  a  change. 
They  are  conscious  on  the  contrary  that  they  are  identically 
the  same  beings  in  powers  and  susceptibilities,  as  they  were 
before  their  regeneration  ;  and  that  that  change  in  their 
affections  is  the  result  solely  of  corresponding  changes  in 
their  views  ;  that  they  love,  fear,  believe,  are  penitent  and 
humble,  distrustfu^l  of  themselves  and  confident  in  God, 
because  of  the  new  and  fit  apprehensions  with  which  their 
minds  have  become  filled,  of  the  great  objects  toward  which 
their  affections  are  exerted. 

Such  are  some  of  the  urgent  difficulties  with  which  this 
theory  of  the  regenerating  agency  is  beset. 

The  adherents,  however,  to  this  scheme,  are  not  accus- 
tomed to  regard  the  perplexities  with  which  it  is  fraught, 
as  wholly  peculiar  to  their  views,  but  have  objections  of 
error  and  absurdity  to  retort  on  the  opposite  hypothesis,  as 
well  as  to  avert  from  their  own  ;  and  expect,  before  being 
urged  utterly  to  abandon  their  present  sentiments,  to  be- 
shown  on  what  better  grounds  the  doctrine  of  their  opponents 
rests,  and  what  juster  claims  it  has  ta  offer  to  assent  and 
approval. 

What  then  are  the  import  of  that  doctrine,  the  proofs  of 
its  truth,  and  fit  answers  to  the  objections  with  which  it  is 
assailed  ? 

It  teaches  that  the  Spirit  in  regeneration  is  employed  in- 
aimply  bringing  a  moral  influence  before  the  mind,  that  is 
adequate  to  excite  it  to  obedience  ;  or  that  it  is  by  the 
communication  of  just  and  affecting  apprehensions  of  di- 
vine ti-uth,  and  deternunation  of  the  motives  that  influence 


279 

It,  that  he  turns  it  from  sin  to  holiness.     It  implies  accord- 
ingly that  no  change  of  constitutional  powers  or  suscepti- 
bilities is  produced,  but  simply  through  the  excitement  of 
moral   means,   a    new    exertion  of  the    mind    that   is    in 
accordance  with  the  divine  requirements ;  its  powers  and 
susceptibilities  being  precisely  the  same  before,  as  at  and 
after  the  change,  and  the  motives  that  are  brought  to  act 
on  it  at  that  crisis,  exerting  their  influence  in  accordance 
with  the  laws  that  govern  their  agency  on  all  other  occasions. 
Motives  are  the  seen  and  felt  reasons  for  which  the  mind 
chooses,  and  puts  forth  the  choices  which  it  does  j  and  lie 
wholly  therefore  in  its  perceptions  and  involuntary  emotions. 
The  various  operations  of  the  mind  may  be  comprised  in 
three  great  classes  :  perceptions,  emotions,  and  volitions. 
Its  perceptions  are  its  sensations  and  ideas  that  arise  by 
reflection  and  suggestion  ;  or  its  consciousness  of  the  im- 
pressions made   on  it   through  the   corporeal   organs,  by 
external  objects  ;  and  its  apprehensions  of  immaterial  exis- 
tences, relations,  truths,  and  actions. 

Its  emotions  are  the  cotemporaneous  feelings  of  approval 
or  disapprobation,  pleasure  or  pain,  which  are  instinctively 
awakened  in  it  by  perceptions,  and  consist  of  three  classes  ; 
those  which  are  directly  excited  by  the  action  of  external 
objects  on  the  senses, — those  to  which  its  supersensual  con- 
ceptions or  views  of  other  objects,  truths  or  events  give 
birth, — and  those  which  are  awakened  by  its  apprehension 
of  the  good  or  evil  character  of  its  voluntary  actions. 

Its  volitions  are  its  choices  or  rejection  of  those  emotions, 
or  the  objects  by  which  they  are  excited,  from  seen  and  felt 
reasons  of  happiness  or  duty  ;  and  its  putting  forth  acts  for 
the  purpose  of  reproducing  those  perceptions  and  emotions 
which  it  prefers,  or  gaining  the  means  of  their  reproduction. 


280 

To  bring  a  moral  influence  to  act  on  it,  is  to  present  to 
it  perceptions  that  instinctively  awaken  its  desires  or  aver- 
sion, and  prompt  it  to  actions  that  have  relation  to  the 
divine  law  ;  or  to  excite  in  it  reasons  for  the  exertion  of 
choices. 

To  these  positions  all  parties  will  probably  assent ;  and 
the  whole  ground  accordingly  of  the  ultimate  difference  of 
the  two  schemes  is,  the  assumption  by  the  advocates  of  the 
current  doctrine,  that  no  capability  whatever  of  excitement 
to  obedience  through  apprehensions  of  spiritual  objects, 
pertains  to  the  mind,  antecedently  to  regeneration  ;  but 
that  its  nature  is  such,  tliat  all  possible  perceptions  of  them, — 
no  matter  to  what  truths  they  relate,  in  what  relations  they 
are  contemplated,  nor  to  what  extent  they  are  carried, — 
instinctively  and  necessarily  excite  its  aversion.  The  whole 
problem  therefore  of  the  truth  or  error  of  these  differing 
views,  lies  in  the  question  whether  such  a  susceptibility  does, 
or  does  not  belong  to  the  mind  ;  or  whether,  in  other  words, 
without  producing  any  change  in  its  physical  constitution, 
it  is  possible  to  the  Holy  Spirit  to  transfuse  into  it  such  a 
species  and  combination  of  views  as  to  prompt  it  to  obedi- 
ence, and  give  birth,  through  that  medium,  to  all  the  varied 
phenomena  of  regeneration.  If  the  accomplishment  of 
that  effect  is  possible,  and  the  mind  possesses  therefore  the 
same  capabilit}'  of  excitement  to  obedience,  by  a  spiritual 
influence,  through  apprehensions  of  divine  objects,  before, 
as  subsequently  to  regeneration,  then,  of  course,  no  alter- 
ation needs  to  be  wrought,  at  that  change,  in  its  constitu- 
tional attributes,  and  no  ground  exists  for  the  supposition 
of  such  a  renovating  agency  as  the  prevalent  theory  con- 
templates. If  no  new  susceptibility  is  communicated,  nor 
pld  one  extinguished,  then  obviously  the  only  eft'ect  accom- 


281 

plished,  is  such  an  excitement  of  the  susceptibilities  that 
previously  belonged  to  the  mind,  as  decisively  to  sway  it 
to  obedient  choices ;  and  as  there  is  no  known  or  conceiv- 
able mode  of  determining  choices,  but  through  the  influ- 
ence of  motives,  nor  any  motives  but  perceptions  that  in- 
stinctively affect  the  susceptibilities  of  enjoyment  or  sense 
of  duty,  it  results  inevitably  that  the  mode  of  its  being 
prompted  to  that  obedience,  is  that  of  a  moral  instrumen- 
tality. 

There  is  no  medium,  therefore,  between  the  doctrine,  on 
the  one  hand,  that  no  constitutional  change  is  wrought  in 
the  mind  at  its  renewal,  and  on  the  other,  that  its  regenera- 
tion is  accomplished  through  the  instrumentalit}^  of  moral 
means ;  any  more  than  there  is  between  the  theory  of  con- 
stitutional regeneration,  and  of  physical  depravity  ;  and 
those  who  disclaim  the  latter  doctrine,  are  forced  in  all 
consistency  to  adopt  the  conclusion  respecting  the  others 
to  which  I  have  been  carried. 

I.  The  first  consideration,  then,  which  I  offer  in  confir- 
mation of  the  doctrine,  that  the  Spirit  of  grace  accomplishes 
the  renovation  of  the  heart  by  the  presentation  of  a  moral 
influence,  or  in  other  words,  by  exciting  the  constitutional 
susceptibilities  through  that  mediunij  in  such  a  manner,  as 
to  give  birth  to  obedient  acts — is,  that  no  evidences  exist 
within  the  range  of  our  knowledge,  that  any  other  agency 
than  that  is  needed,  in  order  to  the  production  of  that 
change,  or  can  be  imagined  to  lend  any  aid  to  its  accom- 
plishment. 

Some  such  evidences,  however,  clearly  ought  to  be  pro- 
duced in  support  of  their  views,  by  those  who  define  regen- 
eration to  be  the  implantation  of  a  relish  for  holiness,  which 
capacitates  the  mind  for  the  enjoyment  of  divine  things, 


282 

and  becomes  the  cause  that  perceptions  of  them  prompt  it 
to  obedience,  before  they  can  be  entitled  to  expect  the  ob- 
jections that  have  been  alleg-ed  against  them,  to  be  surren- 
dered, and  their  hypothesis  received,  as  a  just  exposition 
of  that  great  change. 

They  also  who,  while  they  profess  to  disclaim  the  theory 
of  a  constitutional  taste  for  sin,  and  the  implantation  of  an 
opposite  one  in  regeneration,  still  reject  the  doctrine  of  re- 
novation though  a  moral  instrumentality,  are  in  like  man- 
ner bound  to  furnish  decisive  proofs  of  a  necessity  of  a 
different  spiritual  agency,  from  that  which  is  employed  in 
the  presentation  of  truth,  and  an  explanation  of  what  more 
it  is,  that  is  supposed  to  be  needed,  or  can  be  imagined  to 
be  wrought,  in  order  to  turn  the  mind  to  obedience,  before 
any  just  grounds  can  exist  for  withholding  their  assent  from 
the  doctrine  which  I  am  endeavoring  to  sustain.  To  con- 
tinue to  assert  the  necessity  of  a  physical  agency  that  wholly 
dispenses  with  the  instrumentality  and  presence  of  moral 
means,  without  being  able  to  allege  any  end  for  which  it 
can  be  requisite,  or  point  out  any  effect  to  which  it  can  be 
supposed  to  give  birth,  is  only  to  add  confusion  to  the  sub- 
ject, by  continuing  to  reason  on  the  virtual  assumption  of  the 
doctrine  of  physical  depravity,  after  all  belief  of  it  has  been 
formally  disclaimed. 

II.  The  doctrine  of  renovation  through  the  instrumen- 
tality of  moral  means,  is  expressly  taught  in  the  volume  of 
inspiration. 

*'  Being  born  again,  not  of  corruptible  seed,  but  of  in- 
corruptible, by  tiie  word  of  God."  **  Of  his  own  will  begat 
he  us  with  the  word  of  truth."  In  these  passages  it  is  thus 
specifically  stated  that  the  individuals  to  whom  they  relate, 
were  regenerated  by  the  Most  High  through  his  word.     No 


283 


other  meaning-  can  in  any  accordance  with  the  just  laws  of 
mterpretation,  or  with  any  show  of  propriety,  be  ascribed 
to  their  language.     They  establish  this  doctrine,  therefore, 
of  regeneration,  beyond  controversy  in  respect  to  the  per- 
sons to  whom  they  refer  ;  and  the  only  question  is,  whether 
such  is  not  then  equally  the  fact  in  regard  to  all  others  who 
are  subjects  of  the  renovating  agency  ?     And  to  claim  that 
it  is  not,  is  clearly  to  assume  that  there  are  two  kinds  of 
regeneration  essentially  unlike;  one  that  is  wrought  through 
the  instrumentality  of  the  word  of  God,  and  another  that 
is  produced  by  an  agency  wholly  exclusive  of  that  means  : 
— a  position,  however,  which  the  friends   of  the  current 
system  cannot  be  expected  to  adopt.     If  the  individuals 
whom  these    passages  respect,  required  no  other  agency 
m  order  to  their  regeneration,  than  that  which  employed 
the    instrumentality   of  divine   truth,   what   authority  can 
exist  for  assuming  that  any  other,  and  a  wholly  difierent 
influence,  can  be  essential  in  any  other  instance  ;  or  that 
there  can  be  any  other  mode  than  that,  of  changing  the 
heart  ?    To  assume  that  those  individuals  did  not  require  an 
agency  equal  to  that  which  is  indispensable  in  all  other 
cases ;  that  they  needed  one,  indeed,  no  higher  than  that 
which   is  necessary  to  carry  on   the  sanctification   of  all 
others,  after  their  renovation  has  been  accomplished,  is  to 
assume  that  a  most  essential  diversity  exists  in  the  moral 
natures  of  different  members  of  the  human  family  antece- 
dently to  regeneration ;— a   supposition  plainly  not  only 
utterly  unauthorized  by  the  scriptures,  but  wholly  at  vari- 
ance with  all  their  representations  on  the  subject,  and  sub- 
versive of  many  of  their  fundamental  doctrines.     These 
passages  must  therefore  in  all  fairness  be  regarded  as  con- 


284 

rlusively  establishing   the   doctrine  of   renovation    alone, 
through  a  moral  instrumentality. 

III.  These  views  are  furnished  with  decisive  confirmation 
by  the  fact  that  llie  word  of  God  is  represented  by  the 
Spirit  of  inspiration  himself,  as  the  great  instrument  of  his 
influences,  and  his  agency  specifically  exhibited  as  employ- 
ed in  many  instances  in  the  communication  of  truth  for  the 
purposes  of  conviction,  conversion,  and  sanctification. 

Thus  "  the  sword  of  the  Spirit,"  we  are  told,  "  is  the  word 
of  God," — the  great  instrument  by  which  it  is  that  he  leads 
the  mind  to  a  just  sense  of  its  guilt  and  ruin,  reveals  to  it 
the  righteousness  of  God  in  all  the  requirements  and  sanc- 
tions of  his  government,  and  teaches  it  the  necessity  of  a 
change  of  character  in  order  to  its  escape  from  impending 
judgment ;  and  thus  inflicts  the  stroke  of  death  on  its  vain 
and  self-righteous  hopes,  and  constrains  it  in  self-renuncia- 
tion and  submission,  to  ask  with  the  apostle,  "  what  wilt 
thou  have  me  to  do  ?"  So  distinctly  and  formally  indeed  is 
this  great  fact  of  the  instrumentality  of  truth  in  the  work 
of  conviction,  regeneration,  and  sanctification,  recognized 
in  the  sacred  volume,  that  there  are  many  passages  in  which 
these  efiects  are  directly  ascribed  to  the  word  itself,  without 
a  formal  recognition  of  the  Spirit's  agency  ;  precisely  as 
they  are  in  other  passages  attributed  directly  to  the  Spirit, 
without  allusion  to  the  instrumentality  of  the  word.  Thus 
"  the  law  of  the  Lord  is  perfect,  converting  the  soul." 
"  The  word  of  God  is  quick  and  powerful,  and  sharper 
than  any  two-edged  sword,  piercing  even  to  the  dividing 
asunder  of  soul  and  spirit,  and  of  the  joints  and  marrow, 
and  is  a  discerner  of  the  thoughts  and  intents  of  the  heart." 
"  Now  ye  arc  clean  through  the  word  which  I  have  spoken 
unto  you."     "Ye  received  it  not    as   the  word  of  men. 


285 

but  as  it  is  in  truth,  the  word  of  God,  which  effectually 
worketh  also  in  you  who  believe."  In  other  passages  the 
instrumentality  of  truth  and  agency  of  the  Spirit  are  exhi- 
bited in  conjunction,  as  in  the  following  :  "  Ye  have  purified 
your  souls  by  obeying  the  truth  through  the  Spirit."  In 
accordance  with  these  great  facts,  the  Savior  asked  for  his 
disciples  in  his  intercessory  prayer,  "  sanctify  them  through 
thy  truth,  thy  word  is  truth,"  and  added,  "  for  their  sakes 
I  sanctify  myself,  that  they  also  might  be  sanctified  through 
the  truth."  In  conformity  with  this,  we  are  told  by  the 
Apostle,  that  "  Christ  loved  the  church,  and  gave  himself 
for  it,  that  he  might  sanctify  and  cleanse  it,  with  the  washing 
of  water  by  the  word."  He  accordingly  promised  his  dis- 
ciples that  the  Spirit  when  he  came,  "  should  teach  them  all 
things,  and  bring  all  things  to  their  remembrance." 

We  are  thus  clearly  taught  in  the  volume  of  inspiration, 
that  the  Spirit  does  exert  an  agency  on  the  mind  that  is 
employed  in  the  communication  to  it  of  truth,  and  through 
that  medium,  convicts,  renews,  and  sanctifies  it,  and  thus 
produces  all  the  various  classes  of  effects  that  are  ever  in  the 
scriptures  attributed  to  his  agency ;  and  are  taught  it  in 
statements  and  representations — not  that  are  restricted  by 
any  references  to  particular  individuals,  or  circumscribed 
by  applications  to  subordinate  effects, — but  that  are  wholly 
exempt  from  all  such  limitations,  and  that  accordingly  by 
all  just  laws  of  construction  must  be  received  as  descriptive 
of  the  only  influence  he  employs  in  producing  those  effects. 
The  ascription  to  him  therefore  of  this  agency,  is  no  matter 
of  conjecture,  assumption,  or  uncertainty  ;  but  is  founded  on 
the  clear  and  indisputable  declarations  of  his  own  revelation. 
We  must  thence  regard  it  as  the  sole  doctrine  of  his  word  on 
the  subject;  unless  we  would  involve  ourselves  in  the  conclu- 

36 


286 

sion  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  regeneration,  essentially 
unlike,  and  two  species  of  moral  constitution  among  the 
unrenewed,  that  are  fundamentally  dissimilar,  and  in  all  the 
endless  and  inextricable  errors  and  absurdities  of  such  a 
scheme. 

IV.  This  doctrine  receives  decisive  corroboration  from 
the  testimony  of  consciousness. 

The  subjects  of  the  regenerating  agency,  are  never  sen- 
sible of  any  other  change  antecedently  to,  or  cotempora- 
neously  with  their  first  obedient  acts,  besides  what  is  involved 
in  those  acts  themselves,  except  in  their  views  of  the  objects 
toward  which  their  affections  are  newly  exerted.  They  are 
never  conscious  of  the  uprooting,  as  it  were,  from  the  depths 
of  their  constitutions,  of  one  portion  of  their  susceptibili- 
ties, and  the  implantation  in  its  place,  of  a  "  new  sense" 
totally  diverse  in  nature  and  action,  from  every  thing  of 
which  they  had  before  been  sensible.  They  are  aware, 
however,  of  a  vast  and  radical  change  in  their  apprehen- 
sions of  the  objects  by  which  their  first  obedience  is  called 
forth,  and  are  conscious  that  that  change  forms  the  w  hole 
ground  of  the  altered  character  of  their  affections. 

Let  the  question  be  put  to  every  child  of  God  on  earth, 
and  the  answer  will  come  back  alike  from  all,  both  that  they 
loved  and  feared,  adored  and  trusted  God  ;  or  condemned, 
abhorred,  and  wept  over  themselves,  in  their  first  obedient 
acts,  for  precisely  the  same  reasons  as  in  all  subsequent  in- 
stances, and  that  those  reasons  lay  wholly  in  the  new  and 
affecting  views  with  which  their  minds  were  filled,  of  the 
objects  toward  which  their  affections  were  exerted.  And 
such  also  was  the  testimony  of  Paul.  It  was  when  the 
commandment  came  home  into  instant  contact  as  it  were, 
witii   his  spirit,   and   its  just   exhibitions  of  his  relations. 


287 

character  and  condition,  were  flashed  in  resistless  light  on 
his  conviction,  that  he  sunk  beneath  their  power  in  self- 
condemnation  ;— his  vain  hopes  and  self-righteousness  were 
extinguished ;  and  penitence,  submission,  approval  of  God's 
character,  and  joyful  acquiescence,  in  his  new  discovered 
salvation,  took  possession  of  his  mind. 

V.  This  is  the  only  doctrine  on  the  subject,  that  is  con- 
sistent with  the  requirements  addressed  in  the  word  of  God, 
to  the  impenitent. 

In  every  injunction  of  repentance,  love,  faith,  submission, 
or  any  other  act  of  obedience,  the  Most  High  in  effect  re- 
quires the  unrenewed  to  become  new  creatures  in  Christ ; 
and  he  moreover  specifically  commands  them  to  make  to 
themselves  "  a  new  heart."  He  plainly  treats  them,  there- 
fore, in  all  these  injunctions,  as  able  and  under  obligation 
to  yield  the  obedience  which  he  requires  ;  and  the  rectitude 
of  his  government,  is  obviously  dependent  on  their  possess- 
ing the  powers  and  susceptibilities,  that  are  requisite  for  it. 
No  such  competence  however,  can  possibly  pertain  to  their 
constitutions,  if  regeneration,  in  place  of  being  what  the 
doctrine  for  which  I  am  contending  represents, — consists, 
as  the  current  theory  teaches,  in  the  implantation  of  a  new 
*'  susceptibility."  No  power  is  lodged  in  their  constitu- 
tions like  that  which  is  requisite  to  the  production  of  such 
an  effect.  To  give  birth  to  it,  as  an  act  of  obedience,  were 
of  course  impossible,  as  that  would  imply  that  the  suscepti- 
bility is  itself  an  act,  which  the  theory  denies.  And  to  give 
birth  to  it  by  a  voluntary  act,  its  nature  plainly  must  at  least 
be  clearly  apprehended  by  the  mind,  in  order  to  its  being 
an  object  of  specific  volition.  But  it  is  admitted  on  all 
hands,  that  neither  the  nature  of  that  supposed  suscepti- 
bility nor  the  susceptibility  itself,  is  a  subject  of  conscious- 


288 


ness.  Its  nature  neither  is,  therefore,  nor  can  be,  appre- 
hended by  the  mind,  and  consequently  cannot  be  an  object 
of  formal  volition.  If  God  then,  in  enjoining  on  them  to 
make  to  themselves  a  new  heart,  or  yield  obedience  to  his 
will,  required  them  to  give  birth  to  such  a  susceptibility, 
his  requirement  would  plainly  be  unjust.  The  inference 
is  irresistible,  therefore,  that  no  such  implantation  of  a  new 
susceptibility  is  involved  in  regeneration ;  and,  conse- 
quently, that  no  such  agency,  as  that  which  the  theory  of 
that  susceptibility  implies,  is  exerted  by  the  Spirit  in  ac- 
complishing that  change.  It  follows  then,  that  his  influ- 
ences are  of  the  nature  which  the  doctrine  I  am  endeavoring 
to  sustain,  ascribes  to  him,  and  achieve  their  effect  through 
the  instrumentality  of  moral  means. 

VI.  This  view  of  the  divine  agency,  is  recommended  by 
the  consideration,  that  it  is  consistent  with  the  known  nature, 
and  action  of  the  mind,  and  the  only  one  that  can  be  con- 
ceived to  possess  that  character. 

That  the  mind  is  passive  in  the  reception  of  no  incon- 
siderable portion,  at  least,  of  its  perceptions,  is  a  fact  of  uni- 
versal consciousness.  Innumerable  causes  from  without,  are 
perpetually  acting  on  it,  without  any  previous  or  intentional 
cooperation  from  itself;  and  conveying  to  it,  notices  and 
apprehensions  of  external  objects.  One  of  the  chief  offices 
indeed,  of  the  organized  body  in  which  it  is  lodged,  is,  that 
of  enabhng  external  objects,  if  I  may  so  express  myself, 
to  convey  to  it  perceptions  of  themselves. 

It  is,  in  like  manner  to  all  appearance,  scarcely  less  pas- 
sive in  respect  to  a  vast  proportion  of  the  perceptions  which 
take  place  in  it,  by  reflection  and  suggestion ;  or  with  the 
acquisition  of  which  the  instrumentality  of  the  senses,  is 
not  immediately  concerned.     The  seclasses  of  its  apprehen- 


289 

sions  are  not  objects  of  specific  volitions,  nor  the  result  of 
volitions  in  the  same  manner  as  volitions  are  of  perceptions; 
but  spring  up  in  it,  at  least  in  innumerable  instances,  as 
unexpectedly  to  itself,  and  apparently,  as  independently  of 
its  own  agency,  as  do  the  perceptions  excited  in  it  by  exter- 
nal objects.  On  minds  especially  of  quick  sensibility  and 
superior  cultivation,  thoughts  utterly  unanticipated  and 
often  apparently  little  connected  with  what  had  gone  before, 
perpetually  flash  in  seasons  of  excitement  and  strenuous 
eflbrt,  like  unexpected  meteors  that  dart  a  radiance  across 
the  firmament,  and  disappear  again  in  the  depths  from  which 
they  had  emerged.  These  perceptions  take  place  indeed  in 
accordance,  obviously  with  general  laws,  though  laws  that 
differ  apparently  in  some  respects  in  diflerent  minds ;  and 
their  causes  lie,  doubtless,  at  least  chiefly  in  the  nature  of  the 
mind  itself.  Such,  indeed,  would  be  the  necessary  conclu- 
sion of  philosophy  in  respect  to  all,  had  not  the  voice  of 
revelation  apprised  us,  that  for  some  of  them  we  are  indebted 
to  spiritual  agencies  without  us — the  influence  of  the  Crea- 
tor and  of  created  intelligences. 

This  power,  or  susceptibility,  is  obviously  one  of  the  most 
important,  as  it  is  one  of  the  most  wonderful  and  incom- 
prehensible of  the  attributes  of  the  mind.  It  is  the  ave- 
nue through  which  all  abstract  knowledge  and  wisdom, 
gain  their  access  to  the  soul ;  the  channel  by  which  all 
subordinate  spiritual  agencies  transfuse  their  influence  ;  the 
portal  through  which  God  himself  enters,  when  he  descends 
to  consecrate  it  a  temple  for  his  dwelling-place. 

It  is  thus  a  fundamental  law  of  our  being,  that  per- 
ceptions shall  take  place  within  us,  through  the  action  on 
us  of  external  causes,  and  it  involves  accordingly  no  vio- 
lation  of  our  constitution,  nor  infringement  of  our  free- 


290 

dom.  Our  moral  agency  lies  solely  in  voluntary  action 
under  the  excitement  of  the  perceptions  which  are  thus 
transfused  into  our  minds,  or  take  place  there  by  our  own 
agency ;  in  choosing  between  the  species  of  happiness 
which  they  afford,  and  putting  forth  acts  to  prolong  or  re- 
produce those  which  we  prefer,  or  gain  the  means  of  their 
reproduction.  No  injury  whatever  is  offered  to  our  nature 
or  freedom  in  giving  birth  within  us  to  these  perceptions. 
No  violence  was  offered  to  the  mental  constitutions  or 
moral  freedom  of  Judas  and  Ananias,  when  the  tempting 
spirit  of  darkness  put  it  into  the  thoughts  of  one  to  betray 
the  Savior,  and  of  the  other  to  lie  unto  the  Holy  Ghost : 
nor  to  those  of  the  Apostles,  when  without  their  forethought, 
it  was  given  to  them  what  they  should  speak  at  the  bar  of 
judges,  and  the  thrones  of  kings.  Those  suggestions  or 
communications  were  undoubtedly,  in  each  instance,  ac- 
complished in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  their  nature,  and 
such  is  doubtless  the  fact  in  respect  to  the  gracious  influ- 
ences of  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  the  great  work  of  renewing  and 
sanctifying  the  soul. 

Of  any  other  agency,  however,  than  this,  it  is  not  possi- 
ble to  conceive,  that  can  be  exerted  on  it  in  consistency  with 
the  laws  ofits  constitution.  To  uproot  within  it  the  most 
essential  susceptibility  on  which  its  perceptions  had  antece- 
dently acted,  and  implant  an  opposite  one  in  its  place,  were 
obviously  to  change  the  laws  themselves  of  its  action,  in- 
stead of  influencing  it  in  accordance  with  those  with  which 
it  was  originally  constituted. 

VII.  This  is  the  only  species  of  agency,  which,  as  far  as 
can  be  conceived,  it  is  possible  for  us  to  resist. 

The  scriptures  clearly  teach  us  that  wc  arc  capable  of  re- 
sisting the  strivings  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  causing  him  to 


291 

withdraw  his  gracious  influences ;  and  it  is  obviously  con- 
ceivable, if  his  agency  is  exerted  on  us  in  the  manner  which 
I  have  represented.  He  may  be  resisted  by  turning  from  the 
consideration  of  the  truths  which  he  suggests,  struggling 
to  escape  their  impression,  and  making  guilty  choices  while 
under  their  influence :  and  how  frequently  are  examples  of  this 
kind  beheld,  especially  in  seasons  of  religious  excitement. 
How  often  are  persons,  at  such  periods,  seen  endeavoring 
by  violent  efforts,  as  it  were,  to  escape  from  the  presence  of 
alarming  truth,  rushing  away  from  the  individuals  and 
scenes^with  which  it  is  associated,  or  hurrying  into  others 
^hat  promise  effectually  to  drive  it  from  the  notice  ;  and  how 
often,  while  yielding  attention  to  it,  are  they  seen,  by  a 
strange  perverseness,  fixing  their  eye  only  on  those  relations 
which  are  adapted  to  alarm  their  selfishness,  or  exasperate 
their  hate,  and  push  them  on  to  thoughts  impeaching  the 
rectitude  of  God,  and  guiltily  justifying  themselves. 

But  what  resistance  can  be  imagined  to  be  offered  to  an 
influence  like  that  which  the  usual  views  of  regeneration 
represent  as  exerted  on  the  soul, — an  agency  of  which  the 
mind  is  not  only  utterly  unconscious,  but  the  very  eflects  of 
which  also  lie  wholly  concealed  from  it  within  the  depths  of 
its  physical  nature,  and  as  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of  is 
control,  as  are  any  of  its  other  constitutional  susceptibilities  ? 

Vni.  It  is  a  further  recommendation  of  this  doctrine, 
that  it  does  not  involve,  like  other  theories,  any  definition  of 
the  mode  of  the  divine  agency,  but  in  accordance  with  the  re- 
presentations of  the  scriptures,  exhibits  it  as  entirely  unknown. 

No  subject  lies  more  totally  beyond  the  grasp  of  our  appre- 
hension, than  the  grounds  or  causes  within  us  of  our  mental 
operations,  and  the  mode  in  which  they  are  excited  to 
action.     We  know  nothing  even,  nor  are  capable  of  con- 


jecturing  in  what  mode  it  is  that  the  body  acts  on  the  soul, 
so  as  to  excite  in  it  the  perceptions  of  which  it  is  the  occa- 
sion ;  and  are  equally  ignorant  and  incapable  of  conceiv- 
ing the  manner  in  which  the  mind  acts  on  itself,  as  it  were, 
and  produces  those  numerous  events  of  remembrance  and 
reflection,  conception  and  inference,  which  spring  up  in  us 
independently  of  any  perceived  or  known  external  agency^ 
But  it  lies,  if  possible,  still  more  distantly  beyond  the  grasp 
of  our  power,  to  discern  or  conjecture  in  what  manner  it  is 
that  the  infinite  Spirit  influences  those  causes  of  action  in 
us,  and  communicates  to  us  knowledge,  and  gives  birth 
within  us  to  wisdom.  We  are  conscious  only  of  the  efiects 
which  he  produces — not  of  his  agency,  or  the  mode  of  their 
production.  "  The  wind  bloweth  where  it  listeth,  and  thou 
hearest  the  sound  thereof,  but  canst  not  tell  whence  it 
Cometh,  nor  whither  it  goeth.  So  is  every  one  that  is  born 
of  the  Spirit." 

IX.  No  other  obedience  than  such  as,  in  accordance 
with  ihis  doctrine,  is  prompted  by  moral  reasons,  can  either 
be  honorable  to  man,  or  worthy  of  divine  acceptance. 

No  homage  indeed  of  the  soul  can  be  ofiered,  except  it 
spring  from  that  origin.  The  ground  or  reason  of  love, 
must  necessarily  lie  in  the  mind's  apprehensions  of  the  object 
toward  which  it  is  exerted.  To  love  God  for  any  thing 
else  than  what  he  is,  and  is  seen  to  be,  were  either  not 
to  love  him  at  all,  but  a  mere  fiction  substituted  in  his 
place,  or  to  love  him  without  any  reason  whatever  ;  neither 
of  which  could  merit  the  name  of  homage  or  obedience.  And 
the  reason  in  like  manner  in  every  instance  of  the  mind's 
voluntarily  exercising  its  affections  as  it  does,  lies  in  the 
views  with  which  it  is  filled,  of  the  objects  toward  which  its 
volitions  are  put  forth.     Such  is  the  testimony  of  universal 


293 

consciousness  and  observation.  The  new  born  convert 
alleges  it  as  the  reason  of  his  beginning  to  love  God,  that 
while  struggling  amid  the  storms  of  conviction,  appre- 
hensions of  him  and  his  government,  at  length  burst  upon 
his  eye,  immeasurably  differing  from  any  he  had  ever  before 
experienced:  he  beheld  in  one  overpowering  manifestation,  the 
mingled  glories  of  his  wisdom,  justice,  truth,  and  grace  ;  and 
love,  submission,  joy,  and  trust,  instantaneously  filled  and 
transported  his  heart  with  all  the  energy  of  which  he  was  ca- 
pable. And  he  feels  that  those  views  are  the  fit  and  necessary 
grounds  of  such  effects,  and  must  have  exerted  on  him  a  simi- 
lar influence,  had  he  enjoyed  them  at  any  earlier  period.  A 
love,  however,  that  were  it  possible,  should  not  arise  from  the 
mind's  views  of  the  object  toward  which  it  was  exerted,  but 
owe  its  origin  to  a  constitutional  taste  that  necessarily  gave 
birth  to  that  aflection  toward  it,  no  matter  what  apprehen- 
sions of  it  were  entertained,  could  neither  accord  with  any 
thing  known  to  our  experience,  nor  merit  the  approval  of 
God. 

X.  Thisdoctrine  is  finally  recommended  by  its  consistency 
with  the  ascription  of  virtue  to  beings  solely  in  proportion 
to  their  obedient  actions. 

A  being's  praiseworthiness,  according  to  thejudgment  of 
common  sense,  corresponds  solely  to  the  intenseness  and  num- 
ber of  his  virtuous  exercises,  and  has  no  relation  whatever 
to  the  mere  length  of  the  period  that  may  have  elapsed  from 
his  renovation.  His  virtue  consists, — not  in  his  having  a 
constitution,  that  by  the  necessity  of  its  nature  gives  birth 
to  obedient  affections  whenever  their  proper  objects  pass 
within  his  notice — but  simply  n\  his  exerting  such  affections 
towards  them  ;  and  that  class  of  his  volitions  is  thus  the  mea- 
sure of  his  praiseworthiness.     Such  also  is  the  representa- 

37 


294 

lion  of  the  Scriptures,  it  is  solely  according  to  tiie  deeds 
done  in  the  body,  whether  good  or  evil,  the  Savior  assures 
us,  that  men  are  to  he  judged.  Were  regeneration  however 
what  the  current  doctrine  represents  it  to  be,  the  constitution 
must  be,  it  would  seem,  in  some  degree  at  least,  the  mea- 
sure of  one's  excellence,  and  not  the  nature  solely,  and 
number  of  obedient  acts. 

In  strong  objection  however  to  this  doctrine,  it  is  asked, 
how  in  consistency  with  it,  is  it  to  be  explained,  that  men 
are  not  led  earlier  than  they  are  to  the  exercise  of  right  af- 
fections— inasmuch  as  the  same  motives  are  often  previously 
urged  in  the  same  manner  on  their  sensibilities  ? 

The  whole  force  of  this  objection  lests  on  the  propriety 
of  the  assumption,  that  the  same  motives  had  previously,  in 
the  same  combination,  been  urged  on  their  attention.  It  is 
indubitably  certain  however,  that  identically  the  same,  or  si- 
milarly peculiar  apprehensions,  and  in  the  same  connexions, 
had  never  before  reached  their  minds.  Such  will  be  the 
testimony  of  every  renovated  person  to  whom  inquiry  re- 
specting it  may  be  addressed.  They  had  indeed  had  views 
of  some  species  or  other  of  the  same  great  objects,  but  of  a 
widely  differing  nature.  Their  apprehensions  of  God,  ac- 
quired under  the  aids  of  the  ordinary  means  of  gi'ace  only, 
were  limited  by  ignorance  and  inattention,  dimmed  by  un- 
belief, and  discolored  by  passion  ;  and  their  views  of  them- 
selves inflated  by  pride,  and  distorted  by  selfishness.  The 
commandment  had  never  been  brought  home  to  their  sen- 
sibilities, by  the  higher  influences  of  the  Spirit.  They  had 
never  had  any  of  those  realizing  apprehensions  of  God  and  his 
governm»nt,  nor  of  their  own  relations  and  character, 
which  are  communicated  by  him  at  regeneration. 

Of  the  possibility  and  reality  of  greatly  varying  views  of 
the  same  objects  in  different  minds,  at  the  same  period,  and 


295 


in  the  same  minds  at  different  periods,  from  the  action  o( 
merely   ordinary   causes,  none  can  doubt  or  be  ignorant. 
They  are  facts  of  universal  consciousness.     There  is  as 
wide  and  endless  a  diversity,  for  example,  among  the  various 
trains  of  thought  that  pass  through  the  minds  of  a  congre- 
gation  of  worshippers,    in   consequence   solely  of  what 
they  hear,  as  there  is   in  tlie  events  and  actions  of  their 
lives  ;  and  a  corresponding  diversity  accordingly  charac- 
terizes their  emotions.     The  thoughts  that  are  addressed  to 
them  by  the  speaker,  even  if  regarded  with  universal  atten- 
tion, form  but  a  limited  portion  of  those  that  rush  through 
their  minds,  especially  of  such  of  them  as  are  of  vigorous 
recollection  and  keen  sensibility  ;  and  the  more  eloquent 
he  is,  the  greater  is  the  multitude,  variety,  and  force  of  the 
collateral  views  that  flash  on  their  eye.     It  is,  indeed,  tlie 
distinguishing  and  loftiest  influence  of  genuine  oratory,  that 
it  arouses  the  sensibilities  and  energies  of  those   on  whom 
it  is  exerted  to  such  intense  action,  as  to  make  them  to  be- 
come themselves  partakers  of  the  powers  which  excite  them, 
and  teach  their  own  reason  to  send  forth  the  far  glances, 
and  their  fancy  to  vault  on  the  wing  of  genius.     The  un- 
eloquent  speaker  produces,  on  the  other  hand,  precisely  the 
opposite  eflfects  ; — diffuses  lethargy  over  the  understanding, 
and  suffocates  the  imagination. 

Nothing  can  be  more  wide  therefore  of  the  fact,  than  the 
assumption,  if  we  look  at  theinfluences  of  the  ordinary  means 
of  grace  merely,  that  the  same  trains  of  thought  pass  through 
the  minds  of  all  those  who  listen  to  the  same  teachers,  and 
enjoy  the  same  general  means  of  instruction.  The  views, 
emotions,  and  purposes  of  each  are  modified  by  numerous 
causes  beside  those  that  are  common  to  all,  and  causes  va- 
rying greatly  in  their  relative  powers  in  difl!erent  indivi- 
duals.    The  views  that  an  orator  presents  to  an  assembly, 


296 

form  the  ground  work  only,  or  woof  of  their  general  trains 
of  thought,  into  which  the  understanding,  the  memory,  the 
judgment,  and  the  fancy,  interweave  their  own  materials  as 
they  chance  in  each  individual  to  furnish  the  requisite 
means  ;  and  the  results  differ  as  widely  as  the  countenances 
and  characters  of  those  in  whom  tliey  take  place.  He  who 
should  address  an  audience  with  the  expectation  of  transfu- 
sing into  every  listener  the  same  identical  succession  of  per- 
ceptions and  emotions,  without  the  intermixture  of  any 
additional  and  differing  conceptions  from  the  imagination, 
or  suggestions  from  the  memory,  would  exhibit  but  a  very 
imperfect  knowledge  of  the  nature  and  accustomed  action 
of  the  mind,  and  form  but  a  very  inadequate  estimate  of 
the  narrow  limits  within  which  his  power  over  it  is  circum- 
scribed. 

The  objection  being  thus  founded  on  an  entire  misappre- 
hension of  facts,  forms  no  just  obstacle  to  assent  to  the 
doctrine  against  which  it  is  alleged. 

It  is  offered,  however,  as  an  objection  of  much  higher 
importance  to  the  doctrine,  that  it  is  thought  to  involve  a 
fatal  limitation  of  the  power  of  God  over  the  mind,  by  vir- 
tually representing  that  the  Almighty  Spirit  cannot  directly 
convey  truth  to  it  independently  of  second  causes.  No 
intimation,  however,  of  that  kind,  has  ever  been  uttered, 
nor  apprehension  entertained  by  me.  The  doctrine  which 
I  have  questioned,  is,  that  which  teaches,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  the  Spirit  renews  the  mind  through  a  direct  agency, 
wholly  exclusive  of  means  ;  that  in  accomplishing  that 
great  work,  he  is  neither  employed  in  debarring  from  it 
temptation,  nor  in  presenting  to  it  inducements  to  obedience  ; 
and  affirms,  on  the  other,  that  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
effect  to  be  produced,  moral  means  cannot  possibly  have 
any  instrumentality  in  calling  it  into  existence.     How  the 


297 

rejection  of  this  doctrine  can  involve  a  denial  of  the  Spirit's 
power  to  convey  truth  directly  to  the  soul,  without  the  aid 
of  second  causes,  such  as  men  arc  under  the  necessity  oi 
using  in  order  to  gain  access  to  the  minds  and  influence  the 
thoughts  of  one  another,  it  is  not  easy  to  discern.  When, 
however,  it  shall  be  demonstrated,  it  will  form  a  sufficient 
ground  for  abandoning  the  views  which  I  have  advanced, 
as  no  fact  is  more  clearly  conveyed  to  us  in  the  scriptures, 
or  more  consonant  to  reason  and  the  events  of  universal  ex- 
perience, than  that  God  can  directly  approach  the  soul,  and 
transfuse  into  it  without  any  external  instrumentality,  what- 
ever perceptions  he  pleases.  We  have  innumerable  exam- 
ples of  the  exertion  of  this  power  in  the  communication  to 
prophets  of  the  knowledge  of  futurity  in  dreams  and  visions, 
and  in  the  direct  suggestion  to  apostles  and  teachers  of  the 
wisdom  which  they  were  to  utter  when  called  to  stand  in 
the  presence  of  princes,  for  the  sake  of  Christ.  And  it  is 
doubtless  in  essentially  the  same  manner  that  his  influence 
is  exerted  at  all  periods.  No  limitation  therefore  what- 
ever can  be  assigned  or  imagined  of  the  Spirit's  power  over 
the  mind  through  this  medium. 

To  suppose  it,  is  not  only  utterly  unauthorized,  but  wholly 
contradictory  to  the  representations  of  the  sacred  word,  and 
derogatory  to  his  attributes  and  agency.  It  is  indeed  his 
peculiar  office  work,  we  are  taught  in  the  scriptures,  to 
accomplish  these  efiects — to  convince  of  sin,  to  enlighten  in 
the  knowledge  of  Christ,  to  renew  the  mind  in  its  views  and 
afiections  after  the  divine  image,  and  to  slied  abroad  in  it 
the  love  of  God :  as  much,  and  peculiarly  his  official  work, 
as  the  agency  of  Christ  as  Mediator  is  peculiar  to  him.  It 
is  not  to  be  believed,  therefore,  that  the  mind,  which  is  thus 
the  appointed  scene  of  his  agency,  is  wholly  inaccessible  to 
him,  or  that  the  production  of  these  eflects,  which  it  is  his 


296 

chosen  work  to  accomplish,  lies  beyond  the  limits  of  his 
power  : — that  the  f^uilty  spirit  which  it  is  his  office  to  illu- 
minate, purify,  and  convert  into  a  temple  for  his  own 
inhabitation,  is  closed  against  him  by  insurmountable  bar- 
riers ;  and  that  he  must  wait  its  own  spontaneous  permis- 
sion before  he  can  enter  its  portals.  Hopeless  indeed  were 
the  condition  of  men  were  their  regeneration  obstructed  in 
that  manner,  by  impediments,  wiiich  even  omnipotence  itself 
is  inadequate  to  overcome.  How  wretchedly  do  they,  who 
exhibit  such  views  of  human  independence  and  divine  ina- 
bility, deem  of  the  attributes  and  work  of  the  Spirit  of 
Grace  ! 

Such  are  not  the  representations  which  the  Spirit  of  God 
has  conveyed  to  us  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  his  agency  ; 
nor  are  such  the  views  which  consciousness  suggests,  and 
philosophy  sanctions.  None  of  the  creatures  of  his  will 
have  it  in  their  power  in  that  manner  to  bar  their  intellects 
as  they  please  against  the  beams  of  his  truth  ;  to  spread  an 
impenetrable  shield  over  their  consciences  ;  to  shut  up  the 
fountains  of  their  affections  from  his  approaches  :  and  thus 
to  banish  him  forever  from  the  most  essential  portion  of  his 
empire.  In  place  of  that,  every  element  of  the  soul,  all  the 
hidden  springs  of  its  agency,  and  all  the  causes  that  influ- 
ence it,  are  open  to  his  immediate  access,  and  wholly  subject 
to  his  control  ;  and  whatever  changes  in  its  apprehensions 
or  emotions  he  chooses,  lie  within  the  reach  of  his  instant 
accomplishment.  He  can  flash  the  lightnings  of  his  truth 
through  all  its  dark  recesses,  and  disclose  to  it  the  depths  of 
its  guilt  and  ruin  ;  or — fill  it  with  a  vision  of  God  ;  can 
leave  it  to  fix  its  eye  on  those  of  its  relations,  which  awa- 
ken pride  and  selfishness,  or  turn  it  to  successions  of 
thought  that  will  dissolve  it  in  penitence ;  can  excite  it  to 
remorse  by  the  memory  of  the  past,  and  apprehension  by 


299 

anticipations  of  the  future ;  or  can  translate  it  instan- 
taneously, wiienever  he  pleases,  from  those  tempestuous 
scenes,  to  the  cloudless  calm  of  submission,  adoring  won- 
der and  love.  To  question  it,  were  to  assail  the  foundation 
of  his  whole  moral,  as  well  as  providential  administration, 
and  exhibit  his  creatures  in  every  essential  respect,  as 
wholly  superior  to  his  control. 

It  is  a  still  further  obstacle  with  some  to  the  reception  of 
these  views,  that  they  are  regarded  as  involving  a  denial  of 
special  grace  in  the  work  of  regeneration  : — an  objection, 
however,  of  which  I  am  equally  unable  to  discern  any  just 
foundation. 

All  divine  inlluences  are  properly  regarded  as  special 
grace,  that  are  productive  of  the  effects  which  the  scriptures 
exhibit  as  the  fruits  of  the  Spirit  —whether  those  influences 
are  regenerating  or  sanctifying,  and  whether  therefore  their 
fruits  are  the  first  obedient  acts  of  the  renewed,  or  an  obe- 
dience at  some  subsequent  period.  Those  influences  of 
course  give  birth  to  that  obedience,  or  are  efHcacious,  be- 
cause they  are  special,  or  superior  to  ordinary  influences 
which  terminate  in  a  mere  excitement  of  interest  or  con- 
viction ;  and  are  accordingly  denominated  special,  because 
their  nature  and  degree  ai^e  such,  as  to  render  them  effica- 
cious :  and  also  because  they  are  bestowed  in  accomplish- 
ment of  that  electing  grace  which  chose  their  subjects  before 
the  foundation  of  the  world  to  be  heirs  of  salvation. 

But  such  being  the  ground  of  that  designation,  the  doc- 
trine I  am  endeavoring  to  vindicate,  obviously  no  more 
involves  a  denial  that  regeneration  is  a  work  of  special 
grace,  than  the  opposite,  or  any  othei;  doctrine.  The  Holy 
Spirit  is  as  clearly  exhibited  by  it,  as  by  the  prevalent  theory, 
as  the  eiiicient  cause  of  the  existence  of  that  in  the  mind, 


300 

wliich  is  the  reason  of  its  yieldinij^  obedience ;  and  the  dif- 
ference is  simply,  that  on  the  former,  his  agency  is  regarded 
as  employed  in  giving  existence  merely  to  those  apprehen- 
sions which  constitute  its  conscious  reasons  for  obeying  ; 
and  on  the  latter,  in  giving  birth  to  a  relish  for  holiness, 
which  becomes  the  cause  that  its  apprehensions  prove  such 
reasons  for  obedience.  The  one  effect  is  regarded  as 
wrought  by  a  direct  and  sovereign  interposition,  as  truly 
as  the  other  is  supposed  to  be  ;  and  the  agency  by  which 
it  is  produced,  is  as  superior  as  it  is  exhibited  on  the  one 
theory,  as  on  the  other,  to  that  limited  measure  of  which  the 
unrenewed  are  the  subjects. 

This  view  moreover  alone  coincides  with  that  exhibited 
in  the  scriptures,  which  abound  with  examples  of  supplica- 
tion by  the  renewed,  both  for  continued  aid  for  their  own 
protection  from  temptation  and  advancement  to  a  more  per- 
fect holiness,  and  for  the  sauctification  of  others,  through 
the  truth  ; — and  which  must,  of  course,  therefore,  be  re- 
garded as  supplications  for  special,  or  distinguishing  and 
efficacious  grace.  The  Psalmist  doubtless  asked  for  that 
grace,  when  overwhelmed  with  the  memory  of  the  great 
transgressions  into  which  he  had  fallen,  and  sense  of  his 
weakness  and  danger,  he  prayed,  "  create  in  me  a  clean 
heart,  and  take  not  thy  Holy  Spirit  from  me."  Paul  doubt- 
less asked  for  it,  when  he  prayed  for  the  Collossian  be- 
lievers— "  that  they  might  be  filled  with  the  knowledge  of 
his  will,  in  all  wisdom  and  spiritual  understanding,  that 
they  might  walk  worthy  of  the  Lord  unto  all  well  pleasing, 
being  fruitful  in  every  good  work,  and  increasing  in  the 
knowledge  of  God  ;  strengthened  with  all  might,  according 
to  his  glorious  power,  unto  all  patience  and  long-suffering 
with  joyfulut'is ;  giving  thank.^  unto  (he  Father  who  had 


;301 

made  them  meet  to  be  partakers  of  the  inheritance  of  the 
saints  in  light ;  and  had  delivered  them  from  the  power  of 
darkness,  and  translated  them  into  the  kingdom  of  his 
dear  Son."  And  Christ,  likewise,  doubtless  asked  for  special 
grace,  when  praying — not  for  the  world  but  for  those  who 
were  given  to  him  out  of  the  world,  he  asked,  *'  sanctify 
them  through  thy  truth — thy  word  is  truth."  The  suppo- 
sition, therefore,  that  no  influences  that  were  to  renew  and 
sanctify  through  the  instrumentality  of  truth,  could  amount 
to  special  grace,  is  as  inconsistent  with  the  representations 
of  the  scriptures,  as  it  is  with  the  reasons  for  which  that 
designation  is  given  to  the  Spirit's  efficacious  agency,  to 
distinguish  it  from  those  of  his  influences  on  the  impenitent, 
which  never  give  birth  to  obedience.  That  supposition  is 
as  inconsistent  also  with  reason,  as  it  is  with  the  scriptures. 
There  is  no  more  ground  for  the  assumption  that  a  super- 
natural communication  or  suggestion  of  such  apprehensions 
of  divine  things,  as  to  prompt  a  hitherto  rebellious  mind  to 
obedience,  would  not  be  an  act  of  special  grace, — that  is 
superior  in  regard  to  the  degree  of  the  influence  exerted, 
and  distinguishing  in  respect  to  the  favor  by  which  it  was 
bestowed  : — than  there  is  for  the  assumption,  that  a  commu- 
nication of  truth  by  inspiration,  as  to  a  prophet  or  an  apos- 
tle, would  not  be  a  miraculous  act.  The  supposition, 
moreover,  that  no  grace  can  be  special,  unless  it  dispenses 
with  every  instrumentality,  and  by  a  mere  jihysical  agency, 
produces  a  change  in  the  mental  constitution,  is  obnoxious 
to  all  the  objections  that  perplex  the  doctrine  of  physical 
depravity. 

Those  views,  therefore,  of  the  Spirit's  influences,  which 
I  have  presented,  are  in  fact  not  only  compatible  with  the 

38 


302 

doctrine  of  special  grace,  but  are  the  only  views  that  fully 
meet  the  representations  of  the  scriptures  on  that  subject. 

Should  the  truth  of  these  views,  however,  be  admitted, 
it  will  still  perhaps  be  asked — what  benefit  can  arise  from 
such  discussions  of  the  subject,  and  especially  from  its  in- 
troduction into  the  pulpit,  in  place  of  the  more  practical 
doctrines  of  the  gospel  ? 

To  this  I  reply  :  the  object  of  this  discussion  is,  to  pre- 
vent a  continuance  of  those  representations  on  the  subject 
that  are  erroneous  and  fraught  with  a  hurtful  influence,  and 
to  induce  a  substitution  in  their  place,  of  just  and  scriptural 
views — an  object  surely  not  only  legitimate,  but  highly 
importanto 

The  frequent  introduction  of  minute  and  controversial 
disquisitions  respecting  it,  into  the  pulpit,  I  should  neither 
recommend  nor  approve.  It  should  be  limited  at  most  to 
cases  where  erroneous  views  are  found  not  only  to  present 
important  obstacles  to  the  persuasions  of  the  gospel,  but 
to  be  incapable  of  counteraction  by  the  simple  statement 
of  the  truth  respecting  the  subject.  In  general,  however, 
it  will  probably  prove  sufiicient,  if  the  teachers  of  religion, 
without  the  formality  of  a  controversial  discussion,  relin- 
quish the  erroneous  representations  to  which  I  have  objected, 
and  confine  themselves  to  the  doctrine  and  language  of  the 
scriptures — that  the  Spirit  renews  and  sanctifies  the  mind 
through  the  truth ;  and  teach  in  conformity  with  it,  that  his 
influences  are  alike  compatible  with  and  adapted  to  our  nature 
as  voluntary  agents,  and  consistent  with  all  the  doctrines  of 
the  sacred  word  respecting  our  sinfulness  and  dependence, 
with  the  divine  requirements  and  our  obligations,  and  with 
the  electing  and  distinguishing  grace  of  God  toward  the 
heirs  of  salvation. 


THE  DOCTRINES  OF 
PHYSICAL  AND  VOLUNTARY  DEPRAVITY. 


To  one  who  has  attempted  to  influence  the  faith  of  his 
fellow-men  on  the  great  themes  of  revelation  ;  and  espe- 
cially by  the  exhibition  of  views  that  differ  from  those  that 
are  generally  entertained  ;  it  is  a  useful  and  interesting  task, 
when  the  impressions  made  by  his  labors  have  had  oppor- 
tunity to  become  developed,  to  pause  and  inquire  after  their 
nature  : — what  the  reception  is  with  which  his  sentiments 
have  met — whether  the  grounds  on  which  they  were  made  to 
depend   for  their  support,  have  proved   substantial  under 
the  test  of  inquiry  and  opposition — whether  his  views,  when 
transfused  into  the  minds  of  others,  have  proved  fruitful  of 
the  tendencies  with  which  they  seemed  to  himself  to  be 
fraught — whether,  as  they  have   been  intermixed  with  the 
ignorance  and  weakness,  or  knowledge  and  wisdom  of  other 
minds,  they  have  continued  to  retain  their  distinguishing 
character,    and    exert  their    appropriate    influence, — and 
whether  their  failure  to  achieve  the  effects  that  were  antici- 
pated from  them,  if  they  have  failed  in  any  instance,  has 
arisen  from  themselves,  or  rather  from  causes  by  which  they 
were  counteracted,  or  for  which  they  were  not  responsible. 
I  am  prompted  to  inquiries  like  these  at  the  present  time, 


304 

respecting  the  views  which  it  has  been  a  principal  object  of 
this  work  to  disseminate  ;  partly  by  the  objections  that  have 
been  offered  against  them  in  several  recent  publications ; 
and  partly  by  the  differing  speculations  and  peculiar  prac- 
tical measures  that  have  in  some  instances  been  associated 
with  them  by  those  by  whom  they  are  to  some  extent 
entertained. 

The  principal  object  of  this  work  has  been  to  point  out 
what  is  thought  to  be  an  essential  error  in  the  current  rep- 
resentations respecting  the  nature  of  depravity,  and  to  ex- 
hibit a  juster  theory  on  that  and  the  topics  with  which  it  is 
intimately  associated.  The  objection  alleged  against  the 
common  doctrine  on  that  subject  is,  that  it  exhibits  depravity 
as  a  physical  attribute  ;  and  the  considerations  offered  in 
support  of  that  allegation  are,  that  it  represents  it  as  an 
affection  of  nature  in  distinction  from  actions  ;  as  existing 
in  all  individuals  since  the  fall,  antecedently  to  the  commence- 
ment of  moral  agency  ;  as  transmitted  from  one  series  of 
the  race  to  another,  like  other  constitutional  properties, 
by  generation  ;  as  the  sole  cause  that  men  put  forth  the 
disobedient  actions  which  they  exert ;  and  finally,  as  re- 
moved in  regeneration,  by  a  purely  physical  influence,  in 
distinction  from  a  moral  instrumentality.  These  represen- 
tations and  methods  of  reasoning  respecting  it  which  charac- 
terize the  common  doctrine,  and  which  obviously  treat  it  as 
a  mere  constitutional  affection,  are  regarded  as  sufficiently 
verifying  the  charge  of  exhibiting  it  as  a  physical  attribute. 

No  intimation,  however,  is,  or  has  been  offered,  nor  sus- 
picion entertained,  that  they  who  employ  these  representa- 
tions and  modes  of  reasoning,  allow  themselves  to  be  carried 
by  them  to  all  the  exceptionable  conclusions,  to  which  their 
language  and  principles  are,  in  my  judgment,  adpated  to 


3a5 

conduct  them.  In  place  of  that,  the  fact  is,  and  has  at  every 
period  been  distinctly  recognised^  that,  inconsistent  as  it  may 
be,  they,  nevertheless,  formally  hold  and  zealously  inculcate 
most  of  the  essential  truths,  which  their  theory  would  le- 
gitimately lead  them  to  reject.  The  whole  object  aimed 
at  in  this  branch  of  the  discussion  accordingly,  is,  to  de- 
monstrate that  their  principles,  whether  so  regarded  by 
themselves  or  not,  are  suited  to  carry  them  to  the  results 
that  are  involved,  as  construed  by  myself,  in  the  doctrine 
of  physical  depravity. 

I.  In  regard  to  the  discussions  on  this  subject,  the  first 
remark  I  have  to  offer  is,  that  whether  the  conclusion  from 
its  statements  and  reasonings,  that  the  current  doctrine 
exhibits  depravity  as  a  physical  attribute,  is  legitimate 
or  not ;  the  allegations  themselves  on  which  that  conclusion 
is  founded — that  it  imputes  depravity  to  nature  in  distinc- 
tion from  voluntary  agency — that  it  exhibits  it  as  existing 
antecedently  to  the  exertion  of  actions,  and  as  the  cause 
that  those  that  are  exerted  are  sinful, — are  indisputably  cor- 
rect, and  are  fully  sustained  by  the  admissions  and  statements 
— to  which  controversy  respecting  it  has  given  birth — of  the 
parties  whose  views  the  question  most  intimately  respects. 

Of  this,  sufficient  evidence  is  furnished  in  the  recent  dis- 
cussions of  the  subject  by  Dr.  De  Witt,  Dr.  Griffin,  and 
the  Editors  of  the  Biblical  Repertory,  as  is  seen  from  the 
following  passages. 

"  My  object  in  this  discourse  is  to  defend  the  main  principles  com- 
prised in  the  doctrine  of  regeneration.  Those  principles  briefly  are, 
that  the  depravity  of  tlie  unregenerate  man  consists  in  the  loss  of 
original  righteousness,  and  in  an  unconquerable  disposition  to  moral 
evil;  and  that  in  regeneration  the  Holy  Ghost  removes  this  disposi 
tion  to  moral  evil,  and  communicates  to  the  soul  a  disposition  or  prin- 
ciple of  holiness,  which  inclines  it  to  holy  action. 


306 

''  This  view  of  the  subject  presuppotics  a  marked  dilTerence  between 
the  moral  actions  of  men,  and  the  moral  dispositions  or  principles 
which  give  impulse  and  character  to  all  their  moral  eiforte.  The 
doctrine  itself  as  thus  explained,  is  conceived  to  be  clearly  and  fully 
expressed. 

_  "  We  stated,  that  in  regeneration  the  depraved  disposition  of  the 
heart  is  removed  by  tlie  immediate  and  direct  agency  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  and  that  a  new  and  holy  principle,  inclining  the  soul  to  holy 
action,  is  implanted.  In  the  elucidation  of  this  doctrine,  it  was  stated, 
that  both  in  common  experience,  and  in  the  holy  Scriptures,  a  marked 
distinction  is  drawn  between  moral  action,  and  the  moral  disposition, 
or  principle  of  the  mind,  which  gives  impulse  and  character  to  all  its 
moral  efforts. 

"  This  proposition  has  been  recently  made  the  subject  of  strenuous 
controversy,  among  brethren  who,  on  the  great  leading  doctrines  of 
the  gospel,  belong  to  the  same  school  of  theology.  The  doctrine 
which  has  been  stated,  is  conceived  to  be  clearly  and  fully  expressed 
in  Holy  Writ ;  and  to  have  been  embraced  and  professed  from  the 
earliest  periods  of  Christianity.  It  was  maintained  by  Chrysostom, 
Hilary,  Cyprian,  Augustine,  Jerome,  and,  as  you  may  learn,  from  the 
first  two  Provincial  letters  of  the  celebrated  Pascal,  by  the  soundest 
part  of  the  Romish  church.  It  was  supported  by  the  ablest  Reformed 
divines  of  Great  Britain,  of  continental  Europe,  and  of  America.  In 
its  favor  we  find  the  names  of  Luther,  Calvin,  Owen,  Charnock, 
Edwards,  Hopkins,  Bellamy,  and  Dwight.  Here  stood  the  fathers  of 
the  Synod  of  Dort,  and  the  Westminster  divines.  It  is  the  doctrine 
professed  in  the  confessions  of  the  Episcopal,  Presbyterian,  and  Re- 
formed Dutch  churches  in  tlio  United  States." — Sermon  on  Regene- 
ration by  the  late  Rev.  John  De  Witt,  D.  D.  p.  3,4. 

"  By  regeneration  the  Scriptures  sometimes  mean  the  change  both 
in  the  temper,  and  in  the  exercises  which  follow ;  namely,  that  in 
which  the  man  is  active,  as  well  as  that  in  which  he  is  passive,  and 
perhaps  I  may  add  conviction  also." — "The  old  divines  found  it  con- 
venient to  divide  this  change  (throwing  out  conviction)  into  two 
parts.  That  change  in  the  temper,  antecedent  to  exercise,  which  is 
produced  by  the  Spirit,  they  called  regeneration  ;  that  cliangc  which 
consists  in  thuncw  exorcises  of  the  moral  agent,  or  in  liis  actual  turn- 
ing to  God,  they  called  conversion." 

"  There  is  a  taste  or  temper  distinct  from  excrcibe.  There  is  a 
Plated  propensity  to  feci  and  act  thus  and  thus,  which  docs  not  lie 


307 

merely  in  the  stated  mode  of  God's  operation,  but  belongs  to  the  matt, 
and  makes  a  part  of  his  character,  oven  when  the  temper  is  not  in  ex- 
ercise." "  Why  are  we  pleased  with  one  object  rather  than  another:" 
The  answer  from  every  tongue  is,  because  it  is  adapted  to  our  taste- 
Who  can  doubt  that  every  man  has  a  great  variety  of  tastes,  fitted 
to  relish  a  still  greater  variety  of  objects  in  nature,  in  art,  in  science, 
in  literature,  in  business,  in  amusements,  in  society  ?  The  long  dis- 
puted question  about  a  standard  of  taste  turns  on  this,  whether  in 
the  race  at  large,  there  is  such  a  similarity  of  constitution  as  fits 
them  to  relish  the  same  objects,  and  to  be  disgusted  with  the  same. 
These  tastes  which  exist  anterior  to  the  pleasure  or  disgust,  are  cer- 
tainly in  the  mind,  and  are  so  connected  with  desire,  love,  hatred,  and 
other  affections  as  their  cause,  that  they  must  be  referred  to  the 
heart.  Allow  one  of  this  family  of  tastes  to  stand  related  to  divine  ob- 
jects, and  I  have  found  what  I  sought." 

"  You  say  you  cannot  conceive  what  that  temper  is.  But  you  can 
conceive  of  an  appetite  of  the  mind,  antecedent  to  desire,  as  easily 
as  you  can  conceive  of  an  appetite  of  the  body,  antecedent  to  hunger. 
You  can  conceive  of  a  tendency  of  the  heart  to  a  certain  kind  of  ex- 
ercise as  easily  as  you  can  conceive  of  a  heart  prepared  to  exercise  at 
all— as  easily  as  you  can  conceive  of  any  faculty  of  the  mind,  or  of 
the  mind  itself,  distinct  from  exercise.  And  certainly  you  can  con- 
ceive of  this  moral  temper,  as  easily  as  you  can  conceive  of  those 
tastes  which  predispose  men  to  relish  the  beauties  of  nature  and  art? 

"  It  was  the  old  way  of  thinking,  that  every  animal  had  a  nature, 
and  acted  it  out ,-  that  the  horse  acted  thus,  because  it  had  the  nature 
of  a  horse  and  not  of  a  serpent :  that  the  different  natures  of  birds,  fish, 
and  worms,  were  the  causes  of  their  different  actions.  But  now  it 
seems,  there  is  no  cause  of  any  distinctive  animal  action,  in  the  ani- 
mal itself,  except  the  mere  organization  of  brute  matter.  Sin  has 
no  root  in  the  human  soul.  The  heart  acts  so  because  it  acts  so. 
To  make  depravity  the  reason,  would  only  be  to  make  a  thing  the 
cause  of  itself  There  is  nothing  in  the  fountain  which  causes  it  to 
send  forth  bitter  waters  rather  than  sweet.  If  you  say,  the  task 
will  be  as  great  to  find  a  cause  for  the  depraved  temper,  I  answer  .- 
the  well  known  process  of  induction,  is  the  inferring  of  a  general  law 
from  particular  facts.  That  law,  which  is  regarded  as  the  cause  of 
the  facts  arranged  under  it,  may  be  resolved  into  another  still  more 
general,  until  you  come  to  the  most  general  that  can  be  discovered. 
And  for  that,  you  can  assign  no  other  reason  than  that  such  is  the 
will  of  our  Creator.     Now  the  question  is,  whether,  when  you  have 


308 

found  that  the  exercises  of  the  Heart  are  sinful,  you  Jiave  come  to  the 
most  general  conclusion  possible,  or  whether,  from  the  universal  and 
continued  exercise  of  sin,  we  may  not  infer  a  sinful  nature  or  dis' 
posilion  in  the  race,  just  as  we  infer  the  law  of  gravitation  from  the 
frequent  fall  of  heav}'  bodies.  And  if  we  may,  and  can  go  back  no 
farther,  we  are  not  to  be  reproached  with  presenting  a  fact  without 
assigning  a  cause. '' — Dr.  Griffin's  Sermon  On  Regeneration ;  in  the 
National  Preacher,  Vol.  VI.  p.  322—326. 

"  We  gather  from  the  review  itself— that  the  leading  objections 
to  the  new  Divinity,  are  those  which  have  been  urged  from  various 
quarters  against  some  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Christian  Spectator. — 
We  need,  therefore,  be  at  no  loss  for  the  distinguishing  features  of 
the  New  Divinity.  It  starts  with  the  assumption  that  morality  can 
only  be  predicated  of  voluntary  exercises  :  that  all  holiness  and  sin, 
consist  in  acts  of  choice  or  preference." — "  Yet  it  is  in  behalf  of  this 
radical  view  of  the  new  system,  that  tlic  authority  of  Edwards,  Bel- 
lamy, Witherspoon,  D wight,  Griffin,  Woods,  as  well  as  Augustine, 
and  Calvin,  is  quoted  and  arrayed  against  Mr.  Itaud.  Almost  every 
one  of  these  writers,  not  only  disclaims  the  opinion  thus  ascribed  to 
them,  but  endeavors  to  refute  it." 

''It  would  be  an  endless  business  to  quote  all  that  might  be  adduced 
to  prove,  that  Edwards  did  not  hold  tlic  opinion  which  the  reviewer 
imputes  to  him.  There  can,  it  would  seem,  be  no  mistake  as  to  his 
meaning — Neither  is  there  any  room  for  doubt,  as  to  the  sense  in  which 
he  uses  the  words,  disposition,  principle,  tendency,  &c.,  because  he  care- 
fully explains  them,  and  characterizes  the  idea  he  means  to  express,  6y 
every  one  of  the  marks  which  the  reviewer  and  others  give,  in  describ- 
ing what  they  spurn  and  reject  under  the  name  of  principle,' '  holy  or 
sinful  taste.'  They  mean  something  distinclfrom,  and  prior  to,  voli- 
tions ;  so  does  President  Edwards ;  it  is  that  which,  in  the  case  of  Adam, 
to  use  his  own  word,  was  '  concreated  ;'  it  was  a  disposition  to  love — 
not  love  itself— a  relish  for  spiritual  objects,  or  adaptation  of  mind  to 
take  pleasure  in  what  is  excellent ;  it  was  a  kind  of  instinct,  which 
as  to  this  point,  [i.  c.  priority  as  to  the  order  of  nature  to  acts)  he  says, 
is  analogous  to  other  instincts  of  our  nature.  He  even  argues  long 
to  show  that  unless  such  a  principle  of  holiness  existed  in  man  prior 
to  all  acts  of  choice,  he  never  could  become  holy.  Again,  the  '  prin- 
ciple' or  '  disposition'  which  they  object  to,  is  one  which  is  represented 
as  not  only  prior  to  voluntary  e.xerciseb,  but  determines  their  charac- 
ter, and  ia  the  cause  of  their  being  what  they  arc.  So,  precisely, 
President  Edwards ; — '  it  it.  a  foundation  laid  in  the  nature  of  tiie 


309 

soul,  for  a  new  kind  of  exercise,  of  the  faculty  of  the  will.'  This,  he 
assumes  in  the  case  of  Adam,  to  have  existed  prior  to  his  choosing 
God,  and  determined  his  choice  ;  what,  in  the  case  of  men  since  the 
fall  he  assumes  as  the  cause  of  their  universally  sinning ;  and  in 
those  which  are  renewed,  as  the  cause  of  their  holy  exercises.  If 
President  Edwards  did  not  hold  and  teach  the  doctrine,  which  the 
reviewer  rejects  and  denounces,  then  no  man  ever  did  hold  it,  or  ever 
can  express  it.  The  case  is  no  less  plain  with  regard  to  Dr.  Dwight, 
who  also  gives  the  two  characteristic  marks  of  the  kind  of  disposi= 
tion  now  in  question,  viz.  its  priority  to  all  voluntary  exercises,  and  its 
being  the  cause  of  the  character  of  those  exercises-  Both  these  ideas  are 
expressed  with  a  frequency,  clearness,  and  confidence,  which  mark 
this  as  one  of  his  most  settled  opinions." — "Thus,  he  says,  Adam 
was  created  holy  ;  i.  e.  with  holy  or  virtuous  dispositions,  prepense 
to  the  exercise  of  holy  volitions." — "Again,  he  makes  original  sin, 
or  depravity,  derived  from  Adam,  to  consist  in  this  sinful  disposition— 
a  contaminated  moral  nature— and  argues  that  infants  are  depraved 
before  they  are  '  capable  of  moral  action.'" 

"We  have  referred  to  the  leading  confessions  of  the  period  of  the 
Reformation,  to  show  that  they  all  represent,  as  the  constituent,  es- 
sential idea  of  original  sin — a  corrupted  nature — or  hereditary  taint 
derived  from  A  dam,  propagated  by  ordinary  generation,  infecting  the 
whole  race,  and  the  source  or  root  of  all  actual  sin.  This  is  not  the 
doctrine  therefore  of  Calvinists  merely,  but  of  the  Reformed  churches 
generally,  as  it  was  of  the  Catholic  church  before  the  Reformation. 
It  is  the  doctrine  too,  of  the  great  body  of  Armiuians."— Bibhcal  Re- 
pertory, Vol.  IV,  p.  279,  280,  281,  290. 

These  passages,  then, — and  a  multitude  of  similar  import, 
might  be  added  from  other  discussions  to  which  the  con- 
troversy has  given  rise — abundantly  verify  the  accuracy 
of  the  representation  of  the  common  doctrine,  which  is  made 
the  ground  of  the  charge  against  it,  of  exhibiting  depravity 
as  a  physical  attribute — that  it  defines  it  as  an  affection  of 
nature,  represents  it  as  existing  prior  to  the  commence- 
ment of  voluntary  agency,  as  the  cause  of  the  exertion  of 
sinful  actions,  as  transmitted  by  generation,  and  as  remov- 
ed in  regeneration  by  a  purely  physical  agency.     All  these 

39 


310 

are  formally  enumerated,  as  characteristics  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  Reformers,  and  their  successors — Lutherans,  Calvin- 
ists,  and  Arminians, — and  are  represented  as  held  as  gene- 
rally by  the  churches  at  present — with  the  exception  of  such 
as  have  recently  abandoned  them — as  at  any  former  period; 
and  the  denial  by  the  writers  in  the  Christian  Spectator,  and 
the  author  of  the  examination  of  "  The  New  Divinity," 
that  such  is  the  fact,  and  attempt  to  prove  that  in  place  of 
entertaining  these  views,  the  leading  Calvinisls  of  New- 
England  have  never  held  any  thing  on  the  subject,  beyond 
the  doctrine,  that  sin  is  a  mere  attribute  of  actions — not  of 
nature, — is  exhibited  as  a  total  and  flagrant  misrepresenta- 
tion. No  difference,  then,  exists  between  us,  in  respect  to 
the  fact,  that  these  are  exhibited  by  the  doctrine  that  has 
hitherto  prevailed,  as  the  characteristics  of  depravity. 

II.  The  whole  question,  accordingly,  at  issue  on  this 
branch  of  the  subject  between  the  advocates  of  that  doctrine 
and  myself,  is  simply,  whether  a  depravity,  answering  to 
those  characteristics,  may  with  propriety  be  denominated  a 
physical  attribute. 

No  room  exists,  however,  it  seems  to  me  for  disputation 
respecting  it.  There  clearly  are  no  characteristics  that  are 
more  peculiar  to  such  attributes,  or  distinguish  them  more 
widely  from  all  other  affections,  than  those  that  are  enume- 
rated of  this  : — that  it  is  not  a  voluntary  affection,  or  an 
effect  of  volition,  but  a  property  of  nature  ;  that  it  not  only 
exists  antecedently  to  and  independently  of  volition,  but  is 
exempt  from  the  control  of  the  will  likewise  in  the  exertion 
of  its  agency,  and  produces  its  cH'ccts  involuntarily — a  trait 
clearly  that  can  belong  to  nothing  but  a  physical  attribute  ; 
that  it  is  not  a  negation,  or  non-existence  of  a  specific 
quality,  but  is  a  real  existence,  and  a  positive  cause,  exerting 


311 

"  an  incessant  and  a  more  extensive  and  momentous  influence 
than  any  other  power  ;  that  it  comes  into  being  and  is 
continued  in  existence  by  the  same  laws  as  other  constitu- 
tional qualities  ;  and  that  precisely  the  same  agency  from 
the  Spirit  is  requisrte  to  accomplish  its  expulsion  or  trans- 
formation, as  would  be  required  to  achieve  an  equal  change 
in  any  other  attribute.     No  traits  then  can  be  conceived, 
that  could  more  decisively  mark  it  as  a  physical  property 
than  these ;  nor  any  imagined,  that  could  add  in  the  slightest 
degree  to  its  claims  to  that  rank.    If  these  therefore  do  not 
authorize   the   ascription  to  it  of  that  character,  it  may 
safely  be  pronounced  to  be  impossible  to  fix  on  any  that 
can,  or  to  demonstrate  that  any  such  attribute  belongs  to 
the  soul. 

To  this  it  may  perhaps  be  objected,  that  however  these 
considerations  may  seem  to  authorize  such  a  conclusion,  yet 
that  a  sufficient  reason  for  withholding  from  this  depravity 
the  name  of  a  physical  attribute,  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  it 
is  held  to  be  eradicable  from  the  mind,  without  destroying 
or  detracting  from  its  capacity  as  a  moral  agent ;  whereas 
attributes,  that  inhere  in  the  essence  of  the  soul,  and  are 
properly  denominated  physical,  are, essential  not  only  to  its 
intelligent  and  moral  nature,  but  to  its  being. 

The  advocates  of  this  doctrine,  however,  although  they 
do  not  exhibit  this  particular  species  of  moral  taste  or  dis- 
position, as  essential  to  constitute  an  intelligent  and  respon- 
sible agent,  yet  regard  an  attribute  of  essentially  the  same 
nature  and  office,  as  an  indispensable  ingredient  in  such  a 
constitution.  They  not  only  hold  that  on  the  eradication  of 
this,  a  holy  dispo&ition  is  and  must  be  implanted  in  its  place, 
and  that  Adam  was  created  with  such  a  principle  of  recti- 
tude; but  regard  such  a  power,  either  holy  or  unholy,  as 


.312 

essential  in  order  to  the  existence  of  a  susceptibility  of  in- 
fluence from  moral  inducements,  and  a  capacity  for  volition. 
These  views  are  expressed  not  only  by  those  from  whom 
the  foregoing  quotations  are  transcribed,  but  still  more 
clearly  and  emphatically  by  several  of  the  writers  to  whom 
they  allude,  and  whose  doctrines  it  is  their  object  to  defend. 
President  Edwards  says : 

"  Human  nature  must  be  created  with  some  dispositions  :  u  dis- 
position to  relish  some  things  as  good  and  amiable,  and  to  be  averse 
to  other  things  as  odious  and  disagreeable ;  otherwise  it  must  be 
without  any  such  thing  as  inclination  or  will,  it  must  be  perfectly 
indifTerent,  without  preference,  without  choice  ox  aversion  toward 
any  thing  as  agreeable  or  disagreeable.  But  if  it  had  any  concreated 
dispositions  at  all,  they  must  be  either  right  or  wrong  ;  either  agree- 
able or  disagreeable  to  the  nature  of  things." — Edwards's  Works, 
Vol.  vi.  p.  269. 

With  this  representation  accords  likewise  that  of  Dr. 
Smalley,  Dr.  Burton,  and  every  writer  without  exception 
who  concurs  with  those  authors  in  their  views  of  depravity. 
The  assumption  of  the  necessity  of  such  a  moral  taste,  lies 
indeed  at  the  foundation  of  all  their  speculations  on  the 
subject,  and  is  the  whole  ground  of  their  inductive  ar- 
gumentation to  demonstrate  its  existence,  in  one  form  or 
the  other  ascribed  to  it,  in  all  the  individuals  of  our  race. 
Were  it  not  regarded  as  wholly  essential  to  a  capacity 
for  moral  agency,  and  the  exertion  of  voluntary  acts,  no 
force  or  propriety  could  attach  to  their  inference  of  its  ex- 
istence, from  the  actions  that  men  exert.  Although,  there- 
fore, this  taste  or  disposition  may  in  the  judgment  of  those 
wlio  teach  its  existence,  difler  in  its  moral  character,  and 
be  susceptible  of  change  in  the  same  individual  from  good 
to  evil,  and  evil  to  good,  yet  they  hold  that  in  one  or  the 


313 

other  of  the  forms  in  which  it  is  supposed  to  exist,  it  is 
indispensable  to  the  mind's  capacity  for  moral  agency,  and 
as  essential  an  ingredient  in  its  constitution,  as  are  any  of 
the  attributes  that  inhere  in  and  are  inseparable  from  its 
nature. 

It  may  be  still  further  objected  perhaps  to  this  designa- 
tion, that  the  doctrine  of  physical  depravity  was  specifically 
disclaimed  and  rejected  by  the  early  protestants,  and  is  in 
like  manner  disclaimed  by  many  of  those  who  still  hold 
their  views.  The  theory,  however,  of  depravity  which 
they  disclaimed,  differed  most  essentially  from  that  which  I 
regard  their  doctrine  as  involving  ;  as  it  exhibited  the  mind 
itself,  as  identical  with  its  depravity ;  or  denied  the  existence 
of  any  difference  between  its  depravity  and  its  essence  and 
attributes  ;  whilst  the  error  I  have  imputed  to  their  doctrine 
is  simply  that  of  exhibiting  depravity  as  a  physical  attri- 
bute. The  difierence  of  the  doctrine  of  those  theologians 
from  that  which  they  rejected,  is  seen  from  the  following 
passages  from  the  Formula  Concordiae. 

"  A  controversy  has  arisen  among  some  of  the  theologians  of  the 
Augustan  Confession,  respecting  the  nature  of  original  sin ;  one 
party  contending,  as  the  nature  and  essence  of  man  became  totally 
corrupt  through  the  fall  of  Adam,  that  since  that  fall,  his  corrupt 
nature,  substance  or  essence,  or  at  least,  the  chief  and  most  excel- 
lent part  of  his  essence;  that  is,  his  rational  soul  in  its  highest  rela- 
tions or  principal  powers,  is  itself  original  sin  ;  and  that  it  is  there- 
fore called  a  sin  of  nature  or  person,  because  it  is  not  a  thought, 
word,  or  work  of  any  kind,  but  nature  itself,  from  which,  as  from  a 
root,  all  other  sins  arise.  For  that  reason,  therefore,  they  affirm  that 
since  the  fall,  inasmuch  as  nature  is  corrupted  through  sin,  there  ier 
no  difference  whatever  between  man's  nature,  substance,  or  essence, 
and  original  sin. 

"  The  other  party,  however,  asserts  the  contrary;  Ihat  original 
sin  is  not  the  nature,  substance,  or  essenccitself  of  man ;  that  is,  his 


314 

body  and  snul,  which  are  now  in  ug,  ever  have  been  since  the  fall, 
and  will  over  continue  to  bo  the  work  and  creature  of  God :  but  that 
that  original  evil  is  something  in  the  nature  itself  of  man,  his  body, 
soul,  and  all  his  powers ;  namely,  a  deep,  thorough,  horrible,  and  as  to 
language,  inexplicable  corruption  of  hie  nature,  so  that  he  ie  wholly 
divested  of  the  original  righteousness  with  which  he  was  at  first 
created,  and  become  utterly  dead  to  all  spiritual  good,  and  turned  to 
every  evil ;  and  that  it  is  on  account  of  this  corruption  and  innate 
sin,  which  inheres  infixed  in  nature  itself,  that  actual  sins  of  every 
kind  proceed  from  the  heart.  They  affirm  therefore,  that  a  distinc- 
tion is  to  be  maintained  between  the  nature  and  essence  of  depraved 
man,  or  his  soul  and  body,  which  ever  since  the  fall  are  the  work  of 
God,  and  original  sin,  which  is  the  work  of  the  devil,  through  which 
nature  is  depraved. 

"  It  is  clear  indeed  that  christians  ought  not  only  to  acknowledge 
and  speak  of  actual  faults  and  trangressions  of  the  divine  law  as 
sins,  but  likewise  to  regard  that  horrible  and  abominable  hereditary 
disease  through  which  their  whole  nature  is  corrupted,  as  a  pre-em- 
inently awful  sin ;  as  the  source  indeed  and  head  of  all  sine,  from 
which  other  transgressions  spring  as  from  a  root,  and  flow  as  from  a 
fountain.  This  evil,  Luther  was  accustomed  sometimes  to  denomi- 
nate a  sin  of  nature  and  person,  that  he  might  show  that  even  if 
man  were  never  to  think,  speak,  or  do  any  thing  evil,  which  since 
the  fall  is  in  this  life  plainly  impossible  to  human  nature,  yet  that 
nevertheless,  the  nature  or  person  of  man  is  a  sinner ;  that  is,  is 
throughout  its  lowest  depths  and  profoundest  recesses  totally,  in  the 
eye  of  God,  infected,  poisoned,  and  corrtipted  by  original  sin,  as  with 
a  spiritual  leprosy.  On  account  of  this  corruption  and  sin  of  the  first 
pair  accordingly,  man's  nature  or  person  is  accused  by  the  law  of 
God  and  condemned,  so  that  we  arc  by  nature  children  of  wrath, 
and  the  vassals  of  death  and  damnation,  unless  graciously  rescued 
from  those  evils  through  the  merits  of  Christ. 

"  But  although  original  sin  infects  and  corrupts  the  whole  nature 
of  man,  like  a  spiritual  poison,  or  horrible  leprosy,  as  Luther  deno- 
minated it,  so  that  now  the  two  cannot  be  separately  pointed  out  to 
the  eye  in  the  depraved  mass  ;  that  is  nature  by  itself,  and  original 
sin  by  itself;  yet  corrupt  nature  or  the  substance  of  depraved  man, 
body  and  soul,  or  man  himself  as  he  is  created,  in  whom  original 
sin  (Uvolls,  in  respect  to  which  nature,  subst(ince,  and  in  short,  the 
whole  man  is  corrupt — is  not  one  and  identically  the  same  with  original 
sin  which  dwells  in  l»is  nature  and  corrupts  it ;  just  as  m  n  leprous 


315 

body  ;  the  body  infected  with  leprosy,  and  the  leprosy  itself  are  not 
one  and  tlie  same,  and  are  not  to  be  spoken  of  as  such  if  we  would  ex- 
press ourselves  with  propriety  and  accuracy.  A  distinction  is  there- 
fore to  be  maintained  between  our  nature,  such  as  it  was  created  by 
God,  and  is  continued  to  the  present  time,  in  which  original  sin  re- 
sides, and  original  sin  itself  which  resides  in  that  nature.* 


*  "  Orta  est  inter  nonnullos  Augustan©  Confessionis  Theologos  controversia 
do  peccato  originali,  quidnam  hoc  proprie  et  revera  sit.  Una  enim  pars  con- 
tendit,  (cum  per  lapsum  Adoi,  humana  natura  et  essentia  totaliter  corrupta 
sit)  quod  nunc  post  kipsum  hominis  corrupta  natura,  substantia  et  essentia, 
aut  certc  praecipua  et  praestantissima  pars  ipsius  essentia)  (anima  videlicet 
rationalis  in  summo  suo  gradu,  aut  praecipuis  potentiis)  sit  ipsum  peccatam 
originalc,  quod  ideo  voceiur  poccatum  naturae  vel  personae,  quod  non  sit  co- 
gitatio,  verbum,  aut  opus  quoddam,  sed  ipsissima  natura,  e  qua,  tanquam  ex 
radicc,  omnia  alia  peccata  oriantur  :  eamque  ob  causam  affirmarunt,  jam  post 
lapsum  (quandoquidom  natura  per  peccatum  corrupta  est)  nullum  plane  dis- 
crimen  esse,  inter  hominis  naturam,  substantiam,  seu  essentiam,  et  inter  pec- 
catum originis. 

"Altera  vero  pars  contrarium  asscruit ;  Peccatum  videlicet  originalo  non 
esse  ipsam  hominis  naturam.  substantiam,  aut  essentiam,  hoc  est,  ipsius  homi- 
nis corpus 'Ct  animam,  (quae  hodic  in  nobis,  ctiam  post  lapsum  sunt  manent- 
que  Dei  opus  et  crcatura)  sed  malum  illud  originis  esse  aliquid  in  ipsa  hominis 
natura,  corpore,  anima,  omnibusque  viiihus  humanis  :  horrendam  videlicet, 
profundam,  intimam  atque  verbis  inexplicabilem  humanae  naturae  corrup- 
tioneni,  ita,  ut  homo  originali  justitia,  cum  qua  initio  creatus  erat,  penitusspo- 
liatus  careat,  atque  [in  rebus  spiritualibus]  ad  bonum  prorsus  sit  mortuus,  ad 
omne  vero  malum  totus  plane  sit  conversus,  et  ut  propter  banc  naturae  cor- 
ruptionem  et  insitum  ac  innatum  peccatum  (quod  in  ipsa  natura  infixum  hae- 
ret)  e  corde  humano  omnis  generis  actualia  peccata  promanent.  Discrimcn 
itaque  retinendum  esse  affirmarunt,  inter  corru[)ti  hominis  naturam  et  essen- 
tiam, seu  animam  et  corpus  hominis,  qxix  in  nobis  etiam  post  lapsum  sunt  Dei 
opus  et  creatura,  et  inter  peccatum  originalo,  quod  est  Diaboli  opus,  per  quod 
natura  est  depravata." 

"Et  primum  quidcm  constat,  Christianos  non  tantum  actualia  delicla  et 
transgressiones  mandatorum  Dei  peccata  esse,  agnoscere  et  definire  debere, 
sed  etiam,  horrcndum  atque  abominabilem  ilium  haereditarium  niorbum,  per 
quem  tota  natura  corrupta  est,  imprimis  pro  horribili  peccato,  et  quidem  pro 
principio  et  capite  omnium  peccatorum  (o  quo  reliqux  transgressiones,  tan- 
quam e  radice  nascantur,  ot  quasi  e  scaturiginc  promanent)  omnino  habendum 
esse.  Et  hoc  malum  aliquando  D,  Luthcrus  peccatum  natura:,  item  peccatum 
personal  appellarc  solct,  ut  significet,  etiamsi  homo  projsus  nihil  maUcugita' 


316 

The  doctrine  of  Flacius,  asserting  that  the  depravity  ol 
the  mind  is  identical  with  its  substance  and  essence, — which 
these  theologians  rejected, — was  thus  wholly  unlike  the  doc- 
trine they  actually  held — as  I  have  construed  it — that  the 
depravity  of  the  mind  is  a  physical  attribute  ;  and  of  course 
their  rejection  of  the  former  did  not  necessarily  imply  a 
denial  of  the  latter  ;  nor  demonstrate,  that  it  is  not  in  truth 
involved  in  their  theory.  While,  accordingly,  they  so 
zealously  disclaimed  the  former,  they  still  continued  to 
assert  with  additional  distinctness  and  energy,  if  possible, 
their  belief  that  "  the  nature,  substance  and  essence  of  the 
soul,"  are  depraved,  and  depraved  as  with  a  disease  that 
necessarily  impairs  the  organization,  and  impedes  the  vital 
functions  of  its  subject. 


rot,  loquerotur,  aut  agerct,  (quod  sane  post  primorum  nostrorum  parentum 
lapsuni,  in  hac  vita,  huiuanaj  natura;  est  impossibile)  tanien  nihilominus  ho- 
uiinis  natuiani  e t  personam  esse  pcccatriccm,  hoc  CBt,  pcccato  originali  (quasi 
lepra  quadam  spirituali)  prorsus  ct  totaiitcr  in  intimis  ctiam  visccribus,  ct 
cordis  reccssibus  profundissiinis  totani  esse,  coram  Deo,  infectani,  vencnatam 
ct  ponitus  corruptam.  Et  propter  banc  corruptioncm,  atquc  primorum  nostro- 
rum parentum  lapsum  natura  aut  persona  hominis  lege  Dei  accusatur  ct  con- 
dcmnatur,  ita,  ut  naturu  filii  ira;,  mortis  et  damnationis  raancipia  simus,  nisi 
beneficio  meriti  Christi  ab  his  maiis  Uberemur  ctservemur." 

' '  Etsi  voro  peccatum  originale  totam  hominis  naturam,  ut  spiritualc  quod- 
dam  venenum  et  horribilis  lepra  (quemadmodmn  D.  Lutherus  loquitur)  inlc- 
cit  et  corrupit,  ita  quidem,  ut  jam  in  nostra  natura  corrupta  ad  oculum  non 
monstrari  possint  distincto  hacc  duo,  ipsa  natura  sola,  et  origimdc  peccatum 
solum  :  tamen  non  unum  et  idem  est,  corrupta  natura,  scu  substar>tia  corrupt! 
hominis,  corpus  et  anima,  aut  homo  ipse  a  Deo  creatus,  in  quo  originale  pec- 
catum habitat,  (cujus  ratione  natura,  substantia,  totus  denique  homo  corrup- 
tus  est)  ct  ipsuin  originale  peccatum,  quod  in  hominis  natura  aut  essentia  ha- 
bitat, eamque  corrumpit.  ducmadmodum  ctiam  in  lepra  corporali  ipsum  cor- 
pus leprosum,  ct  lepra  ipsa  in  corporc  non  sunt  unum  ct  idcjii,  si  propric  ct 
dislinctc  ca  do  re  disscrcro  vclinius.  Discrimeii  igilur  reiinendum  est,  inter 
naturam  nostram,  qualis  a  Deo  crcata  cot,  hodiequc  conservatur,  in  qua  pecca- 
tum originale  habitat,  ct  inter  niouai  peccatum  originit^,  quod  in  natura  ha- 
bitat.''— Formula  Concordia? 


317 

The  fact,  therefore,  that  they  did  not  hold,  that  no  diffe- 
rence whatever  exists  between  the  depravity  attributed  to 
nature,  and  nature  itself,  or  the  whole  substance  and  essence 
of  the  soul,  does  not  prove  that  their  doctrine,  that  that 
substance  and  essence  are  depraved,  does  not  imply  that 
its  depravity  is  of  a  physical  nature  ;.  and  consequently  their 
denial  of  the  former  cannot  justly  be  regarded  as  necessa- 
rily equivalent  to  a  rejection  of  that  doctrine  of  physical  de- 
pravity, which  I  regard  as  involved  in  their  representation. 

On  the  whole,  then,  there  is  nothing  in  either  of  these 
objections — if  the  characteristics  before  enumerated  are  to 
guide  us  in  our  decisions — to  intercept  us  from  the  con- 
clusion, that  the  depravity  they  delineate  and  ascribe  to 
our  nature,  is,  if  it  exist,  a  physical  attribute. 

Were  it,  however,  demonstrated  that  the  depravity  deli- 
neated by  their  doctrine,  is  not,  in  fact,  such  an  attribute, 
it  would  still  fall  wholly  short  of  exempting  it  from  objec- 
tion for  its  representations  of  that  depravity,  as  an  affection 
of  nature,  in  place  of  actions ;  as  commencing  and  continu- 
ing its  existence  independently  of  the  mind's  agency;  and 
as  the  cause  of  all  the  sinful  acts  that  are  exerted ; — repre- 
sentations which  whether  they  exhibit  depravity  as  physical 
or  not,  are  demonstratively,  in  my  judgment,  wholly  at 
variance  with  all  the  facts  of  consciousness,  contradictory 
to  the  scriptures,  and  fruitful  of  all  the  injurious  influences 
with  which  the  doctrine  of  physical  depravity  itself  could 
be  fraught. 

III.  No  demonstrative  evidences  of  the  truth  of  that 
doctrine  have  been  furnished  in  the  disquisitions,  which  con- 
troversy respecting  it  has  drawn  from  its  friends,  and 
no  such  proofs  of  its  accuracy,  it  is  sufficiently  clear,  are 
likely  ever  to  be  produced. 

40 


318 

It  has  no  express  sanction  from  the  volume  of  inspira- 
tion in  its  ascription  of  sinfuhiess  to  the  nature  of  the  mind, 
apart  from  its  voluntary  agency.  It  does  not  accord  with 
the  scriptural  representation,  that  men  are  to  be  judged 
according  to  the  deeds  done  in  the  body ;  nor  with  the 
legislation  of  the  Most  High  over  us,  which  respects  actions 
only,  not  the  essence  of  the  mind,  or  its  constitutional 
qualities.  Nor  does  it  harmonize  with  the  decisions  of  con- 
science, of  which  voluntary  acts  alone  are  the  objects,  not 
natural  powers  or  susceptibilities,  nor  involuntary  effects. 

In  place  of  coinciding  with  these  and  the  phenomena  at 
large  of  our  agency,  which  it  is  its  object  to  explain,  the 
theory  of  a  specific  taste  for  sin  and  aversion  to  holiness, 
offers  to  them  at  every  step  the  most  open  and  violent  con- 
tradiction. 

No  such  susceptibility,  the  truth  is,  is  known  to  human 
consciousness,  nor  any  thing  approaching  to  it,  as  a  specific 
taste  for  sin  and  aversion  to  holiness j^er  se,  or  in  the  abstract; 
a  taste,  that  is,  for  sin,  simply  because  it  is  sin,  and  aversion 
to  holiness,  because  it  is  holiness,  apart  from  all  considera- 
tion whether  the  love  and  commission  of  the  one,  and  exer- 
tion or  avoidance  of  the  other,  are  to  involve  or  preclude  the 
gratification  of  other  susceptibilities  of  enjoyment.  No 
such  abstract  sin  or  holiness  exists — holiness  and  sin,  that  is, 
wholly  out  of  acts  and  modes  of  agency  ;  nor  any  possibility 
of  the  excitement  of  such  a  taste,  were  it  in  fact  an  ingre- 
dient in  our  constitution.  No  taste  or  susceptibility  can 
be  developed  or  called  into  activity,  except  by  its  appro- 
priate object.  But  by  the  supposition,  to  the  first  who 
committed  sin,  no  sin  existed  to  be  an  object  of  perception, 
and  act  on  his  taste  for  it.  If,  therefore,  as  the  theory  as- 
sumes, it  must  be  perceived  before  it  can  be  exerted,  and 


319 

can  gain  existence,  only  by  acting  on  that  taste,  and  thereby 
becoming  an  object  of  love  ;  it  is  demonstrable  that  it  could 
never  come  into  existence,  any  more  than  sin  in  the  form 
of  eating  the  forbidden  fruit  could  have  been  committed, 
had  no  such  fruit  ever  come  within  the  reach  or  perception 
of  the  first  pair.  The  taste  for  sin  must  forever  have  re- 
mained an  unexercised  and  latent  attribute,  as  completely 
as  would  a  susceptibility  of  any  other  species  of  pleasure, 
were  the  mind  never  to  be  placed  under  the  action  of  the 
means  of  its  excitement. 

In  like  manner,  if  holiness  can  be  exercised  only  in  the 
love  of  holiness — as  it  must  then  exist  and  be  an  object  of 
perception,  before  it  can  be  exerted — it  is  clear  that  there 
can  be  no  possibility  of  its  ever  coming  into  existence,  nor 
therefore  of  its  becoming  the  instrument  of  exciting  the 
aversion  to  itself,  which  is  exhibited  as  one  of  the  elements 
of  this  depraved  taste. 

Had  sin  and  holiness,  however,  actually  gained  existence, 
so  as  to  come  in  contact  by  perception  with  a  taste  like 
that  which  this  doctrine  describes,  its  mode  of  agency  could 
never  have  borne  any  resemblance  to  our  present  conscious- 
ness. Under  the  action  of  such  a  taste,  the  sole  reason  of 
the  mind's  exerting  sinful  actions  would  be,  that  they  are 
sinful, — not  that  they  yield  pleasure  to  some  other  suscep- 
tibility that  may  be  indulged  innocently,  or  virtuously. 
The  reason  that  the  prevaricator  violates  the  truth,  would 
be,  that  falsehood  is  sinful,  not  that  it  aids  him  in  the  acqui- 
sition of  wealth,  assists  his  ascent  to  power,  or  is  the  instru- 
ment of  shielding  him  from  punishment : — the  reason  that 
the  vindictive  and  irascible  give  vent  to  their  passions, 
would  be,  that,  anger  and  revenge  are  sinful ;  not  that,  apart 
from  that  consideration,  they  find  gratification  in  the  utter- 


320 

ance  or  infliction  of  evil ;  and  the  sole  aim,  in  like  manner, 
of  the  drunkard,  the  miser,  the  extortioner,  the  votary  of 
power,  of  fame,  of  pleasure,  in  all  their  forms,  would  be, 
the  perpetration  of  sin  ;  not  the  gratification  of  their  various 
appetites  and  passions  in  the  species  of  enjoyment  which 
their  several  forms  of  sinful  agency  involve  : — and  the  con- 
sideration that  those  modes  of  agency  are  sinful,  in  place 
of  proving  under  the  action  of  reason,  conscience,  and  fear, 
a  restraint,  as  is  the  fact,  would  be  the  most  efficient  and 
resistless  inducement  to  their  exertion  ! 

The  communication,  accordingly,  to  a  being  of  such  a 
nature,  of  a  knowledge  of  his  obligations,  would  only  be  to 
tempt  him  to  transgress — a  representation  we  perpetually 
hear  indeed  from  the  advocates  of  this  scheme.  The  higher 
his  views  of  his  relations  to  God  were  raised,  and  the  deeper 
his  sense  became  of  his  duty,  the  more  resistless  would  be 
his  inclination  to  sin,  and  the  more  absolute  the  certainty 
of  his  yielding  to  its  indulgence.  And  the  only  method 
on  the  other  hand  of  counteracting  or  suspending  that  in- 
clination would  be,  to  divest  him  of  the  knowledge,  or 
withdraw  him  from  the  consideration  of  the  character  of  his 
agency.  The  more  deeply  he  became  involved  in  ignorance, 
the  farther  he  succeeded  in  excluding  God  from  his  thoughts, 
and  the  more  thoroughly  he  extinguished  in  himself  the 
sense  of  right  and  wrong,  the  lower  would  be  the  point  to 
which  his  guilt  would  be  reduced,  and  the  nearer  his 
approach  to  a  condition  of  innocence  ! 

What  a  theory  to  be  held  and  taught  by  theologians, 
whose  office  it  is  to  learn  and  dispense  the  lessons  of  that 
wisdom  which  came  from  above;  to  mark  and  expound 
the  relations  of  our  nature  and  actions  to  the  law  of  God ! 
The  facility  with  which  those  who  are  most  highly  gifted 


321 

with  genius,  most  distinguished  for  learning,  most  eminently 
practised  in  the  observation  of  men,  and  most  profoundly  skill- 
ed in  the  art  of  touching  the  springs  of  our  agency,  thus  quit 
the  high  way  of  facts,  and  running  counter  to  history,  ex- 
perience, consciousness,  and  the  word  of  God,  plunge  head- 
long into  the  regions  of  error  and  absurdity — forces  me  to 
despair  of  men,  and  feel  with  a  deeper  energy  than  ever,  that 
no  guide  in  religion  but  that  of  inspiration,  can  be  safely 
followed  on  even  those  subjects  that  lie  the  most  completely 
within  the  grasp  of  our  knowledge. 

If  we  turn  to  that  oracle,  we  hear  nothing  of  a  specific 
taste  for  sin  and  aversion  to  holiness,  as  the  sole  susceptibi- 
lity capable  of  guilty  indulgence,  and  sole  source  of  temp- 
tation ;  but  in  place  of  that,  are  taught  that  all  our  suscep- 
tibihties  are  fraught  with  danger,  and  may  be  sinfully 
indulged ;  that  the  world,  the  flesh,  and  the  devil,  are 
sources  to  them  of  fatal  excitement ;  and  that  our  sin  lies 
in  the  misdirection  of  powers  and  passions,  and  perversion 
of  gifts,  capable  of  modes  of  gratification  and  employment 
that  are  compatible  with  our  obligations.  And  if  we  com- 
pare these  teachings  with  the  lessons  of  consciousness,  we 
find  them  to  be  coincident ;  that  our  sin  takes  place  in  the 
indulgence  in  forbidden  modes,  of  susceptibilities  in  them- 
selves good  ;  in  loving  the  creature  supremely ;  in  forget- 
ting and  disregarding  God,  from  our  attachment  to  other 
objects ;  and  in  opposing  and  hating  him  because  of  his 
interfere7ice  icitli  the  gratification  of  our  susceptibilities  of 
pleasure  from  the  objects  around  us — not  simply  apart  from 
that  reason,  because  of  his  holiness  :  and  finally,  that  the 
consideration  that  those  forms  of  indulgence  and  agency 
which  his  law  forbids,  are  sinful, — in  place  of  being,  as  it 
would  be  under  the  action  of  such  a  taste  for  sin, — the  sole 


322 

reason  of  our  pursuing  them,  is,  in  fact,  by  far  the  most 
efficient,  and  almost  indeed  the  only  restraint  by  which  we 
are  withheld  from  transgression  ;  and  that  to  remove  that 
restraint,  would  be  to  extinguish  conscience,  and  convert 
the  world  into  a  mere  field  of  rapine,  blood,  and  misery  ; — 
a  scene  from  which  the  form  of  virtue  had  wholly  vanished, 
as  well  as  its  substance  ! 

This  theory,  therefore,  of  a  specific  taste  for  sin,  in  place 
of  furnishing  the  requisite  solution  of  the  phenomena  it  is 
employed  to  explain,  contradicts  the  whole  series  of  our 
consciousness,  and  can  never  become  true,  without  a  total 
change  of  our  nature,  and  reversion  of  the  laws  of  our 
agency. 

IV.  The  friends  of  that  theory  have  not  only  found  it 
impracticable  to  demonstrate  its  truth,  but  have  likewise 
failed  to  refute  the  views  which  have  been  advanced  in  this 
work  in  its  place  ;  or  to  prove  that  they  are  not  adequate 
to  account  for  the  facts  which  they  are  employed  to  ex- 
plain. 

These  views  are  summarily,  that  mere  nature,  apart  from 
actions,  is  not  the  subject  of  moral  character ;  that  the  mind 
antecedently,  as  well  as  subsequently  to  regeneration,  is 
fraught  with  all  the  powers  and  susceptibilities  that  are  re- 
quisite to,  or  are  ever  exerted  in  obedience;  that  it  may  act 
obediently  as  well  as  sinfully  ;  that  its  powers  and  suscep- 
tibilities do  not  themselves  form  the  reason,  nor  constitute 
the  previous  certainty  of  its  acting  in  the  manner  in  which 
it  does  ;  but  that  that  is  constituted  by  the  moral  influences  by 
which  it  is  excited  ;  or  that  its  reasons  for  exerting  the  volun- 
tary acts  which  it  does,  lie  wholly  in  the  perceptions  and  emo- 
tions which  it  experiences  cotemporaneously  with  its  exertion 
of  those  acts;  and  that  consequently,  its  holiness  and  sin 


323 

lie  wholly  in  its  choices  ;  or  that  it  is  of  it,  as  their  agent, 
alone,  that  those  qualities  are  predicable. 

The  adequacy  or  inadequacy  of  these  views  to  solve  the 
phenomena  of  our  agency,  obviously  depends  on  the  ques- 
tion, whether,  as  they  assume,  all  the  susceptibilities  on  which, 
any  motive  to  volition  that  ever  reaches  the  mind,  acts,  are 
common  both  to  the  renewed  and  unrenewed  ;  or  exist  in 
the  same  individual,  as  well  before,  as  after  regeneration. 

No  proofs  then — I  repeat  it — have  been  produced  by  the 
opposers  of  these  views,  that  that  assumption  does  not  ac- 
cord with  fact.  No  attempt  indeed  towards  it  has  been 
made,  except  in  the  doctrine  of  a  specific  taste  for  sin  and 
holiness.  That  that  doctrine  however,  is  incorrect,  as  far 
as  it  respects  a  taste  for  sin,  has  already  been  demonstrated ; 
and  that  no  such  taste  for  holiness,  as  it  represents,  is  im- 
planted in  those  who  are  renewed,  is  equally  certain ;  as  all 
the  phenomena  it  is  employed  to  account  for,  become  wholly 
inexplicable,  on  the  supposition  of  its  existence.  If  in  re- 
generation, that  supposed  taste  for  sin  is  eradicated,  and  a 
taste  for  holiness  introduced  in  its  place,  then,  to  accord  with 
the  theory,  every  volition  put  forth  should  be  holy.  A  great 
proportion  of  them  are  in  fact,  however,  sinful.  They 
demonstrate,  therefore,  that  no  such  taste,  giving  its  charac- 
ter to  every  moral  exercise,  exists.  If  the  supposed  taste 
for  sin  is  not  extinguished  in  regeneration,  but  remains 
in  conjunction  with  the  newly  implanted  taste  for  holiness, 
then  the  theory  requires  that  every  object  of  perception 
should  act  on  those  opposite  tastes  in  precisely  opposite 
modes,  and  the  mind  feel  toward  it,  at  the  same  time,  an 
equal  complacency  and  aversion — if  those  tastes  are  of  equal 
strength — be  under  an  equal  inducement  to  the  choice  and 
rejection  of  it,  and  consequently  never  be  determined  to  any 


324 

volition  respecting  it !  Is  there  any  thing  like  this,  how- 
ever, known  to  human  experience  ?  Are  any  of  the  renewed, 
conscious  of  thus  hating  and  loving  in  the  same  exercise, 
and  being  held  in  this  manner,  in  equilibrio,  as  long  as  the 
objects  that  excite  them,  continue  before  their  minds  ?  Do 
they  never  exert  any  holy  or  sinful  actions,  after  their 
regeneration  ? 

This  theory  then,  it  may  be  safely  said,  has  never  been 
demonstrated,  and  no  refutation,  therefore,  as  it  is  the  only 
mode  in  which  any  has  been  attempted,  has  been  furnished 
of  the  accuracy  of  that  which  I  have  offered  in  its  place. 

If  indeed  the  theory  of  such  a  taste  is  rejected,  no  room 
can  exist  for  any  other  view  of  our  nature  and  agency,  than 
that  which  I  have  given.  If  there  are  no  peculiar  suscepti- 
bilities in  the  unrenewed,  on  which  the  motives  act  that 
prompt  them  to  sin,  nor  any  that  are  peculiar  to  the  rege- 
nerated, on  which  the  motives  act  by  which  they  are  excited 
to  obedience ;  then  of  course  the  susceptibilities  of  both 
classes  are  the  same,  and  those  of  every  renovated  individual, 
the  same  before,  as  after  regeneration.  But  if  their  sus- 
ceptibilities are  the  same,  and  the  reason  consequently  of 
the  difference  in  their  agency,  does  not  lie  in  their  physical 
nature  ;  then  of  course  it  must  lie  in  the  moral  influences 
that  act  on  their  susceptibilities,  or  in  their  perceptions  and 
emotions ;  and  those,  they  are  in  truth  conscious,  are  the 
reasons  of  their  putting  forth  their  choices. 

It  is  clear  indeed,  that  no  facts  can  ever  be  produced 
against  this  theory.  No  example  can  be  furnished  of  a  voli- 
tion put  forth  from  the  action  of  a  motive  on  any  other  sus- 
ceptibility or  power,  than  such  as  is  common  to  the  re- 
newed and  unrenewed.  Every  such  act  of  the  unregenerate 
may  be  traced  to  attributes  and  susceptibihties,  that  con- 


325 

tinue  to  belong  to  the  mind  after  renovation  ;  and  every  act 
of  the  renewed  may  be  traced  to  attributes  that  belonged 
to  it  antecedently  to  regeneration.  The  whole  excite- 
ment under  which  it  puts  forth  its  choices,  lies,  in  every 
instance,  in  the  perceptive  power  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  senses  on  the  other,  and  higher  susceptibilities  that  be- 
long to  it  as  a  moral  agent.  The  drunkard  indulges  in  his 
excesses,  for  the  sake  of  the  pleasurable  sensations  which  in- 
toxication involves ;  and  abstains  from  them,  from  the  rebukes 
of  reason,  the  reproaches  of  conscience,  the  impulses  of 
shame,  the  promptings  of  ambition  or  avarice,  the  appeals  of 
suffering  friends  to  his  sympathy,  or  of  taunting  enemies  to 
his  pride.  The  new-born  convert  embraces  the  joys  of 
obedience,  because  the  vision  of  God  and  his  government, 
which  the  Holy  Spirit  has  flashed  on  his  eye,  has  caused  his 
reason,  conscience,  and  every  susceptibility  which  that 
vision  can  affect,  to  acquiesce  in  those  objects,  and  filled 
him  with  supreme  delight.  The  whole  ground  of  his  volun- 
tary submission,  love,  and  devotion,  lies  accordingly  in 
those  views  and  emotions  ;  and  the  susceptibilities  excited, 
and  powers  exerted,  are  those  which  he  had  always  pos- 
sessed, and  exerted  in  a  thousand  instances  before  in  sin. 

V.  To  these  views — as  exhibited  in  this  work — no  effi- 
cient objections  have  hitherto,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  been 
alleged. 

The  chief  considerations  urged  against  them  by  Dr.  De 
Witt,  are  those  precisely  which  have  been  alleged  against 
his  own  theory;  and  the  main  aim  of  his  argument  respect- 
ing them  is,  simply  to  show,  that  whatever  may  be  their 
force,  they  are  as  applicable  to  the  doctrine  which  I  have 
advanced,  as  to  that  which  he  endeavored  to  maintain. 

In  the  first  of  these,— -which  respects  the  question  whe- 

41 


326 

thef  the  mind  is  active  or  passive  in  regeneration, — he  has 
fallen  into  the  error  of  regarding  a  recognition  of  the  fact, 
that  the  mind  is  involuntary  in  the  reception  of  the  rege- 
nerating and  other  influences,  that  are  employed  in  the  excite- 
ment in  it  of  perceptions,  as  equivalent  to  a  representation 
that  that  influence,  or  its  author,  is  the  efficient  cause  likewise 
of  the  obedient  agency  which  is  exerted  under  it ;  and  that  the 
mind  therefore  is  passive  also  in  regard  to  that  agency.  He 
founds  his  argument  on  this  subject,  on  the  following  pas- 
sages from  the  number  for  May  1830,  p.  483. 

"  It  is  indubitably  certain  from  the  light  of  philosophy,  that  God 
can  determine  every  perception  that  shall  reach  the  mind  of  an  in- 
telligent being  ;  and  accordingly  through  that,  the  only  medium  of 
influencing  his  conduct,  determine  with  invincible  certainty,  the  man- 
ner in  which  he  will  act.  Every  perception  is  an  effect,  and  is 
produced  by  a  cause.  That  cause  must  obviously  be  either  God 
himself,  or  some  dependent  existence  which  he  has  created,  and  con- 
tinues in  being,  and  which  owes  to  hirn  its  whole  power  and  oppor- 
tunity to  act  through  every  successive  moment.  To  question  this 
were  in  so  many  words  to  question  the  dependence  on  him  of  his 
works,  and  deny  his  power  over  matter  as  well  as  mind." 

"  He  that  created  every  instrument  through  which  perceptions 
are  conveyed  to  the  mind,  and  endowed  the  soul  itself  witli  its  power 
of  receiving  them,  and  all  its  secret  grounds  of  emotion  and  springs 
of  activity,  cannot  he  still  retain  them  within  his  grasp,  and  deter- 
mine what  influences  shall  reach  and  excite  them?" 

On  these  passages  he  remarks: 

"  Judge  now,  my  hearers,  with  such  sweeping  principles  lying  at 
the  basis  of  their  system,  with  what  consistency  can  our  respected 
brethren  rail  as  they  do,  against  the  doctrine  of  '  passivity  r'  Is  not 
this  a  '  passivity'  not  restricted  to  any  particular  class  of  men,  nor 
to  any  particular  class  of  actions  ?  According  to  this  scheme,  are 
not  oven  the  unregenerate  passive  under  the  operation  of  a  power 
which  '  determines  with  iuvincible  certainty  the  manner  in  which 
they  will  act,'  in  every  sinful  action  which  they  commit  ?  And  doe* 
it  not  assert,  in  svibstancc,  that  the  very  first  holy  volition  of  the  eub- 


327 

ject  of  regeneration,  to  use  tlie  very  language  of  tlic  author,  is  an 
effect  produced  by  a  cause ;  and  is  it  not  an  absurdity  to  say,  that 
an  effect,  so  far  as  it  is  an  effect,  is  active  in  its  own  production  ?  Thus, 
then,  it  appears,  that  every  point  and  principle  which  our  brethren 
denounce  with  so  much  vehemence  in  discourses  from  the  pulpit,  and 
essays  and  reviews  from  the  press,  forms  an  essential  part  of  their 
own  doctrine." — p.  10,11. 

He  has  thus  construed  those  passages  as  though  their  rep- 
resentation that  "  every  perception  is  an  effect  produced  by 
a  cause,"  were  identical  with  a  representation  that  every 
volition  is  likewise  an  effect  produced  by  the  same  cause, 
and  in  the  same  manner.  This  is  obviously,  however,who]ly 
unauthorized.  It  has  no  sanction  either  in  the  passages 
themselves,  or  in  the  laws  of  our  agency.  It  does  not  follow 
from  the  fact  that  the  mind  is  passive,  or  involuntary,  in  re- 
spect to  the  production  in  it  of  perceptions  and  emotions  by 
the  action  of  external  agents  on  the  senses,  and  the  transfu- 
sion by  the  Spirit  of  those  apprehensions  of  divine  things, 
which  are  the  instrument  of  prompting  it  to  obedience ; 
that  it  is  in  like  manner  passive  in  regard  to  the  volitions 
which  it  puts  forth  under  the  excitement  of  those  percep- 
tions; or  that  it  is  not  itself,  the  efficient  cause,  as  I  have 
always  expressly  represented  it,  of  its  choices.  It  does 
not  follow  from  the  fact,  that  the  adversary  was  the  effi- 
cient cause  of  the  temptations  with  which  he  assailed  the 
man  Christ  Jesus,  that  he  was  also  the  efficient  cause  of  the 
resistance  with  which  they  were  repelled  ;  nor  from  the 
fact  that  Christ  was  involuntarily  the  subject  of  those  temp- 
tations, that  he  was  not  the  efficient  cause  of  the  replies 
by  which  the  tempter  was  baffled  and  repulsed !  In 
place  of  that,  his  activity  in  the  latter,  was  obviously  per- 
fectly compatible  with  his  involuntariness  in  the  former ; 
and  such  is,  doubtless,  equally  the  fact  in  regard  to  the 


328 


regenerating  nnd  all  oilier  agencies,  that  are  simply  em- 
ployed in  conveying  moral  influences  to  the  mind.  Pas- 
siveness  or  involuntariness,  and  consequent  irresponsibility 
in  respect  to  the  introduction  into  it  of  perceptions,  is  en- 
tirely compatible  with  its  efficiency  and  responsibility  in 
the  volitions  which  it  puts  forth  under  the  excitement  of 
those  perceptions. 

Neither  the  assertion,  therefore,  in  the  foregoing  pas- 
sages, of  the  fact  that  God  determines  all  the  moral  in- 
fluences that  reach  us,  nor  of  the  fact  implied  in  that 
position,  that  our  subjection  to  those  influences  takes 
place  in  many  instances,  at  least,  without  our  volition, 
amounts  to,  or  makes  any  approach  toward  a  representa- 
tion that  those  influences,  or  their  authors,  are  the  efficient 
causes  of  the  volitions,  which  we  exert  in  consequence  of 
their  presence  ;  nor  that  the  relation  which  we  sustain  to 
them,  bears  any  resemblance  to  that  in  which  we  stand  to 
those  and  other  similar  involuntary  and  unavoidable  events 
of  which  we  are  the  subjects. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  principle  on  which  those  passa- 
ges, and  all  others  that  I  have  framed  on  the  subject,  pro- 
ceed— that  no  violation  of  our  moral  agency  or  infringement 
of  our  rights,  is  involved  in  our  subjection  involuntarily  to 
such  moral  influences  as  those  which  we  daily  experience,  in 
which  good  and  evil,  life  and  death,  are  presented  to  our 
choice ;  and  that  our  morality  and  responsibility  are  con- 
fined wholly  to  our  choices  themselves,  of  the  good  or  evil 
presented  in  those  influences,  or  to  the  acts  of  which  we 
are  ourselves  the  efficient  causes — is  fully  recognized  in  our 
consciousness,  and  sanctioned  by  the  word  of  God.  We 
never  feel  blame  for  excitements  to  evil,  to  which  we  become 
subjected,  without  our  volition,  or  which  we  appropriately 


329 

resist;  nor  are  ever  treated  by  the  Most  High  as  though  we 
were  responsible  for  temptations  that  assail  us  in  that  man- 
ner, or  influences  that  prompt  us  to  resist  them ;  but  only 
for  the  voluntary  surrendry  of  ourselves  to  the  one,  or  obe- 
dience to  the  other. 

He  next  alleges,  that  the  views  I  have  advanced,  in  place 
of  avoiding,  in  fact  involve  the  doctrine  of  physical  depra- 
vity, as  palpably  as  the  theory  of  inherent  moral  disposi- 
tions.    His  language  is, 

*'  We  come  now  to  the  second  point  of  dissent.  Our  brethren  deny 
the  existence  of  inherent  moral  dispositions,  prior  to  actions,  as  a 
determining  cause  ;  and  they  charge  those  who  maintain  an  innate 
depravity,  consisting  in  the  want  of  original  righteousness,  and  a  dis- 
position to  moral  evil,  with  teaching  the  doctrine  o^  physical  depra- 
vity. And  further,  they  contend,  that  to  represent  regeneration  as 
consisting  in  the  communication  of  a  habit,  or  principle  of  holiness 
to  the  soul,  inclining  it  to  holy  action,  is  to  teach  the  doctrine  of  phy- 
sical regeneration.  All  this  they  say,  is  to  make  depravity  and  holi- 
ness, attributes  of  our  physical  nature  ;  a  gross  absurdity,  continue 
they,  for  what  is  physical  is  involuntary,  and  what  is  involuntary  is  not 
moral,  cannot  be  forbidden  and  punished,  nor  commanded  and  reward- 
ed, no  more  than  the  inaccurate  movements  of  a  bad  time-piece,  or 
the  production  of  agreeable  fruit  by  a  good  tree. 

"  Now  we  will  engage  to  prove  from  their  own  principles,  that  our 
respected  brethren,  substantially  and  undeniably  maintain  the  exist- 
ence of  inherent,  and  as  far  as  they  know,  an  innate  law  or  principle ; 
or  if  they  disrelish  this  phraseology,  an  inherent  somethingin  human  na- 
ture, which  is  prior  to  all  sinful  choices  and  actions  in  unregenerate 
men ;  and  which  is  the  necessary,  involuntary  cause  of  the  sinfulness 
of  their  choices  and  actions.  That  those  who  make  the  nature  and  the 
operations  of  the  mind  the  subject  of  their  professed  attention,  should 
yet  be  so  inadvertent  in  regard  to  the  tendency  of  their  principles, 
and  so  precipitate  as  to  impute  to  others  doctrinal  offences,  to  tlie 
imputation  of  which  they  are  themselves  obnoxious,  may  seem  ex- 
traordinary, but  is  nevertheless  demonstrably  true. 

"  According  to  their  system,  up  to  the  moment  of  regeneration 


330 

the  clioices,  ami  the  actions  resulting  from  those  choices,  of  every  re- 
newed man,  are  sinful  and  wholly  sinful.  They  are  entirely  destitute 
of  the  nature  of  true  holiness.  Every  choice,  and  every  act,  is  de- 
termined in  opposition  to  the  strongest  motives  to  duty.  That  such 
is  the  position  of  our  brethren  on  this  subject,  they  can  feel  no  desire 
to  deny.  They  cannot  recede  from  this  position,  without  changing 
the  essence  of  their  theology  on  the  subject.  Here,  then,  we  per- 
ceive the  whole  human  race,  without  an  exception,  putting  forth  volun- 
tary acts,  which  universally  bear  one  and  the  same  moral  stamp. 
They  possess  one  and  the  same  moral  quality,  sinfulness ;  and  until 
the  change  is  effected  in  regeneration,  not  one  solitary  choice  is  holy.'' 
"  Now,  on  the  principle  of  the  inductive  reasoning,  which  is  allow- 
ed to  be  the  safest  on  all  subjects,  whether  physical  or  moral,  what 
does  such  a  state  of  things  warrant  us  to  conclude  ?"  "  According 
to  this  mode  of  reasoning,  from  the  perfect  and  acknowledged  uni- 
formity in  the  moral  character  of  the  choices  of  unregenerate  men, 
that  up  to  the  moment  of  the  spiritual  change,  they  are  always 
unholy,  we  must  infer,  and  we  cannot  shun  the  inference,  that  there 
must  exist  in  the  mind  of  every  unregenerate  person,  some  moral 
cause  or  law,  tending  to  that  result ;  and  that  this  law  is  innate  and 
uniform,  certain  and  necessary  in  its  operations.  Whether  the  sub- 
ject be  matter  or  mind,  uniformity  in  the  effect  proves  fixedness  and 
uniformity  in  the  cause."  p.  11 — 14. 

He  has  thus  attempted  to  prove,  that  the  theory  of  our 
nature  and  agency  which  I  have  advanced,  after  all  implies, 
as  well  as  his  own,  the  existence  of  inherent  susceptibilities 
that  are  of  a  moral  character,  and  is  fraught,  therefore,  as 
fully  as  his,  with  all  the  essential  elements  of  the  doctrine 
of  physical  depravity ;  and  the  ground  on  which  he  has 
founded  this  allegation,  is  the  admitted  sinfulness  of  all  the 
moral  acts  of  the  unregenerate.  The  method,  however, 
which  he  has  chosen  for  the  support  of  the  charge  on  that 
ground  is,  that  of  assuming  that  the  laws  of  induction, 
force  us  to  the  conclusion  from  the  universal  sinfulness  of 
luiregenerate  choices,  that  its  cause  lies  in  inherent  dispo- 


331 

sitious  that  are  themselves  sinful  and  by  a  necessity  of  na- 
ture impart  their  character  to  every  voluntary  act. 

But  this  is  gratuitously  to  assume  the  whole  point  at  issue 
between  us,  which  is,  whether  or  not  the  sinfulness  of 
the  actions  of  the  unregenerate  springs  from  an  inherent 
sinful  disposition, — the  position  which  he  has  affirmed,  and 
I  have  denied  ;  which  he  was  to  have  proved,  therefore,  in 
place  of  simply  asserting  or  taking  it  for  granted,  and 
which  I  long  since  refuted,  and  have  in  the  foregoing  pages 
refuted  again.  His  argument,  therefore,  thus  wholly  de- 
pendent for  its  force,  on  the  mere  assumption  of  the  exis- 
tence of  such  an  inherent  sinful  disposition,  as  the  cause  of 
the  sinful  actions  that  are  exerted ;  instead  of  settling  the 
controversy,  leaves  it  precisely  where  it  found  it.  It  must 
be  shown  both  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  susceptibilities 
which  are  common  to  the  renewed  and  unrenewed,  and  that 
have  no  moral  character,  are  not  sufficient  to  account 
through  the  influences  that  act  on  them,  for  the  disobedience 
of  the  unregenerate ;  and  on  the  other,  that  the  theory  of 
a  specific  taste  for  sin  will  solve  the  phenomena  of  their 
agency ;  before  any  room  can  exist  for  regarding  that  dis- 
obedience as  demonstrative  of  the  existence  of  such  a  taste. 
These  are  positions,  however,  which  although  assumed  by  all 
other  advocates  of  the  doctrine  of  physical  depravity,  as 
well  as  Dr.  De  Witt,  have  never  yet  been  proved,  and  will 
never  become  susceptible  of  demonstration,  while  our  na- 
ture and  mode  of  agency  remain  unchanged.  The  admitted 
fact,  therefore,  that  men  sin  universally  while  unrenewed, 
which  Dr.  De  Witt  made  the  ground  of  his  allegation 
against  the  views  I  have  advanced,  furnishes  no  authority 
whatever  for  that  charge.  If  indeed  those  actions  demon- 
strated the  existence  of  such  a  depravity  of  nature  as  he 


332 

infers  from  them,  it  could  not  be  proper  to  charge  a  theory 
which  formally  denied  the  existence  of  that  depravity,  and 
traced  all  sinful  actions  to  susceptibilities  that  are  not  sin- 
ful, with  virtually  involving  the  doctrine  which  it  rejects. 
The  charge  of  sanctioning  that  doctrine,  could  only  lie 
against  the  admission  of  the  sinfulness  of  those  actions ; 
not  against  the  theory  which  accounted  for  that  sinfulness 
by  denying  the  existence  of  an  inherent  moral  disposition, 
and  tracing  it  to  susceptibilities  that  are  not  sinful. 

He,  however — after  having  made  this  assumption— en- 
deavors to  demonstrate  that  the  doctrine  that  no  morality 
can  attach  to  inhei'ent  dispositions  and  involuntary  emotions, 
whether  "  the  fallacy"  of  the  "  speculation"  can  be  de~ 
tected  or  not,  is  fallacious,  and  "in  direct  and  open  collision 
both  with  fact  and  the  sacred  scriptures."  The  following 
is  his  argument  respecting  emotions. 

"  Are  our  brethren"  "  prepared  to  deny  that  there  are  emotions, 
prompted  by  original  constitution,  and  rising  spontaneously  in  the 
mind,  to  which  the  general  sense  of  mankind  ascribes  moral  qualities?" 

"  The  bare  contemplation  of  many  actions  and  objects  without 
previous  reflection,  spontaneously  awakens  emotions  planted  deep  in 
our  nature  which  are  eminently  moral.  Thus  the  bare  perception 
of  what  is  morally  vile,  such  as  an  iniiuman  murder  committed  from 
avarice,  and  accompanied  with  perfidy  and  rank  ingratitude,  or  in- 
stances of  insult  and  dishonor  offered  by  children  to  their  parents, 
or  gross  and  daring  acts  of  impiety  towards  God,  awakens  emotions 
peculiarly  painful  and  shocking  in  the  mind  of  a  truly  good  man. 
Thus  also  he  experiences  a  spontaneous  j)lcasure  in  contemplating 
some  holy  beneficent  character,  and  especially  the  character  of  the 
blessed  God.  These  emotions  of  pain  and  pleasure,  are  not  produced 
by  reasoning  on  the  subject,  nor  by  a  previous  act  of  choice.  They  a- 
arise  from  the  established  moral  frame  and  temper  of  the  mind  ;  but  do 
they  on  this  account  cease  to  deserve  our  approbation  ?  Are  they 
not  a  necessary  part  of  the  moral  excellence  of  the  person  who  is 
the  subject  of  them  ?     If  he  could  behold  crime  and  virtuous  cha- 


333 

acters  like  these  with  indifferetice,  if  the  emotions  of  abhorrence  and 
delight  did  not  arise  spontaneously  from  his  very  nature,  if  he  had  to 
be  indebted  to  an  act  of  will,  or  to  a  logical  process  before  he  could 
feel  them,  would  he  not,  by  common  consent,  be  condemned  as  labor- 
ing under  an  egregious  moral  defect  ?"  p.  17.  18. 

The  existence  of  these  spontaneous  emotions,  is  thus  ad- 
mitted, and  is  clearly  indisputable ;  and  the  existence  of  innu- 
merable others  also,  corresponding  to  our  sense  of  right  and 
wrong,  and  susceptibilities  of  enjoyment  and  suffering,  is 
equally  manifest.  They  obviously  must  take  place  on 
the  presentation  to  those  susceptibilities  of  their  appropriate 
objects,  in  order  that  those  objects,  or  our  perceptions  of 
them,  may  become  motives  to  volition.  If  perceptions  gave 
no  pleasure  whatever,  nor  pain,  nor  excited  any  sense  of 
right  or  wrong,  they  would  exhibitno  good  to  be  sought, 
or  evil  to  be  avoided,  and  of  course  could  neither  awaken 
aversion  nor  desire,  nor  constitute  any  inducement  to  action. 
That  they  involve  no  moral  character,  however,  is  abun- 
dantly clear  from  many  considerations. 

The  mind  is  so  formed,  as  not  to  feel  blame  or  compla- 
cency for  such  involuntary  emotions,  any  more  than  for  the 
susceptive  powers  themselves  from  which  they  spring,  or  for 
any  other  constitutional  attributes.  We  feel  no  moral  de- 
sert, because  our  capacities  of  being  pleased  with  objects 
of  external  beauty,  or  moral  grandeur, with'forms  and  colors, 
sounds  and  odors,  justice,  truth,  and  amiable  conduct  in 
those  around  us  ;  or  of  being  displeased  with  unkindness, 
treachery,  and  cruelty,  are  called  into  activity  by  the  pre- 
sence of  their  appropriate  causes  ; — because  the  generous 
sympathy  of  a  Howard  and  the  disinterested  patriotism  of 
a  Washington  excite  our  respect  and  veneration  ;  and  the 
ambition  of  a  Napoleon  and  inhumanity  of  a  Borgia  fill  us 

42 


334 

with  detestation  ;— because  the  sublime  meekness,  the  inef^ 
fable  dignity,  the  divine  benevolence  of  Christ  on  the  cross, 
strike  our  sensibility  to  what  is  great  and  good  with  over- 
powering force,  and  carry  our  sympathies  resistlessly  along 
with  him  ;  while  the  ingratitude,  meanness,  and  treachery  of 
Judas,  and  the  impious  taunts  and  brutal  malignity  of  Jewish 
priests  and  rulers,  fill  us  with  indignation  and  horror.  In  place 
of  attaching  any  moral  character  to  these  involuntary  and  un- 
avoidable emotions,  we  feel  as  completely  irresponsible  for 
them,  as  for  the  perceptions  themselves — which  take  place  in 
the  same  manner  from  the  necessity  of  our  nature — by 
which  they  are  excited.  It  is  not  until  we  voluntarily  act 
under  their  influence,  and  choose  the  one,  or  reject  the 
other,  that  we  feel  that  we  have  ceased  to  be  irresponsible, 
and  experience  the  approval  or  reprobation  of  conscience. 
Mankind  at  large  act  on  the  same  principles  in  their 
judgment  of  others.  It  is  not  regarded  as  a  moral  excel- 
lence in  the  murderer,  that  he  hesitates  from  involuntary 
sympathy,  and  the  unbidden  rebukes  of  conscience,  when 
about  to  assail  the  life  of  a  fellow  creature ;  nor  in  the  thief, 
that  spontaneous  desires  spring  up  in  his  mind  of  the  good 
he  seeks,  without  the  guilt  which  his  mode  of  attaining  it 
involves ;  and  that  his  spirit  quails  in  the  perpetration  of 
crime,  from  a  consciousness  of  guilt  and  degradation,  and  an 
irrepressible  sense  of  the  dignity  and  amiableness'of  rectitude. 
The  hungry  are  never  blamed  for  instinctively  desiring  the 
food  which  they  steal ;  but  only  for  choosing  to  possess 
themselves  of  it  in  violation  of  right ;  nor  the  murderer  for 
involuntarily  feeling  that  wealth  and  power  are  means  of 
happiness,  but  for  resolving  to  gain  them,  though  at  the 
price  of  blood.  To  be  the  mere  subject  of  such  emotions, 
is  not  to  be  virtuous  ;  but  virtue  consists  wholly  in  choos- 


335 

ing  that  lawful  good  to  which  these  emotions  prompt,  and 
rejecting  those  forbidden  gratifications  from  which  they  dis- 
suade ;  and  guilt,  on  the  other  hand,  lies  solely  in  resisting 
those  influences  that  restrain  from  sin,  and  choosing  prohi- 
bited modes  of  enjoyment,  in  despite  of  the  conviction  of 
their  sinfulness. 

This  principle  is  recognised  by  the  Most  High  also  in 
his  requirements  and  prohibitions.  His  legislation  respects 
voluntary  actions  only,  not  unavoidable  eiSects  like  percep- 
tions and  emotions,  that  are  excited  without  our  volition  by 
the  action  of  external  agents. 

But,  to  ascribe  to  these  spontaneous  emotions,  a  moral 
character,  is  to  contradict  an  essential  element  of  Dr.  De 
Witt's  own  theory,  as  well  as  consciousness  and  the  word  of 
God  ;  as,  if  they  are  fraught  with  morality,  then  the  unreger 
nerate  themselves,  so  far  forth  as  many  of  those  emotions 
are  concerned,  are  holy,  and  consequently  their  nature  also, 
on  the  principles  on  which  he  has  reasoned,  as  far  as  the 
susceptibilities  which  are  the  grounds  of  those  emotions  are 
concerned,  is  likewise  holy.  "The  bare  perception  of  what 
is  morally  vile,  such  as  an  inhuman  murder  committed  from 
avarice,  and  accompanied  with  perfidy  and  rank  ingrati- 
tude, or  instances  of  insult  and  dishonor  ofiered  by  children 
to  their  parents,  or  gross  and  daring  impiety  towards  God, 
awakens  emotions  peculiarly  painful  and  shocking"  in  un- 
renewed, in  many  instances  at  least,  as  well  as  in  renovated 
minds.  There  is  not  an  individual  of  the  race  probably, 
who,  if  allowed  to  dwell  calmly  on  the  subject,  can  avoid 
feeling  that  it  is  amiable  in  ofl*spring  to  honor  and  obey 
those  from  whom  they  have  derived  existence,  and  to  whom 
they  owe  their  preservation,  nurture,  and  happiness  ;  and 
base  in  children  to  traduce  and  insult  a  parent ;  not  a  being 


336 

on  whom  the  Creator  has  impressed  the  lineaments  of  a 
moral  agent,  who  can  escape  feeling  that  it  is  estimable  to 
relieve  suffering ;  generous  to  defend  the  oppressed,  to  rescue 
merit  from  injury  and  raise  it  from  depression  ;  noble  to  for- 
give, father  than  to  revenge  an  injury  ;  and  base  and  detest- 
able to  rob  the  helpless,  to  crush  the  defenceless  into  de- 
pendence and  subserviency,  or  wantonly  to  inflict  evil  in 
any  form.  To  suppose  that  these  involuntary  sentiments  or 
emotions,  and  others  of  the  like  nature,  are  not  natural  and 
common  to  the  unregenerate,  as  well  as  to  the  renewed ; 
were  to  suppose  that  they  have  no  sense  of  right  and  wrong, 
no  ideas  of  obligation,  of  merit,  or  guilt ;  no  conceptions  of 
cruelty,  injustice,  falsehood,  meanness,  or  their  opposites; 
no  capacity  whatever  of  feeling  "  how  awful  goodness  is, 
and  virtue  how  lovely,"  and  to  strike  them  at  once  from 
the  rank  of  intelligent  and  moral  beings,  and  sink  them  to 
a  level  with  brutes. 

As  then  it  is  thus  indisputable,  that  the  unrenewed  are 
the  subjects,  as  well  as  the  regenerate,  of  all  these  species  of 
involuntary  emotion — as  indisputable  as  it  is  that  they  are, 
of  the  same  species  of  perceptions,  and  are  as  competent  to 
the  same  species  of  voluntary  agency — it  is  equally  clear, 
inasmuch  as  the  unrenewed  are  wholly  without  holiness, 
that  no  morality  whatever,  can  attach  to  those  emotions,  but 
that  the  mind  is  as  unmeritorious  and  irresponsible  for  them, 
as  it  is  for  its  involuntary  perceptions,  or  constitutional 
attributes. 

The  same  remarks  are  applicable  to  the  statements  and 
reasonings  by  which  he  endeavors  to  prove,  "  that  there  are 
constitutional  dispositions,  natural  propensities  in  the  mind, 
that  is,  propensities  which  accompany  our  nature  under  all 
circumstances,  to  which  the  common  sense  of  mankind  has 
ver  ascribed  moral  character." 


I 


337 

"  Some  persons  are  constitutionally  chaste  and  pure.  This  temper 
of  mind  becomes  a  reasonable  moral  creature,  and  properly  belongs 
to  the  excellency  of  its  nature.  The  opposite  propensity  would 
be  a  foul  blemish  in  its  character.  In  this  light  alt  men  regard  the 
subject.  None  but  a  metaphysician  would  undertake  to  reason  us 
out  of  our  belief,  that  although  it  is  constitutional,  and  invincible,  and 
antecedent  to  volition,  it  is  not  morally  good."  p.  19. 

I  spare  this  passage  from  the  severe  criticisms  which  it 
merits.  It  is  a  sufficient  refutation  of  its  statements,  that  if 
there  are  "  constitutional  dispositions"  or  "  propensities," 
which  thus  "accompany  our  nature  under  all  circum- 
stances," and  belong  therefore  to  every  individual ;  which 
become  "a  reasonable  moral  creature,"  and  "to  which  the 
common  sense  of  mankind  has  ever  ascribed  moral  charac- 
ter ;"  then  either  mankind  have  egregiously  erred  in  their 
judgment  respecting  those  propensities  ;  or  else  the  unre- 
newed, in  place  of  being  wholly  sinful,  are  at  least,  as  far  as 
those  propensities  go,  "morally  good,"  as  well  as  the  rege- 
nerate ;  and  their  nature  consequently,  instead  of  being 
wholly  destitute  of  original  righteousness,  or  a  disposition 
to  what  is  morally  excellent,  and  fraught  with  nothing  but 
an  unconquerable  disposition  to  moral  evil,  is  formed  with 
a  multitude  of  "  dispositions  or  propensities,"  "  constitu- 
tional, invincible,  and  antecedent  to  volition,"  that  are 
"  morally  good  ;" — "  dispositions  and  propensities"  there- 
fore, that  on  the  presentation  of  their  appropriate  objects 
must,  on  his  principles,  "  invariably  and  necessarily  lead  to 
obedience"  in  every  act  of  choice  put  forth^under  their  in- 
fluence !  Would  Dr.  De  Witt  have  assented  to  this  conclu- 
sion, to  which  his  representations  in  these  passages  would, 
if  consistent,  have  inevitably  carried  him  ?  "  That  those 
who  make  the  nature  and  the  operations  of  the  mind  the 
subject  of  their  professed  attention,  should  yet  be  so  inad- 


338 

vertent  in  regard  to  the  tendency  of  their  principles,  and  so 
precipitate  as  to  impute  to  others  doctrinal  offences,  to  the 
imputation  of  which  they  are  themselves  obnoxious,  may 
seem  extraordinary,  but  is  nevertheless  demonstrably  true." 
p.  12. 

But  the  doctrine  of  this  passage  is  as  inconsistent  with 
fact,  and  the  decisions  of  common  sense,  as  it  is  with  the 
essential  elements  of  Dr.  De  Witt's  own  scheme. 

Constitutional,  in  distinction  from  voluntary  purity,  arises 
from  a  mere  incapacity  or  exemption  from  appetite  for 
that  species  of  pleasure  which  may  be  unchastely  indulged. 
But  there  obviously  is  no  moral  excellence  in  such  a  mere 
destitution  of  that  susceptibility.  Is  the  abstinence  of  in- 
fancy or  old  age,  of  decrepitude  or  artificial  incapacity, 
from  such  criminal  gratifications,  "  morally  good,"  and  so 
palpably  so,  that  none  but  a  metaphysician  would  under- 
take to  reason  us  out  of  the  ascription  to  it  of  that  charac- 
ter ?  Is  it  a  virtue  in  disembodied  spirits  or  angelic  natures, 
that  they  never  descend  to  those,  to  men,  forbidden  modes  of 
indulgence?  These  questions  require  no  answer.  It  is  obvi- 
ously erroneous,  and  absurd  to  the  last  degree,  to  predicate 
that  virtue  of  beings  who  are  constitutionally  incapable  of  vo- 
luntarily exercising  it,  or  voluntarily  indulging  in  the  vice 
that  is  its  opposite.  Even  voluntary  abstinence  from  that  vice 
is  far  from  being  necessarily  or  universally  holy.  It  may 
result  from  an  absence  of  temptation,  from  the  restraints  of 
society,  the  promptings  of  fear,  or  the  impulses  of  shame, 
as  well  as  from  a  conscientious  regard  to  obligation. 
Neither  the  voice  of  consciousness  then,  the  general  judg- 
ment of  mankind,  nor  the  principles  of  Dr.  De  Witt's  own 
system,  yield  him  any  sanction  in  the  ascription  of  a  moral 
character  to  such  constitutional  affections. 


339 

His  appeal  to  "  the  word  of  God,"  as  distinctly  recog- 
nizing "  the  existence  of  an  inherent  disposition  or  propen- 
sity to  evil,"  and  branding  "  it  as  being  morally  wrong,"  is 
equally  unauthorized  and  unpropitious  to  his  cause.  The 
passage  which  he  alleges  as  specifically  teaching  that  theory, 
is  Rom.  vii.  14 — 23.  A  glance  at  the  nature  and  object  of 
its  argument  however,  will  show  that  he  has  wholly  misap- 
prehended its  import.  The  apostle  had  in  a  preceding  part 
of  the  chapter,  stated  an  intimation  from  an  objector,  that 
the  discontinuance  of  the  law  as  a  rule  of  justification,  and 
substitution  of  a  method  of  gracious  acceptance  in  its  place, 
must  have  arisen  from  some  defect  in  the  law  itself.  This 
the  apostle  pronounced  a  false  inference,  and  stated  that 
the  law  instead  of  being  itself  sinful,  is  the  very  instrument 
by  which  we  become  apprised  that  we  are  sinners,  and  ad- 
verted in  illustration  of  it  to  the  fact,  that  while  we  remain 
inconsiderate  of  its  requirements,  we  continue  insensible  of 
our  guilt,  but  become  aware  of  the  relation  of  our  actions 
to  our  obligations,  when  its  injunctions  are  brought  home 
into  immediate  contact  with  reason  and  conscience. 

"  What  shall  we  say  then  ?  Is  the  law  sin?  God  forbid.  Nay  I 
had  not  known  sin  but  by  the  law  ;  for  I  had  not  known  lust,  except 
the  law  had  said,  thou  shalt  not  covet.  But  sin,  taking  occasion  by 
the  commandment,  wrought  in  me  all  manner  of  concupiscence" — all 
manner  of  concupiscence  was  shown  by  the  law  to  be  sin.  "  For 
without  the  law,  sin  was  dead.  For  I  was  alive  without  the  law  once, 
but  when  the  commandment  came,  sin  revived  and  I  died.  And  the 
commandment  which  was  ordained  to  life,  I  found  to  be  unto  death." 

He  then  again  introduced  the  objector  as  ofiering  on  the 
ground  of  that  reply,  the  further  intimation  against  the  law, 
that  if  it  is  thus  the  instrument  of  demonstrating  that  we  are 
sinners,  it  is  properly  to  be  considered  as  the  cause  of  our 


340 

death,  and  to  be  reprobated  therefore,  rather  than  approved. 
This  the  apostle  likewise  repelled,  and  showed  that  it  is 
not  the  law  itself,  but  our  transgression  of  it,  that  is  the 
cause  of  our  death ;  and  in  illustration  of  it,  referred  to 
the  fact,  that  we  are  accustomed  in  all  the  decisions  of  rea- 
son and  operations  of  conscience  respecting  it,  to  recognize 
the  excellence  of  the  law,  while  it  condemns  us,  and  to  trace 
our  ruin  to  ourselves,  as  voluntary  transgressors ;  that  we 
approve  of  its  injunctions,  and  acknowledge  our  obligations, 
even  when  we  refuse  to  obey  them,  and  perceive  the  guilt 
of  sin,  and  feel  it  to  be  hateful,  while  we  continue  to  go  on 
in  its  perpetration. 

"  Was  then  that  which  is  good,  made  death  unto  me  ?  God  forbid. 
But  sin,  that  it  might  appear  sin,  working  death  in  me  by  that  which 
is  good,  that  sin  by  the  commandment  might  become  exceeding  sin- 
ful. For  we  know  that  the  law  is  spiritual ;  but  I  am  carnal,  sold 
under  sin.  For  that  which  I  do,  I  allow  not ;  for  what  I  would,  that 
do  I  not,  but  what  I  hate,  that  do  I.  If  then  I  do  that  which  I  would 
not,  I  consent  unto  the  law  that  it  is  good.  I  find  then  a  law  that 
when  I  would  do  good,  evil  is  present  with  me.  For  I  delight  in 
the  law  of  God  after  the  inward  man,  but  I  see  another  law  in  my 
members,  warring  against  the  law  of  my  mind,  and  bringing  me  into 
captivity  to  the  law  of  sin,  which  is  in  my  members.  So  then  with 
the  mind  I  myself  serve  the  law  of  God,  but  with  the  flesh,  the  law 
of  sin." 

The  apostle  thus,  in  place  of  lending  any  support  to  the 
theory  which  Dr.  De  Witt  endeavored  to  sustain  by  his  lan- 
guage, furnishes  the  most  ample  proofs  of  its  error,  and  of 
the  accuracy  of  the  opposite  doctrine.  Instead  of  repre- 
senting us  as  prompted  to  transgression  solely  by  a  specific 
taste  for  sin,  and  exhibiting  the  sinfulness  of  our  disobe- 
dient acts,  as  the  reason  of  our  committing  thorn,  as  that 
theory  implies  and  teaches,  he  formally  recognises  tlie  fact 


341 

that  we  are  accustomed  to  carry  with  us  into  the  very  act  of 
sinning,  a  conviction  of  the  excellence  of  the  law,  of  our  ob- 
ligations to  obey  it,  and  of  the  evil  of  sin;  and  to  perpe- 
trate it  in  defiance  of  these  restraints  ;  instead  of  being 
prompted  by  them  to  its  commission.  He  likewise,  on  the 
other  hand  as  specifically  recognises  the  fact,  that  the  in- 
ducements that  prompt  us  against  these  restraints,  to  trans- 
gression, are  addressed  to  our  corporeal  appetites,  and  men- 
tal passions,  or  susceptibilities  of  pleasure  from  the  objects 
around  us  ;  which  are  capable  of  being  preserved  within 
the  limits  of  obligation,  and  made  "  the  instruments  of  righ- 
teousness unto  God,"  as  well  as  of  being  indulged  in  for- 
bidden forms,  and  made  "the  instruments  of  unrighteous- 
ness"— the  fact  identically  that  constitutes  the  chief  element 
of  the  doctrine  I  have  endeavored  to  sustain. 

He  alleges,  as  a  further  objection  to  these  views,  that  they 
involve  a  renunciation  of  the  distinction  introduced  by  Pre- 
sident Edwards,  between  natural  and  moral  inability. 

"  President-Edwards  was  the  first  in  this  country  to  ascertain  witli 
precision,  and  to  prove  by  arguments  hitherto  unanswered,  that 
whilst  fallen  man  possesses  all  the  natural  faculties  requisite  to 
constitute  him  a  moral  and  an  accountable  agent,  the  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  his  performing  his  duty  to  God  and  man,  are  first  to  be 
looked  for  in  the  moral  attributes  of  his  soul,  in  the  unconquerable 
dominion  of  his  depraved  inherent  disposition  to  evil,  diffused  throwgh 
the  whole  moral  man.  It  is  the  invincible  strength  and  influence  of 
his  predilection  for  sin,  that  renders  the  sinner  its  very  slave,  and 
constitutes  the  necessity  of  a  divine  efficacious  interposition.  This 
distinction  between  natural  faculties  essentially  requisite  to  consti- 
tute men  the  proper  subjects  of  accountability  and  moral  disposition, 
established,  as  it  was  thought,  with  great  regard  to  precision,  was  em- 
braced by  the  next  generation  of  eminent  divines  in  this  country, 
such  as  Bellamy,  the  younger  Edwards,  Hopkins,  West,  Smalley, 
and  Dwight,  and  it  obtained  extensive  currency  among  the  divines  of 
Europe.     Human  inability  was  thus  distinguished  into  that  which 

43 


342 

is  natural,  and  tliat  which  is  moral.  The  former  completely 
excuses  and  clears  its  subject  of  all  blame  ;  the  latter  is  entirely  con- 
sistent with  the  blackest  guilt.  Wheiher  this  distinction  threw 
greater  precision  and  accuracy,  over  the  older  method  of  exhibiting  the 
subject,  cannot  at  present  be  discussed.  My  object  in  this  historical 
statement  is  merely  to  ascertain  what  our  brethren  at  present  believe 
on  this  subject,  and  what  they  desire  others  to  believe.  We  have  per- 
ceived that  they  charge  all  those  who  place  the  depravity  of  the  unre- 
genernle  man,  in  his  inherent  propensity  or  disposition  to  evil,  with 
teaching  physical  depravity,  and  thus  destroying  accountability.  As 
this  charge  directly  affects  President  Edwards'  distinction  of  natural 
and  moral  inability,  it  follows  with  undeniable  clearness  that  they 
have  renounced  that  distinction,  and  that  according  to  these  views  of 
the  matter,  the  moral  inability  maintained  by  President  Edwards  is 
physical,  for  he  resolved  it  into  unholy  disposition.  They  have  thus 
given  the  death's  blow  to  that  celebrated  distinction." — p.  25,26. 

A  just  consideration  of  the  subject,  however,  will  show 
that  it  is  the  theory  itself  of  President  Edwards,  that  sub- 
verts that  distinction,  while  the  views  I  am  endeavoring 
to  vindicate,  in  place  of  contradicting  it,  present  the  only 
ground  on  which  it  can  be  consistently  maintained.  The 
object  of  his  reasonings  respecting  that  distinction  was,  to 
demonstrate  that  the  reason  that  men  sin,  and  the  ground  of 
the  certainty  that  they  will  continue  to  transgress,  unless  with- 
held from  it  by  the  renovating  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
do  not  lie  in  a  physical  incapacity  for  obedience,  but  in  place 
of  that,  are  such  as  are  compatible  with  and  necessarily  in- 
volve their  perfect  freedom,  responsibility,  and  blamewor- 
thiness :  and  it  was  this  reason,  and  ground  of  certainty 
that  he  denominated  a  moral  inability. 

This  representation,  however,  he  directly  contradicted  in 
his  theory,  respecting  constitutional  depravity,  in  which  he 
denied  that  there  is  any  susceptibility  in  the  mind,  on  which 
motives  can  act  in  sucli  a  manner  as  to  prove  inducements  to 


343 

obedience ;  and  ascribed  to  it  a  specific  taste  for  sin,  which  by 
the  necessity  of  its  nature,  renders  all  motives  mere  tempta- 
tions to  transgression  :  as  in  denying  it  a  capacity  of  being 
excited  to  obedience,  he  plainly  denied  its  capacity  for  obe- 
dience itself;  and  in  representing  it  as  fraught  with  no  other 
susceptibility  than  of  excitement  to  sin,  he  represented  its 
capacity  for  moral  agency  as  nothing  more  than  a  mere  ca- 
pacity for  transgression.  The  charge,  therefore,  of  contra- 
dicting his  own  representation,  that  the  reason  that  men  sin 
does  not  lie  in  a  natural  incapacity,  but  is  such  as  is  wholly 
compatible  with  physical  ability,  perfect  obligation  to  obey 
and  utter  inexcusableness  and  guilt  in  disobedience,  lies 
unanswerably  against  his  own  theory. 

That  view  of  the  subject,  however,  which  I  have  sought 
to  sustain,  as  obviously  escapes  that  inconsistency,  by  de- 
nying the  existence  of  a  specific  taste  for  sin,  and  placing 
the  ground  of  our  acting  in  the  manner  in  which  we  do,  in  the 
moral  influences  by  which  we  are  excited ;  and  accordingly, 
completely  attains  the  object  at  which  President  Edwards 
aimed ;  an  explication  of  the  reasons  of  our  sinning,  that  is 
consistent  with  our  capacity  and  obligation  to  obey,  and 
the  certainty  of  our  continuing  to  sin,  if  left  without  the  re- 
novating influence  of  the  Spirit. 

He  likewise  alleges  that  these  views  imply 

"  That  bad  men  are  released  from  obligation  to  obedience,  and 
free  from  guilt,  in  proportion  as  they  find  it  difficult,  through  the 
strength  and  obstinacy  of  their  disposition  to  wickedness,  to  comply 
with  the  laws  of  God  and  man." — p.  30. 

He  has  here  again,  however,  taken  for  granted  the  posi- 
tion which  he  should  have  proved — that  there  can  be  no 
successful  excitement  to  sin,  unless  it  takes  place  agreeably 


344 

to  his  theory,  by  the  action  of  motives  on  a  specific  taste 
for  sin  ;  and  thence  that  to  deny  the  compatibility  of  an  ex- 
citement through  such  a  taste,  with  our  obligations,  is  to 
deny  the  compatibility  of  any  excitement  to  it  whatever, 
with  blameworthiness  in  its  perpetration.  But  that  position 
must  be  demonstrated  before  his  allegation  can  be  author- 
ized. It  has  never  yet  been  demonstrated,  however,  nor 
ever  can  be,  nor  his  inference  from  it  invested  with  a  shadow 
of  propriety ;  and  if  no  such  specific  taste  for  sin  exists, 
but  in  place  of  that,  the  excitements  to  transgression  which 
we  experience,  take  place  as  I  have  represented,  by  the  ac- 
tion of  motives  on  susceptibilities  that  are  not  in  themselves 
evil,  but  that  may  be  indulged  in  consistency  with,  as  well 
as  in  violation  of  obligation,  it  then  does  not  follow  from 
the  denial  that  an  excitement  to  sin  through  the  agency  of 
such  a  taste  for  sin,  would  be  compatible  with  guilt  in  it ; 
that,  therefore,  the  excitements  to  it  which  we  in  fact  expe- 
rience and  by  which  we  are  pi'ompted  to  transgression,  are 
also  incompatible  with  blameworthiness ;  anymore  than  the 
denial  that  the  mind  is  responsible  for  the  involuntary  efiects 
of  which  it  is  the  subject,  involves  a  denial  of  its  responsi- 
bility in  its  voluntary  agency.  The  two  positions  have  no 
connexion  whatever  with,  nor  resemblance  to  each  other, 
and  the  allegation  in  question,  therefore,  which  is  predica- 
ted on  the  assumption  of  their  identity,  wholly  falls  to  the 
ground. 

Thus  manifest  is  it,  that  the  foregoing  objections  to  these 
views,  in  place  of  accomplishing  the  object  at  which  they  are 
aimed,  only  serve  to  demonstrate  tlie  erroneousness  of  the 
principles  they  are  employed  to  sustain,  and  to  vindicate 
those  which  they  are  designed  to  subvert. 

It  is  likewise  the  occasion  of  prejudice  against  these 


345 

views,  that  Dr.  Taylor,  who  professes  to  have  rejected  the 
doctrine  of  physical  depravity,  and  his  associates,  have  run 
into  speculations  fraught  with  the  subversion  of  many  of  the 
essential  truths  of  revelation  :  and  some  have  perhaps  been 
led  by  that  circumstance  to  the  inference  that  the  abandon- 
ment of  that  theory  necessarily  leads  to  such  results  ;  and 
that  all  therefore  who  renounce  the  one,  must,  as  a  matter 
of  course,  have  rejected  the  others,  or  are  at  least  to  be 
carried  to  that  rejection,  whenever  they  follow  their  princi- 
ples to  their  legitimate  results. 

Not  the  slightest  ground,  however,  exists  to  justify  either 
that  inference  or  prejudice.  Neither  they  who  have  drawn 
the  one,  nor  they  who  have  yielded  to  the  otlier,  can  need 
to  be  told  that  the  fact  that  men  coincide  in  their  views  on 
one  branch  of  theological  doctrine,  does  not  necessarily  de- 
monstrate that  they  agree  on  all  others  with  which  that  has 
no  immediate  connexion ; — that  it  does  not  follow  from  the 
fact  that  those  gentlemen,  as  well  as  myself,  believe  in  the 
existence  of  the  Deity,  that  we  concur  in  all  our  views  of  his 
nature,  attributes,  and  government ;  nor  from  the  fact  that 
we  alike  regard  the  scriptures  as  a  divine  revelation,  that 
all  our  apprehensions  of  the  doctrines  which  they  teach, 
are  coincident  with  each  other.  To  infer  in  that  manner, 
a  universal,  from  a  partial  concurrence  of  opinion,  were  to 
verify  the  pretences  of  Dr.  Taylor,  that  he  coincides  in 
every  essential  particular  with  the  orthodox  in  his  views  of 
the  subjects  which  his  controversies  affect,  and  to  assume 
that  no  difference  of  any  significance  can  ever  exist  between 
any,  who  unite  in  assenting  to  the  divine  existence,  and  the 
inspiration  of  the  scriptures. 

That  inference,  moreover,  as  far  as  Dr.  Taylor  is  con- 
cerned, is  rendered  wholly  unjust  and  absurd  by  the  fact 


346 

that — as  I  have  shown  on  a  former  occasion — he  not  only 
had  no  agency  whatever,  in  originating  the  views  I  have 
advocated  on  that  subject — and  this  is  true  likewise  of 
his  associates, — but  has  never  yet  succeeded  in  extrica- 
ting himself  from  the  theory  of  physical  depravity.  In 
place  of  that  he  has  through  every  period  strenuously  con- 
tended that  the  views,  reasoning  and  language  of  the  West- 
minster divines,  of  Edwards,  Dwight,  and  the  Calvinists 
generally,  in  which  it  is  embodied,  are  free  from  every  just 
exception,  and  solemnly  denied  all  consciousness  of  having 
departed  on  that  or  any  other  article  of  doctrinal  belief,  from 
his  "  revered  instructer  in  theology  ;"  has  likewise  repre- 
sented and  continues  to  represent  the  nature  itself  of  the 
mind  as  the  cause  of  its  sinning,  in  distinction  from  the  in- 
fluences that  excite  it;  asserts  the  existence  in  it  of  a  "  selfish 
principle,"  essentially  coincident  in  nature  and  agency  with 
the  taste  for  sin  ascribed  to  it  by  the  advocates  of  the  cur- 
rent theory  ;  and  professes  accordingly  to  hold  to  the  ne- 
cessity of  a  direct  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  regenera- 
tion— in  distinction  from  that  which  is  employed  in  convey- 
ing truth  to  it,  or  acting  through  amoral  instrumentality — 
and  which  of  course,  therefore,  must  be  employed  in  chang- 
ing its  physical  constitution,  in  place  of  the  mode  of  its 
agency.  He  has,  therefore,  no  title  to  be  regarded  as  having 
in  fact  rejected  the  doctrine  of  physical  depravity,  any  more 
than  those  who  do  not  profess  to  have  departed  from  the 
views  which  heretofore  have  generall}'  prevailed ;  or  those 
who  simply  deny  the  propriety  of  denominating  a  trans- 
mitted corruption,  a  physical  attribute,  while  they  continue 
to  treat  it  as  a  constitutional  afiection,  and  to  approve  and 
employ  all  the  terms,  reasonings,  and  representations  that 
are  the  usual  vehicles  of  its  definition  and  inculcation. 


347 

But  it  were  equally  unauthorized  and  unjust  to  regard 
the  views  which  I  have  advanced,  as  laying  any  foundation 
for  the  errors  into  which  those  gentlemen  have  run.  The 
two  systems  are  not  only  wholly  disconnected,  but  totally 
incompatible  with  and  subversive  of  each  other. 

Of  those  errors,  the  first  which  I  shall  notice,  is  the  doc- 
trine of  a  self-determining  will,  or  the  representation  involved 
in  their  speculations  respecting  the  nature  of  moral  agency, 
that  the  mind  exerts  its  volitions  without  any  intelligent 
reasons.  No  argument  can  be  necessary  to  prove  that  this 
absurd  dogma  has  no  direct  sanction  in  the  precisely  oppo- 
site doctrine  which  I  have  advanced  on  the  subject : — that 
the  mind,  in  place  of  acting  in  that  merely  mechanical 
manner,  exerts  its  choices  solely  for  seen  and  felt  reasons, 
and  that  those  reasons  lie  wholly  in  its  perceptions  and 
emotions,  or  the  motives  under  which  it  puts  forth  its 
volitions. 

It  is  equally  clear  that  no  human  sagacity  can  ever  de- 
rive their  theory,  or  obtain  any  sanction  for  it  by  any  le- 
gitimate logic  from  any  of  the  positions — involved  in  this 
doctrine — which  I  have  advocated  or  sanctioned. 

It  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  fact,  that — as  I  have  re- 
presented— men  are  the  efficient  causes  of  their  volitions. 
That  representation  no  more  lays  a  foundation  for  the 
inference,  that  they  are  mere  brute  or  senseless  machines  in 
their  agency,  than  it  does  for  any  other  absurd  and  impossi- 
ble consequence.  It  no  more  follows  from  the  fact,  that 
they  put  forth  their  volitions  by  their  own  efficiency,  that 
they  exert  them  without  intelligence ;  than  it  follows  from 
the  fact  that  God  is  the  efficient  cause  of  his  own  acts,  that 
he  is  unintelligent  in  his  agency : — no  more  than  it  follows 
from  the  fact,  that  they  are  not  the  efficient  causes  of  those 


348 

events  of  which  they  are  involuntarily  the  subjects,  that 
they  are  not  in  fact  involuntarily  the  subjects  of  those  events. 
In  place  of  that,  to  act  by  one's  own  efficiency,  is  identi- 
cal with  acting  with  intelligence.  To  act  by  one's  own 
power,  indeed,  without  intelligence,  were  wholly  impossible. 
No  other  idea  can  be  formed  of  an  efficient  agent,  than  that 
he  intelligently  puts  forth  acts  by  his  own  power,  instead 
of  being  moved  by  causes  external  to  himself,  or  acting  for 
reasons  of  which  he  has  no  consciousness. 

It  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  fact,  that  men  are  volun- 
tarily active  in  their  moral  agency.  That  were  to  make 
voluntary  activity  identical  with  acting  from  an  involuntary 
and  mechanical  impulse.  To  act  by  volition  however 
is  simply  to  act  by  one's  own  efficiency  for  an  intelligent 
reason,  instead  of  being  moved  by  causes  of  which  the  mind 
is  not  conscious. 

It  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  fact  that  the  mind  is  deter- 
mined in  its  choices  by  motives.  That  were  again  to  make 
acting  from  motives  identical  with  an  involuntary  and  un- 
intelligent agency.  But  in  place  of  that,  to  be  determined 
by  motives,  is  to  act  solely  for  seen  and  felt  reasons,  instead 
of  acting  without  reasons,  or  being  prompted  by  causes  of 
which  the  mind  has  no  consciousness. 

Nor  can  it  be  deduced  from  the  doctrine,  that  the  motives 
that  determine  us  in  our  choices,  do  not  act  on  a  specific 
taste  for  sin  or  holiness,  but  solely  on  susceptibilities,  that 
are  not  in  themselves  evil  or  good,  and  that  may  be  indulged 
either  in  modes  that  are  holy  or  that  are  sinful.  To  act  for 
the  reasons  involved  in  the  excitement  of  such  susceptibilities, 
or  the  good  anticipated  in  their  gratification,  is  no  more  to 
act  without  intelligence,  than  to  act  from  the  promptings  of 
a  specific  taste  for  sin,  were  such  an  attribute  lodged  in  the 


349 

mind — would  be  to  act  without  knowledge.  In  place  of 
tbat,  to  put  forth  choices  from  the  action  of  motives  on  such 
susceptibilities,  is  by  the  terms,  to  act  for  reasons  that  are 
seen  and  felt,  or  of  which  the  mind  is  conscious. 

To  deduce  their  theory  of  a  self-determining  will,  there- 
fore, from  any  of  the  elements  of  the  system,  which  I  have 
endeavored  to  sustain,  is  wholly  out  of  question.  The  two 
systems  are  the  entire  reverse  of  each  other,  and  can  never 
be  maintained  in  conjunction.  Every  element  of  the  one  is 
fraught  with  the  denial  and  subversion  of  every  element  of  the 
other  ;  and  let  those  gentlemen  but  adopt  the  doctrine,  that 
men  in  their  choices  act  only  for  intelligent  reasons,  and  they 
will  instantly,  if  consistent,  abandon  their  theory  of  self-de- 
termination, and  all  the  erroneous  elements  and  consequences 
that  are  incorporated  with  it,  in  their  system. 

No  sagacity,  it  is  equally  clear,  in  the  next  place,  can 
ever  detect  anything  in  the  views  which  I  have  advocated, 
that  can  sustain,  or  give  any  countenance  to  the  denial — 
which  forms  a  conspicuous  element  in  the  theory  of  those 
gentlemen — of  the  possibility  to  God  of  determining  the 
volitions  of  men,  and  preventing  them  from  the  sin  which 
they  commit.  That  denial,  not  only  has  no  direct  counte- 
nance in  the  system  for  which  I  am  pleading,  but  there  is 
nothing  in  it,  it  is  equally  clear,  that  can  yield  it  any  indi- 
rect sanction.  It  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  fact,  that 
men  are  moral  agents.  It  no  more  follows  from  that  fact, 
that  God  cannot  determine  what  reasons  for  acting  shall  be 
conveyed  to  their  minds,  nor  that  he  cannot  place  them 
iHider  such  a  species  of  excitement,  as  to  sway  them  to  obe- 
ence,  than  it  does  that  they  exert  their  choices  without 
reasons.  No  incompatibility  whatever  exists  between  their 
nature  as  moral  agents,  and  their  being  subject  to  the  divine 

44 


350 

control,  in  respect  to  the  species  and  succession  of  their  per- 
ceptions and  involuntary  emotions.  It  does  not  belong  to 
them,  as  moral  agents,  directly  to  determine  the  nature  or 
succession  of  their  perceptions  ;  but  solely  to  exert  voli- 
tions under  their  influence.  To  suppose  them  to  be  the 
absolute  determiners  of  their  own  perceptions,  were  to  run 
into  the  absurdity  of  supposing  a  conception  of  their  per- 
ceptions to  exist  in  their  minds  antecedently  to  the  existence 
of  their  perceptions  themselves.  They  clearly  could  never 
intelligently  choose  the  existence  of  a  new  species  of  per- 
ceptions, until  possessed  of  a  conception  of  that  species 
itself,  or  an  individual  of  it ;  nor  the  re-existence  of  one 
which  had  been  already  experienced,  until  that  perception 
had  involuntarily  again  risen  by  recollection,  or  the  action 
of  some  external  agent.  To  suppose,  therefore,  that  they 
are  the  efficient  causes  of  their  perceptions  and  involuntary 
emotions,  were  to  suppose,  both  that  they  are  not  involun- 
tary in  regard  to  them,  and  that  their  perceptions  exist  and 
are  the  objects  of  volition  antecedently  to  their  existence  ; 
and  to  plunge  accordingly  into  all  the  absurdities  of  the 
doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  or  of  an  infinite  succession  in  the 
mind  of  every  individual  perception  of  which  it  is  now,  ever 
has  been,  or  is  hereafter  to  be  the  subject.  So  far,  there- 
fore, is  the  fact  that  they  are  moral  agents,  from  involving 
any  inconsistency  with  the  doctrine  that  God  determines 
the  influences  which  reach  them,  and  through  that  medium 
can  sway  them  whenever  he  pleases,  to  obedience  ;  that 
there  is  no  other  doctrine  than  that,  that  is  compatible  with 
their  nature  as  responsible  agents,  or  that  is  not  fraught 
with  total  inconsistency  with  all  the  facts  of  their  agency. 

Nor  does  the  denial  by  those  gentlemen  of  the  divine 
ability  to  prevent  men  from  sin,  enjoy  any  sanction  in  any 


351 

of  the  elements  which  I  have  represented  us  involved  in 
their  moral  agency  ;  as  their  efficiency,  voluntariness,  or 
responsibility.  It  does  not,  as  has  been  seen,  follow  from 
the  fact  that  they  are  the  efficient  agents  of  their  choices, 
that  they  likewise  are  of  their  perceptions  and  involuntary 
emotions  ;  nor  does  it  therefore,  from  the  fact  that  they  put 
forth  their  choices  by  their  own  efficiency,  that  God  does 
not  determine  the  nature  and  succession  of  their  perceptions, 

Nor  can  that  denial  be  founded  on  their  responsibility ; 
as  they  are  responsible  only  for  their  voluntary  agency  ;  not 
for  effects  of  which  they  are  merely  involuntarily  the  sub- 
jects. To  suppose  that  they  cannot  involuntarily  be  made 
the  subjects  of  perceptions  and  emotions,  without  impairing 
their  responsibility  for  the  choices  put  forth  under  their  in- 
fluence, were  to  suppose  that  they  cannot  be  subjected  to 
any  influence  whatever,  either  from  the  senses,  from  depen- 
dent agents,  or  from  God,  without  an  annihilation  of  their 
obligations  ;  and  to  contradict  therefore  not  only  our  whole 
consciousness,  but  the  doctrines  of  the  scriptures  likewise 
respecting  the  agency  of  the  Spirit,  of  the  adversary,  and 
of  our  fellow-men  on  us. 

In  all  these  respects,  therefore,  their  doctrine  on  this  sub- 
ject is  not  only  without  the  slightest  pretence  of  any  sanction 
from  me,  but  is  directly  the  converse  of  every  fundamental 
position  of  the  system  1  have  endeavored  to  maintain  ;  and 
must  of  necessity  be  abandoned  by  all  who  assent  to  the 
elements  of  that  system. 

Let  the  gentlemen  at  New  Haven  but  adopt  the  doctrine 
that  men  never  put  forth  choices  except  for  intelligent  rea- 
sons, that  their  reasons  for  their  choices  lie  solely  in  their 
perceptions  and  involuntary  emotions,  and  that  God  deter- 
mines the  nature  and  succession  of  their  perceptions,  and 


352 

can  convey  to  tliom  whatever  rombinatiou  of  motives  he 
pleases,  and  they  will  in  that  act  itself  reject  their  whole 
doctrine  of  self-determination,  and  as  a  consequence,  if  con- 
sistent, give  up  their  denial  of  the  divine  ability  to  prevent 
us  from  sinning. 

VI.  But  the  great  principles  on  which  these  views  rest, 
have  not  only  never  been  overthrown  nor  embarrassed  by 
any  legitimate  objections,  but  as  was  remarked  in  the  con- 
clusion of  the  first  number  of  this  work,  they  are  specifi- 
cally admitted  and  asserted  by  the  great  body  of  those  who 
maintain  the  opposite  scheme,  and  will  carry  them,  as  they 
have  me.  to  the  adoption  of  the  system  at  large,  of  which 
they  are  the  foundation,  whenever  they  shall  be  followed 
to  their  legitimate  results,  and  all  opinions  rejected  that  are 
inconsistent  with  them. 

The  doctrine  that  all  mankind,  whether  regenerated  or 
unrenewed,  are  naturally  or  physically  able  to  yield 
obedience  to  the  divine  law  ;  or  that  they  possess  all  the 
constitutional  attributes  that  are  essential  to  moral  agency 
and  obligation,  is  asserted  as  specifically  and  strenuously  by 
Dr.  De  Witt,  and  Dr.  Griffin,  as  it  is  by  me.  Dr.  De  Witt 
says,  "  fallen  man  possesses  all  the  natural  faculties  requi- 
site to  constitute  him  a  moral  and  accountable  agent ;"  and 
Dr.  Griffin,  that  "  our  obligations  rest  on  the  faculties  of 
a  rational  soul."  Such  likewise  were  the  views  of  President 
Edwards  and  Dr.  Dwight,  as  is  seen  from  the  following 
passages  : 

"  A  moral  agent  is  a  being  that  is  capable  of  those  actions  that 
have  a  moral  quality,  and  which  can  properly  be  denominated  good 
or  evil  in  a  moral  sense,  virtuons  or  vicious,  commendable  or  faulty. 
To  moral  agency  belongs  a  moral JacuUy,  or  sense  of  moral  good  and 
evil,  or  of  such  a  thing  as  desert  or  worthiness  of  praise  or  blame. 


353 

reward  or  punishment:  and  a  capacity  which  an  agent  has  of  being 
influenced  in  his  actions  by  moral  inducements  or  motives,  exhibited 
to  the  view  of  understanding  and  reason,  to  engage  to  a  conduct  agree- 
able to  the  moral  faculty." 

"  The  essential  qualities  of  a  moral  agent  are  in  God  in  the  greatest 
possible  perfection  :  such  as  understanding,  to  perceive  the  difference 
between  moral  good  and  evil ;  a  capacity  of  discerning  that  moral 
worthhiess  and  demerit,  by  which  some  things  are  praiseworthy, 
others  deserving  of  blame  and  punishment ;  and  also  a  capacity  of 
choice,  and  choice  guided  by  understanding,  and  a  power  of  acting 
according  to  his  choice  or  pleasure,  and  being  capable  of  doing  those 
things  which  are  in  the  highest  sense  praiseworthy.  And  herein 
does  very  much  consist  that  image  of  God  wherein  he  made  man,  by 
which  God  distinguished  man  from  the  beasts  ;  viz :  in  those  facul- 
ties and  principles  of  nature,  whereby  he  is  capable  of  moral  agency. 
Herein  very  much  consists  the  natural  image  of  God  ;  whereas  the 
spiritual  and  moral  image,  wherein  man  was  made  at  first,  consisted 
in  that  moral  excellency  with  which  he  was  endowed." — Edwards's 
Works,  Vol.  II.  p.  39,  40,41. 

"  It  may  be  also  proper  to  state  the  difference  which  in  my  own 
view  exists,  between  permitting  or  not  hindering  sin,  and  creating  it. 
It  is  this.  In  the  former  case,  man  is  the  actor  of  his  own  sin.  His 
sin  is  therefore  wholly  his  own  ;  chargeable  only  to  himself;  chosen 
by  him  unnecessarily,  while  possessed  of  a  power  to  choose  other- 
wise ;  avoidable  by  him  ;  and  of  course  guilty  and  righteously  pun- 
ishable. Exactly  the  same  natural  power  is  in  this  case  possessed 
by  him,  while  a  sinner,  which  is  afterwards  possessed  by  him  when 
a  saint ;  which  Adam  possessed  before  he  fell ;  and  which  the  holy 
angels  now  possess  in  the  heavens.  This  power  is  also,  in  my  view,  pet- 
feet  freedom  ;  a  power  of  agency,  as  absolute  as  can  be  possessed  by 
an  intelligent  creature.'' — Dwight's  Theology,  Vol.  I.  p.  414. 

But  if,  as  these  passages  represent,  all  men  thus  possess 
all  the  natural  faculties  requisite  to  render  them  moral  and 
accountable  agents,  it  follows  indisputably  that  no  attribute 
or  susceptibility  can  be  wanting  to  the  unregenerate,  that 
is  essential  to  render  them  physically  able  to  obey ;  and 
none  therefore  that  is  necessary  in  order  to  their  being 
capable  of  excitement  to  obedience.    No  necessity  then  can 


354 

exist  for  the  implantation  of  a  new  susceptibility  in  order 
to  their  being  prompted  to  obedience  ;  and  none  therefore 
can  be  in  fact  implanted  when  they  begin  to  obey.  The 
reason  then  that  some  become  obedient  and  others  continue 
to  disobey,  cannot  lie  in  any  difference  in  their  nature,  but 
must  arise  solely  from  the  influences  that  are  exerted  on 
them.  But  as  the  sole  reason  of  their  acting  as  they  do, 
lies  in  the  motives  by  which  they  are  prompted,  the  ground 
of  their  different  agency  must  lie  in  the  moral  influences 
under  which  they  act ;  and  finally,  as  they  are  determined  in 
their  choices  wholly  through  that  medium,  it  follows  that 
the  regenerating  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit  act  solely 
through  that  instrumentality,  and  are  employed  accordingly, 
not  in  changing  the  physical  constitution  by  the  introduc- 
tion into  it  of  a  new  susceptibility,  but  in  extricating  it 
from  temptation  and  swaying  it  to  holiness  by  the  commu- 
nication of  truth,  or  excitements  to  obedience.  The  admis- 
sion that  all  men  possess  all  the  natural  faculties  that  are 
requisite  to  constitute  them  proper  subjects  of  such  a  govern- 
ment as  God  is  exercising  over  them — thus  followed  to  its 
legitimate  consequences — will  lead  inevitably  to  the  rejection 
of  the  theory  of  physical  depravity  and  all  its  associated 
dogmas,  and  to  the  adoption  of  the  whole  series  of  doctrines 
that  constitute  the  system  which  I  have  endeavored  to 
maintain. 

VII.  These  views,  if  adopted  and  allowed  their  appro- 
priate influence,  would  have  prevented  the  practical  errors 
into  which  some  of  the  rejectors  of  the  theory  of  physical 
depravity  have  fallen. 

Among  these,  one  of  the  most  conspicuous,  is  a  treatment 
of  the  subject,  as  though  the  mere  misconception  by  the 
impenitent  of  their  physical  nature,  were  the  sole  or  chief 


355 

reason  of  their  rejection  of  the  gospel;  and  consequently,  as 
though  a  conviction  of  their  ability  would  of  itself  prove 
to  them  an  efficient  inducement  to  obedience  ;  an  error 
scarcely  less  palpable,  or  less  mischievous,  than  that  of 
physical  depravity  itself.  Although  the  impression  with 
which  the  impenitent  are  almost  universally  perplexed,"  that 
some  change  must  be  wrought  in  their  nature,  before  they 
can  become  competent  to  obedience,  is  one  of  the  most  for- 
midable barriers  to  then*  conviction  as  well  as  conversion, 
and  will  be  certain  to  continue  them  in  impenitence,  unless 
at  least  virtually,  if  not  intelligently  abandoned,  or  disre- 
garded ;  yet  the  mere  removal  of  that  impression,  and  sub- 
stitution in  its  place,  of  a  right  apprehension  of  their  nature, 
is  not  enough  to  secure  their  obedience,  or  lay  any  founda- 
tion for  it  under  merely  such  inducements  to  holiness  as  they 
are  already  enjoying,  and  as  that  impression  has  previously 
served  to  counteract.  The  reasons  for  which  they  exert 
their  disobedient  choices,  lie  in  the  perceptions  and  emotions 
which  are  the  objects  of  those  choices,  or  in  the  pleasures  to 
be  enjoyed,  and  evils  to  be  avoided  in  their  agency — not 
solely  in  an  impression  that  they  are  unable  to  exert  a  dif- 
ferent series  of  acts.  The  drunkard  indulges  in  intoxication 
for  the  sake  of  the  sensations  which  it  involves  ;  not  irre- 
spectively of  that,  from  a  mere  apprehension  that  he  is  in- 
capable of  temperance  ;  and  the  impenitent  at  large,  trans- 
gress for  the  sake  of  the  pleasures  enjoyed  in  transgression, 
not  solely  because  of  a  false  judgment  respecting  their  phy- 
sical constitution.  The  question  respecting  their  ability  or 
inability  to  obey,  in  fact,  neither  has  any  influence,  on  at 
least  a  great  share  of  their  choices,  nor  is  in  the  slightest 
degree  a  subject  of  attention  when  they  exert  them ;  and 
the  mere  removal  accordingly  of  the  impression  of  their 


356 

inability — while  all  the  other  considerations  present  to  their 
minds  remain  the  same — as  it  would  not  essentially  dimi- 
nish the  pleasures  of  transgression,  would  have  no  effectual 
influence  to  prompt  them  to  obedience.  Though  possessed 
of  the  justest  apprehensions  of  their  nature,  they  still  would 
never  relax  their  rebellion  until  other  temptations  also,  that 
are  reasons  of  their  choosing  a  guilty  agency,  were  re- 
moved or  overcome  by  the  transfusion  into  their  minds  of 
new  and  more  powerful  excitements  to  obedience.  To  suppose 
that  a  just  notion  of  their  physical  constitution  would  of  itself 
prove  to  them  an  efficient  motive  to  holiness,  would  be  to 
suppose  an  apprehension  of  themselves,  in  place  of  an  appre- 
hension of  God,  to  be  the  reason  of  their  love  to  him  ;  and  a 
misapprehension  of  their  nature,  instead  of  the  interference 
of  his  will  and  providence  with  their  selfish  wishes,  to  be  the 
reason  of  their  aversion  to  him.  To  make  it,  therefore,  a  leading 
object  of  instruction  from  the  pulpit,  to  convince  the  impe- 
nitent that  they  are  not  physically  depraved,  and  need  no 
change  of  constitution  to  fit  them  for  obedience,  and  treat 
it  as  the  sole  or  chief  theme  that  is  entitled  to  their  consi- 
deration ;  is  wholly  to  mistake  its  relations  to  their  agency, 
and  defeat  the  end  that  should  be  sought  in  its  discussion  ; 
which  is  simply  to  remove  the  barriers  to  the  access  and  in- 
fluence of  the  truth  that  are  presented  by  the  doctrine  that 
commonly  prevails  ;  to  dissipate  the  mist  with  which  it 
invests  the  eye,  and  imparts  a  false  coloring  to  the  objects 
that  reach  it,  and  thereby  open  the  way  for  the  unobstructed 
transfusion  into  the  mind  of  the  pure  and  resistless  light  of 
truth,  and  efficient  application  to  the  reason,  conscience, 
and  affections,  of  all  the  varied  restraints  from  sin,  and  ex- 
citements to  holiness,  with  which  that  truth  is  fraught.  A 
minister,  accordingly,  after  having  won  his  way  through  the 


337 

obstructioni  of  the  common  doctrine,  and  gained  access  to 
the  impenitent,  instead  of  regarding  the  victory  at  which  he 
aims,  as  won  or  secured,  should  only  regard  his  hearers  as 
brought  within  the  reach  of  the  higher  influences  by  which  if 
obtained  by  him,  he  is  to  gain  that  victory  ;  and  in  place  of  re- 
laxing his  efibrts  therefore,  should  only  make  his  discussion 
of  the  subject  precursive  and  auxiliary  to  a  more  distinct, 
emphatic,  and  unremitting  inculcation  of  all  the  great  mes- 
sages of  the  gospel,  and  enforcement  of  its  sanctions. 

Others  have  fallen  into  the  error  of  conducting  their  dis- 
quisitions in  such  a  manner,  as  seemingly  to  transfer  the 
blame  of  their  misapprehensions  from  the  impenitent  them- 
selves, to  their  theological  teachers,  and  thereby  render 
them  objects  of  disrespect,  and  the  subject  itself  a  source  of 
temptation  to  prejudice,  partisanship,  or  vanity.  In  place 
of  a  course  fraught  with  such  a  mischievous  influence,  just 
views  will  lead  to  such  a  treatment  of  the  subject  as  to  cause 
the  sinner  to  feel  that  he  is  himself  responsible  for  his  mis- 
apprehension and  denial  of  the  truth,  by  showing  hTm  that 
in  his  theory  of  inability,  he  not  only  has  no  sanction  from 
the  scriptures,  which  should  be  the  sole  guide  of  his  opi- 
nions, but  contradicts  alike  the  principles  of  the  divine  ad- 
ministration, the  convictions  on  which  he  proceeds  in  his 
judgment  of  the  actions  of  others,  and  the  testimony  of  his 
own  consciousness  ;  and  that  in  his  plea,  therefore,  of  inca- 
pacity, as  a  reason  for  disobedience,  he  enters  into  a  con- 
test directly  with  himself,  as  well  as  with  that  awful  Being 
whose  requirements  he  violates  and  accuses  of  injustice. 
If  thus  made  responsible  for  the  imputations  which  he  casts 
on  the  divine  government,  met  with  the  charge  of  guilt  on 
the  ground  to  which  he  resorted  for  the  justification  of  his 
sins,  convicted  by  the  decisions  of  his  reason  and  the  im- 

45 


358 

pulses  of  conscience,  of  the  error  of  his  theory,  and  led 
to  see  that  no  mere  capacity  for  obedience,  if  possessed, 
nor  consciousness  of  such  a  capacity,  would  ever  of  itself 
induce  him  to  obey  : — the  discussion  may  be  then  made  a 
powerful  means  of  revealing  to  him  his  guilt  and  ruin,  and 
prompting  him  through  the  teachings  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
to  exert  the  powers,  he  had  before  voluntarily  perverted,  in 
accordance  with  his  obligations. 

That  definition  of  regeneration  which  exhibits  it  as  a 
change  of  the  governing  purpose  in  respect  to  the  object 
of  supreme  affection,  or  a  mere  determination  to  love  and 
serve  God ;  is  likewise  at  variance  alike  with  the  divine 
word,  the  laws  of  our  agency,  and  the  testimony  of  con- 
sciousness. There  is  nothing  in  the  scriptures  or  in  the 
experience  of  the  pious,  to  authorize  the  assumption  on 
which  that  definition  proceeds,  that  the  first  obedient  act, 
whatever  it  may  be,  is  in  every  instance  of  the  same  species, 
as  an  act  of  determination,  of  submission,  of  love,  or  of 
faith,  in  distinction  from  all  other  forms  of  obedience.  To 
suppose  such  to  be  the  fact,  were  to  suppose  that  the  first 
obedient  act  of  each  renovated  mind  is  exerted  toward  per- 
ceptions of  the  same  species — that  is,  of  precisely  the  same 
objects,  and  contemplated  in  identically  the  same  relation — 
and  conjoined  likewise  with  precisely  similar  involuntary 
emotions.  What  ground,  however,  is  there  for  such  a  sup- 
position in  respect  to  the  first,  any  more  than  the  second, 
the  tenth,  or  any  other  given  act  in  their  subsequent  agency  ? 
It  were  obviously  as  gratuitous  and  erroneous,  as  it  were  to 
suppose  that  the  energy  and  rapidity  of  perception,  the 
degree  of  knowledge,  and  the  strength  of  affection  are 
the  same  in  all  individuals.  As  the  mind's  reason  for  ex- 
erting its  acts,   lies  solely  in  its  perceptions  and  emotions. 


359 

— in  what  it  sees  and  feels — and  it  acts  by  precisely  the  same 
laws,  in  the  commencement  of  its  obedient  agency,  as  in  all 
its  subsequent  stages ;  no  reason  can  be  given  why  any 
combination  of  perceptions  and  emotions,  in  which  there  is 
no  reference  to  a  previous  obedient  agency,  that  is  adequate 
in  any  instance  to  prompt  it  to  obedience,  might  not  be  the 
instrument  of  exciting  it  to  its  first  obedient  act.  To  sup- 
pose, indeed,  that  it  would  not,  were  to  suppose  that  its  per- 
ceptions and  emotions  are  not  the  real  reasons  of  its  exerting 
its  agency  ; — as  if  in  instances  in  which  the  reasons  for  act- 
ing involved  in  its  perceptions  and  emotions  were  identi- 
cally the  same,  it  exerted  a  different  agency,  it  is  clear  that 
the  reason  of  its  agency  could  not  lie  wholly  in  those  per- 
ceptions and  emotions,  and  must,  therefore,  be  of  an  unintel- 
ligent nature,  or  consist  of  something  of  which  the  mind 
was  not  conscious.  The  assumption  is  false,  therefore,  that 
the  first  obedient  act  is  necessarily  in  all  individuals  of  iden- 
tically the  same  species  ;  or  that  such  motives  as  are  ade- 
quate to  prompt  it  to  obedience  at  one  period,  every  thing 
else  being  the  same,  would  not  be  equally  adequate  at  ano- 
ther. But  it  is  a  still  more  glaring  error  to  suppose  that  a 
mere  determination  to  love  and  serve  God,  or  make  him  the 
object  of  supreme  regard,  can  be  in  any  instance  the  first 
act  of  obedience  ;  as  clearly  to  be  an  obedient  act,  it  must 
spring  from  a  present  love  or  preference  of  God.  If  not 
put  forth  from  a  present  sight  and  sense  of  his  character, 
agency,  or  will,  in  some  relation  or  other,  and  cordial  ap- 
proval of  them,  it  obviously  is  not  an  obedient  act,  but  has 
its  origin  in  some  sinister  consideration  ;  and  if  it  springs 
from  a  sight  and  approval  of  what  he  is,  it  as  clearly  is  a 
consequence  of  right  affections,  and  therefore  is  not  the 
first  act  of  obedience.     The  first  obedient  act,  therefore, 


demonstratively  is  never  a  mere  determination  to  serve  and 
love  God,  or  make  him  the  object  of  supreme  regard,  but 
is  itself  an  act  in  which  God  is  in  fact  directly  or  virtually 
the  object  of  supreme  affection  ;  and  may  difler  in  its  form 
in  different  individuals,  according  as  their  perceptions  vary 
in  nature  or  extent,  or  the  relations  difler  in  which  God,  or 
the  truths  that  respect  him,  are  contemplated.  In  some  it 
may  be  self-abhorrence,  humility,  penitence,  approval  of 
the  divine  law ;  in  others,  an  adoring  acquiescence  in  the 
purity  and  rectitude  of  God,  submission  to  his  will,  com- 
placency in  his  benevolence,  gratitude  for  his  mercy,  reliance 
on  his  promises,  a  joyful  acceptance  of  salvation  through 
Christ,  or  any  other  form  of  obedient  agency  in  which  there 
is  no  reference  to  a  previous  act  of  obedience. 

The  exhibition  of  a  governing  purpose  to  serve  God, 
as  a  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the  renewed  and  proper 
evidence  of  regeneration,  is  fraught  with  an  equally  palpa- 
ble error.  Obedience  itself  to  God,  is  the  characteristic 
of  the  renewed,  as  far  as  they  exhibit  a  christian  character, 
not  a  mere  determination  to  obey.  Such  resolutions,  how- 
ever appropriately  or  frequently  adopted,  form  but  a  very 
slight  share  of  the  obedient  agency  of  the  regenerate.  To 
represent  them  as  the  most  essential  form  of  obedience  and 
conspicuous  evidence  of  renovation,  is  to  supersede  the 
chief  branches  of  practical  duty,  and  overlook  the  most 
essential  of  the  fruits  of  the  Spirit. 

Those  representations  of  the  subject  in  which  a  determina- 
tion or  purpose  to  love  and  serve  God,  is  exhibited  as  the  rea- 
son for  which  the  mind  actually  loves  and  serves  him,  are  like- 
wise fraught  with  an  equal  error  ;  as  they  proceed  on  the  as- 
sumption, that  the  mind  is  not  determined  in  its  agency  by  the 
perceptions  and  emotions  which  are  the  objects  of  its  atten- 


'361 

tion,  cotemporaneously  with  its  choices,  but  by  its  past  acts, 
which,  by  the  supposition,  are  not  objects  at  the  time  of  its 
perception  ; — and  to  run  accordingly,  into  all  the  absurdi- 
ties of  that  form  of  the  dogma  of  self-determination.     As 
the  mind  however  exerts  its  volitions  only  for  seen  and  felt 
reasons,  it  is  manifest  that  no  antecedent  act  that  has  passed 
from  its   consideration,  can  be  its  reason  for   its  present 
agency  toward   a   different  object,  but  its  reason  for   its 
choices  must  in  all  instances  lie  wholly  in  its  cotemporaneous 
sight  and  sense  of  the  object  toward  which  they  are  exerted. 
Such  resolutions,  in  place  of  directly  determining  the  mind 
in  its  subsequent  choices,  exert  their  useful  instrumentality 
wholly,  when  they  exert  any,  in  leading  it  to  turn  its  atten- 
tion to  God  and  his  service,  and  recalling  to  it  the  views 
and  emotions  which  were  its  reasons  for  its  former  obedi- 
ence :  whilst  not  they,  but  the  apprehensions  themselves, 
and  emotions  which  they  are  in  that  manner  the  instrument 
of  suggesting,  are  its  reasons  for  the  obedience  which  it 
puts  forth  under  their  influence. 

Exhortations  are  sometimes  addressed  to  the  impenitent 
to  form  a  specific  resolution  to  seek  salvation,  or  a  deter- 
mination to  make  God  the  object  of  their  supreme  regard, 
that  are  obnoxious  to  the  same  objections;  as  from  the  re- 
presentations of  the  governing  purpose,  with  which  they  are 
conjoined,  they  appear  to  proceed  on  the  assumption  that 
such  a  resolution  is  regeneration  itself,  and  doubtless  con- 
vey that  impression  in  many  instances  to  those  to  whom 
they  are  oflered — or  that  it  will  naturally  become  to  those 
who  form  it,  an  efficient  reason  for  the  commencement  of  a 
course  of  obedience. 

All  these,  and  similar  representations  of  the  nature  and  in- 
fluence of  such  determinations  are  thus  obviously  incorrect, 
and  wholly  inconsistent  with  all  the  essential  principles  of 


3G2 

the  system  which  I  have  sought  to  sustain  ;  and  let  those 
who  are  accustomed  to  exhibit  them,  but  adopt  the  doctrine 
that  the  mind  acts  in  its  volitions  only  for  seen  and  felt 
reasons — reasons,  therefore,  that  lie  wholly  in  the  percep- 
tions and  emotions  of  which  it  is  conscious  cotemporane- 
ously  with  its  choices;  and  they  will  of  necessity  abandon 
those  representations,  as  well  as  the  false  principles  on  which 
they  are  founded. 

VIII.  The  truths  of  the  gospel,  when  presented  in  the  rela- 
tions in  which  they  are  exhibited  in  these  views,  are  fraught 
with  a  far  higher  adaptation,  than  when  shrouded  in  the 
forms  of  the  opposite  system,  to  produce  the  effects  that  are 
sought  through  their  instrumentality,  as  they  are  exhibited 
in  their  actual  relations  to  each  other,  to  God,  and  to  us  ; 
and  coincidently  accordingly  with  the  facts  of  experience, 
and  the  convictions  of  reason. 

Their  representation  of  us,  for  example,  as  the  efficient 
causes  of  our  voluntary  agency,  accords  with  our  conscious- 
ness ;  and  the  fact  itself  lays  to  our  convictions  a  proper  foun- 
dation for  our  being  required  to  exert  a  right  series  of  actions, 
prohibited  from  such  as  are  wrong,  and  held  responsible  for 
the  acts  that  we  exert.  The  representation  of  sinfulness  and 
rectitude,  as  predicable  of  acts  only  in  distinction  from  attri- 
butes, likewise  accords  with  our  natural  convictions,  and  the 
principles  on  which  we  judge  of  the  agency  of  each  other; 
whilst  a  voluntary  misuse  of  our  powers,  and  violation  of  ob- 
ligation, is  felt  to  be  a  proper  ground  of  condemnation  and 
punishment.  It  is  in  their  relations  to  these  great  facts  also, 
that  the  infinite  benevolence  of  God  in  the  work  of  redemption, 
the  doctrines  of  sovereignty  and  election,  of  the  gracious  gift 
of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  a  free  justification  through  the  media- 
tion of  Christ,  are  seen  in  their  true  character,  and  brought, 
without  the  obstructions  of  inconsistencv,  to  bear  with  their 


363 

appropriate  energy  on  the  reason,  conscience,  and  heart. 
The  mind,  when  thus  led  to  see  that  it  is  itself  the  voluntary 
author  of  its  ruin,  is  prepared  to  realize  the  justice  of  its 
condemnation  ;  when  shown  that  its  free  rejection  of  sal- 
vation and  preference  of  rebellion  is  the  ground  of  its  need 
of  the  Spirit's  intervention  to  turn  it  to  holiness,  it  is  fitted 
to  feel  that  God  is  under  no  obligation  to  bestow  his  influ- 
ences ;  and  the  conviction  that  salvation,  if  given,  must  be 
the  bequest  of  infinite  grace,  prepares  it  to  see  that  God  has 
a  right  to  select  whomever  his  wisdom  sees  fit,  as  the  sub- 
jects of  that  grace,  and  does  no  injustice  to  those  who  are 
left,  in  leaving  them  to  perish.  It  is  thus  placed  by  these 
views  in  all  its  relations,  in  precisely  that  attitude  toward 
God  and  his  government,  in  which  it  is  exhibited  in  the 
doctrines  of  the  gospel,  and  in  which  the  whole  system  of 
revealed  truth  may  be  carried  home  to  its  sensibilities,  em- 
barrassed with  the  fewest  obstructions,  and  fraught  with  the 
highest  energy. 

Thus  sustained  in  the  assurance  of  their  accuracy  by  this 
renewed  inspection  of  the  principles  on  which  they  rest,  and 
the  contrast  which  their  simplicity,  self-consistency,  and  har- 
mony with  consciousness  and  the  word  of  God,  presents  to 
the  complexity,  and  contradictoriness  to  itself,  to  common 
sense,  and  to  the  doctrines  of  revelation,  which  characte- 
rize the  opposite  system ;  and  confirmed  in  the  conviction  of 
their  adaption  to  an  efiicacious  ministration  of  the  truth,  by 
the  success  which  has  attended  their  partial  inculcation  here- 
tofore ;  I  commend  them  again  to  the  consideration  of  the 
ministers  of  the  gospel  and  churches,  with  an  ardent  hope 
that  they  may  soon  gain  a  far  wider  difiusion,  and  by  a 
juster  exhibition,  exert  a  still  more  propitious  instrumen- 
tality. 


DIFFERENCES  OF 
OBEDIENT  ACTS  IN  EXCELLENCE. 


It  has  been  the  object  of  several  disquisitions,  in  former 
numbers,  respecting  the  existence  of  moral  evil,  to  demon- 
strate that  God  desires  all  his  creatures  to  yield  a  perfect 
obedience  to  his  laws ;  that  his  permitting  them  to  trans- 
gress, is  nevertheless  voluntary,  and  not  the  result  of  an  inabi- 
lity to  hinder  them ;  that  he  is  able,  in  every  instance,  to 
carry  them  forward  in  uninterrupted  obedience ;  that  the 
obedience  he  requires  would,  if  rendered,  secure  the  greatest 
good ;  that  he  in  fact  secures  the  greatest  good  by  his 
present  administration  ;  and  that  the  reason  consequently 
of  his  allowing  them  to  sin  as  they  do,  is,  that  no  other 
obedience  than  that  which  he  requires — that  is,  in  the  cii-- 
cumstances  in  which  they  are  now  placed  by  his  providence 
— would,  were  he  to  lead  them  to  render  any  other,  involve 
as  great  a  sum  of  good  as  that  would  which  he  requires, 
and  as  is  obtained  by  his  administration  toward  their  present 
course  of  agency. 

This  last  position  rests  on  the  facts,  that  there  are  different 
acts  of  obedience,  and  different  obedient  agencies,  differing 
very  essentially  in  their  value  ;  that  it  is  possible  to  God  to 


365 

creatures,  arid  systems  of  creatures,  through  difiering  series  of 
circumstances,  or  to  place  them  under  the  action  of  differing 
trains  of  moral  influence,  under  which  they  would  yield  unin- 
terrupted obediences,  but  obediences  varying  as  greatly  as 
their  circumstances,  in  the  manifestations  they  would  involve 
of  regard  to  God,  and  differing  accordingly,  in  an  equal  de- 
gree in  their  value  ;  and  that  such  a  difference  of  the  worth 
of  obediences  lays  a  proper  foundation  for  the  consistent 
desire  of  one,  which,  if  rendered,  would  secure  the  greatest 
good,  without  desiring,  or  taking  measures,  if  that  is  not 
rendered,  effectually  to  secure  another  of  inferior  value, 
when  the  greatest  good  may  still  be  attained  by  a  different 
system  of  administration. 

These  great  principles,  which  furnish,  it  is  believed,  the 
true  solution  of  the  divine  administration  in  respect  to  sin, 
are  worthy  of  a  fuller  consideration. 

I.  The  first  theme  on  which  I  shall  dwell,  is  the  fact,  that 
different  acts  of  obedience  differ  essentially  in  their  value, 
or  in  the  strength  and  decisiveness  of  the  expression  which 
they  involve,  of  devotedness  to  God. 

That  there  are  various  degrees  of  affection,  or  diversities 
in  the  energy  with  which  obedient  feelings  are  exercised  at 
different  times,  is  a  fact  of  which  none  can  be  unaware.  De- 
pending chiefly,  as  they  do,  for  their  strength  on  the  nature  of 
the  objects  by  which  they  are  awakened,  the  relations  in  which 
those  objects  are  contemplated,  and  the  extent  and  vividness  of 
the  mind's  apprehensions,  their  diversities  in  depth  and  intense- 
ness  are  as  great  as  the  differences  are  of  the  strength  and  clear- 
ness of  the  perceptions  and  accuracy  and  extent  of  the 
knowledge  from  which  they  spring.  Those  differences  are, 
accordingly,  every  where  recognized  in  the  scriptures  and 
the  langJiage  of  conunon  life,  and  denoted  by  as  specific  and 

46 


366 

numerous  terms,  as  are  employed  to  designate  differences  in 
the  energy  of  any  other  mental  acts,  or  in  the  strength  of 
natural  endowments. 

From  these  differences,  however,  in  the  energy  of  their 
exercises,  equal  differences  must  obviously  exist  in  their 
value.  If  they  are  virtuous,  and  are  for  that  reason  esti- 
mable, as  the  intenser  they  are,  the  larger  is  the  virtue  with 
which  they  are  fraught,  the  greater  in  a  corresponding  de- 
gree, must  be  their  merit  of  esteem.  The  superior  strength 
of  some,  is  as  just  a  reason  for  ascribing  to  them  an 
equally  superior  value,  as  the  inferior  excellence  of  others 
is  for  the  regard  of  which  they  are  made  the  objects. 

It  is,  accordingly,  a  matter  of  common  feeling  that  vir- 
tuous actions  differ  in  their  excellence  in  proportion  to  their 
intenseness,  and  the  certainty  with  which  they  demonstrate 
attachment  to  right ;  in  the  same  manner  as  acts  of  friend- 
liness are  esteemed,  according  to  the  strength  of  the  affec- 
tion which  they  exhibit,  and  as  favors  that  are  conferred  at 
the  price  of  danger  or  self-denial,  are  felt  to  be  entitled  to 
a  regard  proportional  to  the  energy  of  the  good-will  from 
which  they  are  seen  to  proceed. 

This  diversit}'  accordingly,  in  the  worth  of  obedient  acts, 
is  clearly  recognized  in  the  scriptures,  and  is  the  ground, 
as  will  be  seen  in  the  progress  of  the  discussion,  of  many  of 
the  most  peculiar  and  conspicuous  measures  of  the  divine 
administration. 

"  And  Jesus  sat  over  against  the  treasury,  and  beheld 
how  the  people  cast  money  into  the  treasury ;  and  many 
that  were  rich  cast  in  much.  And  there  came  a  certain 
poor  widow,  and  she  threw  in  two  mites,  which  make  a  far- 
thing. And  he  called  unto  him  his  disciples  and  saith  unto 
them,  verily  I  say  unto  you,  that  this  poor  widow  hath  cast  in 


367 

more  than  all  they  which  have  cast  into  the  treasury.  For 
all  they  did  cast  in  of  their  abundance  ;  but  she  of  her  want, 
did  cast  in  all  that  she  had,  even  all  her  living."  Christ 
here  plainly  taught  that  he  placed  a  higher  moral  estimate 
on  that  act,  than  on  all  the  richer  offerings  with  which  it 
was  accompanied,  and  on  the  ground  of  the  superior  mani- 
festation which  it  involved  of  regard  to  God.  *'  This  poor 
widow  hath  cast  in  more  than  all  they  which  have  cast  into 
the  treasury  ;" — not  that  her  gift  exceeded  theirs  in  amount, 
as  it  was  of  little  significance  in  that  respect  compared  with 
theirs,  but  that  in  being  all  that  she  had,  it  presented 
an  indubitable  demonstration  of  her  devotedness.  That 
demonstration  was  doubtless  still  more  decisive  to  the  eye 
of  Christ,  who  saw  all  its  attendant  circumstances,  than  to 
his  disciples.  She  had  previously  passed  it  seems  through 
many  and  severe  trials,  had  been  bereft  of  her  husband,  and 
probably  of  all  other  near  friends  on  whom  she  could  rely 
for  support,  and  suflered  the  loss  perhaps  of  wealth  or  com- 
petence, until  her  earthly  resources  were  at  length  reduced 
to  two  mites  ;  and  yet  after  having  thus  surrendered  every 
thing  else,  when  called  to  the  question  whether,  at  the  ap- 
pointed season  of  presenting  offerings  to  the  treasury  of 
God,  she  should  resign  her  last  possession  in  token  of  alle- 
giance to  him,  or  withhold  that  visible  expression  of  sub- 
mission which  the  law  required,  she  preferred  the  former, 
and  cheerfully  gave  her  all.  That  act — not  of  thoughtless- 
ness, or  mere  inconsiderate  habit,  but  the  result  of  delibera- 
tion and  conscientiousness,  and  doubtless  preceded  by 
prayer,  and  a  formal  surrendry  to  God  of  all  her  interests, 
was  thus  a  sublime  instance  of  obedience,  decisively  evincing 
a  supreme  devotedness,  and  readiness  whenever  called  to  the 
test,  to  relinquish  all  for  God.     It  was  obviously  fraught 


368 

therefore  with  a  far  higher  degree  of  moral  excellence  than 
the  gifts  of  the  rich,  whose  ofTorings,  even  if  obedient, 
involved  no  such  manifestation  ;  as  being  from  their  abun- 
dance, they  subjected  them  to  no  decisive  self-denial,  and 
furnished  no  certainty  therefore  of  their  continued  obedience, 
if  called,  like  her,  to  give  up  all  for  God. 

The  fact  is  thus  clearly  taught  in  this  distinguished  ex- 
ample, that  acts  of  obedience  differ  essentially  in  their  moral 
value,  and  that  God  accordingly  places  a  far  higher  estimate 
on  some  than  on  others,  and  makes  the  strength  of  attach- 
ment to  right  which  they  exhibit,  and  the  decisiveness  of  the 
demonstration  which  they  present  of  supreme  regard  to 
him,  the  measure  of  their  worth. 

A  still  more  illustrious  exemplification  of  this  fact  is  seen 
in  his  treatment  of  Abraham's  obedience  in  offering  Isaac. 

*'  And  it  came  to  pass  after  these  things,  that  God  did 
tempt  Abraham,  and  said  unto  him — take  now  thy  son, 
thine  only  son  Isaac  whom  thou  lovest,  and  get  thee  into 
the  land  of  Moriah,  and  offer  him  there  for  a  burnt-offering 
upon  one  of  the  mountains  which  I  will  tell  thee  of.  And 
Abraham  rose  up  early  in  the  morning  and  saddled  his  ass 
and  took  two  of  his  young  men  with  him,  and  Isaac  his 
son,  and  clave  the  wood  for  the  burnt-offering,  and  rose  up 
and  went  unto  the  place  of  which  God  had  told  him — And 
Abraham  built  an  altar  there,  and  laid  the  wood  in  order, 
and  bound  Isaac  his  son,  and  laid  him  on  the  altar  on  the 
wood.  And  Abraham  stretched  forth  his  hand  and  took 
the  knife  to  slay  his  son.  And  the  angel  of  the  Lord  called 
unto  him  out  of  heaven  and  said,  Abraham,  Abraham  ;  and 
he  said,  here  am  I.  And  he  said,  lay  not  thine  hand  upon 
the  lad,  neither  do  thou  any  thing  unto  him  :  for,  now  I  know 
that  thou  fearest  God,  seeing  thou  hast  not  withheld  thy 


369 

son,  thine  only  son,  from  me.  And  the  angel  of  the  Lord 
called  unto  Abraham  out  of  heaven  the  second  time,  and 
said.  By  myself  have  I  sworn,  saith  the  Lord  ;  for  because 
thou  hast  done  this  thing,  and  hast  not  withheld  thy  son, 
thine  only  son  ;  that  in  blessing  I  will  bless  thee,  and  in 
multiplying  I  will  multiply  thy  seed  as  the  stars  of  the  heaven, 
and  as  the  sand  which  is  upon  the  sea  shore ;  and  thy  seed 
shall  possess  the  gate  of  his  enemies  :  And  in  thy  seed  shall 
all  the  nations  of  the  earth  be  blessed,  because  thou  hast 
obeyed  my  voice." 

He  thus  treated  that  eminent  act  as  of  far  higher  worth 
than  any  other  portion  of  Abraham's  obedient  agency ;  and 
in  distinction  .from  other  acts,  counted  it  to  him — we  are 
assured  in  the  New-Testament — for  righteousness,  or  a 
qualification  for  a  gracious  acceptance,  on  the  ground  that 
it  presented  an  indubitable  demonstration  of  his  unwavering 
faith,  and  supreme  devoted ness  and  submission.  "  Now  I 
know  that  thou  fearest  God,  because  thou  hast  not  withheld 
thy  son,  thine  only  son  from  me.  I  have  sworn  because 
thou  hast  done  this  thing,  that  in  blessing  1  will  bless  thee, 
and  in  thy  seed  shall  all  the  nations  of  the  earth  be  blessed." 
And  such  is  the  estimate  likewise  which  we  ourselves  ne- 
cessarily form  of  the  act.  We  see  and  feel  resistlessjy  both 
that  in  resigning  his  son,  the  only  son  of  his  hopes  and  of 
God's  promise,  in  that  manner,  in  consenting  himself  to 
inflict  the  stroke  of  death  and  kindle  the  devouring  fire,  he 
gave  the  highest  proof  of  which  his  condition  and  nature 
were  capable,  that  he  was  ready  at  the  call  of  God  to  give  up 
all  for  him  ;  and  that  that  act  was  fraught  with  a  far  higher 
share  of  excellence  than  one  that  involves  no  such  decisive 
proof  of  inflexible  attachment  to  God.  And  such  are  doubt- 
less the  sentiments  likewise  of  all  other  beings  who  beheld 


370 

or  who  contemplate  it.  Every  spirit  among  the  witnessing 
hosts  of  heaven  must  have  seen  that  no  higher  evidence 
could  be  given  of  supreme  attachment  and  unconditioned 
submission  ;  that  in  laying  his  son  on  the  altar,  he  laid  his 
whole  heart  there  ;  and  that  it  involved,  therefore,  a  juster 
ground  than  an  ordinary  act  of  obedience  for  the  regard 
with  which  it  was  treated. 

That  characteristic  of  the  act  was  accordingly  the  ground 
of  its  being  made  to  all  subsequent  believers,  an  exemplar 
of  the  affection  required  of  them  towards  God,  as  the  con- 
dition of  pardon  and  justification  through  Christ ;  an  affec- 
tion supreme  in  its  energy,  recognising  his  rightful  claim 
to  the  whole  heart,  and  cheerfully  at  his  bidding  surrender- 
ing itself  and  every  interest  to  him. 

These  considerations  then  sufficiently  demonstrate  that 
different  acts  of  obedience,  differ  essentially  in  value  ;  and 
that  the  degree  of  their  excellence  corresponds  to  the  energy 
of  the  holy  affections  which  they  exhibit,  or  the  decisiveness 
with  which  they  evince  a  supreme  devotedness  to  God. 

II.  The  obedience  accordingly  which  God  requires  of 
us,  is  that  which  is  fraught  with  the  highest  share  of  ex- 
cellence, or  that  evinces  an  entire  subjection  of  the  heart 
to  him. 

The  first  and  greatest  of  his  commands  is,  "  thou  shalt 
love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart,  and  with  all  thy 
soul,  and  with  all  thy  mind."  This  spirit  of  supreme  and 
intense  devotedness  is  thus  to  reign  in  us,  and  prompt  and 
characterize  all  our  agency.  All  the  other  requirements  of 
the  law  and  gospel  are  but  specifications  of  the  forms  in 
which  it  is  to  be  exerted,  or  the  modes  in  which  it  is  to  be 
exemplified.  This  alone  fits  for  heaven,  or  can  meet  with 
acceptance.     "  He,"   saith  Christ,   *'  that  loveth  father  or 


371 

mother  more  than  me,  is  not  worthy  of  me ;  and  he  that 
loveth  son  or  daughter  more  than  me,  is  not  worthy  of  me ; 
and  he  that  taketh  not  his  cross  and  followeth  after  me,  is  not 
worthy  of  me."  All  attachments  to  creatures,  however  lovely 
they  may  be,  or  how  near  soever  may  be  their  relations  to 
us,  are  to  be  wholly  subordinate,  and  God  to  be  all  in  all. 
The  spirit  of  discipleship  to  Christ  is  to  be  the  spirit  itself 
of  martyrdom  ;  a  readiness  to  relinquish  the  dearest  earthly 
objects,  and  embrace  death  if  necessary  for  his  sake.  Such 
accordingly  was  the  obedience  of  Noah,  of  Job,  of  Moses, 
of  the  prophets,  and  of  the  apostles,  who  are  held  up  as  ex- 
amples for  our  imitation.  Thus  « '  Moses  refused  to  be  called 
the  son  of  Pharaoh's  daughter  ;  choosing  rather  to  suffer 
affliction  with  the  people  of  God,  than  to  enjoy  the  pleasures 
of  sin  for  a  season  ;  esteeming  the  reproach  of  Christ 
greater  riches  than  the  treasures  of  Egypt,  for  he  had  re- 
spect unto  the  recompense  of  reward."  Paul  also  took 
♦•  pleasure  in  infirmities,  in  reproaches,  in  necessities,  in 
persecutions,  in  distresses,  for  Christ's  sake ;"  and  counted 
all  things  but  loss  for  the  excellency  of  the  knowledge  of 
Christ,  for  whom  he  suffered  the  loss  of  all  things,  and 
counted  them  but  dross,  that  he  might  win  him.  And  such 
is  the  spirit  to  which  the  promises  are  addressed.  The 
language  of  Christ  to  the  churches  is,  "  to  him  that  over- 
cometh  will  I  grant  to  sit  with  me  on  my  throne,  even  as  I 
overcame,  and  am  set  down  with  my  Father  on  his  throne." 
On  the  other  hand  a  subordinate  or  lukewarm  affection  is 
reprobated  as  offensive,  rather  than  acceptable.  "  1  know 
thy  works,  that  thou  art  neitlier  cold  nor  hot.  I  would  that 
thou  wert  cold  or  hot." 

And  such  a  supreme  regard  is  obviously  due  to  God, 
and  the  only  affection  that  befits  our  relations.     He  is  infi- 


372 

nitely  greater  and  more  excellent  than  all  other  beings ; 
and  is  the  only  proper  object  therefore  of  the  highest 
love.  His  relations  to  us  likewise  are  immeasurably  more 
intimate  and  momentous  than  those  of  all  other  beings, 
and  his  title  in  that  respect  therefore,  to  our  supreme 
regard,  infinitely  greater  than  that  of  all  created  beings  and 
objects.  His  law  accordingly  only  expresses  what  are  at 
once  his  rights,  and  our  obligations,  in  requiring  our  su- 
preme love  to  him. 

HI.  His  providential  administration  is  so  arranged  ac- 
cordingly, as  to  call  us  to  such  an  obedience,  by  putting  us 
at  every  step  of  our  progress,  to  the  test,  not  only  whether 
we  will  obey,  or  rebel,  but  whether  we  will  render  obedience 
amidst  such  obstructions  of  temptation,  and  at  the  price  of 
such  self-denial,  as  decisively  to  demonstrate  a  supreme 
devotion  to  him.  ' 

His  allotments  are  such  as  to  render  life  to  all  a  scene  of 
severe  probation.  Each  individual,  by  being  thrown  suc- 
cessively under  the  action  of  different  influences,  of  enjoy- 
ment and  suflering,  of  wealth  and  poverty,  of  bereavement, 
dependence,  disappointment,  and  their  opposites,  or  trials 
of  some  form  or  other,  is  subjected  to  a  decisive  test  of 
character,  and  made — if  obedient — to  render  an  obedience 
involving  a  manifestation  of  supreme  regard  to  God.  And 
such  has  been  the  character  of  his  providence  in  every  age. 
To  what  a  succession  of  trials  of  this  kind  were  the  patri- 
archs, prophets,  and  apostles  subjected  .'*  What  a  series  of 
such  disciplinary  dispensations  were  appointed  to  the  Hebrew 
nation,  during  their  progress  through  the  wilderness,  and 
their  residence  in  Canaan  ?  In  what  a  perpetual  tempest 
of  persecutions  and  sufferings,  subjecting  its  piety  to  the 
severest  test,  was  the  christian  church  involved  through  a 


373 

long  tract  of  ages  iVoiu  its  institution  r  And  what  else  in 
eft'ect  is  life  to  every  one  than  a  similar  scene,  in  which  under 
the  action  of  powerful  and  diversified  influences,  his  suscep- 
tibilities are  developed,  and  his  supreme  aflections  put  to 
daily  and  decisive  trials  ? 

IV.  These  trials  are,  to  a  great  extent  at  least,  adventi- 
tious, and  instituted  for  the  express  purpose  of  calling  them 
to  a  determinate  choice  between  good  and  evil,  and  exhi- 
bition of  their  supreme  afl'ection. 

Such,  we  are  expressly  told,  was  the  object  of  those  to 
which  the  Hebrew  nation  was  subjected. 

"  Then  said  tlie  Lord  unto  Moses,  Beliold  I  will  rain  bread  from 
heaven  for  you,  and  the  people  shall  go  out  and  gatliev  a  certain  rate 
every  day,  that  I  may  prove  them,  whether  they  will  walk  in  my  law 
or  no." — Exodus  xvi.  4. 

"Thou  slialt  remember  all  the  way  which  the  Lord  thy  God  led 
thee  these  forty  years  in  the  wilderness,  to  humble  thee  and  to  prove 
thee,  to  know  what  was  in  thine  lieart :  whether  thou  wouldst  keep 
his  commandments  or  no ;  and  he  humbled  thee  and  sutiered  thee  to 
hunger,  and  fed  thee  with  manna,  which  thou  knewest  not,  neither 
did  thy  fathers  know  :  that  he  might  make  thee  know  that  man  doth 
not  live  by  bread  only,  but  by  every  word  that  proceedeth  out  of  the 
mouth  of  the  Lord  doth  man  live." — Deut.  viii.  2.  3. 

"  If  there  arise  among  you  a  prophet,  or  a  dreamer  of  dreams,  and 
giveth  thee  a  sign  or  a  wonder,  and  the  sign  or  the  wonder  come  to 
pass  whereof  he  spake  unto  thee,  saying,  Let  us  go  after  other  gods, 
which  thou  hast  not  known,  and  let  us  serve  them ;  Thou  shalt  not 
hearken  unto  the  words  of  that  prophet,  or  that  dreamer  of  dreams; 
for  the  Lord  your  God  proveth  you,  to  know  whether  ye  love  the 
Lord  your  God  with  all  your  heart  and  with  all  your  soul."  Deut.xiii.  1  3. 

"  I  will  not  henceforth  drive  out  any  from  before  them  of  the  na- 
tions which  Joshua  left  when  he  died  ;  that  through  them  I  may  prove 
Israel  whether  they  will  keep  the  way  of  the  Lord  to  walk  there- 
in, as  their  fathers  did  keep  it,  or  not.  Therefore  the  Lord  left 
those  nations,  without  driving  them  out  hastily ;  neither  delivered 
he  them  into  the  hand  of  Joshua." — Joshua  xi.  21-23 

47 


374 

"  And  Hezekiah  prospered  in  all  his  works.  Howbeit,  in  the  busi- 
ness of  the  ambassadors  of  the  princes  of  Babylon,  who  sent  unto  him 
to  inquire  of  the  wonder  that  was  done  in  the  land,  God  left  him  to  try 
liim,that  he  might  know  all  that  was  in  his  heart. " — Cliron.  xxxii.  31 . 

These  severe  trials,  through  blesshigs  and  calamities,  we 
are  thus  assured  were  permitted  for  the  express  purpose  of 
testing  the  hearts  of  those  who  were  subjected  to  their  in- 
fluence, and  giving  it  to  be  seen  from  their  agency,  by 
themselves  and  the  universe,  that  their  supreme  affections 
were  what  they  were,  and  were  a  just  and  proper  ground 
accordingly  of  the  regard  with  which  they  were  treated  by 
the  Most  High.  And  such  is  doubtless  the  design  of  the 
similar  allotments  to  which  men  are  in  every  age  subjected. 
And  there  is  an  obvious  propriety  in  his  arranging  his  pro- 
vidence in  such  a  manner,  as  to  obtain  such  a  decisive 
manifestation  of  their  character  from  his  creatures,  as  a 
ground  of  his  ultimate  disposal  of  them. 

A  supreme  affection  toward  him  is  the  only  one  that  meets 
his  rights  and  their  obligations,  and  the  only  one  there- 
fore that  can  with  propriety  be  distinguished  with  his  ap- 
probation. And  to  require  it,  and  place  them  in  such  a 
condition  as  to  exhibit  it,  is  not  only  fit  in  itself,  but  pecu- 
liarly proper  also  perhaps  in  respect  to  other  orders  of  beings 
who  are  spectators  of  his  administration  over  us  ;  as  possibly 
it  furnishes  the  only  appropriate  evidence  to  them  that  the 
supreme  affections  of  those  whom  he  receives  to  his  favor, 
are  such  as  to  render  them  proper  objects  of  that  regard. 
To  admit  beings  who  had  rebelled  to  his  favor,  while  their 
allegiance  appeared  to  be  possibly  of  a  doubtful  character, 
might  subject  his  administration  to  suspicion.  That  this 
branch  of  his  government  is  a  theme  of  consideration  to 
other  orders  of  beings,  and  that  these  appointments  of  his 


375 

providence  have  some  reference  to  them,  is  clearly  intimated 
in  the  scriptures  ;  particularly  in  respect  to  the  extraordinary 
trials  that  were  appointed  to  Job. 

An  intimation  was  offered,  it  is  seen  from  the  sacred  his- 
tory, by  the  spirit  of  evil,  that  Job's  obedience  was  wholly 
mercenary,  and  that  God,  accordingly,  in  crowning  him 
with  distinguished  tokens  of  approbation,  was  honoring 
and  rewarding  mere  selfishness.  "  Then  Satan  answered 
the  Lord  and  said,  doth  Job  fear  God  for  nought  ?  Hast 
thou  not  made  an  hedge  about  his  house,  and  about  all  that 
he  hath  on  every  side  ?  Thou  hast  blessed  the  work  of  his 
hands,  and  his  substance  is  increased  in  the  land  ;  but  put 
forth  thine  hand  now,  and  touch  all  that  he  hath,  and  he 
will  curse  thee  to  thy  face."  It  was  accordingly  to  refute 
this  suggestion,  that  he  was  subjected  to  those  trials,  which 
so  triumphantly  vindicated  his  integrity.  While  basking  in 
the  sunshine  of  peace  and  prosperity,  and  rejoicing  in  the 
happiness  and  mutual  attachment  of  his  children,  a  storm 
of  calamities  burst  in  an  instant  on  him,  and  bereft  him  of 
his  ofispring,  his  possessions,  his  honors,  and  his  influence. 
The  Sabeans  and  Chaldeans  slaughtered  his  servants,  and 
took  away  his  herds  ;  the  fire  of  God  fell  out  of  heaven  and 
devoured  his  flocks  and  their  keepers ;  and  a  whirlwind  from 
the  wilderness  smote  the  dwelling  in  which  his  children 
were  assembled,  and  crushed  them  in  death.  Yet  though 
thus  plunged  into  the  depths  of  calamity  and  suffering,  no 
rebellious  murmur  escaped  his  lips,  nor  guilty  sentiment 
rose  in  his  heart ;  but  looking  up  from  the  dust  and  ashes 
of  his  depression  with  a  sublime  submissiveness,  befitting  one 
whose  heart  was  with  God,  he  recognized  the  rightfulness 
of  his  dealings,  and  glorified  his  excellence.  "  Then  Job 
arose,  and  rent  his  mantle,  and  shaved  his  head,  and  fell 


376 

down  upon  ilie  ground,  and  worsliipped,  and  said,  naked 
came  I  out  of  my  mother's  womb,  and  naked  sliall  I  return 
thither ;  the  Lord  gave,  and  the  Lord  hath  taken  away  ; 
blessed  be  the  name  of  the  Lord.  In  all  this  Job  sinned  not, 
nor  charged  God  foolishly ." 

The  adversary,  liowever,  again  suggested,  that  this  obe- 
dience involved  no  certain  proof  of  a  supreme  attachment  to 
God  ;  that  while  left  in  the  enjoyment  of  life,  or  exemption 
from  corporeal  suffering,  he  might  still  keep  up  an  appear- 
ance of  obedience,  from  a  selfish  gratitude,  or  mercenary 
hope.  "  And  tiie  Lord  said  unto  Satan,  hast  thou  con- 
sidered my  sei'vant  Job,  that  there  is  none  like  him  in 
the  earth,  a  perfect  and  an  upright  man,  one  that  feareth 
God,  and  escheweth  evil  'f  and  still  he  holdeth  fast  his 
integrity,  although  thou  movedst  me  against  him,  to  de- 
stroy him  without  cause.  And  Satan  answered  the  Lord, 
and  said,  skin  for  skin,  yea,  all  that  a  man  hath  will  he  give 
for  his  life ;  but  put  forth  thine  hand  now,  and  touch  his  bone 
and  his  flesh,  and  he  will  curse  thee  to  thy  face."  To  re- 
fute this  accusation,  accordingly,  severe  corporeal  suffer- 
ings were  added  to  his  other  trials.  "  And  the  Lord  said 
unto  Satan  ;  behold,  he  is  in  thine  hand,  but  save  his  life. 
So  Satan  went  forth  from  the  presence  of  the  Lord,  and 
smote  Job  with  sore  boils  from  the  sole  of  his  foot  unto  his 
crown ;  and  he  took  a  potsherd  to  scrape  himself  withall ; 
and  he  sat  down  among  the  ashes."  These  excruciating- 
sufferings  gave  birth  likewise,  to  another  trial,  far  more  in- 
sidious and  unexpected.  The  being  to  whose  sympathies 
and  counsels  he  naturally  turned  for  support,  became  a 
tempter  to  rebellion.  "  Then  said  his  wife  unto  him,  dost 
thou  still  retain  thine  integrity  .^  Curse  God  and  die.  But 
he  said  unto  her,  thou  speakest  as  one  of  the  foolish  women 


377 

speaketh.  What !  shall  we  receive  good  at  the  hand  of  the 
Lord,  and  shall  we  not  receive  evil  ?  In  all  this  did  not  Job 
sin  with  his  lips." 

By  thus  both  giving  up  all  his  possessions  and  enjoy- 
ments at  the  call  of  God,  and  submitting  with  calm  re- 
signation to  such  an  extremity  of  sufl'ering,  he  evinced 
the  supreme  sincerity  and  strength  of  his  devotedness, 
and  showed  himself  to  be  a  fit  object  of  God's  approval, 
vindicated  the  divine  favor  toward  him  from  aspersion. 
And  God  accordingly  treated  this  adherence  to  his  integ- 
rity as  of  preeminently  higher  worth  than  an  ordinary 
obedience,  and  not  only  "  turned"  his  "  captivity"  and 
restored  him  to  enjoyment,  but  redoubled  to  him  the  gifts 
of  his  bounty  and  tokens  of  his  approval. 

The  trials  which  the  children  of  God  now  experience, 
have,  possibly,  also  a  similar  reference  to  other  orders  of 
beings.  We  are  a  spectacle  unto  angels  and  to  men,  and 
"  to  the  intent  that  now  unto  the  principalities  and  powers 
in  heavenly  places,  might  be  known  by  the  church,  the 
manifold  wisdom  of  God."  They  are  at  least  designed,  as 
were  those  to  which  the  Israelites  were  subjected,  to  prove 
them,  that  it  may  be  known  from  their  actions  whether  they 
love  the  Lord  their  God  with  all  their  hearts,  and  with  all 
their  souls.  They  are  apprised  accordingly  that  they  are 
instituted  for  that  end,  and  exhorted  to  welcome  them  with 
submission  and  joy,  as  adapted,  if  rightly  endured,  to  ad- 
vance them  in  holiness  and  preparation  for  heaven. — 
"  Blessed  be  the  God  and  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ, 
which  according  to  his  abundant  mercy  hath  begotten  us 
again  unto  a  lively  hope  by  the  resurrection  of  Jesus 
Christ,  to  an  inheritance  incorruptible — reserved  in  heaven 


378 

for  you,  who  are  Itept  by  tlie  power  of  God  through  faith 
unto  salvation,  wherein  ye  greatly  rejoice,  though  now  for 
a  season,  if  need  be,  ye  are  in  heaviness  through  manifold 
temptations,  that  the  trial  of  your  faith,  being  much  more 
precious  than  of  gold  that  perisheth,  though  it  be  tried  with 
fire,  might  be  found  unto  praise  and  honor  and  glory,  at 
the  appearing  of 'Jesus  Christ."  "  My  brethren,  count  it 
all  joy  when  ye  fall  into  divers  temptations,  knowing  this, 
that  the  trying  of  your  faith  worketh  patience.  But  let 
patience  have  her  perfect  work,  that  ye  may  be  perfect  and 
entire,  wanting  nothing."  Such  accordingly  were  the 
sentiments  with  which  the  apostles  and  their  disciples  re- 
ceived the  trials  they  were  called  to  experience.  "  We 
glory  in  tribulations  also,  knowing  that  tribulation  worketh 
patience,  and  patience  experience,  and  experience  hope,  and 
hope  maketh  not  ashamed,  because  the  love  of  God  is  shed 
abroad  in  our  hearts  by  the  Holy  Ghost  which  is  given  un- 
to us." 

The  trials  of  God's  children  are  in  many  instances  the 
instruments  of  great  good  to  others  likewise,  as  well  as  to 
those  who  obediently  endure  them.  How  many  have  Job's 
afflictions,  submission,  and  patience,  contributed  to  instruct 
and  comfort  under  similar  trials  !  How  many  have  been 
strengthened  in  their  faith  in  the  dark  and  tempestuous 
periods  of  their  pilgrimage,  by  the  faith  of  Abraham! 
How  immeasurably  brighter  was  Paul's  obedience,  and 
how  much  greater  and  more  beneficial  the  influence  with 
which  it  was  fraught,  in  consequence  of  the  severe  and 
perpetual  trials  to  which  he  was  subjected,  than  it  could 
otherwise  have  been  !  God  might  doubtless  have  wholly 
exempted  him  from  persecutions,  perils  and  sufferings  ;  pre- 


379 

vented  his  ministry  from  opposition,  enriched  him  with 
wealth,  invested  him  with  unresisted  authority,  and  render- 
ed his  passage  from  nation  to  nation  a  perpetual  triumph  ; 
but  how  would  his  obedience  in  such  circumstances  have 
been  shorn  of  its  lustre,  and  bereft  of  its  useful  influence 
on  that  and  every  subsequent  age  !  Of  the  important  in- 
strumentality his  example  was  to  exert,  he  was  not  himself 
unaware.  God's  purpose  to  show  him  how  gi-eat  things  he 
was  to  sufier  for  his  sake,  was  announced  to  him  doubtless 
by  Annanias ;  and  he  represents  himself  as  having  obtained 
mercy  in  order  that  in  him,  first,  Jesus  Christ  might  show 
forth  all  long-suffering  for  a  pattern  to  them  which  should 
thereafter  believe  on  him  to  life  everlasting.  The  appoint- 
ments of  Divine  Providence  in  regard  to  others,  have  un- 
doubtedly a  similar  design,  and  might  be  so  varied  as  to 
carry  them  without  any  such  decisive  trials,  through  an 
uninterrupted  obedience,  though  an  obedience  of  far  less 
intrinsic  worth,  and  of  a  proportionally  less  useful  influence 
on  others. 

From  these  considerations  then,  it  is  seen  that  important 
differences  exist  in  the  worth  of  different  acts  of  obedience 
and  obedient  agencies,  and  that  God  desires  and  requires 
an  obedience  manifesting  a  supreme  attachment  to  him,  and 
so  adjusts  his  providential  administration,  as  to  subject  all 
to  the  necessity  of  showing  by  their  agency,  whether  they 
yield  him  that  regard  or  not. 

We  see  in  these  facts  the  reason  and  consistency  of  God's 
pursuing  his  present  administration  toward  men,  although 
he  is  able  to  exempt  them  from  these  trials,  and  place  them 
in  conditions  in  which  no  successful  inducements  to  trans- 
gression would  ever  reach  them.  It  is  the  only  administra- 
tion under  which  either  he   could   receive,  or  they  exhibit 


380 

such  an  obedience,  as  is  his  due,  and  as  could  render  it  fit 
in  him,  to  treat  them  by  raising  them  to  his  kingdom,  as 
having  given  decisive  evidences  of  supreme  attachment  to 
him.  To  exempt  them  from  such  a  probation,  were  to  place 
it  out  of  their  power  to  give  any  demonstrative  proofs  of 
their  inflexible  adherence  to  his  service ;  to  diminish  pro- 
portionally therefore  the  value  of  their  obedience,  and  pre- 
clude himself  accordingly  to  an  equal  extent,  from  as  great 
a  sum  of  good  as  the  obedience  he  now  requires  would 
involve,  and  as  he  secures  by  his  present  administration. 
To  place  them  under  such  an  administration,  is,  therefore, 
not  only  consistent  with,  but  required  by  his  infinite  holi- 
ness. It  is  the  only  administration  by  which  he  can  properly 
exhibit  his  supreme  desire  and  preference  of  an  obedience 
fi'om  them  that  involves  the  highest  worth,  and  is  most 
appropriately  his  due,  and  most  befitting  them.  It  is  like- 
wise both  consistent  with,  and  required  by  his  infinite  be- 
nevolence, as  it  is  the  only  one  by  which,  whether  they 
obey  or  rebel,  he  can  secure  the  greatest  attainable  sum  of 
good. 

We  see  from  these  views,  the  error  of  Dr.  Taylor's  doc- 
trine, that  the  Most  High  carries  his  elibrts  in  every  instance 
to  extricate  his  creatures  from  temptation,  to  the  utmost  ex- 
tent in  his  power,  and  permits  them  to  transgress,  solely 
because  it  is  impossible  to  him  to  prevent  them,  without 
destroying  their  responsibility. 

That  doctrine  is  a  formal  denial  that  life  is  probationary; 
that  the  dispensations  of  divine  providence,  by  which  men 
are  subjected  to  trials,  are  instituted  for  the  purpose,  as  the 
scriptures  represent,  of  determining  by  experiment  whether 
they  will  yield  the  Most  High  such  an  obedience  as  is  his  due. 
It  not  only  denies  that  God  intentionally  institutes  or  per- 


381 


mus  the  trials  which  they  experience,  but  implies  that  he  is 
under  obligation  completely  to  exempt  them  from  tempta- 
tion, if  in  his  power;  and  that  to  leave  them  to  sin,  when 
he  m,ght  prevent  them,  were  to  prefer  sin  to  holiness,  and 
exhibit  an  imperfection  of  wisdom,  benevolence,  and  purity 
He  could  not,   according  to  Dr.  Taylor's  doctrine,  have 
possibly  placed  the  first  pair  under  a  less  degree  of  temp- 
tation,    than    that   by  which  they  were    led  to  sin.       He 
could  not  have  so  altered  his  providence,  as  to  have  ex- 
empted the  Israelites  from  any  of  the  peculiar  trials  to  which 
they  were  subjected  on  their  passage  from  Egypt,  and  during 
their  subsequent  history.     He  could  not  have  shielded  Job 
from  any  of  the  extraordinary  calamities  that  proved  to  him 
the  occasion  of  fatal  temptation.     It  was  not  he,  therefore 
HI  fact,  who  inflicted  them,  or  intentionally  suffered  their 
infliction,  but  the  spirit  of  evil  or  some  other  created  agent 
or  cause.     Employed  in  endeavoring  to  the  utmost  of  his 
power  to  prevent,  instead  of  intentionally  permitting  them, 
he  failed  only  because  the  real  authors  of  them,  were  inde- 
pendent of,  or  superior  to  his  control !      Satan  accordingly 
paid  a  very  needless  deference  to  him,  in  waitina"  for  his 
permission,   before  he  proceeded  to  the   infliction  of  th.t 
portion  of  those  evils  of  which  he  was  the  author  !  and  Job 
offered  the  Most  High  a  most  unprovoked  and  consummate 
.njrn-y,  m  referring  their  infliction  to  his  providence  I     Th 
profound  acquaintance  with  the  great  principles  and  aims 
of  the  divine  administration,  as  well  as  the  express  repre 
sentations  of  the  sacred  word,  which  this  scheme  thus  C 

ai^dii:^^^^ 

To  all   whose  passions  do  not  render  them  incapable  of 
-eing  and  feeling  the  most  palpable  truths,  it  must  be  to. 

48 


362 

obvious  to  need  any  farther  demonstration,  than  these  con- 
siderations furnish,  that  this  scheme  is  wholly  contradictory 
to  the  scriptures.  To  attempt  to  reconcile  them,  is  prepos- 
terous :  and  to  undertake  to  prove  his  theory  to  be  true,  is 
nothing  else  than  openly  to  endeavor  to  demonstrate  that 
the  volume  of  inspiration  exhibits  a  total  misrepresentation 
of  the  most  important  facts  of  the  providence,  and  most 
essential  principles  of  the  legislation  of  the  Most  High. 

From  the  fact  illustrated  in  the  foregoing  remarks — that 
one  object  of  the  trials  to  which  good  men  are  subjected 
is,  to  determine  whether  they  choose  obedience  chiefly  be- 
cause of  the  happiness  it  involves  and  secures,  or  because 
it  is  right — we  see  that  it  is  an  essential  element  of  holiness, 
to  act  from  a  regard  to  obligation  ;  to  exert  the  agency  re- 
quired, because  it  is  right ;  or  to  love  and  serve  God  for 
what  he  is  and  does,  and  not  merely  because  of  the  plea- 
sures that  are  involved  in,  and  consequent  on  obedience. 

And  such  is  the  fact  obviously  from  the  nature  of  the 
government  God  has  instituted  over  us,  which  enjoins  the 
exertion  of  a  right  agency,  not  the  mere  pursuit  of  the 
greatest  happiness;  and  offers  the  character,  relations,  rights, 
works,  and  will,  of  the  lawgiver,  as  the  chief  reasons  of  the 
requirement  of  that  particular  agency  which  he  enjoins, 
not  the  mere  fact  that  it  will  secure  the  greatest  happiness. 
The  distinction  between  the  agency  God  enjoins,  and 
that  which  he  prohibits,  is,  that  the  first  is  right,  and  the 
other  wrong  ;  not  that  the  one  is  pleasurable,  and  the  other 
the  reverse.  Each  affords  a  share  of  enjoyment,  and  the 
Immediate  pleasure  involved  in  that  which  is  sinful,  is  doubt- 
less often  as  great  as  that  involved  in  that  which  is  holy  ; 
whilst  the  pleasure  and  pain  to  which  they  subsequently  give 
birth  respectively,  are,  to  a  great  extent  at  least,  adventitious, 
or  are  consequences  that  arc  connected  with  ihem  by  the 


383 

sovereign  appointment  of  God.  It  is  not  a  greater  plea- 
surableness  of  the  one  that  is  the  reason  of  its  being  com- 
manded, nor  an  inferior  pleasurableness  of  the  other  that 
is  the  reason  of  its  being  prohibited,  nor  the  pleasurableness 
or  painfulness  of  the  efiects  to  which  they  ultimately  give 
rise,  that  is  the  ground  of  their  requirement  or  prohibition  ; 
but  the  one  is  enjoined  because  it  is  right,  and  enjoined 
however  much  self-denial  it  may  involve  ;  and  the  other 
prohibited  because  it  is  wrong,  and  prohibited  therefore 
absolutely,  however  great  may  be  the  enjoyment  it  may 
yield ;  and  the  ultimate  pleasure  that  is  annexed  to  that 
which  is  right  as  a  reward,  is  annexed  to  it  because  it  is 
right;  and  the  evil  that  is  annexed  to  the  other  as  a  punish- 
ment, is  annexed  to  it  because  it  is  wrong. 

Such  being  the  nature  of  the  moral  government  which 
God  is  exerting  over  us,  the  aim  of  his  providence  in  put- 
ting us  to  trial,  of  course  is — in  accordance  with  it — to  de- 
termine whether  we  will  choose  that  which  is  right,  though 
at  the  sacrifice  of  present  enjoyment  and  the  surrendry 
of  all  to  God  ;  the  only  way  obviously  in  which  it  can  be 
seen  that  the  aim  of  our  obedience  is — not  the  mere  plea- 
sure involved  in  or  secured  by  it — but  a  regard  to  right. 
The  trial  accordingly  to  which  Abraham  was  called  was, 
whether  he  would  meet  his  obligations  to  God,  and  obey 
him  at  all  events,  though  at  the  greatest  self-denial ; — not 
merely  whether  he  would  choose  the  greatest  happiness,  in 
preference  to  an  inferior  one,  or  ewdless  misery.  And  the 
object  of  Job's  trial  was,  to  determine  whether, — as  the  evil 
spirit  intimated, — he  would  cease  to  obey  whenever  obedi- 
ence ceased  to  be  attended  with  immediate  rewards;  or 
whether  he  would  hold  "  fast  his  integrity,"  or  inflexibly 
adhere  to  right,  "  fearing  God  and  eschewing  evil,"  though 


384 

bereft   of  all   present   enjoyment,    and   overwhelmed  with 
dishonor  and  suffering. 

It  is  obviously  then  an  essential  element  of  a  holy  agency, 
that  it  is  exerted  supremely  from  regard  to  God,  or  respect 
to  obligation  ;  not  from  a  reference  to  the  consequences 
with  which  he  rewards  that  which  he  requires,  and  punishes 
that  which  he  prohibits. 

In  this  fact  we  see  again,  that  one  of  the  grounds  of  the 
superior  estimate  with  which  God  regards  acts  of  obedience 
that  are  exerted  under  great  trials  is,  that  they  demonstrate 
a  supreme  attachment  to  right,  or  show  that  those  who  yield 
them,  are  not  prompted  by  a  mere  respect  to  the  immediate 
enjoyments  or  rewards  with  which  obedience  is  usually 
attended,  but  are  governed  by  a  regard  to  God. 

We  likewise  see  in  it  the  ground  and  propriety  of  his 
subjecting  his  creatures  to  trial,  and  limiting  the  rewards  bf 
his  kingdom  to  those  who  show  by  experiment  that  they 
hold  fast  their  "  integrity," — that  that  part  of  their  agency 
which  he  makes  the  condition  of  his  favor,  may  both  be, 
and  be  perceived  to  be  such  as  befits  his  approval,  and  that 
it  may  be  seen  that  m  justifying  them,  whether  perfectly 
holy  or  recovered  by  his  grace  from  sin,  and  in  bestowing 
on  them  everlasting  life,  he  is  rewarding  sincere  and  tried 
subjects,  not  mere  mercenary  friends  or  disguised  enemies. 

We  see  from  these  views,  the  error  of  those  of  Dr.  Tay- 
lor's speculations  respecting  regeneration,  in  which  he  ex- 
hibits the  mere  desire  of  happiness,  as  the  motive  that 
should  and  must  prompt  the  impenitent  to  embrace  the  ser- 
vice of  God. 

"  We  proceed  to  say  then,  that  before  the  act  of  the  will  or  heart  in 
which  the  sinner  first  prefers  God  to  every  other  object,  the  object  of 
the  preference  must  be  viewed  or  estimated  as  the  greatest  good. 


385 

Before  the  object  can  be  viewed  as  the  greatest  good,  it  must  be 
compared  with  other  objects,  as  both  are  sources  or  means  of  good. 
Before  this  act  of  comparing,  there  must  be  an  act  dictated  not  by 
selfishness,  but  by  self-love,  in  which  the  mind  determines  to  direct 
its  thoughts  to  the  objects  for  the  sake  of  considering  their  relative 
value,  of  forming  a  judgment  respecting  it,  and  of  choosing  one  or 
the  other  as  the  chief  good.  These  acts  also  imply  under  the  pre- 
sentation of  the  objects  to  the  mind,  an  intellectual  perception  of 
their  adaptedness  to  the  nature  of  man  as  sources  or  means  of  happi- 
ness, and  also  an  excitement  of  constitutional  susceptibilities  in  view 
of  the  objects,  i.  e.  involuntary  propensities,  inclinations,  or  desires 
towards  each  object  respectively." 

"  Should  any  doubt  or  hesitation  in  regard  to  what  has  just  been 
stated,  respecting  the  process  of  mental  acts,  arise  in  the  mind  of  the 
reader,  it  would  probably  respect  the  position  that  the  acts  of  con- 
sidering and  comparing  the  objects  of  choice,  are  dictated  not  by 
selfishness  but  by  self-love.  To  remove  all  doubts  on  this  point,  we 
deem  it  sufficient  to  say  that  such  an  act  of  consideration  as  we  have 
described  cannot  be  dictated  by  selfishness,  because  the  act  is  not 
fitted  to  subserve,  but  is  fitted  to  defeat,  a'selfish  purpose.  What  selfish 
purpose  can  any  one  propose  to  accomplish  by  thinking  of  God,  and  com- 
paring him  with  other  objects  of  aifection,  for  the  sake  of  determining 
whether  he  will  not  henceforth  choose  God  as  his  chief  good  instead 
of  the  world  ?  or  what  kind  of  selfishness  is  that  which  prompts  a  man 
solemnly  to  consider  whether  he  will  not  in  heart  renounce  all  infe- 
rior good  as  his  chosen  portion  for  the  supreme  good  .''  That  such  acts, 
done  for  the  sake  of  forming  more  clear,  correct,  and  impressive  views 
of  the  relative  value  of  the  objects  of  choice,  and  of  choosing  anew, 
either  one  or  the  other  as  the  chief  good,  should  be  dictated  by  the 
selfish  principle,  is  impossible.  The  reason  for  so  directing  and  em- 
ploying the  thoughts,  is  not  that  the  heart  is  fixed  on  any  definite 
object  as  the  source  or  means  of  the  highest  happiness.  It  is  not 
that  God  is  loved  supremely  on  the  one  hand,  nor  that  the  world  is 
loved  supremely  on  the  other,  which  prompts  this  employment  of  the 
thoughts  ;  for  they  are  thus  employed  for  the  very  purpose  of  making 
this  choice,  i.  e.  for  the  very  purpose  of  taking  by  an  act  of  choice,  or 
preference,  one  or  the  other  as  the  chief  good.  These  acts  of  con- 
sideration and  comparison  of  the  objects  of  choice  are  dictated  then, 
not  by  selfishness,  but  by  the  desire  of  happiness  or  self-love,  which, 
in  its  own  nature,  fixes  on  no  definite  object  as  the  source  of  happiness. 

"  This  self-love  or  desire  of  happiness  is  the   primary  cause  or 


386 

reason  of  all  acts  of  preference  or  choice  which  fix  supremely  on  any 
object.  In  every  moral  being  who  forma  a  moral  character,  there 
must  be  a  first  moral  act  of  preference  or  choice.  This  must  respect 
some  one  object,  God  or  mammon,  as  the  chief  good,  or  as  an  object 
of  supreme  affection.  Now  whence  comes  such  a  choice  or  prefer- 
ence ?  Not  from__a  previous  choice  or  preference  of  the  same  object, 
for  we  speak  of  the  first  choice  of  the  object.  The  answer  which 
human  consciousness  gives,  is,  that  the  being  constituted  with  a  ca- 
pacity for  happiness  desires  to  be  happy ;  and  knowing  that  he  is 
capable  of  deriving  happiness  from  different  objects,  considers  from 
which  the  greatest  happiness  may  be  derived,  and  as  in  this  respect 
he  judges  or  estimates  their  relative  value,  so  he  chooses  or  prefers 
the  one  or  the  other  as  his  chief  good.  While  this  must  be  the  pro- 
cess by  which  a  moral  being  forms  his  first  moral  preference,  sub- 
stantially the  same  process  is  indispensable  to  a  change  of  this  pre- 
ference." 

"  We  have  already  said  that  the  sinner  is  the  subject  of  that  con- 
stitutional desire  of  happiness,  called  self-love,  to  which  no  moral 
quality  pertains.  Let  the  sinner  then,  as  a  being  who  loves  happiness 
arid  desires  the  highest  degree  of  it,  under  the  injluence  of  such  a  desire, 
take  into  solemn  consideration  the  question  whether  the  highest  happi- 
ness is  to  be  found  in  God  or  in  the  ivorld;  let  him  pursue  this  inquiry, 
if  need  be,  till  it  result  in  the  conviction  that  such  happiness  is  to  be 
found  in  God  only ;  and  let  him  follow  up  this  conviction  with  that 
intent  and  engrossing  contemplation  of  the  realities  which  truth 
discloses,  and  with  that  stirring  up  of  his  sensibilities  in  view  of  them, 
which  shall  invest  the  world,  when  considered  as  his  only  portion,  with 
an  aspect  of  insignificance,  of  gloom  and  even  of  terror,  and  which 
shall  chill  and  suspend  his  present  active  love  of  it ;  and  let  the  con- 
templation be  persevered  in,  till  it  shall  discover  a  reality  and  an  ex- 
cellence in  the  objects  of  holy  affection,  which  shall  put  him  upon 
direct  and  desperate  efforts  to  fix  his  heart  upon  them ;  and  let  this 
process  of  thought,  of  effort,  and  of  action,  be  entered  upon  as  one 
which  is  never  to  be  abandoned  until  the  end  proposed  by  it,  is  accom- 
plished— until  the  only  living  and  true  God  is  loved  and  chosen,  as  his 
God  forever;  and  we  say  that  in  this  way  the  work  of  his  regene- 
ration through  grace  may  be  accomplished.  On  this  course  he  may 
now  enter;  instead  of  rejecting  or  perverting,  or  abusing  or  sinfully 
using  the  truths  of  tjrod  another  moment." — Christian  Spectator  for 
March,  1029,  p.  19—21.32.* 


387 

He  thus  formally  treats  obedience  to  God — not  as  a  duty 
or  service  that  is  to  be  approved  and  rendered  because  it  is 
right, — but  as  a  mere  matter  of  expediency,  to  which  "the 
sinner"  is  to  be  prompted  solely  by  the  consideration  of  Aw 
own  happiness  ;  and  exhibits  religion  accordingly  as  wholly 

*  There  are  several  assumptions  and  representations  in  these  passages,  which, 
as  1  am  neither  able  to  discern  their  truth,  their  consistency  with  each  other, 
nor  their  compatibility  with  the  theory  of  moral  agency;  which  Dr.  Taylor  has 
made  the  basis  of  many  of  his  most  important  theological  speculations,  I  take 
leave  to  point  them  out,  that  he  may  have  the  opportunity  either  of  vindicat- 
ing, or  retracting  them. 

1.  He  represents  that  at  every  moral  being's  first  moral  preference,  both 
"  God  and  mammon"  are  objects  of  perception,  and  that  that  choice  is  a  specific 
choice  either  of  God  or  mammon,  in  preference  to  the  other.  "  In  every  moral 
being  who  forms  a  moral  character,  there  must  be  a  first  moral  act  of  prefer- 
ence. This  must  respect  some  one  object,  God,  or  mammon,  as  the  chief 
good.  Now  whence  comes  such  a  choice  1  The  answer  is — the  being  considers 
from  which  the  greatest  happiness  may  be  derived,  and  as  in  this  respect  he 
judges,  so  he  chooses  or  prefers  the  one  or  the  other,  as  his  chief  good.  This 
m,ust  be  the  process  by  which  a  moral  being  forms  his  first  moral  preference." 
If  such  is  the  fact,  then  God  either  imparts  a  knowledge  of  himself  to  each  in- 
dividual in  a  supernatural  manner,  in  order  to  the  exertion  of  that  first  moral 
act ;  or  else  no  moral  preference  is  ever  exerted,  until  ajust  conception  of  him 
is  acquired,  either  from  the  instructions  of  men,  the  study  of  his  works,  or  the 
teachings  of  his  word.  Is  the  former  assumed  to  be  the  fact  7  Where  are  there 
any  proofs  of  its  truth  7  Isittaughtin  the  volume  of  inspiration'?  Areanyevi- 
dences  of  it  furnished  by  "  human  consciousness  1"  Has  Dr.  Taylor  a  distinct 
remembrance  of  his  first  moral  preference,  and  recollection  that  it  was  put  forth 
under  the  impulse  of  a  clear  apprehension,  both  of  God  and  of  mammon,  super- 
naturally  communicated  to  him?  and  that  the  reason  of  his  choice  of  the  latter 
was,  that  he  judged  it  to  be  of  greater  "  value"  as  a  "  chief  good,"  or  "  object  of 
supreme  aflTection"  than  God  1 

Is  it  assumed,  on  the  other  hand,  that  no  moral  being  ever  exerts  a  moral 
preference,  until  after  ajust  conception  of  God  has  been  acquired  by  study,  or 
from  instruction  7  Then  indisputably  myriads  who  live  to  mature  age,  never 
exert  a  moral  preference  during  life ;  as  multitudes  never  have  a  just  concep- 
tion of  him,  but  change  his  glory  "  into  an  image  made  like  to  corruptible  man, 
and  to  birds,  and  fourfooted  beasts,  and  creeping  things,"  or  regard  him  as  alto- 
gether such  an  one  as  themselves;  and  multitudes  of  those  even,  who  are  edu- 
cated in  christian  lands,  probably  never  gain  such  a  conception  of  him,  if  they 
ever  acquire  it  at  all,  until  long  after  they  are  usually  regarded  as  moral 
agents,  and  treated  as  such  by  their  fellow  men. 


388 

mercenary;  a  business  of  gain  or  loss  simply,  of  enjoyment 
or  misery;  not  of  obligation,  or  rectitude.  Instead  of 
being  pleasurable  because  it  is  right ;  it  is  right  only,  on  this 
scheme,  because  it  is  pleasurable  ;  and  men  are  to  love  and 
serve  God  merely  because  he  has  annexed  eternal  life  as  a 


But  this  is  not  the  worst  objection  to  which  this  assumption  is  obnoxious. 
He  can  give  no  reason  that  both  God  and  mammon  must  be  objects  of  percep- 
tion at  the  first  moral  preference,  any  more  than  at  every  subsequent  one ; 
and  his  representation,  if  admitted  to  be  true,  would  carry  us  to  the  conclusion 
that  none  of  the  preferences  that  men  ever  exert,  are  moral,  except  those  that 
are  put  forth  with  a  direct  reference  to  the  Most  High ;  that  no  character  or 
responsibility,  therefore,  attaches  to  those  of  their  actions,  that  are  exerted 
when  he  is  excluded  from  their  Ihouglils;  and  that,  consequently,  to  live  in 
utter  ignorance  and  thoughtlessness  of  him,  is  to  live  without  sin. 

2.  He  states  that  the  mind  has,  antecedently  to  its  first  moral  choice,  a  know- 
ledge of  its  susceptibility  of  happiness  from  the  objects  of  its  perception — accord- 
ing to  his  theory,  God  and  mammon — when  it  puts  forth  that  choice.  "  The 
being  constituted  with  a  capacity  for  happiness,  desires  to  be  happy ;  and 
knowing  that  he  is  capable  of  deriving  happiness  from  different  objects,  con- 
siders from  which  the  greatest  happiness  may  be  derived."  To  render  this 
representation  true,  the  mind  must  have  a  knowledge  antecedently  to  its  first 
moral  choice,  not  only  of  the  lact  of  its  capabiUty  of  happiness  from  God,  but 
also,  to  some  extent  at  least,  of  the  nature  and  degree  of  the  happiness  which  it 
is  capable  of  deriving  from  him  ;  as  otherwise,  it  could  form  no  estimate  of 
the  relative  value  of  God  and  mammon,  as  a  "  chief  good"  or  "  object  of 
supreme  afleclion."  It  obviously,  however,  is  not  then  possessed  of  any  such 
knowledge.  It  knows  nothing  of  its  susceptibilities  of  happiness,  except  from 
experience.  It  has  no  intuitive  discernment  either  of  its  own  capacities,  or  of 
the  power  of  objects  to  aili;ct  it  with  enjoyment  or  sufl'ering.  It  can  know  noth- 
ing therefore  of  its  capacity  of  hni)piness  from  GoJ,at  its  first  moral  choice, 
except  from  the  involuntary  pleasure  which  its  perception  of  him  excites. 
But  that  is  not  to  know  its  susceptibilities  of  enjoyment  in  voluntarily  loving 
and  serving  him,  or  the  happiness  it  is  capable  of  deriving  from  hin),  as  an  "ob- 
ject of  supreme  affection."  His  statement  involves  the  error  accordingly  of 
representing  the  mind  as  aware  previously  to  its  first  moral  preference,  of  its 
susceptibility  of  happiness  from  roluntarily  serving  Gorf,  or  of  possessing  ante- 
cedently to  any  experience,  that  knowledge  of  its  capacity,  with  which  experi- 
ence itself  alone,  can  make  it  acquainted  !  His  representations  respecting 
mammon  are  likewise  obnoxious  to  similar  objections. 

3.   He  exhibits  the  first  moral  preference  ao  put  forth  in  consequence  of  a 
deliberate  consideration  of  the  "  relative  value"  of  "  God  and  mammon''  as 


389 

consequence  to  obedience,  and  death  to  transgression, — a 
homage  precisely  like  that  which  the  spirit  of  evil  falsely 
represented  Job  as  rendering,  and  which  God  treated  as 
wholly  unworthy  of  his  acceptance.  In  place  however  of 
springing  from  such  a  rank  and  shameless  selfishness,  Job's 


sources  of  happiness,  or  objects  of  supreme  and  lasting  affection ;  and  that 
preference  itself  as  a  choice  "  forever"  of  one  or  the  other  as  "  the  chief  good." 

To  consider  "the  relative  value"  of  God  and  the  world  as  scources  of  hap- 
piness, the  mind  must  obviously  regard  as  a  most  essential  element  in  their 
adaptation  to  that  end,  the  length  of  the  periods  through  which  they  may  be 
enjoyed — the  eternity  of  God  and  the  happiness  which  his  favor  affords,  and 
the  short  at  most,  and  possibly  only  momentary  space  during  which  the  world 
can  be  possessed  and  prove  a  source  of  pleasure.  In  its  first  moral  choice 
then,  if  his  representation  is  true,  it  solemnly  considers  the  relative  periods 
through  which  God  and  the  world  may  be  sources  of  happiness,  and  prefers 
the  latter  from  a  conviction  of  its  superior  value  in  that  respect ; — chooses 
it  for  eternity  rather  than  God,  although  perfectly  aware — certainly  if  it  forms 
such  a  comparison — that  it  can  be  the  scene  of  its  residence,  and  instrument 
of  its  enjoyment,  but  for  an  insignificant  portion  of  its  endless  being  ! 

But  as  no  reason  can  be  given  why  such  a  formal  comparison  of  the  rela- 
tive value  of  God  and  mammon  as  objects  of  supreme  affection,  must  take 
place  at  the  first  moral  choice,  any  more  than  at  any  subsequent  one,  the  state- 
ment under  consideration,  if  true,  must  be  as  applicable  to  all  others,  as  to  that- 
There  arc  innmnerablc  choices,  however,  the  aim  of  which  is  not  mam- 
mon, or  the  world  at  large  permancntli/,  but  merely  some  immediate  trratifi- 
cation.  The  conclusion,  however,  to  which  the  representation  of  the  passage 
would  carry  us  is,  that  in  all  such  instances,  the  mind  in  fact  chooses  the  object 
on  which  it  fixes  its  preference,  as  a  lasting  object  of  affection  and  jneans  of 
happiness : — that  the  votary  of  intemperance,  though  aware  when  he  grasps  the 
inebriating  cup,  that  at  the  longest,  it  can  yield  gratification  but  for  a  few  mo- 
ments or  hours,  still  exhausts  its  contents  as  a  lasting  source  of  happiness,  and 
from  a  solemn  persuasion  of  its  greater  "  relative  value"  in  that  respect,  than 
God ;  and  that  all  men  in  like  manner  choose  every  short  lived  sinful  pleasure, 
as  an  endless  enjoyment,  though  apprised  by  experience  of  its  certainly  transient 
duration ! 

4.  He  represents  the  first  moral  choice — if  a  choice  of  a  created  object — as 
of  course  a  choice  of  it  as  an  object  of  supreme  and  lasting  affection,  and  a 
formal  rejection  accordingly  of  God.  He  says,  ''the  firot  moral  act  of  prefer- 
ence of  every  moral  being  must  respect  some  one  object — God  or  mammon,  a» 

49 


390 

obedience,  as  we  have  seen,  was  rendered  because  it  was 
right,  not  simply  because  it  was  expedient ;  and  such  is  the 
fact  with  all  other  obedient  beings  ;  and  their  obedience  is 
pleasurable  to  them  because  it  is  right — and  not  right, 
simply  because  it4s  pleasurable. 


the  chief  good ;"  and  that  in  fixing  on  it,  he  "  considers  from  which  the  greatest 
happiness  may  be  derived  ;  and  as  in  this  respect  he  judges,  so  he  chooses  or 
prefers  the  one  or  the  other  as  his  chief  good."  If  then  the  object  chosen  is 
not  God,  but  some  created  object,  the  choice  of  it  necessarily  involves  a  for- 
mal rejection  of  God.  But  as  no  reason  can  be  alleged  that  such  must  be  the 
fact  in  respect  to  that,  any  more  than  to  all  other  choices  ;  his  representations 
if  assented  to,  will  lead  to  the  conolusion  that  every  moral  choice  of  a  created 
object,  is  of  that  character ; — that  to  choose  to  eat,  drink,  breathe,  or  indulge  in 
any  mode  of  sensation,  no  matter  how  essential  it  may  be  to  the  continuance 
of  life,  how  innocent  or  how  virtuous  even  ;  to  love  a  fellow-creature,  though 
it  be  our  neighbor  as  ourselves,  cither  involves  no  morality  at  all,  or  else  is  to 
choose  it  as  an  object  of  supreme  affection,  and  lasting  source  of  happiness,  and 
formally  to  reject  God  !  How  far  short  does  this  fall  of  exhibiting  us  as  under 
a  physical  necessity  of  sinning  ? 

5.  He  states  that  this  self-love — though  the  primary  cause  of  all  acts  of  pre- 
ference— yet  "  in  its  own  nature  fixes  on  no  definite  object  as  the  source  of 
happiness."  To  desire  happiness,  however,  without  desiring  any  particular 
species  of  it,  or  fixing  on  any  "definite  object"  as  its  means  or  source,  were 
obviously  to  desire  it  without  a  perception  of  any  of  its  specific  kinds.  But 
that  were  as  obviously  to  desire  it  without  any  idea  of  its  nature ;  and  that 
were  to  desire  it  not  only  involuntarily,  but  wholly  unintelligently.  The  mind 
then  according  to  the  representation  in  this  passage,  is  entirely  unintelligent 
in  all  its  desires  of  happiness  !  They  spring  up  in  it  wholly  without  cause, 
and  are  exerted  without  an  object !  He  represents  "  this  self-love,"  however, 
"or  desire  of  happiness"  as  "  the  primary  cause  or  reason  of  all  acts  of  pre- 
ference or  choice  which  fix  supremely  on  any  object."  All  the  choices  of  the 
mind  then,  of  particular  sources  or  modes  of  happiness,  as  well  as  its  desires, 
take  place  wholly  unintelligently,  and  arc  mere  senseless  and  mechanical 
effects !  A  self-determined  will,  conjoined  with  a  self-determined  desire ! — fit 
elements  to  b«  united  in  the  same  theory,  and  more  happily  suited  to  each 
other,  than  any  of  the  others  that  belong  to  his  system.  It  is  with  great  pro- 
priety certainly  that  ho  protests  that  "  no  moral  quality  pertains"  to  "  this 
self-love '." 

6.  It  is  under  the  guidance  of  these  two  extraordinary  attributes— a  wholly 
mechanical  unintelligent  self-determined  desire,  prompting  to  action,  an  unin- 


391 

-.  We  are  finally  taught  by-this  subject  not  only  to  regard 
the  trials  and  calamities  of  life,  of  which  we  are  incompe- 
tent to  discern  the  immediate  reasons,  and  all  the  inscruta- 
ble measures  of  the  divine  administration,  as  compatible 
with  infinite  wisdom  and  beneficence,  but  as  permitted  and 
appointed  by  those  attributes,  and  in  place  of  impeaching 
the  rectitude  or  knowledge  of  the  Most  High,  on  their  ac- 
count, or  attempting  to  vindicate  him  by  denying  or  limiting 
his  power  over  his  works,  are  to  regard  the  boundless  ma- 
nifestations of  his  perfections  which  we  in  fact  see  and  com- 
prehend, as  demonstrative  of  the  equal  wisdom  and  goodness 
of  those  portions  of  his  administration  that  at  present  are 
inexplicable  to  us  ;  and  in  adoring  submissiveness  and  joy 
to  rely  on  their  being  made  ultimately  to  subserve  the  well- 
being  of  his  kingdom,  and  contribute  to  the  illustration  of 
his  glory. 

Such  was  the  sublime  lesson  conveyed  to  Job  in  the  reply 
of  God  to  his  doubts  and  complaints.  In  the  controversies 
in  which  he  and  his  friends  became  involved  respecting  the 
reasons  for  which  he  was  visited  with  so  extraordinary  a 
series  of  judgments,  they — assuming  that  the  infliction  of 
such  calamities  on  the  righteous,  would  both  be  a  depar- 
ture from  the  usual  laws  of  providence,  and  incompatible 
with  the  divine  rectitude — alleged  that  he  must  either  be 
wholly  hypocritical  in   his   obedience,  or  must  have  fallen 


telligent  self-determined  will, — that  he  exhorts  "  the  sinner"  to  "  take  into 
solemn  consideration  the  question  whether  the  highest  happiness  is  to  be  found 
in  God,  or  in  the  world,"  to  ''  pursue  this  inquiry,  if  need  br,  till  it  result  in 
the  conviction  that  such  happiness  is  to  be  found  in  God  only :"  and  to  "■  follow 
up  this  conviction  with  intent  and  engrossing  contemplation,''  with  a  "stirring 
upof  his  sensibilities,"  and  "  with  direct  and  desperate  efforts  to  fix  his  heart," 
on  "  the  objects  of  holy  affection ;''  and  assures  him  "  that  in  this  way  the 
work  of  his  regeneration,  through  grace,  may  he  accomplished !" 


392 

into  some  of  those  flagrant  trjinsgressions  which  usually 
draw  down  the  signal  tokens  of  God's  displeasure  on  their 
perpetators. 

Job,  on  the  other  hand,  while  conscious  of  his  innocence 
of  such  crimes,  and  of  the  sincerity  of  his  regard  to  God, 
he  vindicated  himself  from  those  imputations,  still  thought 
the  conduct  of  the  Most  High  incapable  of  explication 
consistently  with  the  known  principles  of  his  government, 
and  impatiently  desired  to  learn  on  what  ground  it.  was 
that  he  proceeded  in  that  extraordinary  dispensation. 

God,  however,  in  replying  to  him,  neither  oflered  any 
direct  answer  to  that  impeachment  of  his  administration, 
nor  furnished  any  explanation  of  the  reasons  of  his  provi- 
dence ;  but  in  place  of  that,  directing  him  to  the  proofs  of 
knowledge  and  goodness  with  which  every  portion  of  the 
divine  works  is  fraught,  and  inquiring  whether  he  was  pre- 
sent at  their  creation,  assisted  in  their  contrivance,  or  un- 
derstood the  laws  of  their  government ;  in  that  manner 
taught  him  the  presumption  of  a  dependent,  feeble,  and 
ignorant  creature's  assuming  an  equality  with  his  Maker, 
and  questioning  the  propriety  of  his  conduct,  when  in  pos- 
session of  such  demonstrations  of  his  wisdom.  "  Shall  he 
that  contendcth  with  the  Almighty,  instruct  him  ?  He  that," 
undertaking  that  office,  "  reproveth  God,  let  him  answer  it." 

On  Job's  acknowledging  his  insignificance  and  vileness, 
and  confessing  his  presumption,  the  Most  High,  to  impress 
him  still  more  deeply  with  the  folly  of  attempting  to  "  dis- 
annul his  judgments,"  called  on  him  to  display  his  adequacy, 
if  he  possessed  any,  for  that  task,  by  exerting  his  power 
over  the  objects  and  beings  around  him,  by  casting  abroad 
his  wrath  and  abasing  the  proud;  and  at  length  by  pointing 
|)im  to  Behemoth  nnil  Leviathan,  gave  him  to   see  tiiat  in 


393 

place  of  being  competent  to  contend  with  his  Creator  in 
the  higher  excellencies  of  wisdom  and  goodness,  he  was 
incapable  of  equalling  even  his  unintelligent  creatures,  in 
the  lower  attribute  of  power,  or  of  standing  undismayed  in 
their  presence. 

We  are  thus  taught  on  the  one  hand,  the  guilt  of  ques- 
tioning the  rectitude  of  the  Most  High  in  those  of  his  ways 
which  we  are  unable  to  comprehend,  while  presented  in 
every  portion  of  his  works  with  numberless  and  stupen- 
dous manifestations  of  his  perfections  ;  and  the  duty  on  the 
other,  of  regarding  the  proofs  in  his  works  that  every  where 
surround  us,  of  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness,  as  demon- 
strative that  those  of  his  moral  and  providential  measures, 
the  design  of  which  we  are  not  at  present  able  to  discern, 
are  in  fact  equally  wise  and  good  : — a  touching  reproof  of 
the  doubts,  the  unbelief,  and  the  fears  of  his  children  in  re- 
spect to  the  dark  and  distressing  allotments  of  his  provi- 
dence ;--a  dread  rebuke  to  the  self-sufficiency  and  presumption 
of  those  who  venture  to  circumscribe  his  wisdom  within  the 
limits  of  their  comprehension,  or  boldly  to  deny  his  power, 
in  order  to  account  for  the  occurrence  of  those  evfents  in 
his  empire,  the  permission  of  which  their  ignorance  and 
weakness  are  not  able  to  reconcile  with  his  omnipotence. 


Note— The  reference  on  page  320,  should  have  been  to  No-  VIII.  for  May  1831 . 


VIEWS 


THEOLOGY, 


No.  XIX.     Vox..  ZZZ. 


MAY,  1833. 


NEWYORK: 
JOHN  P.  HAVEN,  148  NASSAU-STREET, 

AMERICAN  TRACT  SOCIETY'!?  HOUf-E. 

1833. 


O.   p.   SCOTT  AND  CO.'pRINTERS, 

avsk-sthbet,  cohnrr  of  Nassau. 


CONTENTS. 


Art.  I. — Truths  through  which  the  Spirit  cojivicts 

and  sanctifies 395 

Art.  II. — Theological  Controversy 406 

Art.  III. — The  Christian  Spectator  on  the  Permis- 
sion of  Evil 440 


The  Views  in  Theology  will  continue  to  be  published 
semi-annually,  in  May  and  November,  and  be  devoted 
chiefly,  as  heretofore,  to  discussion  on  the  Doctrines  of 
Religion.  Four  numbers  will  form  a  volume.  Those  who 
desire  the  work,  will  please  to  give  notice  to  the  publisher, 
at  148  Nassau-street.  Ministers  and  theological  students, 
of  whatever  denomination,  who  apply  for  it,  will  receive  it 
without  charge. 


T  R  U  T  H  S 


THROUGH    WHICH 


THE  SPIRIT   CONVICTS   AND   SANCTIFIES. 


It  was  the  object  of  several  pages  of  the  last  number,  to 
show  that  the  ground  of  the  mind's  choices  lies  in  its  percep- 
tions and  emotions  ;  and  that  it  is  through  the  determination 
of  them  accordingly,  or  the  communication  of  appropriate 
apprehensions  of  divine  things,  that  the  Spirit  turns  it  to 
obedience. 

These  views,  intelligently  adopted,  are  obviously  suited 
to  exert  a  propitious  influence  on  the  teachers  of  religion. 
They  naturally  prompt  the  inquiry  : — what  are  the  truths 
which  are  distinguished  by  this  momentous  instrumentality  ? 
What  are  the  views  of  himself,  his  purposes,  his  will, 
his  government ;  of  our  condition,  character,  and  destiny, 
and  of  the  method  of  salvation  through  Christ,  which  God 
has  made  knovv'n  by  revelation,  for  the  purpose  of  exciting 
us  to  obedience  ?  What  are  the  apprehensions  which  the 
Spirit,  in  fact,  conveys  to  the  mind  in  regeneration,  and 
makes  the  means  of  turning  it  from  darkness  unto  light, 
and  from  the  power  of  Satan  unto  God  ;  and  under  the 
promptings  of  which,  the  renovated  exhibit  their  obedient 
aflections,  and  experience  the  joys  of  the  divine  favor  .^ 

SO 


396 

These  questions,  thus  iimnediately  sug;gesled  by  tliat 
view  of  our  agency,  will  naturcilly,  if  rightly  determined, 
lay  a  foundation  for  a  just  exhibition  and  enforcement  of 
the  gospel. 

The  answer  to  them,  is  obviously  to  be  sought  chiefly 
from  the  page  of  revelation  ;  subordinately  from  the  history 
of  the  church,  and  the  record  of  christian  experience.  A 
full  enumeration  of  those  truihs,  the  limits  of  this  article 
will  not  allow  me  to  undertake ;  I  shall  aim  only  at  a  brief 
outline  of  such  of  them  as  are  the  most  essential.  They 
respect  the  being  and  character  of  God,  his  purposes  and 
agency,  his  rights  and  claims  with  respect  to  mankind,  and 
the  requirements  and  sanctions  of  his  government,  and 
allotments  of  his  providence  in  which  they  are  asserted  and 
exercised;  the  relations,  obligations,  and  character  of  men, 
the  work  of  redemption,  the  conditions  of  pardon,  the  prin- 
ciples on  which  God  proceeds  in  the  gift  of  salvation,  the 
agency  he  employs  to  bring  its  subjects  to  accept  it,  and 
the  destiny  which  awaits  those  who  continue  in  impenitence. 

1.  God  is  self-existent,  independent,  eternal,  almighty, 
omniscient,  and  infinite  in  wisdom,  rectitude,  and  benevo- 
lence, Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit ;  and  these  boundless 
perfections  are  displayed  in  all  his  works,  and  characterize 
all  his  agency  ;  and  are  preeminently  the  ground  of  his 
right  to  the  supreme  homage  of  his  intelligent  creatures. 
This  awful  being,  incomprehensible  in  nature,  inefl'able  in 
glory,  is  he  whom  wc  are  to  fear  and  adore ;  on  whose 
attributes  we  are  to  repose  our  confidence  and  hope,  and 
whose  excellence,  not  in  the  abstract,  or  regarded  irrespec- 
tively of  the  modes  in  which  it  is  exhibited,  but  as  manifest- 
ed in  his  works,  and  especially  in  his  moral  and  providential 
administration  over  us,  we  are  to  love. 


397 

2.  He  from  eternity  determined  on  a  system  of  agency 
that  is  to  continue  for  ever,  and  involve  a  display  of  his 
infinite  excellence,  and  in  the  fulfilment  of  that  purpose, 
gave  and  continues  existence  to  the  universe,  and  its  intel- 
ligent inhabitants  ;  extends  his  providential  agency  to  all 
the  events  that  transpire  in  his  empire,  and  causes  them  all 
by  their  natural  instrumentality,  or  the  overruling  sway  of 
his  government,  to  contribute  to  the  aims  of  his  wisdom 
and  goodness. 

3.  He  claims  on  the  ground  of  his  character,  relations  and 
agency,  their  supreme  homage  from  all  his  intelligent 
creatures ;  has  established  over  them  a  moral  government, 
in  which  he  prescribes  the  modes  in  which  they  are  to 
exhibit  that  regard,  requiring  them  to  acknowledge  him  as 
their  creator,  preserver,  and  the  giver  of  all  their  blessings, 
to  love  him  with  all  their  hearts,  to  submit  cheerfull}^  to  all 
the  appointments  of  his  providence,  and  to  glorify  him  by 
obedience  to  all  his  will.  These  laws,  which  are  holy,  just 
and  good,  embody  a  most  important  portion  of  the  truths 
which  are  the  instrument  of  conviction  and  conversion. 

4.  He  claims  and  exercises  the  right  of  placing  his  moral 
creatures  on  probation  ;  of  appointing  their  condition  here  ; 
of  subjecting  them  to  such  trials  as  to  lead  them  to  a 
definitive  choice  between  holiness  and  sin ;  between  the 
good  which  is  attended  with  his  favor,  and  that  which 
is  followed  by  his  frown ;  and  finally  of  making  their 
condition  of  happiness  or  misery  throughout  their  future 
existence — which  is  to  continue  forever — to  depend  on  their 
conduct  under  these  trials. 

5.  In  his  delineation  of  their  character  or  agency  under 
this  administration,  he  exhibits  them  as  sinning  universally 
while  left  without  his  renovating  influence  ;  as  rejecting  him, 


398 

trampling  on  his  rights,  disregarding  his  will,  perverting 
his  bounty,  slighting  his  love,  and  contemning  his  dis- 
pleasure ;  the  slaves  of  their  corporeal  appetites,  and  devot- 
ed to  those  species  of  pleasure,  which  are  furnished  by  the 
beings  and  objects  around  them,  to  which  they  sustain  but  a 
transient  relation,  or  which  can  prove  sources,  at  the  longest, 
of  enjoyment  only  during  this  life. 

6.  He  exhibits  them  as  forfeiting  all  worthiness  of 
his  favor  by  this  rejection  of  him  and  his  service,  and 
preference  of  sinful  pleasures,  and  meriting  to  be  de- 
barred forever  from  his  presence,  cut  off  from  his  gifts, 
and  consigned,  on  their  removal  from  this  scene  of  exist- 
ence, to  a  Vv'orld  where  no  provision  is  made  for  their 
welfare,  there  to  suffer  throughout  their  endless  being,  the 
burning  sting  of  a  condemning  conscience,  and  devouring 
fire  of  unsatisfied  want. 

7.  He  exhibits  their  guilt  as  such,  that  nothing  short 
of  the  death  of  the  divine  Redeemer  as  a  vicarious  sacri- 
fice to  manifest  his  unchangeable  rectitude  and  aver- 
sion to  sin,  could  render  it  consistent  in  him  to  restore 
to  them  his  favor,  sanctify,  pardon  and  save  them  : — and 
their  alienation  from  him  as  such,  that  no  agency  short  of 
the  renovating  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  adequate  to 
recall  them  from  rebellion  and  lead  them  to  holiness. 

8.  The  Son  of  God  accordingly  became  incarnate,  and 
offered  himself  a  ransom  for  the  whole  race,  the  just 
for  the  unjust,  that  he  might  bring  them  unto  God.  On 
the  ground  of  that  expiation,  pardon  and  salvation  are 
offered  to  all  who  will  accept  them  by  faith  in  him 
and  obedience  to  his  authority  :  and  all  are  required  to 
repent  and  believe,  and  thereby  flee  from  the  wrath  to 
come. 


399 

9.  Neither  these  stupendous  manifestations  of  mercy, 
however,  these  invitations  and  requirements,  nor  the  ordi- 
nary strivings  of  the  Divine  Spirit,  turn  men  from  rebellion, 
nor  were  no  higher  influence  to  be  employed,  would  ever 
lead  a  solitary  individual  to  obedience.  Thus  slighted  and 
rejected,  God  in  sovereign  mercy,  according  to  his  eternal 
purpose,  interposes  the  efiicacious  agency  of  his  Spirit,  and 
renews  unto  holiness  such  as  he  had  chosen  to  that  end 
before  the  foundation  of  the  world,  and  keeps  them  there- 
after by  his  mighty  power  through  faith  imto  salvation  ; 
and  in  righteousness  leaves  all  others  under  the  ordinary 
restraints  of  his  providence,  calls  of  his  word,  and  strivings 
of  his  Spirit, — which  they  are  bound  to  obey, — to  close 
their  probation  in  sin.  His  selection  of  those  whom  he 
saves  is  not  founded  on  any  worth  of  theirs,  as  they  are 
saved  from  a  state  of  total  guilt  and  ruin,  but  solely  on 
the  higher  subserviency  of  their  salvation  from  such  a  state, 
than  that  of  others,  to  his  glory  and  the  good  of  his  king- 
dom ;  and  his  purposes  and  agency  in  respect  to  those  who 
are  left  to  perish,  are  not  the  offspring  of  any  unwillingness 
that  they  should  repent  and  gain  eternal  life,  if  they  will 
under  the  administration  he  exercises  over  them — as  he 
desires  and  requires  them,  as  well  as  others,  to  embrace 
the  salvation  he  offers  them — but  he  leaves  them  to  go  on  in 
sin  notwithstanding  that  desire,  solely  because  to  carry  his 
agency  any  farther  than  he  does  to  lead  them  to  repent- 
ance, would  be  less  glorious  to  him,  and  less  beneficial 
to  his  empire  at  large,  than  the  course  which  he  now 
pursues. 

10.  Renovation,  pardon,  and  the  gift  of  life,  are  acts  of 
infinite  grace  to  the  subjects  of  them,  bestowed  not  only 
without  any  merit  in  them  of  good  ;  but  against  the  desert 


400 

of  eternal  dealli ;  and  solely  from  respect  to  the  mediation 
of  Christ ;  as  repentance  and  faith,  which  are  the  conditions 
of  acceptance,  arc  the  fruit  of  divine  mercy,  as  truly  as  the 
pardon  and  salvation  themselves  are  which  are  graciously 
annexed  to  those  conditions. 

Such  then  are  the  most  essential  of  the  truths  which  God 
has  revealed  for  the  purpose  of  swaying  men  from  sin  to 
obedience  ; — the  great  elements  of  the  message  which  the 
ambassadors  of  the  cross  are  to  proclaim  to  their  hearers, 
in  order  to  turn  them  from  the  power  of  Satan  unto  God. 
It  is  to  declare  them,  that  their  office  is  instituted,  and  by 
inculcating  them  in  their  various  relations,  and  wit!)  appro- 
priate energy,  alone,  that  they  can  attain  the  end  of  their 
ministry. 

They  are  the  truths  likewise,  as  is  seen  from  the  history 
of  the   church,   which   the  Spirit,  ni  fact,  employs  in  the 
work  of  conviction  and  conversion.     It  is  where  they  are 
taught,  that  his  eflusions  are  seen  to   descend  ;    and  the 
regions  from  which  his  presence  is  withheld,  are  those  in 
which  they  either  are  not  made  known,  or  are  not  exhibited 
in  their  true  character.     Those  ministers  who  have  been 
most   signally  successful,   are  those  who  have  been   most 
eminently  distinguished  for  the  clearness,  consistency,  and 
energy   with  which   they   exhibited    the    divine  character, 
expounded  and  enforced  the  law  of  God,  vindicated   his 
rights,  depicted  the  obligations,  guilt  and  ruin  of  men,  pre- 
sented the  atonement  of  Christ  as  the  only  ground  of  pardon, 
taught  the  necessity  of  regeneration  by  the  special  influence 
of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  justification  by  grace,  with  the  asso- 
ciated doctrines  of  divine  purposes,  election,  sovereignty 
and  perseverance  ;  and  thus  illustrated  in  the  clearest  man- 
ner the  holiness,  justice,  and  grace  of  God,  and  enforced 


401 

with  tlie  highest  energy  the  obligations,  and  displayed  in 
their  truest  colors  the  inexcusableness  and  guilt  of  men. 
The  purity  and  permanence  of  revivals  have  accordingly 
corresponded  most  conspicuously  to  the  amplitude,  con- 
sistency and  force  with  which  these  truths  have  been  ex- 
hibited ;  and  the  unfruitfulness  or  spuriousness  of  the 
excitements  that  have  taken  place,  have  borne  a  close  rela- 
tion to  the  neglect  of  these  doctrines,  or  the  imperfection 
with  which  they  have  been  taught. 

These  are  the  truths  likewise,  which  are,  in  fact,  present 
to  the  mind  in  conviction  and  conversion,  and  which  are 
the  means  of  bringing  it  to  obedience  ; — the  character, 
rights  and  will  of  God,  its  obHgations,  guilt  and  ruin,  the 
work  of  the  Redeemer,  the  method  of  pardon  and  salvation, 
the  necessity  of  the  renewing  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
the  sovereign  right  of  God  to  bestow  those  influences  on 
whom  he  chooses,  and  leave  whom  he  pleases  without  them 
to  go  on  in  sin  and  perish ;  and  the  necessity  of  uncondi- 
tioned submission  to  him  as  such  a  sovereign.  It  is  in  the 
presence  and  under  the  action  of  these  great  truths,  that  the 
mind,  in  fact,  takes  the  posture  of  submission,  and  repents, 
adores,  loves,  believes  and  rejoices  ;  and  they  are  obviously 
as  essential  to  the  exercise  of  those  acts,  as  the  activity  itself 
of  the  mind  is.  They  are  the  only  views  under  the  prompt- 
ings of  which  those  aflections  can  be  exerted.  God  cannot 
become  the  object  of  reverence,  love  and  trust,  except  by 
being  beheld ;  his  rights  cannot  be  acknowledged  and 
respected  but  as  they  are  seen  ;  his  government  cannot  be 
submitted  to,  except  as  its  claims  are  understood;  the  guilt 
of  sin,  the  ruin  it  involves,  the  impossibility  of  justification 
by  works,  the  necessity  of  a  gracious  justification,  cannot 
be  appreciated,  except  by  just  conceptions  of  the  character 


402 

and  rights  of  the  Most  High,  his  law,  our  obligations,  and 
llie  relation  to  them  of  our  actions.  And  it  is  only  under 
the  impression  of  these  truths,  that  our  ruin,  our  need 
of  a  divine  Redeemer  and  almighty  Sanctifier,  and  our  de- 
pendence on  the  sovereign  grace  of  God  to  grant  renova- 
tion and  pardon,  are  adequately  discerned  and  realized. 
That  such  convictions,  with  the  appropriate  afi'ections  to 
which  they  give  birth,  should  spring  from  any  other  appre- 
hensions of  those  great  subjects,  is  as  impossible,  as  that 
they  should  take  place  in  the  total  absence  from  the  mind 
of  those  subjects  themselves. 

These  views  are  likewise  those  under  which  they  who  are 
renovated,  continue  to  exert  their  obedience.  Brought  in- 
to a  new  relation  to  God,  and  become  the  subjects  of  new 
affections,  they  arc,  indeed,  placed  under  the  action  of  a  far 
wider  circle  of  truths,  and  truths,  in  many  instances,  having 
a  peculiar  reference  to  themselves.  They  have  blessings 
to  acknowledge,  manifestations  of  mercy  to  admire,  joys  to 
recount,  and  hopes  to  cherish,  to  which  others  are  stran- 
gers. Their  apprehensions  of  divine  things  are  likewise 
vastly  enlarged,  and  their  associations  quickened  and  ex- 
tended ;  yet  the  same  great  truths  respecting  God  and  his 
government,  themselves  and  salvation,  continue  to  form  the 
essential  elements  of  the  views  under  which  they  put  forth 
their  obedient  afi'ections.  If  they  fear,  adore  and  love ;  it 
is  the  King  eternal,  immortal  and  invisible,  the  only  wise 
God,  who  is  the  object  of  their  homage,  whose  understand- 
ing is  infinite,  whose  faithfulness  reacheth  unto  the  heavens, 
and  whose  tender  mercies  are  over  all  his  works.  If  they 
ofier  thanksgiving  and  praise,  it  is  to  him  who  is  glorious 
in  holiness,  fearful  in  praises,  a  God  doing  wonders,  whose 
laws  are  holy  just  and   good,  whose  kingdom  rulelh  over 


403 

alJ,  and  from  whom  cometh  down  every  good  and  perfect 
gift.       If   they   dwell  on  their  character,    condition,    and 
prospects  as  his  children,  their  thoughts  are  turned  to  him 
who  was  slain  for  them  before  the  foundation  of  the  world, 
redeemed  them  by  his  blood,  and  made   them  kings  and 
priests  unto  God,  and  their   hearts  ascend  in  ascriptions 
of  honor,  and   glory,  and  power  unto    him   who    sitteth 
upon    the  throne,    and  unto  the  Lamb  forever.      And   if 
they  invoke  the  aids  of  divine  grace,  it  is  the  influence  of  that 
Almighty  Spirit  who   convinces   of  sin,  of  righteousness, 
and  of  judgment  to  come,  who  new  creates  the  heart,  and 
gives  birth  within  it,  to  all  its  forms  of  holiness,  and  by 
whose  mighty  power  it  is  that  they  are  to  be  kept  through 
faith  unto  salvation. 

These  views,  then,  of  our  agency  and  the  influences  of 
the  Spirit,  which  I  have  desired  to  sustain,  are  obviously 
from  these  considerations,  adapted  to  exert  a  propitious  in- 
fluence  on  the  teachers   of  religion   who  adopt  them,  by 
leading  them   to  a  faithful  and  zealous  inculcation   of  the 
whole  gospel,  as  the  indispensable  and  direct  means  of  at- 
taining the  end  of  their  ministry.    To  neglect  or  slight  any 
of  its  truths,  to  dwell  chiefly  on  some  portions  of  them  to 
the  exclusion  of  others,  and  above  all,  to  substitute  for  them, 
the  cold  and  shadowy  speculations  of  philosophy,— which 
on  the  subjects  of  revelation  are  but  another  name  for  the  as- 
sumptions of  ignorance,  or  ebullitions  of  folly— is  to  contra- 
dict those   doctrines  themselves,  in   place   of  legitimately 
following  their  guidance. 

To  suppress  or  neglect  the  truths  of  the  gospel,  is  to 
shut  out  from  the  mind  the  objects  toward  which  the  obedi- 
ent afiections  are  exercised,  to  deprive  it  thereby  of  ex- 
citements to  holiness,  and  render  its  continued  rebellion,— as 

51 


404 

far  as  the  influence  of  instruction  from  the  pulpit  can  affect 
it — a  natural  and  inevitable  result. 

To  dwell  perpetually  on  one  portion  of  truth  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  others,  is  likewise  to  withhold  the  requisite  means 
of  excitement  to  the  different  branches  of  obedience,  and 
render  the  affections  as  well  as  the  views,  distorted  and  im- 
perfect. Especially  to  dwell  continually  on  the  truths  which 
relate  to  human  ability,  even  if  for  the  purpose  of  counter- 
acting pernicious  error,  is  fitted  to  lead  to  injurious  results, 
by  investing  them  with  too  high  an  importance,  and  shroud- 
ing and  depreciating  the  truths  with  which  they  should  ever 
be  intimately  associated,  that  respect  the  necessity  of  the 
Spirit's  influences.  Misapprehensions  like  those  which  re- 
late to  our  mental  constitution,  which  consciousness  and 
experience  contradict,  are  far  less  likely  to  prove  seriously 
prejudicial,  than  such  as  meet  with  no  direct  counteraction 
from  the  mind's  intuitive  perceptions,  or  necessary  convic- 
tions, such  as  those  that  respect  the  character  of  God,  the 
import  of  his  law,  the  nature  and  necessity  of  renovation 
by  the  Spirit,  and  the  method  of  gratuitous  justification.  In 
place,  therefore,  of  authorizing  the  slight  or  denunciation 
of  which  some  have  been  guilty,  of  the  doctrines  of  special 
grace,  of  sovereignty,  and  of  God's  universal  purposes, 
providence  and  power  over  his  creatures,  the  increased  at- 
tention that  is  at  present  given  to  the  subject  of  human 
ability,  renders  it  preeminently  necessary  that  those  doctrines 
likewise  should  he  treated  with  additional  frequency,  and 
their  import  and  relations  more  fully  expounded.  Human 
ability  no  more  supersedes  the  necessity  of  the  influence  of 
ti)e  Holy  Spirit,  than  that  influence  supersedes  the  necessity 
of  human  ability.  It  does  not  prevent  men  from  continuing 
to  sin,  any  more  than  from  commencinc  it.    The  certaintv, 


405 

notwithstanding  that  ability,  of  their  continuing  to  sin  if  left 
without  the  Spirit's  special  influence,  is  as  absolute,  as  the 
previous  certainty  was  that  they  would  commence  their  mo- 
ral agency  as  sinners.  It  is  this  awful  fact,  indeed,  that 
renders  his  interposition  necessary,  and  a  just  conception 
of  it  is  accordingly  indispensable  to  a  proper  sense  of  our 
hopeless  condition  without  the  intervention  of  sovereign 
grace. 

Carried  thus,  as  they  must  be  by  these  views,  to  the  con- 
viction that  that  preaching  will  prove  the  most  useful,  which 
is  fraught  with  the  justest  and  largest  exhibitions  of  reveal- 
ed truth,  which  raises  the  mind  the  nearest  to  God,  and 
gives  him  and  the  great  facts  of  his  government  to  be  most 
intimately  associated  with  its  habitual  views ;  which  con- 
veys the  clearest  conviction  of  duty  to  reason,  makes  the 
deepest  impression  on  conscience,  imparts  the  strongest  im- 
pulse to  the  voluntary  affections,  and  thereby  addresses  to 
all  the  various  elements  of  our  nature,  the  highest  excite- 
ments to  obedience — those  who  adopt  them,  if  they  allow 
them  their  proper  influence,  will  naturally  be  led  by  them 
to  an  impartial  and  zealous  exhibition  of  the  whole  coun- 
sel of  God,  and  sole  reliance  on  it,  through  the  divine  bles- 
sing, for  success. 


THEOLOGICAL  CONTROVERSY. 


One  of  the  most  extraordinary  spectacles  exhibited  by 
the  church,  is  the  controversies  of  its  teachers  respecting 
the  doctrines  of  Christianity.  A  perpetual  succession  of 
disputations  has  agitated  it ; — commencing  in  the  days  of 
the  apostles,  who  devoted  a  large  share  of  their  writings  to 
the  correction  of  Jewish  and  Grecian  misapprehensions  and 
misrepresentations ;  extended  soon  after  to  almost  every 
branch  of  faith  and  duty  by  allegorical  interpretations, 
and  attempts  to  accommodate  the  doctrines  of  the  gospel  to 
the  prevalent  philosophy  ;  subsequently  directed  at  one 
time  to  the  nature  of  the  Supreme  Being  ;  at  another  to 
man's  attributes  and  agency  ;  now  treating  the  epoch  of 
the  resurrection,  or  the  prerogatives  of  a  bishop,  as  subjects 
of  fundamental  importance  ;  now  expending  an  ardent 
zeal  on  the  subtleties  of  scholastic  theology ;  at  the  Refor- 
mation, returning  again  to  the  great  essentials  of  revelation, 
and  employed  from  that  day  to  this  in  questions  respecting 
the  import  of  its  principal  doctrines.  It  has  thus  been  a 
scene  of  almost  uninterrupted  distractions, — of  contest"; 
in  which  truth  has  often  been  the  victim,  and  error  the  van- 


407 

quisher  ;  sophistry  a  more  successful  weapon  than  upriglii 
argument,  and  passion  tlian  reason ;  and  in  which  the  friends 
of  God  have  frequently  by  ignorance,  credulity,  or  unskil- 
fulness,  betrayed  the  cause  it  was  their  aim  to  sustain  ;  while 
his  enemies  have  employed  the  name  and  sanctions  of  his 
revelation  to  discountenance  its  truths,  and  exterminate  its 
friends.  Of  those  successive  disputations,  the  number  is  small 
thatcanmeritjif  impartially  surveyed,  a  full  approval.  But 
few  of  the  representations  of  Christianity  given  even  by  its 
friends,  can  be  sanctioned  as  in  all  essential  respects  correct, 
and  none  perhaps  of  the  long  train  of  combatants  can  be  be- 
lieved on  emerging  from  this  scene  of  being,  not  to  have 
experienced  some  important  modifications  of  the  views 
they  had  labored  to  sustain ;  while  in  the  systems  of  multi- 
tudes of  the  greatest  the  wisest  and  the  best,  whose  apprehen- 
sions were  distinguished  in  many  respects  by  accuracy,  and 
their  agency  by  beneficial  influences,  essential  revolutions 
must  undoubtedly  have  been  wrought  by  the  light  of  a 
better  world,  and  the  disclosure  of  the  limitedness  and  im- 
perfection of  their  attainments,  filled  them  with  surprise. 
The  spirits  of  Zvvingle,  Luther  and  Melancthon,  of  Calvin, 
Knox  and  Beza,  of  Leighton  and  Owen,  Baxter,  Ed- 
wards and  Dwight,  when  transported  by  the  volition  of  the 
Almighty,  from  the  dark  shadows  of  this  world,  doubtless 
caught  in  the  first  rays  of  the  cloudless  day  in  which  they 
now  dwell,  views  widely  diftering  from  any  they  had  before 
obtained  of  many  of  the  great  themes  which  had  here 
been  conspicuous  objects  of  their  attention,  as  well  as  bright- 
er and  ampler  apprehensions  of  the  truths  they  had  correctlj' 
understood  ;  and  extricated  instantaneously  from  the  theo- 
ries in  which  their  theology  had  been  shrouded,  left  them 
behind  them,  never  again  to  be  the   medium  of  tlieir  vision 


408 

of  divine  objects.  Were  tiiey  to  return  and  mingle  again  in 
these  sublunary  scenes,  far  difi'erent  would  be  the  aspects  in 
which  they  would  present  many  of  the  great  subjects  in  re- 
spect to  which  they  attempted  to  sway  the  opinions  of  man- 
kind, and  widely  dissimilar  in  many  instances,  the  spirit 
they  would  exhibit,  and  the  methods  on  which  they  would 
rely  to  correct  the  errors  and  guide  the  faith  of  God's 
people. 

The  contests  of  truth  with  error  are  far  from  having 
terminated  ;  or  those  who  are  conducting  the  warfare  from 
having  escaped  the  imperfections  of  their  predecessors. 
Similar  weaknesses,  passions  and  temptations  continue 
to  give  rise  to  similar  defects  and  errors.  What  then  are 
the  proper  remedies  for  these  evils  f  or  what  are  the  prin- 
ciples on  which  such  discussions  are  to  be  conducted  in 
order  to  correct  them,  and  the  methods  in  which  the  legiti- 
mate objects  of  theological  controversy  are  to  be  sought 
and  gained  ?  These  are  inquiries  of  high  interest  at  the 
present  period,  and  merit  the  impartial  consideration  of 
those  who  are  mingling  in  the  contentions  that  are  agitat- 
ing the  Church. 

The  aim  of  theological  controversy,  like  all  discussions 
on  religious  subjects,  should  obviously  be,  solely  to  deter- 
mine what  is  truth,  and  to  place  it  in  so  just  and  clear  a 
light,  as  to  lead  those  who  hold  it,  to  continue  its  adherents, 
and  persuade  those  who  reject  it,  to  become  its  disciples 
and  obey  its  dictates.  The  discussion  itself,  therefore, 
should  be  an  upright,  faithful,  and  fearless  exhibition,  and 
defence  of  truth,  and  exposure  and  rebuke  of  error,  un- 
warped  by  personal  or  party  considerations,  and  unawed 
by  the  wishes  and  unbiassed  by  the  opinions  of  men. 

I.  To  conduct  a  controversy  with  such  an  \\\u\,  and  in  such 


409 

a  manner,  it  is  obvious,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  word  of 
God  must  be  made  the  standard  by  which  the  accuracy  or 
error  of  the  sentiments  that  are  in  discussion,  is  to  be  deter- 
mined. 

If  the  theme  in  disputation  is  a  subject  of  express  revela- 
tion, the  question  to  be  settled,  of  course,  is  simply,  what 
are  the  views  respecting  it  which  the  Spirit  of  God  has 
revealed.  It  is  by  reference  to  them  alone,  therefore,  that 
it  is  to  be  determined.  There  are,  indeed,  many  facts  and 
truths  announced  to  us  in  the  word  of  God,  which  are  like- 
wise known  or  discernible  from  other  sources  ;  and  many 
assumed  also,  of  which  independently  of  the  aid  of  revela- 
tion, we  are  or  may  become  apprised  by  consciousness, 
observation  or  the  testimony  of  our  fellow  men  ;  and  these 
sources  of  knowledge  may  be  legitimately  employed,  as  they 
are  indeed  in  the  scriptures  themselves,  in  illustration  and 
confirmation  of  the  truths  which  they  teach.  Yet  when 
the  question  at  issue  respects  the  import  of  inspired 
representations,  they  are  to  be  the  sole  criteria  by  which  it 
is  to  be  decided  ;  not  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  the 
judgment  of  men,  or  the  conjectures  of  philosophy. 

Indisputable  as  this  position  is,  and  resistless  as  is  the 
conviction  of  its  accuracy  which  it  carries  to  every  mind  ; 
it  is  yet  to  the  open  or  virtual  violation  of  it,  that  almost 
every  theological  error  owes  its  origin.  Were  it  for  ex- 
ample ingenuously  and  implicitly  followed,  what  douljt 
would  any  longer  exist  that  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  is 
taught  in  the  scriptures  ;  or  that  while  they  assert  that  there 
is  but  one  God,  they  also  ascribe  the  attributes,  rights 
agency,  and  names  of  the  Deity  alike  to  tiie  Father,  Son 
and  Holy  Spirit  ? — which,  as  we  are  ignorant  of  the  physi- 
cal  nature  of  the   Divine  Being,  obviously  embodies   the 


410 

only  conceptioij   we  are   capable    of  forming   of  the  fact 
expressed  by  that  doctrine,  and  is  the  only  mode  consequent- 
ly, in  which  the  knowledge  of  it  can  be  conveyed  to  us. 
The  reality  of  this  ascription,  therefore,  being  ascertained 
and  admitted,  as  it  is  by  man}',  at  least,  of  the  opponents 
•  of  that  doctrine,  it  plainly  sliould  be  regarded  as  evincing 
that  it  is  the  doctrine  of  the  sacred  volume.     In  place  of 
this  however,   they  proceed  immediately  to   construe  that 
ascription  by  their  philosophy  ;  and  by  an  arbitrary  theory 
of  a   delegation  of  attributes,  rights   and   agency,  flatter 
themselves  that  they  divest  it  of  its  testimony,  and  recon- 
cile it  with  the  denial  of  the  doctrine  which  it  contains  and 
demonstrates.      They   thus  transfer  the   question,  that  re- 
spects a  subject,  of  which  from  its  nature,  philosophy  has  no 
cognizance,  from  the  page  of  revelation  to  the  bar  of  reason, 
or  rather  of  conjecture  ;  and  because  we  are  unable  to  prove 
more  than  the  scriptural  doctrine  involves,  or  explain  what 
from  its  nature   cannot   be  to  us  a  subject  of  knowledge, 
assume  that  that  doctrine  is  neither  taught  in  the  scriptures 
nor  true. 

This  rule  is  likewise  applicable  to  controversies  re- 
specting the  sentiments  or  doctrines  of  individuals  and 
sects ;  which  are  also  to  be  determined  solely  by  the 
language,  repi'esentations  and  reasonings  in  which  they  are 
embodied ;  not  by  a  priori  reasoning,  or  the  dogmas  of 
others.  In  the  inquiry,  for  example,  respecting  Edwards's 
doctrine  of  original  sin,  the  only  point  to  be  determined,  is 
the  import  of  the  terms,  statements  and  arguments  which  he 
employs  in  its  definition  and  support.  When  that  is 
ascertained,  the  question  is  settled.  To  carry  the  inquiry 
back  of  that,  to  the  nature  of  the  mind,  the  laws  of  its 
agency,  or  the  doctrine  of  the   scriptures,  and  make  these 


411 

the  interpreter  of  his  language  and  logic,  is  not  to  determine 
what  his  sentiments  are,  or  approach  the  proper  method  of 
ascertaining  them,  but  is  only  to  substitute  sophistry  for 
reason,  and  assumption  for  proof. 

II.  But  as  a  great  portion  of  the  doctrines  and  sentiments 
that  are  subjects  of  theological  controversy,  are  inferences 
from,  or  philosophical  constructions  of,  the  representations 
of  the  scriptures,  and  are  thence  regarded  as  enjoying  their 
sanction,  one  of  the  most  important  offices  of  controversy 
obviously  is,  to  trace  the  principles  on  which  those  doc- 
trines rest,  to  their  results,  and  thereby  determine  their  co- 
incidence or  incompatibility  with  the  indisputable  teachings 
of  revelation,  and  dictates  of  consciousness  and  reason. 

It  is  in  this,  indeed,  that  the  whole  task  of  the  vindicator 
of  truth  usually  consists,  as  it  is  in  false  theories  of  that  kind, 
and  assumptions  of  positions  that  are  to  be  proved,  that 
the  great  elements  of  error  usually  lie.  To  ascertain  their 
character,  therefore,  those  assumptions,  and  the  deductions 
that  are  founded  on  them,  are  to  be  traced  to  their  legitimate 
results,  and  refuted  by  pointing  out  the  false  conclusions 
with  which  they  are  fraught,  and  the  absurdities  they  in- 
volve. 

The  doctrine,  for  example,  that  an  inability  on  the  part 
of  God  to  prevent  sin,  is  the  reason  of  his  not  excluding  it 
from  the  universe,  is  founded  on  the  double  assumption  that 
the  nature  of  moral  agents  is  such  as  to  render  it  impossible 
for  him  efficaciously  to  influence  them  in  their  choices ;  and 
that  a  voluntary  permission  of  sin  is  incompatible  with  wis- 
dom and  benevolence.  The  truth  or  falsehood  of  that  doc- 
trine depends,  therefore,  on  the  accuracy  or  error  of  the 
principles  on  which  those  assumptions  are  founded ;  and  its 

52 


412 

character  is  to  be  determined  by  developing  those  principles 
and  the  conclusions  which  they  involve. 

Of  dogmas  and  systems  founded  on  positions  thus  falsely 
assumed,  and  fallacious  deductions  from  them,  innumerable 
instances  may  be  adduced  from  every  department  of  pole- 
mics and  philosophy.  Of  the  latter,  a  signal  example  is 
seen  in  the  denial  by  Berkley,  Hume,  and  their  followers, 
of  the  existence  of  the  external  universe ;  founded  on  the 
assumption,  either  that  a  perception  of  external  objects, 
were  they  to  exist,  is  impossible  to  us ;  that  in  order  to  it,  a 
sense  wholly  different  in  nature  and  agency,  from  any  which 
we  in  fact  possess,  would  be  requisite ;  or  else  that  such  ob- 
jects, were  they  to  exist,  would  necessarily  produce  effects 
in  us,  wholly  unlike  those  which  we  now  experience  ;  that  a 
knowledge,  therefore,  of  their  existence,  would  involve  a 
state  of  mind  essentially  different  from  any  of  which  we  are 
the  subjects !  On  this  baseless  and  barefaced  assumption 
of  the  position  which  they  should  have  proved,  they  founded 
the  whole  tissue  of  their  reasoning  in  support  of  their  theory. 
A  modest  petitio  principii  for  a  school  of  philosophers  who 
boasted  of  it  as  their  proudest  characteristic,  that  they  yield- 
ed assent  to  nothing  but  demonstrative  evidence  !  a  worthy 
sophism  to  attract  the  wonder  and  applause  of  the  learned 
and  witty  of  every  rank  and  land,  to  betray  multitudes  into 
a  distrust  of  their  faculties,  and  assent  to  the  absurd  and 
impossible  dogmas  of  atheism,  and  to  fill  the  friends  of  com- 
mon sense  and  religion  with  apprehensions  for  their  safety ! 
The  advocates  of  this  system  should  have  demonstrated 
that  the  effects  produced  by  an  external  world,  were  there 
one  existing  and  acting  on  us,  would  be  wholly  unlike  those 
which  we  now  experience,  before  they  could  possess  the 
slightest  materials  for  proving  that  our  present  sensations 


413 

are  not  produced  by  such  a  world,  and  not  fraught  there- 
fore with  a  perception  of  its  existence — a  task  thai  would 
have  required  a  somewhat  higher  eftbrt  of  perspicacity  than 
the  contrivance  of  a  spe<:ious  pefifio  principii.  What  evi- 
dence could  they  produce  that  the  Creator,  were  he  to  place 
a  race  of  intelligent  beings  in  a  material  world,  and  endow 
them  with  the  power  of  perceiving  and  distinguishing  the 
objects  by  which  they  were  surrounded,  would  not  so  con- 
stitute them  that  it  should  produce  precisel}^  such  eflecls 
in  them  as  the  sensations  of  which  we  are  the  subjects  ?  But 
until  that  shall  be  demonstrated,  it  clearly  cannot  be  pro- 
ved that  the  sensations  which  we  are  accustomed  to  ascribe 
to  that  origin,  are  not  the  effects  of  an  external  world,  and 
do  not  constitute,  therefore,  a  knowledge  of  its  existence. 

Another  conspicuous  example  of  erroneous  theorizing,  is 
seen  in  the  doctrine  of  the  contingency  of  choices,  or  self- 
determination,  which  is  founded  on  the  assumption  that  com- 
plete exemption  from  influences  is  essential  to  the  mind's 
freedom  and  responsibility  in  its  volitions.  To  act,  how- 
ever, in  independence  of  all  influence,  would  obviously  be  to 
act  without  intelligent  reasons.  That  theory,  accordingly, 
implies,  that  the  mind  acts,  in  its  volitions,  wholly  irrespec- 
tive of  the  objects  which  it  chooses,  is  totally  unconscious, 
therefore,  of  any  reasons  for  exerting  its  choices,  and  thence 
acts  in  a  merely  senseless  and  mechanical  manner;  and  thus, 
by  the  results  which  it  directly  involves,  completely  sub- 
verts the  responsibility  which  it  is  devised  to  maintain. 

The  great  aim  of  controversy,  then,  it  is  sufficiently  ma- 
nifest from  these  illustrations,  should  be  to  detect  and  ex- 
pose the  fundamental  principles  on  which  errors  proceed, 
and  refute  them  by  demonstrating  the  false  and  absurd 
conclusions  which  they  involve.     It  is  by  detecting  those 


414 

principles  alone  that  their  real  relations  to  truth  can  be  dis- 
covered and  revealed  ;  and  no  other  achievement  can  ac- 
complish their  subversion,  or  prove  of  any  avail.  To  con- 
tend against  mere  vi'ords  and  phrases,  is  only  to  skirmish  at 
a  distance,  and  leave  the  enemy  unvanquished  and  un- 
molested. 

III.  In  the  accomplishment  of  this, — not  mere  appeals  to 
authority,  or  the  empty  pomp  of  declamation,  but  upright 
and  perspicuous  argument  must  obviously  be  the  instru- 
ment :  a  clear  statement  of  the  points  to  be  proved,  and  of 
the  means  by  which  they  are  to  be  demonstrated,  and  exhi- 
bition of  the  connexion  through  all  its  successive  steps  of 
conclusions  with  their  premises. 

It  is  by  this  process  alone  that  principles  can  be  traced 
to  their  results,  and  the  relations  of  doctrines  to  each  other 
and  the  scriptures,  developed  and  made  known  ;  and  this 
alone  can  carry  any  permanent  conviction  to  the  mind,  or 
possess  any  just  claims  to  respect.  Mere  expressions  of 
one's  belief,  appeals  to  the  opinions  of  others,  or  bold  as- 
severations, can  contribute  nothing  towards  dispossessing 
error  of  its  mask,  or  furnishing  a  clue  to  the  proper  method 
of  its  subversion. 

It  is  only  by  such  exhibitions  of  the  truths  involved  in 
doctrines  in  their  relations  and  connexions,  that  the  great 
principles  on  which  controversies  respecting  them  turn, 
have  been  developed  and  extricated  from  perplexity,  and 
shown  to  rest  on  immovable  foundations,  and  the  errors  by 
which  they  were  contradicted  overthrown.  Such  pre- 
eminently was  the  character  and  result  of  Edwards's  inquiry 
respecting  the  freedom  of  the  will.  Tiiere  probably  is  not 
a  solitary  elemental  truth  advanced  in  that  work,  that  had 
not  also  been  seen  and  held  by  multitudes  before  him  ;  and 


415 

not  impossibly  by  all  the  individuals  against  whom  his 
reasonings  were  directed  ;  nor  a  position  subverted  that 
had  not  also  been  seen  to  be  erroneous  and  opposed  by 
multitudes  who  had  preceded  him.  The  task  which  he 
accomplished  did  not  consist  in  discovering  truths  which 
were  before  unperceived,  or  refuting  errors  that  had  uni- 
versally until  that  period  passed  as  truths ;  but  solely  in 
seizing  the  great  master  principle  by  which  the  relations  of 
all  the  fundamental  truths  involved  in  the  subject  ai-e  de- 
veloped, and  in  clearly  displaying  them  through  its  instru- 
mentality in  their  diversified  connexions,  and  thereby  enabl- 
ing his  readers  to  discern  the  bearings,  consistency  and 
dependence  of  those  facts  of  consciousness  and  doctrines  of 
revelation,  of  which  separately  they  had  before  been  aware, 
but  without  being  able  to  detect  the  clue  to  their  relations, 
and  deduce  from  them  the  great  truths  which  they  unitedly 
demonstrate.  Had  he  in  place  of  that,  contented  himself 
with  simply  asserting  the  different  elements  of  which  his 
doctrine  consists,  he  would  have  left  them  where  they  had 
been  left  by  former  inquirers  ; — objects  separately  of  a  con- 
fident belief,  but  undemonstrated  and  uncomprehended  as 
an  harmonious  whole. 

IV.  The  deduction  of  false  conclusions  from  premises  that 
are  just,  or  the  prostitution  of  admitted  facts  and  truths,  to  the 
support  of  illegitimate  inferences,  is  one  of  the  most  com- 
mon and  specious  forms  in  which  error  is  propagated.  One 
of  the  most  important  tasks,  accordingly,  of  the  controver- 
sialist, is  to  divest  it  of  those  masks,  and  rescue  the  truth 
from  perversion. 

Instances  of  this  deceptive  logic  are  as  numerous  as 
errors  themselves  are,  or  the  efibrts  that  are  made  for  their 
support.     Arminians,  for  example,  allege  the  exhortations. 


i  416 

cautions  and  encouragements  of  the  scriptures  addressed  to 
believers,  as  demonstrating  that  tl)ere  is  a  possibility  of 
their  utterly  falling  from  obedience,  and  thence  that  no 
divine  purpose  exists  of  preserving  them  in  holiness,  nor 
certainty  of  their  final  salvation.  But  that  is  obviously  to 
allege  the  fact,  that  God  actually  employs  appropriate 
means  to  continue  them  in  obedience,  as  proof  that  he  has 
no  purpose  of  employing  those  means  efficaciously  ;  or  in 
other  words,  it  is  to  infer  from  the  fact,  that  he  places  them 
under  the  action  of  a  vast  system  of  the  moral  inducements 
by  which  alone  intelligent  agents  are  withheld  from  trans- 
gression and  prompted  to  holiness, — that  he  has  no  purpose 
of  efficaciously  exciting  them  through  their  instrumentality, 
and  thence,  that  no  certainty  exists  that  they  will  be  kept 
by  his  mighty  power,  through  faith  unto  salvation  ! 

An  equally  striking  example  is  seen  in  the  allegation  by 
the  deniers  of  the  divine  al)ility  to  prevent  moral  beings 
from  sinning,  of  the  fact,  as  proof  of  it,  that  they  must  still 
under  every  preventing  influence,  continue  to  possess  power 
to  transgress  ; — that  is,  must  continue  to  be  moral  agents, 
or  capable  of  understanding,  affection  and  volition.  The 
fact  that  they  possess  the  powers  of  moral  agency,  is  thus 
employed  to  prove  that  they  cannot  be  efficaciously  influenc- 
ed as  moral  agents,  to  exert  those  powers  in  obedience  to 
the  divine  will ;  or  in  other  words,  the  fact,  that  they  are 
moral  agents,  is  alleged  to  demonstrate  that  there  is  no 
certainty  tliat  they  will  exert  their  powers  as  moral  agents ; 
nor  that  they  will  not  act  in  all  their  choices,  as  mere  unin- 
telligent and  mechanical  beings!  a  false  conclusion  un- 
questionably ;  while  the  premise  from  which  it  is  deduced, 
is  as  indisputably  true. 

The  detection  and  exposure  of  this  species  of  deceptive 


417 

reasoning,  by  which  irutli  is  seemingly  made  to  yield  it» 
testimony  to  falsehood,  and  error  invested  with  the  aspect 
of  truth,  is  thus  one  of  the  most  important  objects  of  con- 
trovers}^,  and  efficient  methods  of  attaining  its  end. 

V.  The  exposure  of  the  inconsistencies  into  which  the 
advocates  of  false  systems  fall,  is  likewise  a  useful  method 
of  demonstrating  and  refuting  their  errors. 

There  are  probably  no  errorists  who  do  not  admit  and 
maintain  a  multitude  of  truths  which  contravene  the  mis- 
taken positions  they  labor  to  defend,  and  few  it  is  to  be 
hoped,  who,  could  they  be  led  to  see  the  relations  of  their 
different  sentiments  to  each  other,  would  not  become  con- 
vinced that  in  regard  to  one  portion  or  the  other  of  them 
at  least,  they  had  fallen  into  some  error,  and  feel  the  neces- 
sity of  re-examining  and  correcting  their  principles.  The 
Arminians,  for  example,  in  order  to  elude  the  doctrine 
that  God  determines  the  mode  in  which  men  act,  adopt 
a  theory  of  self-determination,  that  is  wholly  inconsistent 
with  intelligence  and  freedom  in  volitions,  and  exhibits 
their  agency  as  nothing  better  than  an  irrational  motion  ; 
the  identical  fault  which  they  impute,  though  falsely,  to 
the  theory  which  they  reject.  They  likewise,  in  admitting 
the  divine  fore-knowledge  of  those  actions,  in  effect,  at  least, 
admit  that  to  the  Most  High,  a  ground  of  absolute  cer- 
tainty exists  of  their  occurrence,  and  grant,  therefore, 
what  is  equivalent  to  the  position  which  it  is  the  object  of 
their  theory  to  disprove.  They  also  who  deny  the  compa- 
tability  of  a  voluntary  permission  of  sin  with  wisdom  and 
goodness,  admit,  in  conceding  the  fact  that  God  volun- 
tarily creates  and  upholds  the  beings  who  transgress,  that 
he  voluntarily  permits  the  sin  which  they  exert ;  and  lay 
therefore,  by  their  denial  of  the  wisdom  of  buch   a  permis- 


418 

sion,  a  foundation  for  precisely  that  impeachment  of  the 
Most  High,  which  it  is  tiie  object  of  their  theory  to  escape. 
Inconsistencies  like  these  show  decisively  that  the  systems 
of  those  who  are  convicted  of  them,  are  fraught  in  some 
part  or  other  with  essential  error,  and  are  adapted,  if  fitly 
exposed,  to  impress  them  with  the  necessity  of  a  re-exami- 
nation of  their  doctrines,  that  they  may  learn  where  it  is 
that  error  lurks,  and  what  portion  of  their  principles  or 
reasonings  requires  to  be  modified  or  abandoned. 

VI.  Unhappily  however  men  err  not  only  in  the  as- 
sumption unwittingly  of  false  premises  and  the  deduction  of 
inferences  that  are  unauthorized,  but  frequently  through 
pride  and  perverseness,  refuse  to  correct  the  errors  into 
which  they  have  run,  when  pointed  out  to  them,  and  resort 
even  to  intentional  sophistry,  and  deliberate  misrepre- 
sentation, rather  than  give  up  positions  which  they  have 
advanced,  or  submit  to  the  acknowledgment  of  error. 

In  such  instances,  justice  to  the  truth  obviously  requires 
an  unsparing  exposure  of  their  unfairness,  that  the  public 
may  be  guarded  against  deception  by  them,  and  error 
stripped  of  the  aid  which  it  might  otherwise  derive  from 
their  sanction.  A  teacher  of  theology,  who  is  convicted  of 
essential  error  in  his  principles,  or  inaccuracy  in  his  rea- 
sonings, is  clearly  under  obligation  to  correct  it  by 
a  prompt  acknowledgment,  or  modification  of  his  state- 
ments and  arguments  ;  and  if  influenced  supremely  by  a 
love  of  truth,  will  do  it  not  only  without  hesitation,  but 
Avith  pleasure.  He  will  regard  it  as  a  favor  to  be  aided  in  the 
detection  and  abandonment  of  error  and  attainment  of  truth, 
and  deem  it  an  imperious  duty  to  remove  every  obstruc- 
tion of  which  he  is  the  author,  to  its  adoption  by  others. 
To  maintain  an  obstinate  silence  in  such  a  case,  and  there- 


419 

by  treat  his  errors  as  thougii  they  were  not  known  to  be 
such — is  to  prove  a  traitor  to  truth  ;  and  to  repeat  those 
errors,  and  endeavor  by  sophistry  and  falsehood  to  main- 
tain and  propagate  them,  is  deliberately  to  wage  war 
against  the  truth,  and  aim  at  its  extermination.  What 
worse  enemy  to  the  gospel  is  there,  than  one  who  thus 
knowingly  tramples  on  its  doctrines,  and  struggles  to 
retain  his  fellow-men  in  the  rejection  of  them,  or  betray 
them  into  fatal  error,  rather  than  subject  bis  selfish  passions 
to  the  law  of  rectitude,  or  incur  the  risk  of  impairing 
with  his  adherents  his  reputation  for  infallibility  ?  He  who 
can  suffer  his  pride  or  ambition  to  prompt  him  to  such  a 
course,  only  needs  an  equal  temptation  to  incite  him  to  any 
crime,  and  has  no  more  claims  to  the  confidence,  forbear- 
ance or  charity,  than  he  has  to  the  approval  and  esteem  of 
the  friends  of  truth  ;  and  their  first  duty  is — no  matter 
what  his  name,  station,  or  influence  may  be, — to  strip  him 
of  his  mask,  and  hold  him  up  to  the  reprobation  and 
pity  of  those  who  might  otherwise  become  victims  of  his 
arts. 

Such  then  are  some  of  the  principal  methpds  by  which 
controversy  is  to  be  made  the  instrument  of  accomplishing 
the  discovery  and  support  of  truth — by  making  the  word 
of  God  the  criterion  af  the  accuracy  or  error  of  doctrines, 
by  developing  the  principles  on  which  theories  and  senti- 
ments rest,  and  the  results  they  involve  ;  by  removing  the 
mask  from  the  false  assumptions  and  inferences  which  are 
employed  for  their  support ;  by  pointing  out  the  inconsis- 
tencies of  false  doctrines  with  the  truths  that  are  held  in 
conjunction  with  them ;  and  finally — when  these  measures, 
in  place  of  recalling  the  votary  of  error  to  the  truth,  only 
prove  the   occasion  of  prompting   him  to  deliberate  false- 

53 


420 

hood  and  chicane  for  the  support  of  his  sentiments, — 
by  disarming  him  of  his  power  to  injure,  by  a  prompt 
and  faithful  exposure  to  the  public  of  his  dishonorable 
artifices. 

To  these  rules,  thus  manifestly  just,  all  who  attempt  to  dis- 
cuss religious  topics  are  obviously  bound  rigidly  to  adhere. 
No  one  who  does  not  feel  it  to  be  incumbent  on  him  to  take 
them  as  his  guide,  can  be  qualified  to  treat  such  themes,  or 
be  entitled  to  public  respect;  and  no  one  who  has  the  slightest 
claims  to  the  praise  of  uprightness  and  candor,  can  dispute 
their  applicability  to  himself  as  well  as  others. 

They  are  the  laws  which  common  justice  imposes  on  men 
in  all  other  pursuits,  and  which  itwere  infamous  deliberately 
to  violate.  It  may  with  pre-eminent  propriety,  therefore,  be 
expected  and  required  that  they  should  be  implicitly  observed 
by  those  who  enter  the  arena  of  theological  disputation,  where 
frankness,  impartiality,  and  rectitude,  are  at  least  as  essential 
as  in  other  scenes,  and  where  selfishness  and  chicane  are 
doubly  criminal,  as  they  are  an  open  violation  of  that  reli- 
gion which  it  is  their  professed  object  to  subserve,  and  direct 
affronts  to  that  infinite  Being  whose  authority  they  claim  for 
their  sanction. 

It  now  remains  to  look  at  these  views  in  their  practical 
relations. 

1.  No  one  should  engage  in  theological  controversy,  or 
undertake  the  responsible  task  of  influencing  the  faith  of  his 
fellow  men,  who  is  not  prepared  to  adhere  immovably  to 
these  principles,  and  under  their  promptings  to  give  up  his 
errors  and  correct  his  misrepresentations,  whenever  they  are 
discovered  to  him,  with  the  same  conscientiousness  and  fideli- 
ty which  he  would  desire  and  exact  in  similar  circumstances 
from  an  opponent.  No  one,  in  other  words,  should  embark 
in  such  an  enterprise  who  is  not  inflexibly  resolved  by  di- 
vine grace  to  be  scrupulously  honest,  faithful  to  God,  to 


42  i 

himself,  and  his  fellow  men  ;  for  to  adhere  to  these  prhicl- 
pies,  is  only  to  act  uprightly  in  those   relations,  and  avoid 
what,  in  all  other  spheres,  would  be  universally  regarded  as 
most  discreditably  unfair,  and  prove  an  insuperable  obstacle 
to  influence.     To  deny  that  they  are  just  and  obligatory, 
were  to  deny  that  truth  and  uprightness  are  duties.  To  make 
personal  aggrandizement,  or  the  interests  of  party,  the  object 
of  pursuit,  and  follow  the  promptings  of  pride  and  selfish- 
ness in  place  of  integrity,  were  to  carry  into  religion  worse 
principles  than  are  tolerated  in  the  world,  and  to  obstruct 
and  dishonor  the  cause  which  it  should   be  the  aim  of  such 
discussions  to  subserve.     Individuals,  however,  are  not  un- 
frequently  seen  engaging  in  these  controversies,  who  appear 
not  only  never  to  have  formed  such  a  resolution,  but  never 
to  have  gained  any  impression  that  it  can  be  their  duty  to 
yield  these  rules  a  practical  regard.     They  act,  at  least  vir- 
tually, on  the  assumption  that  they  are  exempt  from   the 
obligations  of  truth  and  justice  in  their  discussions — enti- 
tled to  violate  the  laws  of  right  toward  their  fellow  men,  and 
trample  on  the  doctrines  and  interests  of  religion  with  impu- 
nitj',  whenever  the  gratification  of  their  ambitious  passions 
may  require  it; — to  treat,  in  short,  the  laws  of  uprightness, 
candor,  and  benevolence,  as  imperatively  obligatory  on  their 
opponents,  but  as  wholly  inapplicable  to  themselves.     No 
matter  how  clearly  they  may  be  convicted  of  inaccuracies  in 
doctrine,  sophistry  in  argument,  or  ei*ror  in   asseveration, 
they  are  never  known  to  express  any  regrets  for  their  delin- 
quencies, or  ofier  any  retraction  of  their  errors  ;  and  no  one 
acquainted  with  their  passions  and  principles,  expects  from 
them  such  an  act  of  common  equity  or  frankness. 

Aware,  therefore,  as  they  must  become  from  experience, 
of  the  power  of  these  temptations  over  them,  they  should 
never  again  expose  themselves  to  their  influence,  by  enter- 
ing into  the  conflicts  of  public  discussion;  but  should  con- 


422 


fine  the  exercise  of  their  talents  to  scenes  less  fraught  with 
provocations  "  to  the  temperament  of  the  old  man,"  and 
more  propitious  to  "  the  graces  of  the  new." 

2.  Those  who  engage  in  this  species  of  discussion,  should 
make  themselves  acquainted  with  the  subjects  respecting 
which  they  dispute,  and  the  art  of  expressing  themselves 
intelligibly. 

It  is  usually  a  task,  of  sufficient  difficulty,  successfully  to 
convey  knowledge  that  is  possessed,  and  clear  up  perplex- 
ities that  are  thoroughly  understood.  To  attempt  it  in  the 
absence  of  those  qualifications,  is  indeed  to  disclose  indis- 
putable proofs  of  weakness  and  presumption,  but  cannot 
contribute  to  the  vindication  of  truth.  A  more  unenviable 
and  ludicrous  predicament  can  scarcely  be  imagined,  than 
that  of  those  who  in  their  attempts  to  elucidate  themes 
that  perplex  and  baffle  other  intellects,  show  that  they  have 
neither  any  comprehension  of  the  doctrines  which  they 
wish  to  subvert,  nor  the  principles  they  aim  to  defend ;  and 
furnish,  accordingly,  in  their  blunders  and  inconsistencies, 
far  more  ample  materials  for  their  own  hopeless  overthrow, 
than  for  the  confutation  of  their  opponents. 

3.  Those  who  follow  the  guidance  of  these  rules,  will 
find  no  occasion  to  resort  to  artificial  sarcasms  and  un- 
merited ridicule  to  beat  down  the  sentiments  which  they 
assail.  If  those  sentiments  are  erroneous,  to  manifest  their 
character  will  be  to  refute  them,  and  their  error  itself  will 
furnish  the  appropriate  means  of  procuring  their  rejection. 
To  add  to  that,  an  array  of  invective  or  studied  and  un- 
natural ridicule,  can  neither  be  necessary  nor  just. 

It  by  no  means,  however,  follows  from  this,  tiiat  to  ex- 
hibit an  opponent's  sentiments  ludicrously,  is  necessarily 
unjust  or  unwise.     As  the  theories  and  reasonings  of  error- 


423 

ists  are  usually  intrinsically  absurd,  a  just  exhibition  of 
them,  will,  as  a  matter  of  course,  render  them  ridiculous. 
How  can  their  false  principles  be  refuted,  their  incongruities 
developed  and  their  blunders  exposed,  without  causing  them 
to  appear  as  they  are,  absurd  and  odious  f  It  is  not  the 
part  of  duty,  surely,  to  endeavor  to  impart  an  air  of  recti- 
tude to  their  obliquities,  or  dignity  to  their  weakness,  and 
make  their  errors  look  respectable,  for  the  sake  of  sparing 
their  feelings  !  If  their  feelings  are  right,  they  will  them- 
selves acquiesce  in  the  manifestation  of  the  ridiculousness 
of  their  errors.  But  if  they  prefer  to  follow  the  suggestions 
of  pride,  and  claim  for  their  selfish  passions  a  higher  regard 
than  they  are  willing  to  yield  to  the  interests  of  truth,  it  is 
not  worth  while  to  take  any  great  pains  to  spare  their 
feelings !  The  more  they  are  crossed  and  humbled,  the 
better.  When  then,  either  the  doctrines,  or  the  arguments 
of  a  disputant  are  intrinsically  absurd,  and  especially 
when  put  forth  dogmatically  and  with  lofty  pretensions 
to  learning,  justice  and  propriety  not  only  do  not  forbid 
iheir  being  assailed  with  the  shaft  of  ridicule,  but  require 
that  the  mask  should  be  withdrawn  from  them,  and  their 
absurdity  and  hideousness  exposed  without  reserve,  to  the 
general  gaze. 

4.  The  distinction  which  has  lately  been  attempted  to  be 
established  between  our  belief  of  the  doctrines  and  facts  of 
revelation  and  our  philosophy  respecting  them,  is  fraught 
with  an  open  rejection  of  the  scriptures  as  the  standard  of 
theological  truth. 

The  advocates  of  that  distinction  proceed  in  it  on  the 
assumption,  that  their  philosophy  of  a  truth  or  fact,  or  the- 
oretical view  of  it,  is  essentially  distinct  from  their  doctrinal 
and  believing   apprehension   of  it ;  or    that  the   aspect  in 


424 

which  they  contemplate  it  in  their  faith  and  profession  of  it, 
is  wholly  difterent  from  that  in  which  they  regard  it  in 
their  consideration  of  its  metaphysical  nature ;  and  on  that 
ground  they  claim  that  they  and  others  may  hold  all  the 
doctrines  and  facts  of  revelation,  and  yet  in  their  philosophy 
respecting  them,  difler  fundamentally,  and  without  incurring 
any  just  obnoxiousness  to  the  charge  of  abandoning  or 
subverting  them  ! 

The  baselessness  of  this  pretended  distinction,  is  almost 
too  palpable  to  need  demonstration.  Their  views  of  the  doc- 
trines and  facts  of  revelation,  as  objects  of  faith  and  pro- 
fession, are  wholly  different  from  their  views  of  their  nature, 
grounds  and  relations  !  A  more  false,  extraordinary  and 
profligate  pretence  was  never  put  forth,  for  the  support  of 
a  perplexed  and  desperate  cause.  It  divests  at  a  stroke  all 
the  doctrines  and  facts  of  religion  as  objects  of  faith  and 
profession,  of  every  vestige  of  meaning,  and  reduces  them 
to  a  mere  catalogue  of  terms.  Philosophy  alone  is  given 
to  take  cognizance  of  their  nature.  This  assumption  is 
doubUess  well  adapted  to  the  necessities  of  its  author,  and 
furnishes  an  easy  solution  of  some  portions  of  his  practice, 
which  to  many  have  seemed  rather  inexplicable  ;  and  shows 
what  reliance  is  to  be  placed  on  his  zealous  professions  of 
continued  agreement  with  the  orthodox,  in  every  thing 
except  words.  It  is  obviously,  however,  wholly  false. 
What  difference  can  there  possibly  be  between  the  mind's 
view  of  a  fact  as  an  object  of  faith,  and  its  views  of  its 
nature  ?  To  what  can  views  of  it  possibly  relate,  that  are  not 
views  in  some  relation  or  other  of  its  nature  ;  that  is,  that  in 
reality  are  not  views  of  it  ?  What  truth  can  pertain  to  them 
any  farther  than  they  are  coincident  with  what  it  actually  is  ? 
It  is  indubitably  certain  that   they  must   correspond  to  its 


425 

nature  to  possess  any  accuracy.  If  therefore  they  accord 
with  truth,  all  philosophical  views — views  that  is  respecting 
its  metaphysical  nature — that  differ  from  them,  must  of  course 
be  erroneous,  and  in  place  of  being  compatible  with  faith 
in  it,  are  fraught  with  a  disbelief  and  denial  of  it.  The 
distinction  is  demonstratively  groundless  therefore.  It  is  as 
profligate  also  as  it  is  false  ;  as,  were  it  legitimate,  it  would 
make  all  professions  of  faith  wholly  unmeaning  and  childish, 
and  render  an  open  rejection  and  denunciation  of  all  the 
truths  and  facts  of  revelation  compatible  with  a  continued 
belief  and  profession  of  faith  in  them! 

I  do  not  offer  these  remarks,  however,  with  the  slightest 
expectation  that  they  will  shame  the  author  and  abettors  of 
this  sophism  into  a  rejection  of  it.  I  doubt  not  they  will 
continue  to  repeat  it  with  the  same  confidence  as  heretofore. 
It  is  as  good  a  pretence  as  any  to  which  they  have  resorted 
for  their  vindication,  and  they  are  not  men  who  are  to  be 
abashed  from  the  use  of  a  convenient  pretext  by  a  manifes- 
tation of  its  falsehood,  or  exposure  of  its  profligacy. 

5.  It  may  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  views,  if  correct, 
what  success  will  attend  the  labors  of  those  controversialists 
who  attempt  to  settle  essential  diflerences  of  opinion  by  de- 
nying their  existence,  or  disguising  their  nature,  in  place  of 
inquiring  after  truth. 

The  aim  of  all  such  attempts  is,  in  reality,  to  demonstrate 
that  there  are  no  certain  and  fundamental  truths  or  un- 
changeable principles— and  that  theology,  accordingly,  is 
a  mere  system  of  words,  without  any  fixed  or  substantial 
meaning.  How  can  any  principles  be  fixed  and  essential, 
if  such  on  every  subject  as  are  precisely  the  converse  of  each 
other,  may  be  equally  just,  and  entitled  to  be  regarded  as 
orthodox.?    What  doctrines  can  be  indisputably  true  and 


426 

fundamental,  if  it  may  be  that  tliose  on  the  most  important 
points,  which  are  wholly  contradictory  to  each  other,  neither 
involve  any  departure  from  the  scriptures,  nor  constitute 
any  just  ground  among  their  respective  adherents  for  dis- 
sent from  each  other  ?  And  if  there  are  no  certain  and  essen- 
tial doctrines,  what  can  theology  be  more  than  a  mere  tis- 
sue of  indefinite  terms  and  phrases  ?  To  prove  then  that 
there  are  no  material  differences  of  opinion  among  contro- 
versialists who  maintain  either  wholly  opposite  or  incompati- 
ble views  of  the  same  subject,  is  to  prove  that  the  doctrines 
themselves  of  Christianity  are  of  no  significance,  and  con- 
vert the  whole  subject  of  religion  into  a  niei'e  "logomachy." 
Such  is,  in  effect,  the  task  which  Dr.  Beecher  has  under- 
taken to  accomplish  in  respect  to  the  different  theological 
views  that  are  entertained  by  the  ministers  of  New-Eng- 
land. He  states  it  as  his  belief,  that  no  essential  differences 
on  fundamental  points  exist  among  those  of  them  who  pro- 
fess to  adhere  to  the  orthodox  faith,  but  that  their  imagined 
diversities,  are  all  resolvable  into  mere  verbal  discrepan- 
cies. It  is  the  proof  of  this  that  is  to  be  the  object  of  his 
future  letters  to  Dr.  Woods.  To  demonstrate  it,  therefore, 
will  be  to  show  that  no  difference  of  any  moment  exists  be- 
tween the  doctrines  of  constitutional  and  voluntary  depra- 
vity;  that  the  Edwardean  and  Arminian  theories  of  moral 
agency  are  fundamentally  the  same  ;  that  there  is,  likewise, 
in  every  essential  respect,  a  perfect  coincidence  between  the 
doctrine  which  denies,  and  that  which  ascribes  to  God,  the 
power  of  preventing  his  creatures  from  sinning  without  de- 
stroying their  moral  agency  ;  and  that  each  of  these  theories 
sustains  substantially  the  same  relations  as  that  to  which  it  is 
opposed,  to  all  the  facts  and  doctrines  of  revelation,  on  which 
it  has  any  bearing.    For  these  opposite  doctrines  and  theo- 


427 

lies  are  the  doctrines  and  theories  that  are  held  by  the  con- 
tending parties,  and  that  are  the  great  subjects  of  their 
controversy.  To  prove,  therefore,  that  there  are  no  essen- 
tial diflerences  in  their  sentiments,  will  be  to  demonstrate 
that  those  contradictory  doctrines  are  the  same.  Whatever 
demonstrates  that,  it  can  need  no  labor  to  show,  will  equal- 
ly prove  that  neither  of  them  can  be  of  any  significance. 
If  equally  true,  equally  orthodox,  and  equally  essential, 
none  of  them  can  be  any  thing  more  than  ciphers,  that  are 
indebted  for  their  value  wholly  to  the  station  to  which  they 
happen  to  be  assigned  by  public  opinion. 

Of  his  success  in  this  quixotic  undertaking,  he  seems  not 
to  entertain  the  slightest  doubt,  and  anticipates  from  it  the 
most  propitious  results.  If  there  be  any  accuracy,  however, 
in  the  foregoing  views,  he  has  chosen  a  false  method  of  set- 
tling doctrinal  diflerences ;  and  if  truth  have  any  title  to  a 
preference  over  error,  his  success,  were  he  to  succeed  in  it, 
in  place  of  being  any  less  disastrous  to  the  church  than  the 
errors  and  dissensions  that  are  prevailing,  will  be  as  much 
more  to  be  deprecated,  as  a  universal  disregard  or  rejection 
of  all  the  great  doctrines  of  the  gospel  is,  than  their  neglect 
or  denial  by  a  limited  portion  of  her  members.  But  of  his 
success  in  this  undertaking,  there  is  no  ground  for  appre- 
hension. The  crude  declamation,  and  random  logic  that 
characterize  his  first  letter,  bespeak  any  thing  else  than 
clear  views  of  the  subject  of  which  he  treats,  or  a  likelihood 
of  his  disentangling  the  perplexities,  or  reconciling  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  New-England  controversialists. 

Professing,  as  he  does,  to  believe,  and  designing  to  de- 
monstrate "  that  there  are  among  evangelical  men,  [the 
parties  who  claim  that  character,]  no  diflerences  in  princi- 

54 


428 

pie  on  any  fundamental  point,  and  no  shades  of  difference 
which  do  not  admit  of  an  easy  and  peaceful  comprehension 
within  the  acknowledged  limits  of  sound  ordiodoxy,"  he 
seems  to  have  felt  it  to  be  necessary,  in  order  to  soften  the 
"repellency"  and  ridiculousness  of  the  undertaking,  to  fur- 
nish some  explanation  of  the  fact,  that  the  ministers  and 
churches  of  New-England  actually  regard  themselves  as 
differing  fundamentally  in  their  views  of  many  of  the  car- 
dinal doctrines  of  the  gospel.  He  accordingly  makes  it  a 
main  object  of  his  first  letter  to  point  out  "  some  of  those 
providential  causes  which  may  account  for  the  existing  phe- 
nomena of  excited  mind,"  "sensitiveness,  and  febrile  ac- 
tion," on  the  subject,  consistently  with  the  assumption  that 
no  doctrinal  differences  exist.  The  nature  of  the  "  causes" 
to  which  he  traces  those  phenomena,  is  worth  noticing,  for 
the  light  which  it  throws  both  on  his  qualifications  for  the 
task  he  has  undertaken,  and  on  the  species  of  logic  by 
which  he  is  to  establish  his  positions. 

"  It  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  the  great  defection  from  evangehcal 
doctrine  in  this  city  and  region,  through  the  carelessness  and  negli- 
gence of  former  generations  of  ministers  and  churches,  has  created  a 
salutary  fear  of  the  recurrence  of  such  an  apostacy  again  creeping 
in  at  unawares.  The  fear  is  healthful  and  just;  and  yet  it  implies  a 
state  of  feeling  which,  without  carefulness,  may  be  easily  perverted 
to  purposes  of  unfounded  and  excessive  alarm." 

But  what  possible  solution  do  tiiese  facts  furnish  of  "  the 
phenomena"  for  which  they  are  employed  to  account?  What 
explanation  does  a  salutary  and  just  fear  on  one  subject,  af- 
ford of  an  "  unfounded  and  excessive  alarm"  on  another  ? 
Are  legitimate  and  healthful  apprehensions  a  natural  and 
just  ground  for  "  sensitiveness  and  febrile  action  which 
forbode  little  good  and  much  evil.''"    Does  the  possibiJitv 


429 

that  a  healthful  and  just  tbeliiig  may  be  perverted  to  evil 
purposes,  prove  that  "  the  existing  phenomena  of  excited 
mind,"  in  New-England,  are  the  result  of  such  perversion  ? 
Do  the  efl'ects  which  are  known  to  have  arisen  from  that 
defection,  lend  any  countenance  to  such  a  representation  f 
One  of  the  most  natural  and  conspicuous  of  its  results  to  the 
orthodox  is,  an  ampler  acquaintance  with  the  subjects  to 
which  it  related,  and  a  firmer  conviction  of  the  truth  of  their 
views.  The  long-continued  and  ably-conducted  contro- 
versy which  it  occasioned,  not  only  drew  to  those  themes  a 
more  general  and  far  higher  attention  than  they  had  before 
received,  but  gave  birth  to  a  more  successful  discrimination 
of  truth  from  error,  a  clearer  exhibition  of  the  proofs  of  the 
evangelical  system,  and  refutation  of  objections  against  it, 
and  a  more  just  and  satisfactory  demonstration  of  the  error 
of  the  opposite  scheme.  The  consequence  is,  the  diffusion 
of  clearer  views,  and  a  firmer  establishment  of  the  orthodox 
In  the  belief  of  the  truth.  This  heightened  discrimination, 
and  larger  knowledge  of  all  the  great  doctrines  of  the  gos- 
pel,— for  all  its  essential  elements,  fell  within  the  sweep  of 
that  controversy, — one  might  naturally  expect  would  prove 
an  important  safeguard  against  their  either  subsequently 
misapprehending  the  nature  of  their  own  sentiments,  or  sus- 
pecting and  believing  without  any  just  ground,  that  by  some 
of  their  numbers  their  most  essential  doctrines  are  openly 
abandoned,  or  virtually  subverted;  and  above  all,  against  all 
dangerous  "  sensitiveness  and  febrile  action,"  in  regard  to 
mere  verbal  diversities  that  involve  no  perceptible  diflerences 
of  meaning  !  Quite  the  reverse,  however,  is  the  fact,  it  seems, 
according  to  Dr.  Beecher's  argument.  In  place  of  this  ra- 
tional and  salutary  effect,  that  process,  if  his  reasoning  has 
any  pertinency,  has  only  served  to  create   in  them  an  in- 


430 

creased  "  liability"  to  imagine  that  differences  have  arisen 
among  them  where  none  whatever  exist ;  to  mistake  mere 
variations  in  terms  and  phrases  for  fatal  discrepancies  in 
doctrine,  and  to  generate  misapprehensions,  "  and  unfound- 
ed and  excessive  alarm  !"  He  proceeds — 

"  The  power  and  action  of  public  sentiment  on  theological  subjects, 
are  also  greatly  increased  by  its  [public  sentiment's]  vast  extension, 
and  conscqiient  liability  to  dangerous  agitation.  Once  it  [public 
sentiment]  was  limited  to  states  between  which  bad  roads,  and  a  fee- 
ble press,  and  no  mail,  created  a  non -intercourse.  So  that  contro- 
versies arose  and  died  away,  without  rolling  their  chafed  waves  be- 
yond the  circumference  of  an  inland  lake.  But  now  by  rail-roads, 
and  steam,  and  the  press,  and  the  post-office,  we  are  all  thrown  into 
one  great  oceo.n  of  mind  ;  every  inch  of  whose  surface  feels  the  wind 
of  every  great  controversy ;  and  where  the  same  anger  and  impru- 
dence which  once  might  have  agitated  the  waters  of  a  pond,  may 
now  roll  up  mountain  waves.  This  is  a  consideration  of  great  mag- 
nitude, and  should  cause  us  to  look  well  to  our  ways,  and  make  haste 
slowly  when  about  to  do  a  deed  which  may  compromise  the  peace  of 
tlie  entire  church." 

The  object  of  this  singular  piece  of  declamation,  I  take 
it,  is,  in  plain  English,  to  affirm  that  the  great  increase  of 
the  population  and  enlargement  of  the  church  within  the 
last  hundred  and  fifty  years,  the  vast  multiplication  of  books, 
and  the  general  and  more  rapid  diffusion  of  the  sentiments 
that  are  made  known  through  the  press,  throughout  tlic 
nation,  have  increased  the  facility  of  producing  excitement 
on  theological  subjects,  and  added  strength  to  public  opi- 
nion ;  and  this  is  alleged  as  a  "  providential  cause"  that 
shows  that  the  ministers  and  churches  of  New-England 
have  become  possessed  with  a  conviction  that  essential  dif- 
ferences of  opinion  have  arisen  among  them,  when  none 
in  rcnlit}'  exist,  and  indulge  in  alarms  and  contentions 
without  any  legitimate  cause  !  Their  advancement  in  know- 


431 

ledge  has  diminished,  it  appears;  their  power  of  discri- 
minating truth  from  error,  darkened  their  understanding, 
and  unsettled  and  confounded  their  judgment;  and  the 
multiplication  among  them  of  educated  and  cultivated  indi- 
viduals, has  increased,  in  place  of  lessening  their  liability  to 
the  misconception  of  each  other  and  of  the  gospel.  How 
delightfully  this  theory  harmonizes  with  the  views  which  Dr. 
Beecher  usually  advances,  of  the  influences  of  education  ! 
and  what  an  admirable  commentary  it  presents  on  the  be- 
neficent agency  on  the  interests  of  the  western  world,  which 
he  professes  to  anticipate,  from  the  institution  with  which  he 
has  lately  become  connected  ! 

But  his  views  of  the  tendency  of  the  causes  to  which  he 
ascribes  this  extraordinary  agency,  to  increase  the  excita- 
bility of  the  public  mind,  are  as  erroneous  as  his  represen- 
tations of  the  influence  of  knowledge  on  the  power  of  dis- 
tinguishing truth  from  falsehood.  The  great  increase  of 
educated  persons,  the  multiplication  of  books  and  periodi- 
cals, and  the  rapid  distribution  to  every  part  of  the  country, 
and  through  every  grade  of  society,  of  whatever  is  novel  and 
interesting,  have  doubtless  greatlj^  increased  the  desire  for 
what  is  exciting,  but  have  as  obviously  diminished  to  a  far 
greater  degree,  the  power  of  individual  works  and  persons 
to  make  any  deep  and  permanent  impression.  It  has 
become  wholly  impracticable  for  any  one,  no  matter 
what  his  powers  or  theme  may  be,  to  engross  the  general 
attention,  or  maintain  himself  for  any  long  period  before  the 
public  eye.  Followed  by  a  perpetual  throng  of  competi- 
tors, he  is  soon  forced  by  their  mere  multitude,  if  by  nothing 
else,  to  give  way.  If  his  views  happen  even  to  be  novel,  or 
his  reasonings  peculiar,  they  cannot  exempt  him  from  this 
destiny,  and  may,  possibly,  accelerate  it  ;  as  they  may  be  in- 


432 

stantly  plundered  from  his  pages  without  acknowledgment, 
recast,  diluted,  or  wrought  into  new  connexions,  and  put  forth 
by  a  crowd  of  news-paper  writers,  essayists,  or  book-makers, 
as  the  result  of  their  own  "  patient,  conscientious,  and  pray- 
erful investigation,"  and  their  power  of  awakening  interest, 
or  gratifying  curiosity,  in  that  manner  immediately  exhaust- 
ed, and  the  influence  and  credit  that  were  due  to  him, 
usurped  and  enjoyed  by  others.  What  share  of  influence  is 
exerted  by  the  discourses  or  letters  lately  sent  forth  by  Dr. 
Beecher  himself,  compared  with  what  similar  productions 
would  have  enjoyed  even  thirty  years  ago  ?  Not  a  tenth  of 
it,  not  a  twentieth,  and  probably  not  a  hundredth.  They 
may  be  read  through  by  as  many,  or  more,  and  probably 
looked  into  by  a  far  greater  number  of  persons,  but  are  read 
to  be  much  more  quickly  forgotten.  Their  flight  from  the 
memory  is  as  rapid  as  their  progress  from  one  part  of  the 
country  to  the  other  "  by  rail-roads,  and  steam,  and  the  post 
office,"  i.  e.  the  mail.  They  are  pushed  out  of  notice  by 
those  of  superior,  equal,  or  inferior  interest,  by  which  they 
are  instantly  succeeded,  and  these  again  are  compelled  as 
speedily  to  yield  to  the  next  in  the  crowded  train  that  is 
ceaselessly  issuing  from  the  press.  It  was  undoubtedly  ow- 
ing, in  no  inconsiderable  degree,  to  the  absence  of  compe- 
titors, that  the  theological  writers  of  New  England  of  the 
last  century  enjoyed  so  extensive  an  influence,  and  gain- 
ed so  deep  and  lasting  a  hold  on  public  esteem.  Had 
their  number  been  a  hundred  times  greater,  their  relative 
importance  would  have  been  diminished  in  very  nearly  an 
equal  proportion.  And  were  a  few  individuals  now  of  su- 
perior talents  and  cultivation,  to  enjoy  the  sole  command  of 
the  press  for  twenty  years,  they  might  essentially  aflect  the 
character  of  the  nation,  impart  a  tinge  to  its  principles  that 


433 

should  last  for  centuries,  and  transmit  their  names  to  the  re- 
motest generations.  The  agents,  however,  that  are  pour- 
ing their  influence  on  the  public  mind,  are  so  numerous  and 
powerful,  as  not  only  to  extinguish  all  hope  of  Immortality 
to  even  the  best  writers,  but  overcast  with  the  clouds  and 
darkness  of  improbability  their  prospect  of  three  score  years 
and  ten. 

While  then  those  causes  have  thus  augmented  the  desire 
of  excitement,  and  raised  it  indeed  into  a  passion,  they  have 
at  the  same  time  to  a  still  greater  degree,  diminished  the 
power  of  individuals,  of  parlies,  and  of  single  subjects  and 
controversies,  permanently  to  gratify  it ;  and  it  is  in  this 
fact  that  the  cause  lies,  that  the  doctrinal  differences  and 
contentions  that  exist  in  New-England,  have  attracted  so 
small  a  share  of  attention,  compared  with  that  to  which 
they  are  entitled  ;  and  not  the  cause,  as  Dr.  Beecher  would 
have  us  believe,  that  those  controversies  themselves,  and 
the  excitement  which  they  occasion,  have  risen  into  exist- 
ence !     He  goes  on  : — 

"  The  origin  of  this  change  in  our  condition  is  not  of  recent  date. 
The  reformation  was  a  new  era,  not  to  the  church  alone,  but  to  the 
human  mind,  and  all  the  future  interests  of  man.  It  was  the  com- 
mencement of  that  emancipation  from  force,  civil  and  ecclesiastical, 
which  [emancipation]  had  chained  down  the  mind  and  cramped  the 
energies  of  our  race.  But  from  the  moment  the  power  of  mind  was 
unchained,  it  has,  like  a  giant,  rejoiced  to  run  its  race.  From  that 
day,  the  bible  has  been  the  religion  of  Protestants,  and  fearless  free 
inquiry  for  the  most  part  their  practice." 

What  bearing,  however,  has  this  on  the  position  which  it 
is  employed  to  demonstrate  ^  Have  the  emancipation  three 
centuries  since  of  *'  the  human  mind"  "  from  force,  civil 
and  ecclesiastical,"  and  the  adoption  from  that  day  to  this, 
by  protestants,  of  the  bible  as  their  standard  of  t'aith,  and 


434 

of  habits  of  "  fearless  and  free  inquiry,"  so  completely 
darkened  the  eyes  and  confused  the  intellect  of  the  ministers 
and  churches  of  New-England,  that  they  have  become 
incapable  of  discerning  either  what  the  truth  itself  is,  or 
what  their  views  respecting  it  are  ?  Such  must  be  the 
fact,  if,  as  he  represents,  it  can  account  for  their  having 
become  possessed  with  the  conviction,  without  any  just 
cause,  that  some  of  their  number  have  departed  from  the 
truth,  and  for  all  the  other  "existing  phenomena"  of  their 
differences  and  contentions  !  He  proceeds,  however,  in  the 
next  sentence,  to  state,  that  it  is  by  no  means  certain,  that 
in  New-England,  "  the  power  of  mind"  has,  "  like  a  giant, 
rejoiced  to  run  its  race,"  "  from  the  moment  its  was  un- 
chained." 

"  It  is  not  improbable,  however,  that  in  New-England,  where  the 
condition  of  the  church  was  entirely  changed,  [when?  and  by  what  ? 
by  the  reformation  which  transpired  a  century  before  the  first  settle- 
ment there  ?]  and  not  only  protection,  but  the  support  of  law  was 
enjoyed,  an  implicit  confidence  in  formularies  and  civil  protection 
may  liave  occasioned  a  theology  of  memory,  and  an  unharnessing  of 
the  mind  for  intellectual  action  and  original  investigation,  and  a  con- 
sequent lassitude  and  carelessness  which  may  have  opened  the  door 
to  the  very  heresies  which  it  was  the  object  of  the  creeds,  and  the 
church  and  state,  to  prevent." 

It  is,  after  all  then,  it  seems,  highly  possible  that  "the 
providential  causes"  which  he  alleges  to  account  for  "  the 
existing  phenomena"  in  New-England,  have  not  exerted 
the  influence  which  he  ascribes  to  them  ;  and,  thence,  that 
the  doctrinal  differences  and  dissensions  that  exist  there,  in 
place  of  being  wholly  factitious,  are  as  real,  as  important, 
and  the  result  of  as  just  causes,  as  they  have  ever  been 
imagined  to  be.  However  dulled  and  bewildered  all  other 
minds  may  have  become,  who  from  the  brilliant  logic  o( 


435 

these  passages,  can  doubt  Dr.  Beeclier's  cloudless  perspi- 
cacity, and  ample  qualifications  for  the  task  he  has  under- 
taken, of  enlightening  and  correcting  the  intellect  of  New- 
England  ?     He  continues, 

"  The  bursting  out  of  Arminianism,  in  New-England,  roused  up 
the  energies  of  the  immortal  Edwards — the  power  of  whose  intellect 
broke  in  upon  the  apathy  of  mind  which  preceded  him,  [what  had 
become  during  that  period  of  "  the  power  of  mind"  which  the  refor- 
mation had  "  unchained,''  and  which  like  a  giant  rejoiced  to  run  its 
race  ?]  and  gave  an  impulse  to  intellectual  action  which  has  not 
ceased  to  be  felt  with  growing  power  to  the  present  day.  Without 
subvening  the  creeds,  he  gave  to  theology  the  illumination,  and  dis- 
crimination, and  precision  of  his  powerful  mind." 

And  this  again  is  a  "  providential  cause,"  that  accounts 
for  the  "  phenomena  of  excited  mind,"  which,  according 
to  his  representation,  are  seen  in  that  region.  The  clear 
exposition  which  Edwards  gave  of  the  truth  on  that  subject, 
and  masterly  refutation  of  the  errors  of  his  opponents,  have 
prevented  the  present  generation  of  New-England  ministers 
from  discerning  the  differences  of  Arminianism  from  Ed- 
wards's doctrine,  and  given  rise  to  a  cloud  of  suspicions 
that  some  of  their  number  have  departed  from  his  views, 
when  their  sentiments,  in  reality,  continue  to  be  identically 
the  same ! 

"  In  his  train  arose  successive  generations  of  ministers,  men  of 
powerful  and  discriminating  minds  who  sustained  the  light,  and  kept 
up  the  impulse  which  the  great  master  spirit  had  given,  and  super- 
intended the  revivals  which  every  where  characterized  the  Edwardean 
school ;  whose  theology,  though  shaded  by  circumstantial  difference, 
has  been  compreliensively  denominated  New-England  Divinity." 

This  is  a  fit  continuation  of  the  former  argument, 
and  shows  with  equal  clearness,  how  such  a  total  want  of 

55 


436 

discrimination  between  the  doctrines  of  Edwards  and  of  his 
opponents,  as  Dr.  Beecher  imputes  to  the  present  genera- 
tion, may  liave  come  into  existence  ! 

"  We  must  now  turn  to  another  cause  which  has  lent  a  modifying 
influence  botli  to  the  theology,  and  the  theological  sensibilities  of  the 
nation.  It  is  the  instruction  of  the  ministry  6;/ theological  seminaries 
and  the  introduction  of  the  study  of  the  bible  without  reference  to 
any  philosophy  or  theory, but  that  of  the  language  of  the  bible  interpreted 
according  to  the  eslnbiishcd  principles  of  exposition." 

With  what  a  climax  of  evidence  is  this  cluster  of  lucid 
ideas  fraught  of  the  truth  of  his  representation!  Their 
superior  study  and  knowledge  of  the  scriptures  ;  their  higher 
scientific  attainments  ;  and  their  extrication  from  the  sinister 
influences  of  antiquated  and  false  theories,  have  betrayed 
the  teachers  and  scholars  of  those  seminaries  into  the  con- 
viction that  they  essentially  difl'er  in  their  view§  of  the 
fundamental  doctrines  of  the  bible,  when  they,  in  fact,  wholly 
agree  in  regard  to  them ! 

He  at  length  adds  in  conclusion  of  his  argument: — 

*'  To  the  preceding  causes  of  excited  interest  in  the  religious  pub- 
lic on  theological  subjects,  must  be  added  the  very  great  increase  of 
readers  and  thinkers,  by  the  generation  of  sabbath  school  teachers 
and  scholars,  who  have  at  length  come  into  our  churches,  and  on  the 
stage  of  action,  as  well  qualified  to  expound  the  bible  as  some  gener- 
ations of  ministers  who  have  passed  away.  A  new  reading  generation 
on  tiieological  subjects  is  extended  and  extending  over  the  nation, 
correcting  the  evil  which  we  feared  of  the  decline  of  doctrinal  discrimi- 
nation by  the  augmentation  of  zeal  and  action,  and  alarming  us  by 
that  extended  interest  in  theology  for  t])e  production  of  which  we 
have  so  earnestly  preached  and  prayed.  Under  the  influence  of 
bible  classes  and  sabbath  schools  are  rising  up  a  large  body  of  intelli- 
gent laymen,  between  the  clergy  and  the  more  confiding  claso  of  the 
community,  occujjied  in  searching  the  scriptures  by  the  best  lights, 
and  in  proving  all  things,  to  hold  I'atl  and  to  comuunucalc  that  whicli 
js  good.' 


437 

With  these  admirable  reasons  for  an  utter  uiisapprelien- 
sion  in  regard  to  each  other's  sentiments,  and  failure  to  dis- 
tinguish the  most  egregious  and  fatal  errors  from  the  most 
palpable  and  fundamental  truths,  he  concludes  his  argument 
on  this  subject.  The  vast  multiplication  of  readers  and 
thinkers,  the  heightened  interest  in  theological  subjects,  the 
larger  knowledge,  and  clearer  discrimination  to  which 
these  institutions  have  given  birth, — if  the  conclusion  which 
he  deduces  from  them  is  just — in  place  of  proving  a  benefit, 
unhappily  have  converted  the  religious  community  into  a 
mere  babel  ;  utterly  confounding  their  language,  turning 
their  knowledge  into  ignorance,  and  shrouding  their  in- 
tellect in  total  and  lasting  eclipse ! 

Such  are  the  extraordinary  "providential  causes,"  and 
such  the  singular  logic,  by  which  Dr.  Beecher  endeavors 
to  show  that  the  existing  belief  of  the  ministers  of  New- 
England,  that  they  essentially  differ  in  doctrine,  is  without 
any -just  foundation.  The  apprehensions  and  convictions 
that  have  been  so  long  felt  and  cherished,  that  some  of  their 
number  have  fatally  departed  from  the  orthodox  faith,  in 
place  of  having  sprung  from  any  real  disagreement*  in 
principle,  are  the  work  of  a  far  different  species  of  causes  :— 
of  the  "  defection"  in  Boston,  some  twenty  or  thirty  years 
ago  ;  of  "  rail  roads  and  steam,  and  the  press,  and  the 
post  office;"  of  the  reformation  in  the  sixteenth  century; 
of  Edwards's  controversy  with  Dr.  John  Taylor  of  Nor- 
wich; of  the  superior  education  of  the  present  "generation 
of  ministers,"  and  the  more  general  diffusion  of  knowledge 
through  the  instrumentality  of  Sunday  schools  and  bible 
classes  ! — causes  and  considerations,  the  mention  of  which 
converts  his  whole  undertaking  into  a  childish  farce,  and  as 
far  as  they  have  any  bearing  on  the  subject,  demonstrate 


438 

ilic  converse  of  the  position  lie  employs  them  to  sustain  ! 
Had  it  been  his  object,  indeed,  to  prove  that  no  rational 
explanation  can  be  given  of  the  phenomena  in  question, 
unless  there  are  precisely  such  difierences  in  principle 
among  them,  as  they  regard  as  existing,  and  as  are  the 
subjects  of  their  disputations  ;  most  of  the  facts  he  has 
enumerated  might  have  been  pertinently  alleged,  and  would 
have  given  a  strong  color  of  truth  to  his  proposition. 

Such  are  the  inconsistencies  and  absurdities  into  which 
men  run,  when,  in  place  of  admitting  indisputable  facts, 
they  undertake  to  reconcile  contradictory  doctrines  by  de- 
nying that  they  differ  ;  and  to  induce  those  who  dissent  from 
each  other's  views,  to  discontinue  their  discussions,  by  af- 
firming that  their  differing  sentiments  are  in  all  essential  re- 
spects the  same. 

The  modesty  and  self-distrust  which  characterize  his  at- 
tempt to  explain  these  perplexing  phenomena,  and  clear  up 
these  difficulties,  areas  exemplary  and  peculiar  as  his  reason- 
ing is  remarkable.  Though  much  learning  has  so  bewil- 
dered and  maddened  the  ministers  and  good  people  of  New 
England,  that  they  no  longer  distinguish  between  the  most 
opposite  and  irreconcileable  doctrines,  but  confound  truth 
with  error,  and  mistake  their  friends  for  foes,  yet  he  gives 
them  to  understand  that  providence  has  not  hopelessly 
abandoned  them  to  that  condition.  There  is  one  individual 
who  has  escaped  those  disastrous  effects,  and  maintained  him- 
self in  a  happy  exemption  from  the  hallucinating  influences 
of  logic,  metaphysics,  history,  and  facts  ;  who,  consequentl}', 
"cannot  doubt"  that  Iw  "understands  the  principles  and 
shades  of  difference  which  are  comprehended  within  the  li- 
mits of  evangelical  orthodoxy;"  and  who,  if  they  will  only 
relinquish  the  subject  wholly  to  his  hands,  will  soon  dissipate 


439 

their  misconceptions,  extricate  them  from  their  difficulties, 
and  fortify  them  effectually  for  the  future  against  *'  those 
providential  causes"  which  have  heretofore  proved  so  fruit- 
ful to  them  of  mistake  and  "unfounded  and  excessive 
alarm!" 

Who,  from  the  brilliant  proofs  with  which  the  foregoing 
specimens  of  his  logic  are  fraught,  of  his  knowledge  of  the 
subject,  can  distrust  his  ample  competence  to  this  task,  or 
doubt  the  propriety  of  thus  resigning  the  subject  to  his  sole 
disposal  ? 


CHRISTIAN  SPECTATOR 


THE    PERMISSION    OF   EVIL. 


The  author  of  the  review,  in  the  Christian  Spectator,  of 
Dr.  Fisk's  sermon,  which  was  made  the  subject  of  an  article 
on  a  former  occasion,  has  reappeared  in  the  late  December 
number  of  that  work,  and  restated  his  views  respecting  the 
reason  of  the  admission  of  sin  into  the  divine  kingdom,  and 
presented  more  at  large  some  of  the  considerations  on 
which  he  relies  for  their  support,  and  for  the  refutation  of 
the  theories  of  his  opponents.  His  competence  ably  to 
treat  this  subject,  and  accustomed  openness  and  candor, 
excited  high  expectations  from  his  renewed  discussion  of  it. 
Far  more  capable  than  his  associates  of  grasping  the  wide 
range  of  principles  which  the  question  involves,  and  tracing 
them  through  their  various  relations,  familiarized  with  it  by 
a  long  course  of  study,  and  a  skilful  logician,  it  was 
naturally  felt,  that  were  his  system  susceptible  of  being 
disentangled  from    jicrplexity,   and    ph\C('d    on   open    and 


441 

satisfactory  ground,  he  would  not  fail  to  accomplish  it. 
What  then  is  the  result  of  his  renewed  eflbrt  at  its  vindica- 
tion ?  I  shall  look  at  it  first  in  its  relations  to  the  repre- 
sentation of  it,  and  objections  to  its  doctrines,  which  were 
presented  in  the  article  already  refered  to ;  and  next  to  the 
hypothesis  which  I  have  advocated  on  the  subject. 

His  theory  then,  as  I  on  that  occasion  stated  it,  is,  that 
the  entire  exclusion  of  sin  from  a  moral  system  is  impossible 
to  God,  and  that  the  reason  accordingly  of  its  admission 
into  the  present  system  is,  that  he  is  incapable  of  prevent- 
ing it. 


"  Can  Dr.  F.,"  he  asked,"  prove  the  reason"  of  the  admission  of  sin 
"  to  be  any  other  than  this,  that  God  could  not  exclude  all  sin  from  the 
universe,  and  yet  have  a  moral  system  ?"  "  Can  he  prove  that  the 
alternative  presented  to  God  in  creation  was  not  this— ?to  moral 
system,  or  a  system  in  which  some  of  hid  subjects  would  abuse  the 
high  prerogative  of  freedom,  and  rebel  ?"—Ckrislian  Spectator  for 
December,  1831,  p.  607-604. 

For  the  support  of  this  theory,  he  relied  on  the  twofold 
assumption,  that  to  permit  sin  that  might  be  prevented,  is 
inconsistent  with  benevolence  ;  and  that  the  nature  of  free 
agents  is  such,  that  it  is  impossible  to  prove  that  God  can 
prevent  them  from  sin,  by  any  influence  he  can  exert  on 
them,  "  short  of  destroying  their  freedom."  In  regard  to 
the  first,  he  said. 


"  The  argument  on  which"  the  Universalist  "  relies,  as  the  real 
basis  of  his  faith,  is  the  following  :  God  as  infinitely  benevolent,  must 
be  disposed  to  prevent  sin  with  all  its  evils.  God  ;ts  omnipotent  can 
prevent  sin  in  all  his  moral  ciealures;  God  therefore  will  lierealter 
prevent  all  sin,  and  tlius  render  all  his  creatures  happy  forever.  The 
inlidel  reasons  exactly  in  the  same  manner,  and  comes  to  the  same 


442 

conclusion."  "God  cither  wills  thai  evil  sliould  exist,  or  he  does 
not.  If  he  wills  the  existence  of  evil,  wlicrc  is  his  goodness?  If 
evil  exists  against  his  will,  how  can  he  be  all  powerful  ?  and  if  God 
is  both  good  and  omnipotent,  where  is  evil?" 

"•  Now  it  ia  manifest,  that  these  several  conclusions  of  the  Univer- 
salist,  tiic  Infidel,  and  the  Atheist,  are  all  derived  from  substantially 
the  same  premises.  If  the  premises  arc  admitted  to  be  true,  the 
conclusion  follows  with  all  the  force  of  absolute  demonstration." 

''  Here,  then,  the  advocate  of  truth  is  bound  to  show  that  there  is  a 
fallacy  in  these  premises.  Where  then  does  the  fallacy  lie?  The 
premises  rest  on  two  attributes  of  God,  his  power  and  his  benevo- 
lence. As  to  his  power,  the  argument  assumes  that  God  can  by  his 
omnipotence  exclude  sin,  and  its  consequent  suffering  from  a  moral 
system.  Those  who  admit  this  assumption  have,  therefore,  no  plea 
left  for  the  divine  benevolence,  except  to  assert  that  sin  is  the  neces- 
sary means  of  the  greatest  good  ;  and  that  for  this  reason  it  is  intro- 
duced  into  our  system,  and  will  always  be  continued  there  by  a  being 
of  infinite  benevolence.  But  gan  this  be  proved?  Is  this  supposi- 
tion consistent  with  the  sincerity  of  God  as  a  lawgiver,  the  excellence 
of  his  laws,  the  known  nature  and  tendency  of  sin,  and  holiness,  and 
the  unqualified  declarations  of  the  divine  word,  that  '  sin  is  the 
abominable  thing  which  his  soul  hateth,'  and  that  he  would  have  al^ 
men  be  saved  and  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  truth?" 

In  respect  to  the  other,  his  language  was, 

"  We  arc  thrown  back  then  to  consider  the  other  branch  of  this 
argument,  viz  :  the  assumption  that  God,  as  omnipotent,  can  pre- 
vent all  moral  evil  in  a  moral  system.  Is  not  here  the  fallacy  ?  We 
know  that  a  moral  system  necessarily  implies  the  existence  of  free 
agents,  with  the  i)Ower  to  sin  in  despite  of  all  opposing  power.  This 
fact  sets  human  reason  at  defiance  in  every  attempt  to  prove  that 
some  of  these  agents  will  not  use  that  power,  and  actually  sin. — 
There  is,  at  least,  a  possible  contradiction  involved  in  the  denial  of 
this  ;  and  it  is  no  part  of  tiie  prerogative  of  omnipotence  to  accom- 
plish contradictions."     p.  G  1(5-6 17. 

Such  then  is  his  theory,  as  it  was  exhibited  in  his  Ibrmer 
discussion,  and  such  are  the  grounds  on  vvhicli  he  rehed  lor 
lis  support. 


445 

To  the  first  of  these  assumptions  I  objected,  that  he  over*- 
looked  in  it  the  fact,  which  he  admits,  that  the  Most  High 
voluntarily  created  and  upholds  the  universe,  with  a  full 
foresight  of  all  the  evil  which  it  involves  ;  and  that  in  place, 
therefore,  of  furnishing  any  means  of  a  refutation  of  the  rea-- 
sonings  of  atheists,  it  yields  to  them  the  position,  from 
which,  by  his  own  concession,  their  "  conclusion  follows 
with  all  the  force  of  absolute  demonstration  :"  since  if,  as 
they  claim,  and  he  grants,  the  permission  of  sin  that  might 
be  prevented  is  absolutely  incompatible  with  benevolence, 
then,  inasmuch  as  that  which  exists  might  have  been  pre- 
vented by  not  creating  the  universe,  its  existence  demon- 
strates that  the  Most  High  is  not  a  being  of  goodness. 
That  assumption,  therefore,  I  argued,  must,  by  his  own 
concession,  be  given  up,  and  the  fact  admitted  that  sin  may, 
on  some  principle  or  other,  be  voluntarily  permitted,  con- 
sistently with  the  divine  goodness  ;  and  that  the  only  ques- 
tion to  be  determined  respecting  it  accordingly  is,  whether 
the  method  of  its  permission  is  that  which  his  scheme  repre- 
sents, viz. ;  by  the  gift  to  free  agents  in  the  act  of  creation 
of  a  power  which  God  is  incapable  of  controlling  ;  or  that 
which  I  advocated, — by  the  measures  of  his  providential 
and  moral  administration. 

To  the  other  position — that  the  nature  of  free  agents  is 
such  that  it  is  impossible  to  prove  that  God  can  prevent 
them  from  sinning  by  any  influence  he  can  exert  without 
destroying  their  freedom,  founded  on  the  fact  that  under 
every  possible  preventing  influence  they  must  still  possess 
the  power  to  transgress  ;  I  objected  that  it  proceeds  on  the 
assumption  that  they  may  be  determined  in  their  choices  by 
their  mere  power  of  volition,  independently  of  a  moral  influ- 

56 


444 

ence  ;  and  on  the  one  hand,  therefore,  exhibits  their  agency 
as  exerted  without  any  intelligent  reasons,  and  implies,  on 
the  other,  that  the  Most  High  has  no  certainty  of  the  mode 
in  which  they  will  act ;  and  contradicts  alike,  accordingly^ 
their  moral  agency,  and  all  the  essential  attributes  of  his 
character,  and  doctrines  and  declarations  of  his  word,  that 
have  any  relation  to   the  future   agency  of  his  creatures. 

Such  being  the  theory  I  ascribed  to  him,  and  the  objec- 
tions I  urged  against  it,  the  only  method  obviously  of  vin- 
dicating himself,  if  he  attempted  it,  was  either  to  evade  those 
objections  by  disproving  the  representation  of  his  theory 
on  which  they  are  founded  ;  or  if  that  representation  is  cor- 
rect, to  refute  those  objections  themselves,  by  showing  that 
the  principles  on  which  they  rest  are  false,  or  the  reasonings 
fallacious  that  are  employed  for  their  suppvort.  What  then 
are  the  relations  to  them  of  the  views  he  has  presented  itt 
the  article  under  consideration  f 

I.  In  place  of  the  first,  the  theory,  as  he  has  restated  it, 
corresponds  in  every  essential  particular  with  the  represen- 
tation I  then  gave  of  it,  and  confirms  the  propriety  of  all 
the  objections  to  which  I  exhibited  it  as  obnoxious — a  fact 
which  it  becomes  essential  to  notice,  from  his  having  dis- 
claimed one  of  the  doctrines  which  1  represented  his  scheme 
as  involving.  In  proof  of  it,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  cite 
the  following  passages : 

"  The  last  answer  proceeds  on  the  supposition,  that  a  universe  can- 
not be  kept  holy  to  all  eternity,  and  that,  consequently,  God  has 
never  actually  rejected  such  a  universe  as  a  possible  thing ;  but  that 
in  a  universe  from  which  sin  cannot  be  excluded,  he  has  simply  pre- 
ferred to  order  his  works  of  creation  and  providence,  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  reduce  the  evil  to  the  least  proportional  extent  possible,  ra- 


445 

ther  than  order  them  in  any  other  manner.  We  have  averred — that 
the  last  may  be  true. 

"  When  we  vindicate  the  goodness  of  the  divine  purposes  on  this 
ground,  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  we  think  the  position  itself  is  alto- 
gether void  of  probability.  We  have  indeed  asserted  no  more  than 
its  possibility ;  and  like  a  possible  quantity,  we  have  assumed  it  to 
work  out  our  process  of  explanation  and  vindication.  Yet  we  hold 
there  are  strong  probabilities  in  the  case,  that  we  have  not  assumed 
a  wrong  quantity.  We  will  venture,  therefore,  in  the  present  arti- 
cle, to  advance  the  probabilities  which,  in  our  view,  favor  the  posi- 
tion, that  sin  arises  out  of  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  a  moral 
universe — or  that  the  providence  and  moral  government  of  the  Crea- 
tor, having  respect  to  beings  who  can  sin  as  well  as  obey,  are  not 
effectual  to  secure  universal  and  endless  holiness  in  such  a  universe. 

*'■  The  position  we  apply  to  moral  beings.  We  affirm  that  they,  in 
their  very  nature,  are  capable  of  exerting  wrong  as  well  as  right 
choices;  that  they  are  endued  with  susceptibilities  to  temptation,  as 
well  as  to  holy  influences  ;  that  they  have  a  limited  personal  good 
within  reach,  which  occasions  temptation,  as  well  as  the  general 
good,  which  serves  as  an  honorable  and  worthy  motive  to  benevo- 
lence and  virtue- 

"  Again;  we  apply  the  position  to  a  universe  of  moral  beings  for 
tlernity.  We  affirm  that  the  causes  in  kind  which  originate  sin,  being 
inseparably  inherent  in  a  moral  universe,  may  so  accumulate  in  de- 
gree under  every  system  of  providence  and  government  which  can 
be  pursued,  as  to  render  sure  the  occurrence  of  sin.  If  in  a  universe 
■of  such  beings,  no  possible  system  of  providence  adopted  and  pur- 
sued through  eternity  can  shut  out  all  occasions  of  the  outbreakings 
of  sin,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  as  to  his  preventing  it,  sin  is  unavoidably 
incidental  to  the  acts  of  the  Creator  in  creating  and  governing  such 
a  kingdom. "-Christian  Spectator  for  December,  1833,  pp.  620 — 622.* 


*  Essentially  the  same  theory  was  advanced  in  1770,  by  Rev.  Hugh  Knox, 
in  a  letter  to  Rev.  Jacob  Green,  of  New- Jersey  ;  and  republished  in  1809,  in 
the  Churchman's  Magazine.     The  following  are  specimens  of  his  language  : 

"  I  greatly  hesitate  at  that  supposition  of  yours,  '  that  God  might  have 
made  a  world  of  free  agents,  without  a  possibility  of  their  falhng  into  sin.' 
I  conceive  it  safest  to  suppose  (with  all  reverence  be  it  spoken)  that  God 
cmdd  not  (in  consistence  with  his  perfections,  and  the  free  agency  of  the  crea- 


44^ 

His  theory,  as  here  restated,  thus  is,  that  the  entire  exclu- 
sion of  sin  from  a  moral  system  is,  or  may  be,  impossible  to 


ture)  make  a  system  of  free  accountable  creatures,  without  the  possibility  of 
sin's  entering  into  such  a  system  ;' — that  he  '  could  not  (in  consistency  with 
the  liberty  of  the  creature,)  prevent  sin's  entering  into  the  system,  but  that 
having  permitted  it  upon  a  clear  foresight  of  all  its  consequences,  as  best  upon 
the  whole,  rather  than  not  to  produce  snch  a  system,  he  is  determined  to 
overrxde  it  in  such  a  manner,  as  will  give  a  bright  and  perpetual  display  of  his 
infinite  power,  wisdom,  and  goodness.' 

"If  you  mean  that  God,  having  it  in  his  power  to  plan  a  system  wherein 
sin  and  misery  could  not  take  place,  was  pleased,  in  preference,  to  adopt  the 
present,  and  deliberately  to  cause  and  introduce  a  certain  quantum  of  sin  and 
misery,  for  the  greater  good  of  the  whole,  I  profess  I  cannot  see  how  such 
a  choice  and  preference  can  consist  with  the  principle  of  universal  benevo- 
lence. I  know  of  but  one  way  of  getting  rid  of  this  difficulty,  and  that  is,  by 
supposing,  that  although  God  could  have  made  a  sinless  system  of  free  agents 
in  the  sense  above,  yet  in  no  other  system  than  the  present  could  he  have 
given  so  bright  a  display  and  manifestation  of  his  perfections  to  his  creatures ; 
and  that  for  this  reason  he  preferred  and  adopted  the  present,  though  neces- 
sarily involving  multitudes  of  his  creatures  in  endless  misery.  But  this  is  a 
mere  begging  of  the  question,  seeing  it  is  daring  in  us  to  limit  the  divine  wis- 
dom, and  impossible  for  us  to  know  that  God  could  not  have  given  as  bright 
a  display  of  his  perfections  to  the  creatures  of  a  system,  into  which  sin  and 
misery  could  not  have  entered  ;  besides,  not  the  essential  glory,  but  the  uni- 
versal benevolence  of  God,  is  the  idea  to  be  reconciled  with  his  preference  of 
the  present  plan. 

"  I  really  believe  if  any  man  were  able  to  make  this  scheme  consistent 
with  itself,  or  to  cast  light  on  these  dark  and  deep  things  of  God,  Mr.  Ed- 
wards was  that  man.  But  I  confess  his  doctrine  of  the  will  seems  to  me  little 
else  than  a  doctrine  of  fate.  The  constant  dependence  of  our  choice  upon 
motives,  external  or  without  us ;  the  uncontrollable  power  of  these  motives 
to  produce  our  choices  ;  and  all  these  motives  so  fixed  and  planted  by  divine 
determination  and  providence  as  that  the  chain  can  never  be  broken,  but  must 
infallibly  draw  with  it  the  last  link,  render  men's  actions  so  necessary  that  in 
my  opinion  there  can  be  little  room  for  virtue  or  vice,  for  reward  or  punish- 
ment. The  creature  does,  indeed,  in  one  sense,  choose  very  freely,  and  yet 
in  another  sense,  he  chooses  fatally,  and  cannot  but  choose.  Yet  toward  the 
latter  end  of  his  book  he  very  dexterously  gives  all  these  volitions  and  actions 
of  the  creature  such  a  moral  coloring  as  to  make  them  the  proper  objects  of 
praise  and  blame,  reward  and  punishment.     Now  if  the  will  of  a  man  has  no 


,447 

the  Most  High  ;  and  that  that,  accordingly  is,  or  may  be, 
the  reason  of  its  admission  into  the  present  system  :  and  he 
advances  it,  and  endeavors  to  induce  its  adoption  by  others, 
from  a  conviction  that  there  is  a  high  probability  of  its 
truth,  and  that  it  is  the  only  hypothesis  by  which  it  is  pos- 
sible "  to  vindicate  the  goodness  of  the  purposes  of  God  in 
relation  to  the  entrance  of  sin  into  his  kingdom." 

The  ground  on  vrhich  he  rests  this  theory,  likewise,  is 
mainly,  as  before,  the  assumption  that  the  nature  of  free 
agents  is  such  as  to  render  it  impossible  for  God  to  control 
them  in  their  choices.  This  is  seen  sufficiently  from  the 
passages  already  cited,  and  from  the  following  : 

"  Would  he  give  to  his  creatures  a  nature  which  he  could  not  con- 
trol ?  Under  the  limitations  which  we  have  already  thrown  around 
the  question,  it  amounts  simply  to  this:  would  he  give  existence  to 
beings  of  a  moral  nature,  if  their  nature  involved  the  existence  of 
things  which  might,  under  every  possible  system  of  providence  that 
he  could  adopt,  become  sources  and  occasions  of  sin  ?  i.  e.  if  he  could 


elective  self-determining  power  in  the  choice  of  objects,  but  is  necessarily 
and  unavoidably  moved  and  determined  by  a  train  of  external  motives,  so  fixed 
and  ordered  in  the  plan  of  things  as  never  to  fail  in  determining  it,  it  matters 
not  to  me  how  freely,  i.  e.  spontaneously,  the  man  chooses  or  refuses  the  ob- 
jects that  present  themselves  to  him — there  is  certainly  no  possibility  of  his 
choosing  or  refusing  otherwise  than  he  actually  does. 

"  President  Edwards  has  indeed,  in  a  very  logical  and  labored  manner,  en- 
deavored to  establish  the  dependence  of  human  choice  and  volition  upon 
external  motives,  and  to  prove  the  absurdity  and  impossibility  of  the  self-de- 
termining power  of  the  will,  and  its  inconsistence  even  with  common  sense, 
though  it  has  been  generally  thought  a  dictate  of  this.  And  I  confess  I  have 
neither  leisure,  nor  perhaps  penetration  enough,  to  discover  where  the  fallacy 
lies  in  his  reasoning.  But  while  to  me  even  greater  absurdities  and  impos- 
sibdities  seem  to  follow  from  his  scheme,  than  from  that  of  a  self-determin- 
ing power,  I  must  needs  suppose  some  fallacy  in  his  reasoning,  and  can  never 
adopt  a  scheme  which,  as  I  conceive  of  it  upon  present  evidence,  entirely  de-. 
stroys  moral  agency." 


448 

not  so  control  tliera  as  to  prevent  all  sin?  We  reply,  yes,  certainly, 
if  their  nature  involves  this,  because  he  has  given  existence  to  such 
beings." — p.  625. 

He  thus,  as  in  the  former  article,  represents  tlie  nature 
of  moral  beings  to  be  such  as  to  render  it  impracticable  to 
God  wholly  to  prevent  them  from  sin,  by  any  "  possible 
system  of  providence  that  he  could  adopt;"  and  makes  it, 
accordingly,  the  foundation  of  this  theory  that  the  entire 
exclusion  of  sin  from  the  system  is  impossible. 

The  doctrine  that  to  permit  ant/  sin  that  might  be  pre- 
vented, is  inconsistent  with  benevolence,  he  has  not  formal- 
ly repeated,  but  has  placed  those  of  his  reasonings  which 
relate  to  that  branch  of  the  subject  on  the  assumption  that 
it  is  inconsistent  with  benevolence  to  permit  sin  to  be  ex- 
erted to  any  greater  extent,  or  to  allow  it  to  swell  to  a  higher 
aggregate  than  is,  on  the  whole,  unavoidable. — p.  621. 

The  theory  itself  then,  and  the  main  ground  on  which 
it  was  placed — his  assumption  respecting  the  nature  of 
moral  agents — are  as  restated  by  him,  those  precisely  which 
I  ascribed  to  him,  and  present  the  same  elements  as  his 
former  discussion,  for  the  conclusions  I  deduced  from  them. 
The  reason  of  his  having  modified  the  other  assumption 
on  which  he  argued  in  support  of  his  theory,  is  seen  in  the 
following  passage,  in  which  he  disclaims  "  the  doctrine"  I 
represented  it  as  involving,  "  that  God  cannot  prevent  us 
from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we  transgress." 

"  When  we  assert  that  the  reason  for  the  divine  foreordination  of 
sin  may  be,  that  as  to  God's  prevention  it  is  an  unavoidable  attendant 
on  a  moral  universe,  or  on  the  kind  of  good  which  God  seeks  in  his 
purposes,  we  do  not  advocate  '  the  doctrine'  ascribed  to  us  by  the 
author  of  '  Views  in  Theology,'  '  tliat  God  cannot  prevent  us  from 
sin  in  the  instances  in  whicii  we  transgress.'     The  reason  which  we 


449 

allege  is  predicated  of  nothing  short  of  a  whole  universe  of  moral  be- 
ings for  eteniily — that  in  such  a  universe  sin  is  not  wholly  avoida- 
ble by  any  scheme  of  creative  and  providential  acts  on  the  part  of  the 
Creator.  If,  therefore,  the  question  is  raised,  why  does  the  Creator 
permit  sin  to  come  into  a  moral  universe  at  all?  The  proper  answer 
on  the  supposition  we  have  made,  would  be  this :  He  cannot  so  over- 
rule such  a  universe  but  there  shall  be  occasion  of  its  entering  at  least 
Fomewhere,  and  at  some  period.  But  if  the  question  is  raised,  in  the 
particular  form  to  meet  existing  cases  of  transgression — why  does 
he  permit  sin  to  come  into  the  present  universe,  just  when  and  where 
he  does  ?  The  answer,  (though  ultimately  founded  oil  the  same  gene- 
ral reason,)  would  not  be  that  he  cannot  prevent  it  in  these  particular 
cases  by  changing  the  course  of  his  providence  ;  but  simply  this,  that 
the  course  of  providence  which  he  is  now  pursuing,  and  which  re- 
duces the  occasions  of  sin  exactly  within  their  present  limits,  is  the 
best  he  can  adopt  with  reference  to  the  welfare  of  the  universe  for 
eternity.  Any  change  by  which  the  occasions  of  existing  sin  would 
have  been  prevented,  would  involve  with  it  a  course  of  providence 
less  happy  in  its  final  bearing  on  the  interests  of  holiness  and  happi- 
ness in  his  kingdom  ;  less  happy  in  limiting  and  overruling  the  occa- 
sions of  sin  which,  on  the  change,  must  elsewhere  arise  in  his 
kingdom." 

To  this  he  adds  in  a  note. 

"  Yet  the  author  of  '  Views  in  Theology,'  has  attempted  to  refute 
the  position  as  if  it  were  ours,  that  God  could  not  prevent  sin  from 
taking  place  just  when  and  where  it  does.  If  we  should  say  of  an  ar- 
tificial basin  which  should  be  constructed  to  receive  the  water  of  a 
rivulet,  that  it  cannot  possibly  be  constructed  without  flowing  beyond 
the  embankment  somewhere,  and  should  assign  this  as  the  funda- 
mental reason  for  constructing  a  waste  way,  would  this  be  equivalent 
to  asserting,  that  the  particular  outlet  which  was  provided  by  the 
engineer,  and  which  turned  off  the  waters  in  the  best  possible  direc- 
tion, couM  no<  possibly  ie  prevented?  We  have  simply  founded  the 
perfections  of  the  present  scheme  of  Providence  (in  its  relation  to 
sin)  on  its  reaching  the  utmost  proportional  limits  of  prevention  pos- 
sible, with  reference  to  a  whole  universe  for  eternity.'' — p.  621. 

I  should  feel  no  essential  objection  to  his  thus  getting  rid  of 


450 

this  troublesome  doctrine,  without  entering  into  any  inquiry 
whether  it  has  not  been  at  least  virtually  advocated  by  him 
and  his  associates  heretofore,  could  I  discern  any  evidence 
that  I  have  imputed  it  to  him  without  adequate  reasons,  or 
that  it  is  not  still  an  inseparable  element  of  his  theorv.  It 
is  not,  however,  in  any  instance,  the  most  satisfactory  me- 
thod of  disposing  of  such  a  question,  and  for  the  present  exi- 
gency especially,  is  far  too  brief  and  vague. 

In  thus  stating  that  they  do  not  advocate  that  doctrine, 
does  he  mean  to  assert  that  the  ascription  of  it  to  them  in 
the  manner  in  which  I  represented  them  as  teaching  it,  is 
not  authorized  by  their  theory,  reasoning,  and  language  ; 
or  simply  that  whether  involved  in  their  hypothesis  or  not, 
they  do  not  intentionally  and  formally  advocate  it?    If  the 
latter  merely,   it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  question  whe- 
ther they  have  not,  in  fact,  advocated  it,  and  given  just 
reason  for  its  imputation  to  them.      If  the  former,  why  is  it 
that  he  has  not  demonstrated  the  error  of  that  imputation  ? 
It  had  certainly  far  higher  claims  to  his  attention  than  most 
of  the  themes  on  which  he  has  chosen  to  dwell ;   and  to 
have  proved  it,  would  have  contributed  far  more  toward  the 
extrication  of  his  theory  from  objections,  than  the  establish- 
ment of  the  positions  which  he  has  so  strenuously  labored 
to  sustain.     When  so  much  was  to  be  gained  by  the  proof 
of  this,  and  so  little  lost  by  the  neglect  of  other  topics,  it  is 
somewhat  remarkable  that  he  should  have  contented   him- 
self with  a  loose  and  vague  disclaimer  that  leaves  the  ques- 
tion wholly  undecided  and  undiscussed  whether  the  reasons 
for  which  I  imputed  to  them  that  doctrine  are  not  entirely 
legitimate. 

What,  then,  is  the  proper  answer  to  that  question  f    Is 
that  doctrine  inseparably  and  obviously  involved  in  their 


451 

theory ;  and  do  their  assumptions,  language,  and  reason- 
ings respecting  it,  and  the  object  itself  for  which  they  put 
it  forth  and  employ  it,  constitute  just  ground  for  the  ascrip- 
tion of  it  to  them? 

In  proof  that  such  is  the  fact,  I  remark,  in  the  first  place, 
that  it  is  inextricably  and  palpably  involved  in  the  repre- 
sentation which  they  have  made  the  chief  basis  of  the  doc- 
trine that  sin  is  an  unavoidable  incident  in  a  moral  system 
—that  the  nature  of  free  agents  is  such,  that  it  is  impossible 
to  prove  that  they  can  be  prevented  from  sin.  The  annex- 
ed passages,  with  that  quoted  above  from  the  reviewer's 
former  article,  are  examples  of  the  manner  in  which  this  po- 
sition is  advocated  by  them. 

"  It  will  not  be  denied  that  free  moral  agents  can  do  wroncr,  under 
every  possible  influence  to  prevent  it.  The  possibility  of  a  colitradic- 
tion  m  supposing  them  to  be  prevented  from  doinn-  wron<r,  is  there- 
fore demonstrably  certain.  Free  moral  agents  ran  do  wrmio-  under 
all  possible  preventing  influence.  Using  their  powers  as  they  may 
use  them,  they  will  sin;  and  no  one  can  show  that  some  such  agents 
will  not  use  their  powers  as  they  mmj  use  them.  But  to  suppose 
them  to  use  their  powers  as  they  rnmj  use  them,  and  yet  to  suppose 
them  to  be  prevented  from  sinning,  would  be  to  suppose  them  both  to 
sm  and  to  be  prevented  from  sinning  at  the  same  time;  which  is  a 
contradiction." 

"  But  this  possibility  that  free  agents  will  sin  remains,  (suppose 
what  else  you  wiJl,)  so  long  as  moral  agency  remains;  and  how  can 
It  be  proved  that  a  thing  will  not  be,  when,  for  auglit  that  appears,  it 
may  he?  When,  in  view  of  all  the  facts  and  evidence  in  the  case,  it 
remains  true  that  it  may  be,  what  evidence  or  proof  can  exist  that  it 
will  not  be?  Yea,  when  to  suppose  it  prevented,  may  involve,  for 
aught  that  appears,  a  palpable  self-co7itradiction  I  And'  must  we,  to 
honor  God  affirm  boldly  and  confidently  that  he  can  do  what  may  in- 
volve the  same  contradiction,  as  to  affirm  that  he  can  cause  a  thing  to 
be  and  not  to  be  at  the  same  time  ?  Is  God  honored  by  tlic  assertions  of 
mere  ignorance,  and  by  our  affirming  tliat  to  be  true  of  him,  which  may 
be  utterly  false  .="~ChrisLlan  Spectator  for  September,  1830.   p.  563. 

57 


452 

Here,  then,  the  fact,  that  moral  agents  must  continue  to 
retain  the  power  of  sinning  under  every  preventing  in- 
fluence, is  alleged  as  demonstrating  that  God  cannot,  or 
that  it  ma}^  be  that  he  cannot  possibly  prevent  them  from 
exerting  that  power  in  sin  :  and  on  the  ground  manifestly 
that  their  power  of  sinning  is,  or  may  be,  the  sole  determi- 
ner of  the  mode  in  which  they  act,  in  distinction  from,  and 
independently  of  all  influences  that  God  can  exert  on  them. 
For  if  that  power  is  not  the  determiner  of  their  choices, 
what  proof  can  it  constitute  that  influences  cannot  deter- 
mine them?  How  can  it  furnish  any  such  proof  if  influences 
themselves,  in  distinction  from  that  power,  are  the  sole  de- 
terminers of  their  volitions  ?  In  what  conceivable  way 
can  it  prove  an  insuperable  obstacle  to  their  being  pre- 
vented from  transgression,  unless  it  can  determine  them  to 
sin,  independently,  and  in  despite  of  every  species  and 
degree  of  influence  that  can  be  employed  to  withhold 
them  from  that  ageny  ?  Clearly  in  none  whatever. — 
Their  reasoning  in  these  and  similar  passages  cannot  pos- 
sess a  particle  of  force  or  pertinency  on  any  other  construc- 
tion than  that  which  assigns  to  the  power  of  sinning  the 
sole  determination  of  choices,  and  strips  all  the  influences 
that  God  can  exert  of  every  shade  of  agency.  Their  argu- 
ment not  only  proceeds  on  that  assumption,  but  it  is  the 
only  premise  from  which  its  conclusion  can  possibly  follow. 
Expressed,  therefore,  at  large,  it  is  equivalent  to  the  fol- 
lowing :  all  moral  agents  act  in  their  volitions  from  a  self- 
determined  will,  or  possess  and  exert  the  power  of  putting 
forth  choices  independently  and  irrespectively  of  motives, 
or  influences.  They  must  continue  to  possess  and  act  from 
that  power,  under  every  influence  that  God  can  exert  on 
them,    "  short  of  destroying  their  freedom."       No  possible 


453 

degree  or  species  of  influence,  therefore,  that  God  can  exert, 
can  ever  prove  the  means  of  determining-  them  in  their 
choices. 

This  assumption  accordingly  implies,  not  only  that  God 
cannot  prevent  us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we 
transgress  ;  but,  also,  that  he  neither  does  nor  can  in  anj' 
other  instance,  and  cannot  contribute  in  the  humblest  de- 
gree to  the  determination  of  any  portion  of  our  agency  :  as 
it  is  wholly  unrestricted  in  its  terms.  It  is  not  predicated 
of  beings  in  peculiar  circumstances  merely ;  but  of  free 
agents  universally ;  and  is  not  restricted  to  any  particular 
influence,  but  extends  to  all  possible  species  and  degrees, 
and  is  applicable  to  every  free  agent  at  every  stage  of  his 
existence.  The  doctrine  so  summarily  disclaimed  by  the 
reviewer,  is  demonstratively,  therefore,  not  only  involved  in 
his  theory,  but  is  the  main  foundation  on  which  it  is  erected, 
and  cannot  be  withdrawn  from  it,  without  the  subversion  of 
its  whole  fabric. 

In  the  next  place,  this  denial  of  the  divine  ability  to  pre- 
vent us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we  transgress,  is 
implied  in  the  object  for  which  the  theory  is  professedly  put 
forth  and  employed, — which  is  to  account  for  the  admission 
into  the  divine  kingdom,  of  the  evil  that  exists,  compatibly 
with  the  doctrine  that  God  does  not  voluntarily  permit  it. 

The  main  branch  of  the  atheist's  assumption,  from  which 
his  inference  against  the  divine  existence  is  deduced,  and 
which  it  is  the  professsed  object  of  the  theory  to  meet— is, 
that  to  permit  sin  that  might  be  prevented,  is  inconsistent 
with  benevolence.  His  argument,  as  stated  by  the  reviewer, 
in  his  former  article,  is  this, 

"  God  either  wills  that  evil  should  exist,  or  he  does  not.  If  he  wills 
the  existence  of  evil,  where  is  his  goodness  ?     If  evil  exists  against 


454 

his  will,  lio'.v  can  he  be  all-povvcrfiil  .■'     And  if  God  is  both  good  and 
omnipotent,  where  is  evil  ?     Who  can  answer  this  ^" 

Of  this  argument  the  reviewer  says,  "  the  premises  are 
briefly  that  the  *permanent  existence  of  evil  is  inconsistent 
with  the  goodness  and  power  of  God  ;"  and  if  they  "are 
admitted  to  be  true,  the  conclusion  follows  with  all  the  force 
of  absolute  demonstration."  He  admits,  however,  and  labors 
to  show  that  the  assumption  that  the  voluntary  permission  of 
sin,  is  inconsistent  with  "  divine  benevolence,"  is  just,  and 
that  the  only  method  of  reconciling  its  actual  existence  with 
goodness,  is,  by  assuming  that  God  cannot  "  by  his  omnipo- 
tence, exclude  sin  and  its  consequent  suffering,  from  a  moral 
system."  The  object  of  his  argument,  accordingly,^is  to 
maintain  this  assumption,  and  thereby  demonstrate  that  no 
inference  against  the  goodness  of  God  can  arise  from  the  fact, 
that  he  does  not  actually  prevent  it.  In  order  to  accomplish 
this,  it  of  course,  therefore,  must  apply  to  the  evil  which 
actually  exists,  as  well  as  to  any  other  possible  or  conceivable 
evil.  The  atheist  does  not  grant  that  goodness  can  demand 
or  allow  a  voluntary  permission  of  sin,  on  condition  that 
God  cannot  prevent  it,  except  by  giving  up  a  moral  system. 
He  does  not  admit  the  possibility  of  that  condition,  but 
holds  that  an  omnipotent  God,  were  there  one,  could  "  pre- 
vent sin  in  all  his  moral  creatures."  Nor  does  he  grant 
that  benevolence  might  allow  the  existence  of  evil  in  any 
instance,  on  condition  that  it  could  not  be  prevented 
without  giving  birth,  ultimately,  to  a  greater  sum  of  evil  ; 
for  he  makes  no  admission  of  the  possibility  of  that  condi- 
tion ;  but  denies,  absolutely,  the  compatibility  of  a  volun- 

*  He  should  have  said,  not  the  "permanent"  existence,  but  the  "exist- 
cnco  of  evil"  absolutely — as  that  is  the  premise  of  the  Universalisl  also,  as, 
he  states  it,   as  well  as  the  atheist. 


455 

tary  permission  of  evil  with  benevolence ;  and  thence  as 
evil  in  fact  exists — makes  it  the  ground  of  his  inference 
against  the  existence  of  a  being  of  infinite  goodness  and 
power.       The  reviewer's   theory  accordingly,  if   it  meets 
the  atheist's  inference — which  it  was  professedly  put  forth  to 
overthrow — must  meet  it  on  this  ground,  and  deny  specifi- 
cally and  without  reserve,  that  God  does  in  fact  permit  evil 
in  any  instance  in  which  it  is  possible  for  him  to  prevent  it. 
To  admit  that  he  might  prevent  the  evil  which  actually 
exists  ;  and,  therefore,  that  he  voluntarily  permits  it,  is  not 
only  not  to   meet  the  exigence  for  which  the  theory  was 
designed,  but  is  to  yield   to  the  atheist  the  very  position, 
from  which,  by  the  reviewer's  own  concession,  his  inference 
against  the  divine  existence,  "follows  with  all  the  force  of 
absolute   demonstration."      His  theory  then,   if  it  enjoys 
the  slightest  adaptation  to  the  object  for  which  it  was  de- 
vised and  is  employed,  admits  of  no  other  construction,  than 
that  which  exhibits  it  as  fraught  with  "  the  doctrine  that 
God  cannot  prevent  us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we 
transgress." 

But  in  the  third  place,  if  the  assumption  on  which  his 
whole  theory  respecting  the  impossibility  of  an  entire  ex- 
clusion of  sin  from  a  moral  universe  mainly  rests,  is  correct, 
whatever  his  belief  on  the  subject  may  be,  it  is  obviously 
wholly  out  of  his  power  to  disprove  the  doctrine  that  God 
cannot  prevent  us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we 
trangress ;  or  to  give  any  fit  reason  for  his  not  advocating  it. 
That  assumption  is,  that  from  the  fact  that  we  must  con- 
tinue to  possess  the  power  to  sin,  under  every  preventing 
influence,  no  proof  or  certainty  can  exist  that  God  can 
prevent  us  from  sinning,  by  any  influence  that  he  can  pos- 
sibly exert  on  us.    Of  course,  then  it  cannot  be  proved  that 


456 

he  can  prevent  us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we 
transgress.  To  hold  or  suppose  that  he  can,  or  that  it  can 
be  proved  that  he  can,  the  reviewer  himself,  indeed,  and  his 
associates  assure  us,  is  the  grossest  "  self-contradiction." 

"  Free  moral  agents,"  they  say,  "  can  do  wrong  under  every  pos- 
sible influence  to  prevent  it.  The  possibility  of  a  contradiction  in 
supposing  them  to  be  prevented  from  doing  wrong,  is  therefore  de- 
monstrably certain." 

"  But  this  possibility  that  free  agents  will  sin,  remains  [suppose 
what  else  you  will)  so  long  as  moral  agency  remains  ;  and  how  can  it 
be  proved  Xh^X.  a  thing  ici//  not  be,  when  for  aught  that  appears  it 
may  be?  When  in  view  of  all  the  facts  and  evidence  in  the  case,  it 
remains  true  that  it  may  be,  what  evidence  can  exist  that  it  toill  not 
be  ?  Yea,  when  to  suppose  it  prevented,  may  involve  for  aught  that 
appears,  a  palpable  self-contradiction  ?" 

No  logic  or  sophistry  can  ever  twist  these  assumptions 
and  reasonings  so  that  they  shall  not  be  as  applicable  to  us 
in  the  instances  in  which  we  transgress,  as  in  any  others. 
They  are  wholly  incapable  of  limitation.  "  Suppose  what 
else  you  will;"  their  language  is — "this  possibility  that  free 
agents  will  sin,  remains  so  long  as  moral  agency  remains^^ 
and  it  is  thence  that  the  inference  is  drawn,  that  as  long  as 
that  remains,  no  proof  can  exist  that  it  can  be  prevented 
from  being  exerted  in  sin.  The  consideration,  that  "  in 
view  of  all  the  facts  and  evidence  in  the  case,  it  remains 
true,"  that  sin  may  be  exerted,  is  alleged  as  demonstrative 
that  no  evidence  can  exist  that  it  can  be  prevented  from 
being  exerted,  and  that  to  suppose  it  to  be  prevented  may 
involve  a  palpable  self-contradiction."  To  evince  the  im- 
propriety of  that  supposition,  they  accordingly  proceed  to 
ask,  "  and  must  we,  to  honor  God,  affirm  boldly  and  con- 
fidently that  he  can  do  what  may  involve"  such  "  a  con- 
tradiction ?     Is   God   honored   by  tiie   assertions  of  mere 


457 

ignorance  ;  and  by  our  affirming  that   to    be   true  of  liiin 
which  may  be  utterly  false  ?" 

After  having  thus  "  boldly  and  confidently"  taught  the 
doctrine  that  "  so  long  as  moral  agency  remains,"  no  proof 
can  exist  that  God  can  prevent  us  from  sin  in  any  of  the 
instances  in  which  we  transgress,  or  in  any  others,  and 
sneered  at  the  supposition  that  we  can  be  prevented  from 
it,  as  fraught  with  the  grossest  solecism,  it  is  with  a  very 
ill  grace,  I  cannot  but  think,  that  these  gentlemen  now  thus 
coolly  announce  to  us,  without  any  formal  retraction  of  these 
reasonings,  and  representations,  or  a  syllable  of  explica- 
tion, that  they  do  not  advocate  the  doctrine  ascribed  to  them 
by  "  the  author  of  Views  in  Theology,  that  God  cannot  pre- 
vent us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we  transgress  !" 
Boldly  and  confidently  to  advocate  the  doctrine,  that  so 
long  as  we  continue  to  be  moral  agents,  a  possibility  exists 
that  God  cannot  prevent  us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in 
which  we  transgress,  or  in  any  others,  that  no  evidence  can 
exist  that  he  can  prevent  us,  and  that  to  suppose  that  he  can, 
may  involve  "  a  palpable  self-contradiction,"  is  not,  it 
seems,  to  advocate  the  doctrine  that  he  cannot  prevent  us 
from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we  transgress ! 

But  in  the  fourth  place,  I  was  not  only  authorized  by 
these  considerations,  to  represent  the  doctrine  in  question 
as  involved  in  his  theory,  but  was  constrained  to  it,  likewise, 
by  the  fact,  that  Dr.  Taylor  expressly  disclaimed  the  sup- 
position that  God  permits  the  sin  that  exists  for  reasons  of 
expediency,  or  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  greater  good 
than  he  could  gain  by  its  prevention  ;  and  that  no  room  was 
left  therefore  for  any  other  construction  of  the  hypothesis 
than  that  which  represents  it  as  denying  that  God  can  prevent 
us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we  transgress. 


458 

In  his  reply  to  Dr.  Woods,  he  represented  himself  as 
having  reasoned  in  apart  of  the  note  to  his  sermon,  on  the 
supposition  that  God  may  "  have  chosen  to  admit  the 
existing  sin  into  the  system,  as  the  best  means  of  securig 
his  obedient  kingdom  in  perpetual  allegiance  ;"  but  de- 
clared that  that  supposition  "  was  no  part  of  his  scheme," 
"  that  he  made  it  merely  as  an  argument  ex  concessis,  which 
was  fatal  to  his  opponent,  ivJiile  he  himself  places  his  reli- 
ance on  a  very  different  supposition  ;"  and  that  Dr.  Woods, 
in  regarding  it  as  expressive  of  his  views,  had  "  confounded 
an  argument  ex  concessis,  with  a  statement  of  Dr.  Taylor's 
opinion  on  the  subject,"  and  "  triumphed  in  the  complete 
overthrow  of  his  opponent,  by  that  which  has  no  existence, 
except  in  the  inaccuracy  of  his  own  conceptions."  But  if 
Dr.  Taylor  does  not  regard  God  as  admitting  "  the  existing 
sin  into  the  system,  as  the  best  means  of  securing  his  obedi- 
ent kingdom  in  perpetual  allegiance ;"  i.  e.  on  the  ground 
that  its  permission  in  the  instances  in  which  it  is  exerted,  is 
necessary  in  order  to  prevent  its  occurrence  to  a  still  greater 
extent  in  some  other  part  of  the  system  ;  and  still  holds 
according  to  his  theory,  that  the  real  reason  of  its  admis- 
sion is,  that  it  is  an  unavoidable  incident  in  some  part  of  the 
system  ; — then  he  must,  of  course  be  regarded  as  holding 
that  the  reason  of  the  admission  of  that  which  exists  is,  that 
God  cannot  prevent  it  ;  as  there  is  no  other  conceivable 
*'  opinion  on  the  subject"  that  is  consistent  with  that  theory. 

But,  finally,  if  the  reviewer. admits  that  God  can  prevent 
us  and  all  others  from  sin,  in  all  the  instances  in  which  we 
transgress,  he  then  can  furnish  no  proof  nor  probability 
whatever,  from  any  quarter,  that  he  cannot  prevent  us  from 
it  altogether,  and  wholly  exclude  it  from  his  enij)irc. 

He  cannot  make  out  any  such  jnoof  or  probability  from 


459 

the  nature  of  moral  agents ;  as  in  the  admission  that  God 
might  prevent  the  sin  that  takes  place,  he  grants  that  that 
does  not  to  him  arise  necessarily  or  unavoidably,  but  is  a 
consequence  of  the  peculiarity  of  his  moral  and  providen- 
tial administration ;  and  cannot  demonstrate,  therefore,  that 
there  is  any  insuperable  obstacle  in  their  nature,  to  their 
being  prevented  from  it  in  all  other  instances.  Nor  can  he 
from  the  nature  or  extent  of  the  means  for  the  prevention  of 
sin,  that  are  at  the  divine  command ;  as  in  granting  that 
God  might  prevent  all  the  sin  that  is  actually  exerted,  he 
grants  that  he  has  not  exhausted  those  means,  but  might 
carry  them  to  an  immeasurably  greater  extent.  How  then 
can  he  prove  or  render  it  probable  that  the  extent  to  which 
he  can  employ  them  is  not  as  great  as  that  to  which  they 
would  be  required,  in  oi'der  wholly  to  exclude  sin  from  his 
kingdom?  Can  he  show  that  there  are  any  such  limitations 
of  the  divine  attributes  as  to  give  birth  to  such  a  probabili- 
ty ?  That  were  to  prove  that  either  the  power  of  God,  or 
else  his  wisdom,  is  less  than  infinite.  Or  can  he  show  that 
there  is  any  probability  that  holiness,  were  it  exerted  in  the 
place  of  the  sin  that  exists,  would  itself  become  a  tempta- 
tion to  sin,  and  of  such  strength,  as  to  render  it  impossible 
to  God  successfully  to  counteract  its  influence  ?  Does  the 
reviewer  ever  find  that  acts  of  obedience  which  he  exerts 
prove  stronger  temptations  to  sin,  than  any  others  that  induce 
him  to  transgress ;  or  discern  any  evidence  that  such  is 
the  influence  of  the  obedience  of  others  ?  Is  not  the  suppo- 
sition wholly  contradictory  to  fact,  and  fraught  with  the 
grossest  absurdity  ? 

Unless,  then,  he  maintains  the  doctrine  that  God  can- 
not prevent  us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we  trans- 
gress, he  cannot  prove,  or  render  it  probable  on  any  ground 

58 


460 

whatever,  that  the  entire  exclusion  of  sin  from  the  universe 
is  not  practicable  to  the  Most  High,  and  must  abandon 
therefore  his  whole  theory  on  the  subject,  as  well  as  the  pe- 
culiar assumption  on  which  it  is  founded,  and  arguments 
that  are  employed  for  its  support. 

From  these  considerations,  then,  it  is  abundantly  clear, 
that  whether  the  reviewer  and  his  coadjutors  intentionally 
advocate  or  not  the  "  doctrine  that  God  cannot  prevent  us 
from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we  transgress,"  it  is  one 
of  the  most  conspicuous  and  essential  ingredients  of  their 
theory,  the  fundamental  element  of  their  reasonings  for  its 
support,  and  its  all-pervading  and  vivyfying  spirit,  without 
which  its  whole  fabric  must  crumble  instantly  into  dust.  So 
far  from  having  fallen  into  any  error  in  imputing  to  them 
that  doctrine  in  the  manner  I  did,  its  ascription  to  them  is 
not  only  fully  authorized,  but  imperiously  required  in  order 
to  a  just  exposition  of  their  theory. 

On  the  whole,  then,  it  is  sufficiently  seen  that  the  con- 
struction I  have  given  of  tl^eir  theory  is  the  true  one.  Its 
accuracy  in  its  chief  positions  is  fully  verified  by  the  restate- 
ment and  exposition  of  it,  which  the  reviewer  has  presented 
in  the  passages  quoted  above  from  his  late  article  ;  while  on 
the  only  point  on  which  he  has  expressed  any  dissent  from 
it,  he  has  neither  attempted  to  disprove  its  representations ; 
nor,  should  he  undertake  it,  can  ever  succeed  in  the 
effort. 

II.  Such,  then,  is  the  import  of  his  theory,  and  such,  as 
has  been  stated,  the  nature  of  the  chief  objections  urged 
against  it — objections,  it  should  be  recollected,  not  that  are 
founded  on  mere  terms,  or  loose  phrases  and  statements,  that 
might  readily  admit  of  such  a  construction  as  to  preserve 
their  meaning  within  the  limits  of  obvious  truth,  but  that 


461 

spring  from  its  fundamental  elements,  and  the  principles  on 
which  its  reasonings  proceed,  and  which  are  to  be  obviated, 
therefore,  if  obviated  at  all,  not  by  a  loose  disclaimer  of  the 
false  doctrines  which  the  theory  is  thought  to  involve,  but 
only  by  a  discussion  of  those  elements  and  principles  them- 
selves, and  clear  explanation  and  resistless  proof  of  their 
compatibility,  if  they  have  any,  with  the  great  truths  of  re- 
velation which  they  are  charged  with  contravening.  It  is 
such  a  discussion  alone  that  can  vindicate  them,  or  contri- 
bute to  settle  the  controversy  respecting  them.  Simply  to 
repeat  the  theory  itself,  and  the  reasons  that  are  alleged  for 
its  support,  which  are  the  themes  of  objection,  or  endeavor 
after  its  subversion,  to  re-erect  its  prostrate  columns,  and 
rebuild  its  broken  arches  from  the  same  materials,  without 
any  I'eference  to  the  objections  to  which  it  must  continue  to 
be  obnoxious,  is  only  to  waste  his  labors  on  a  task  that 
must  necessarily  result  in  disappointment. 

What  notice,  then,  has  the  reviewer  taken  of  those  ob- 
jections ?  Not  the  slightest.  No  one  who  had  only  read  his 
article,  would  be  led  to  suspect  that  they  had  ever  been  of- 
fered. He  neither  formally  attempts  to  prove,  nor  inti- 
mates that  they  are  false ;  nor  undertakes,  without  directly 
noticing  them,  to  reconcile  the  principles  of  his  theory  with 
the  doctrines  of  tlie  gospel  with  which  they  are  regarded  as 
inconsistent.  He  expresses  his  belief,  indeed,  in  divine  de- 
crees, fore-knowledge,  and  election,  but  oflers  no  explana- 
tion of  the  manner  in  which  those  doctrines  can  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  representations  of  his  theory.  Not  a  syllable 
has  he  uttered  in  its  behalf  in  that  respect,  but  has  left  it 
wholly  unprotected  under  the  charge  of  subverting  those 
and  all  the  other  essential  doctrines  of  revelation  with  which 


462 

they  stand  connected.     If  it  is  in  fact,  therefore,  not  incon- 
sistent with  them,  it  yet  remains  to  be  proved. 

1  cannot  but  regret  this  omission,  and  regard  it  as  singu- 
lar. If  he  actually  sees  that  his  theory  is  not  inconsistent 
with  the  doctrines  which  it  is  thought  by  his  opponents  to 
subvert,  and  feels  himself  able  to  demonstrate  it,  it  is  inex- 
plicable not  only  that  he  has  not  given  some  clue  to  the  me- 
thod of  their  reconciliation,  but  that  he  has  not  put  us  in  pos- 
session of  the  whole  train  of  thought  and  reasoning  by  which 
it  is,  in  his  judgment,  demonstrated;  and  in  that  manner  at 
once  exculpated  his  speculations  from  the  imputation  of 
error,  and  silenced  the  objections  of  his  opponents.  It 
surely  would  have  been  the  proper  method  of  answering 
them  and  of  vindicating  himself. 

III.  In  place  of  that,  the  leading  object  of  his  article  is 
to  state  *'  the  probabilities"  which  he  urges  in  favor  of  the 
truth  of  his  theory.  None  of  the  considerations,  however, 
which  he  alleges — I  shall  now  proceed  to  show — yield  it 
any  subslantial  support.  They  are  founded  on  considera- 
tions that  are  extremely  remote  and  ill-defined,  and  that 
furnish  no  better  ground  for  an  inference  in  his  favor  than 
against  him.     The  first  is  the  following : 

"  The  causes  in  Tcind  which  are  known  to  orig-inate  sin  in  the  present 
universe,  must  necessarily  be  present  in  an)'  possible  universe  of  moral 
beings. 

"  The  things  to  which  we  allude  are,  the  power  of  choosing-,  suscep- 
tibility to  mere  personal  enjoyment,  and  the  presence  of  objects  which 
administer  to  that  enjoyment.  These  things  in  kind  are  necessarily  at- 
tached to  the  very  existence  of  a  system  of  moral  beings;  because  be- 
ings without  the  power  of  choice  would  not  be  moral  beings,  neither 
fit  subjects  of  law,  nor  capable  of  sin  or  holiness  ;  and  beings  unsuscep- 
tible to  personal  enjoyment,  and  unconnected  with  any  objects  of  it, 
could  have  no  demonstration  of  the  goodness  of  God,  nor  any  opportu- 
nity of  rational  and  holy  choice  in  preferring  the  Creator  to  tlie  crea- 


4G3 

ture,  or  in  confiding  any  interests  of  their  own  to  the  regulation  of 
God  rather  than  themselves.  The  power  and  opportunity  of  holy 
choice — the  choice  involved  in  the  very  existence  of  holy  love  and 
submission  to  God,  implies,  necessarily,  the  presence  of  the  things  we 
have  named  in  every  system  of  moral  beings  which  can  be  created. 
There  can  be  no  system  of  moral  beings  instituted,  therefore,  into 
which  the  things  we  have  named  do  not  enter,  as  necessary  insepa- 
rable ingredients;  and  that  these  things  in  kind,  give  rise  to  the  oc- 
currence of  both  temptation  and  sin  in  such  beings,  we  have  the  re- 
sistless demonstration  of  facts. 

"  If  the  causes  of  defectibility  are  thus  inseparable  from  the  exis- 
tence of  a  universe  of  moral  beings,  is  there  not  a  ground  of  proba- 
bility that  they  will  lead  to  actual  defection  in  every  possible  system 
as  well  as  in  this?    Do  the  perfections  of  God  demonstrate  a  priori, 
that  this  cannot  be,  and  thus  exclude  all  probability  from  such  a 
source  ?    We  reply  that  the  ground  of  probability  remains  still,  not 
destroyed  by  the  fact  that  the  intrinsic  perfections  of  God  are  infinite. 
For  his  perfections,  if  employed  on  a  moral  system,  are  employed  on 
a  material  in  its  own  nature  defectible,  and  demonstrate  no  more  than 
that  he  will  obtain  that  result  which  is  the  best  possible,  taking  into 
consideration  both  his  own  perfections  and  the  nature  of  the  material 
on  which  they  are  employed.  The  power  of  God  in  this  case  is  relative ; 
relative  not  to  mere  passive  objects  of  physical  omnipotence,  but  to 
free  moral  agents ;  and  relative,  not  to  a  given  individual  for  a  limited 
term  of  existence,  but  to  a  universe  of  moral  beings  through  eternity." 
"  Now  if  this  is  true,  and  that  it  is,  we  have  evidence  in  facts  too 
clear  and  satisfactory  to  resist — if  this  is  true,  then  we  know  that 
God,  in  choosing  to  exert  his  agency  on  such  a  system,  exerts  it  under 
limitations  rendered  necessary  by  the  system  itself.     For  instance ; 
if  he  chooses  to  create  moral  beings,  his  act  of  creation  is  placed  under 
the  necessary  limitations  which  arise  from  the  essential  nature  of 
moral  beings ;  i.  e.  he  cannot  create  them  without  conferring  on  them 
powers,  capacities,  gifts,  of  such  a  kind  as  constitute  a  real  moral 
agent,  which  by  necessity  involve  the  known  causes  of  sin.  And  if  over 
any  creation  of  such  beings  he  should  begin  and  pursue  any  method  of 
providence  and  government,  it  is  clear  that  the  causes  which  originate 
sin  would  still  exist,  in  kind,  under  his  providence.    And,  since  under 
any  system  of  providence,  the  condition  of  his  creatures  must  be  con- 
stantly changing, — as  it  is  demonstrable  that  a  moral  universe  could 
not  be  kept  by  any  system  of  providence  in  one  immoveable,  quies- 
cent, petrified  state  of  intellect  and  feeling — as  moral  beings  must 


464 

act,  under  any  providence,  and  their  very  actions,  if  nothing  else, 
must  change  their  own  conditions,  and  the  conditions  of  those  around 
them, — it  is  clear  that  among  these  fluctuations  there  may  arise  con- 
junctures in  his  kingdom,  under  any  providence,  in  which  temptations 
will  rise  and  prevail  to  the  overthrow  of  some  of  his  creatures.  Dif- 
ferent schemes  of  providence  might  throw  these  conjunctures  into 
different  parts  or  periods  of  his  kingdom ;  some  might  render  them 
less  disastrous  in  themselves  than  others;  some  throw  them  where 
they  might  be  better  ovprruled  to  the  subsequent  good  of  his  king- 
dom, through  punishment  or  redemption  :  but  where  is  the  evidence 
that  any  sclieme  of  providence  could  wholly  avert  the  evil,  when  it  is 
the  necessary  condition  of  a  moral  universe,  under  any  providence, 
that  the  causes  in  kind  which  are  known  to  originate  sin,  are  present, 
and  that  they  are  changing  in  the  bearing  they  have  on  the  degree 
of  temptation?— p.  622—624. 

His  argument  in  these  passages,  like  those  which  he  and 
his  associates  have  before  used,  is  thus  founded  on  the  pow- 
ers of  moral  agents,  and  assumes,  though  it  is  less  openly 
expressed,  and  is  wholly  dependent  for  its  pertinency  if  it 
has  any,  on  the  assumption,  that  agents  are  determined  in 
their  choices  by  their  powers,  in  distinction  from  influences. 
Their  representation  heretofore  has  been,  that  as  the  power 
to  sin  must  remain  as  long  as  moral  agency  remains,  no  one 
can  prove  that  an  agent  can  be  prevented  from  sin  by  any 
possible  influence.  The  reasoning  now  is,  that  as  the  causes 
that  originate  sin  must  remain  as  long  as  moral  agency  re- 
mains, it  is  probable  that  they  canno-t  all  be  withheld  from 
sin  by  any  course  of  administration,  and  clear  that  under 
any  possible  system  of  providence  conjunctures  may  arise, 
that  in  spite  of  every  preventing  influence,  will  give  birth  to 
transgression. 

This  reasoning  is  obnoxious  to  a  variety  of  insuperable 
objections.  Though  the  premises  are  just,  the  conclusion 
does  not  follow;  inasmuch   as  the  powers  themselves  of 


465 

moral  agents,  are  not  the  determiners  of  their  choices, 
and  do  not,  contemplated  irrespectively  of  the  influences 
that  are  to  be  exerted  on  them,  furnish  any  ground  for 
an  inference  respecting  the  mode  in  which  they  will  be 
employed.  They  are  mere  capacities  for  putting  forth 
moral  acts — of  perception,  affection,  and  choice,  and  are  as 
completely  adapted  and  adequate  to  obedience  as  to  sin, 
and  as  susceptible,  other  things  being  equal,  of  excitement 
to  the  one  as  to  the  other.  We  see,  accordingly,  that  they 
are,  in  fact,  exerted  in  both  of  those  species  of  agency  accord- 
ing to  the  excitements  to  whicii  they  are  subjected; — by  the 
same  individual  at  one  time  in  sin  and  at  another  in  holi- 
ness ;  by  large  classes  of  persons  frequently  or  prevalently 
in  obedience,  and  by  others  uniformly  in  transgression  ;  and 
by  one  world  in  uninterrupted  holiness,  and  by  another 
uninterruptedly  in  sin,  according  to  the  different  influences 
under  which  they  respectively  act.  Their  mere  powers, 
therefore,  thus  variously  employed  and  determined  solely 
by  influences,  contemplated  by  themselves,  furnish  no 
ground  whatever  of  probability  that  they  will  be  exerted  in 
sin,  any  more  than  that  they  will  in  holiness ;  nor  the  slight- 
est for  any  conclusion  whatever  on  the  subject — beyond  the 
fact,  that  they  will  be  exerted  in  moral  acts  of  some  kind 
or  other — any  more  than  they  would  were  they  to  be  *'  pet- 
rified," and  maintained  in  a  condition  of  absolute  quies- 
cence, without  choices,  emotions,  or  perceptions.  Let  the 
reviewer  admit  that  beings  put  forth  their  choices  only  for 
intelligent  reasons,  and  are  determined  accordingly  in  their 
agency  solely  by  perceptions  and  emotions,  and  he  will  as- 
sent to  these  positions,  and  abandon  his  argument  as  in- 
conclusive. 

This  argument,  in  the  next  place  being  founded  on  the 
mere  powers  of  moral  agency  considered  irrespectively  of  the 


466 

influences  that  excite  them,  implies,  if  it  has  any  pertinency, 
that  those  attributes  constitute  or  involve  a  power  of  self- 
determination,  and  may  therefore  exert  themselves  in  sin  in 
despite  of  all  the  preventing  influences  that  can  be  brought 
to  bear  on  them ;  and  is  obnoxious,  accordingly,  to  all  the 
objections  that  I  have  heretofore  urged  against  the  dogma 
of  a  self-determining  will. 

In  the  third  place,  as  the  argument  is  founded  on  the 
mere  powers  of  moral  agency,  without  respect  to  the  in- 
fluences under  which  they  are  exerted,  it  is  as  applicable 
to  one  class  of  moral  agents  as  to  another,  and  accordingly, 
if  it  has  any  force  whatever,  furnishes  as  strong  a  probabi- 
lity that  sin  will  transpire  in  such  a  scene  of  existence   as 
heaven,  as  in  such  a  world  as  this ;  and  that  each  moral 
being  will,  at  some  period  of  his  agency,  yield  to  trans- 
gression,  as   that  any  individual    will.     It  is   as  true    of 
angels,  and  the  spirits  of  just  men  made  perfect,  that  they 
are  moral  agents,  and  that  their  powers  are  the  same  in 
kind  that  are  known  to  originate   sin,   as  it  is  of  us;  as 
clear  that  if  God  "  should  begin  and  pursue  any  method  of 
providence  and  government"  over  them,  "  the  causes  which 
originate  sin  would  still   exist  in  kind,  under  his  provi- 
dence," as  it  is  that  they  vs^ould  among  men  ;  and,  "  since, 
under  any  system  of  providence,  the  conditions  of  his  crea- 
tures must  be  constantly  changing,"  as  clear,  therefore — if 
the  powers  of  moral  agency  alone  are  considered — "  that 
among    these  fluctuations,   there    may   arise   conjunctures 
under  any  providence,  in  which  temptations  will  rise  and 
prevail  to  the  overthrow  of   some  of  those  creatures,"  as 
it  is  that  they  may  under  any  providence  over  such  beings 
as  ourselves. 

On  the  principles,  then,  on  which  his  reasoning  proceeds, 
we  not  only  have  no  certainty  of  the  continued  obedience  of 


467 

holy,  angelic,  and  redeemed  spirits,  but  have  an  absolute 
probability  of  their  universally  yielding  to  rebellion  at  some 
period  of  their  existence,  notwithstanding  every  species  and 
degree  of  preventing  influence  that  God  can  exert  on  them  ! 
— a  conclusion  that  sufficiently  demonstrates  the  error  of  his 
assumption  and  inference  from  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  elements  of  this  reasoning,  if  reversed  and  applied  to 
the  inhabitants  of  hell,  will  furnish  an  equal  probability  that 
each  of  them  will,  at  some  period  of  their  future  existence, 
render  obedience  to  God's  government;  for  "  their  powers 
are  the  same  in  kind  that  are  known  to  originate"  or  exercise 
holiness,  and  will  continue  to  be  the  same  in  kind  "  as  long 
as  their  moral  agency  remains,"  under  any  method  of  pro- 
vidence and  moral  government  that  God  may  exercise  over 
them.  If,  therefore,  the  possession  of  those  powers  which 
originate  sin,  furnishes  a  high  probability  that  they  will, 
under  any  possible  system  of  providence,  at  some  period  or 
other,  be  exerted  in  sin  ;  the  possession  of  the  powers  that 
exercise  holiness,  furnishes  an  equal  probability  that  they 
will  likewise,  under  any  possible  system  of  providence,  at 
some  period  or  other,  be  exerted  in  obedience ! — a  conclu- 
sion that  again  demonstrates  the  error  both  of  his  assump- 
tion and  of  the  inference  he  deduces  from  it. 

In  whatever  light,  then,  his  argument  is  regarded,  it  is 
obviously  false.  Even  if  not  built  on  the  theory  of  a  self- 
determined  will,  it  is  wholly  inconclusive  ;  if  founded  on 
that,  it  contradicts  our  agency  ;  and  in  either  case  it  is  de- 
monstrably erroneous,  as  it  represents  it  to  be  probable  that 
those  beings  will  become  involved  in  transgression,  who  we 
know  are  forever  to  continue  holy  ;  and  thai  those  will  be- 
come holy  who  we  know  are  for  ever  to  continue  to  sin.  It 
yields,  therefore,  no  support  to  his  scheme. 

59 


468 

The  following  passage  exhibits  the  substance  of  his  next 
argument. 

"  We  urge  as  an  additional  source  of  probability,  that  the  occabion 
of  sin  is  founded  in  the  very  nature  of  a  moral  universe;  that  sin  in 
the  present  universe  has  originated  from  such  causes  in  kind  as  are 
inseparable  from  the  existence  of  moral  agents,  notwithstanding  God 
has  put  forlh  no  acts  for  tlie  sake  of  leading  his  subjects  into  sin  ra- 
ther than  holiness." 

"  If,  tJicn,  no  acts  of  God  arc  justly  chargeable  with  being  put  forth 
lor  the  sake  of  introducing  sin  into  his  kingdom,  but  on  the  contrary 
have  all  been  put  forth  to  promote  holiness;  and  if, nevertheless, from 
such  causes,  in  kind,  as  necessarily  pertain  to  a  moral  system,  sin  has 
actually  originated  among  his  creatures,  is  there  no  probability  that 
such  causes  lay  a  foundation  for  the  occurrence  of  sin,  which  is  una- 
voidable by  any  scliemc  of  providence  on  the  part  of  the  Creator?" 
pp.  625,626. 

The  object  of  this  argument  is  to  show  it  to  be  probable, 
from  the  fact  that  God  puts  forth  no  acts  for  the  express 
purpose  of  producing  sin;  that  the  sin  that  comes  into  exis- 
tence is  to  him  an  unavoidable  result  of  the  powers  of  free 
agency  conferred  on  his  moral  creatures,  and  not  a  conse- 
quence of  the  measures  of  his  moral  and  providential  go- 
vernment, which  might  have  been  avoided  or  mitigated  by 
a  different  system  of  administration.  Its  aim,  therefore,  is 
to  prove  that  God  actually  carries  his  preventing  influences 
to  the  utmost  limit  of  his  power ;  and  implies,  accordingly, 
either  that  he  cannot,  by  any  influences  he  can  exert,  deter- 
mine the  mode  in  which  his  moral  creatures  will  act ;  or 
that  he  cannot  carry  his  preventing  agenc}^  at  any  stage  of 
his  administration  any  farther  than  he  does  ;  or  else,  finally, 
that  were  he  to  prevent  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  it  is 
now  exerted,  either  the  means  of  that  prevention,  or  the 
obedience  that  would  result  from  their  agency^  would  be- 
come the  cause  of  subsequent  sin,  and  thereby  give  rise  to 


469 

a  sum  of  evil  equal  or  superior  to  that  which  now  exists. 
The  first,  or  doctrine  of  self-determination,  virtually  denies, 
on  the  one  hand,  that  God  exerts  any  government,  by  throw- 
ing his  creatures  beyond  the  circle  of  his  influences ;  and 
on  the  other,  that  they  exert  any  moral  actions,  by  implying 
that  they  put  forth  their  choices  without  any  intelligent 
reasons.  That  therefore  cannot  be  correct.  The  second, 
or  doctrine  "  that  God  cannot  prevent  us  from  sin  in 
the  instances  in  which  we  transgress,"  though,  as  we  have 
seen,  a  fundamental  ingredient  of  his  theory,  and  an  ele- 
ment that  runs  through  all  his  reasoning,  is  yet,  he  informs 
us,  a  doctrine  he  does  "  not  advocate."  The  third  is  both 
a  rank  absurdity,  as  has  already  been  shown,  and  contra- 
dictory to  many  of  his  own  most  important  assumptions 
and  arguments,  as  will  hereafter  appear.  It  yields  his 
theory,  therefore,  no  substantial  support. 

The  following  quotations  sufficiently  exhibit  his  last  ar- 
gument : 

''  We  advance  it  as  a  ground  of  probability,  that  the  certainty  of  sin 
is  found  in  the  very  nature  of  a  moral  universe;  that  sin  has  originated 
in  the  present  universe  from  those  causes  in  kind  which  are  insepara- 
ble from  the  existence  of  a  moral  universe,  notwithstanding  God  has 
so  ordered  his  providence  over  it  as  to  secure  the  highest  good  pos- 
sible.'' 

"  He  is  now  securing  the  highest  amount  of  moral  good  which  the 
nature  of  a  moral  universe  admits.  Is  there  not,  then,  a  high  proba- 
bility in  the  fact  that  sin  has  come  into  the  present  universe,  and 
broken  the  ranks,  and  interrupted  the  progress  of  universal  holiness, 
and  introduced  a  wide,  and  to  a  great  extent,  irreparable  calamity  ; 
and  that  it  is  known  and  seen  to  have  come  in  from  causes  which  in 
kind  pertain  to  the  very  nature  of  a  moral  universe ;  is  there  not  a 
high  probability,  we  ask,  in  this  fact,  that  the  universal  and  uninter- 
rupted progress  of  the  whole  universe  in  holiness,  and  to  all  eternity, 
is  merely  a  conceivable  good,  which  the  very  nature  of  a  moral  uni- 
verse puts  beyond  the  range  of  possibility  ?" — pp.  628,  629. 


470 


He  thus  In  tliis  argument  infers,  that  to  prevent  the  oc- 
currence of  the  existing,  or  an  equal  amount  of  evil  in  the 
universe,  is  impracticable  to  the  Most  High,  from  the  ad- 
mitted fact,  that  he  actually  secures  the  highest  sum  of  good 
that  is  possible  to  him  to  attain  by  any  system  of  adminis- 
tration. It  proceeds  on  the  assumption,  therefore,  that  to 
have  prevented  the  evil  that  exists,  and  wholly  excluded  it 
from  his  empire,  had  it  been  practicable,  would  have  given 
birth  to  a  far  greater  sum  of  good  than  that  which  now 
exists,  and  is  accordingly — as  that  is  a  principal  point  in 
debate — "  a  mere  paralogism  or  begging  of  the  question," 
and  like  its  predecessors  therefore  contributes  no  support 
to  his  theory. 

Such  are  the  arguments  which  he  urges  in  favor  of  the 
probability  of  the  theory  that  God  is  incapable  of  exclud- 
ing sin  from  his  empire,  or  circumscribing  it  within  a  nar- 
rower circle  than  its  present  limits,  and  on  the  strength  of 
which  he  encounters,  and  asks  the  church  to  encounter  all 
the  various  and  fatal  objections  to  which  that  hypothesis  is 
obnoxious  ; — arguments  that  manifestly  not  only  make  no 
approach  towards  the  merits  of  the  question,  and  have  no 
claims  whatever  to  the  praise  of  conclusiveness,  but  which 
are  built  on  principles  that  are  wholly  false,  and  lead  to  re- 
sults that  are  subversive  of  all  the  essential  truths  of  the 
gospel.  On  what  a  slender  basis  the  towering  structure  of 
his  theory  rests  !  "  The  causes  in  Icind  which  are  known 
to  originate  sin  in  the  present  universe  must  necessarily 
be  present  in  any  possible  universe  of  moral  beings  ;" — 
that  is,  every  system  of  moral  agents,  must  be  a  system 
of  moral  agents,  or  beings  endowed  with  the  requisite  ca- 
pacities for  the  exertion  of  an  agency  that  is  conformable 
to  law,  and  the  proper  subjects  accordingly  of  a  moral 
government — therefore   the  entire  exclusion  of  sin   from  a 


471 

moral  system  is  Impossible  to  God !  What  conclusion  was 
ever  more  distantly  removed  than  this,  from  its  premise  ? 
The  gulph  vvhicii  separated  Dives  from  Lazarus  was  not 
broader  nor  more  impassable.  Yet  it  is  on  the  logical  con- 
nexion of  that  premise  with  this  conclusion — which  is  pre- 
cisely the  inference  that  does  not  follow  from  it, — that  the 
truth  of  his  theory  wholly  depends.  Let  us  reverse  that 
inference.  A  moral  system  must  consist  of  voluntary 
beings  whom  God  creates  and  upholds,  who  act  only  under 
the  influence  of  causes  that  are  entirely  subject  to  his  con- 
trol, and  whose  whole  reasons  for  putting  forth  their  actions 
must  lie  in  perceptions  and  emotions  that  come  into  exist- 
ence through  the  influence  of  those  causes  : — therefore  God 
can  wholly  exclude  sin  from  a  moral  system.  Which  of 
these  conclusions  best  accords  with  their  premise,  with  the 
attributes  of  God,  with  consciousness,  with  the  doctrines  of 
revelation  ? 

ly.  It  is  not  only  apparent  that  none  of  the  arguments 
hitherto  alleged  in  favor  of  the  theory  yield  it  any  support, 
but  is  clear  likewise  from  the  erroneousness  and  inconsist- 
ency of  its  main  principles,  that  it  never  can  be  maintained 
either  on  any  of  the  grounds  on  which  he  has  placed  it,  or 
on  any  other. 

Such  is  certainly  the  fact  in  respect  to  the  first  ground 
which  he  and  his  associates  oft'ered  for  its  support — the  as- 
sumption that  God  cannot  determine  the  mode  in  which 
intelligent  beings  will  act,  couched  in  the  doctrine  that  as 
free  agents  must  possess  the  power  to  sin  under  every  pre- 
venting influence,  it  may  be  that  God  cannot  prevent  them 
from  sin  by  any  agency  that  he  can  exert,  short  of  "  des- 
troying their  freedom." 

1.  That   assumption    is  wholly   erroneous.      It    implies 


472 

that  the  mind  is  determined  in  its  volitions  by  its  mere  pow- 
er of  choosing-,  in  distinction  from  its  j3crceptions  and  emo- 
tions :  that  it  acts  therefore  without,  or  irrespectively  of  any 
seen  and  felt  reasons,  and  is  accordingly  wholly  unintelli- 
gent in  its  agency.  It  is  therefore  not  only  totally  incon- 
sistent with  our  consciousness,  but  is  fraught  with  a  denial 
that  we  are  moral  agents. 

2.  It  involves  a  denial  likewise,  of  God's  power  to  foresee 
the  actions  of  his  moral  creatures,  and  thence  contradicts 
his  most  essential  attributes,  and  all  the  doctrines  and  pro- 
mises of  his  word  that  relate  to  their  future  agency.  In 
representing  the  power  of  putting  forth  acts  as  the  sole 
determiner  of  choices,  it  represents  it  as  the  sole  medium  of 
a  foresight  of  their  being  exerted.  It  is  intuitively  certain 
however,  that  a  mere  capacity  for  putting  forth  volitions, 
that  is  equally  adequate  and  adapted  to  the  exertion  of  an 
infinite  variety  of  acts,  both  that  are  holy  and  sinful,  cannot, 
contemplated  by  itself,  be  the  medium  of  a  foresight  that 
it  will,  at  any  designated  period,  be  employed  in  the  exer- 
tion of  a  given  holy  or  sinful  act.  The  supposition  is 
self-contradictory.  To  suppose  even  that  a  mere  capacity 
for  putting  forth  moral  acts,  can  furnish  a  certainty  or  pro- 
bability that  an  agent  will,  at  a  given  time,  exert  one  species 
of  those  acts,  as  that  which  is  holy,  and  not  the  other,  is 
absurd  :  as  it  is  in  so  many  words  to  assume  that  his  nature 
is  fraught  with  a  bias  to  that  mode  of  agency  rather  than 
the  other,  and  involves  something  more,  therefore,  than  a 
mere  capacity  for  putting  forth  moral  acts.  Even  those 
who  hold  to  the  existence  in  the  mind,  of  such  a  bias,  and 
tlience,  assume  that  God  can,  by  the  bare  inspection  of  the 
nature  of  moral  agents,  foresee  what  species  of  actions  they 
are  to  exert ;  cannot  with  any  propriety  assume  that  it  can 


473 

be  foreseen  through  that  medium,  what  particular  acts  of  the 
species  of  that  bias  are  to  be  exerted.  The  theory,  there- 
fore, in  thus  exhibiting  the  mere  power  of  moral  agents  as 
the  sole  medium  of  a  prescience  of  their  actions,  denies  the 
possibility  to  the  Most  High,  of  a  foresight  of  their  agency, 
and  thereby  contradicts  alike,  the  most  essential  attributes 
of  his  character,  and  doctrines  and  promises  of  his  word. 

3.  But  the  reviewer  has  himself  abandoned  this  ground 
of  his  theory,  and  granted  that  God  can  determine  the  mode 
in  which  his  creatures  will  act,  in  the  statement  that  he  does 
not  advocate  the  doctrine  that  God  cannot  prevent  us  from 
sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we  transgress  ;  since  if  God  can, 
and  it  can  be  proved  that  he  can,  infallibly  prevent  us  from 
sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we  transgress,  there  then  can 
be  no  truth  in  the  doctrine  that  because  we  must  under  evei'y 
preventing  influence  still  possess  the  power  to  sin,  it  may  be 
that  he  cannot  prevent  us  from  sin  by  any  influence  he  can 
exert  on  us.  The  two  positions  are  the  exact  converse 
of  each  other  ;  and  to  suppose  that  both  can  be  true,  is, 
we  have  the  assurance  of  these  gentlemen  themselves,  to 
suppose  that  we  can  "both  sin  and  be  prevented  from 
sinning,  at  the  same  time,  which  is  a  contradiction."  On 
this  ground  then — on  which  it  was  first  placed — thus  incon- 
sistent with  our  nature  and  agency,  fraught  with  a  denial 
of  the  attributes  of  the  Most  High,  and  subversion  of  all 
the  doctrines  of  his  word  that  respect  the  future  agency  of 
his  moral  creatures  ;  and,  finally,  thus  formally  abandoned 
— it  is  abundantly  certain,  that  the  theory  can  never  be 
maintained. 

Nor  can  it  on  the  assumption,  that  to  permit  sin  that 
might  be  prevented,  is  inconsistent  with  goodness, — the 
second  ground  on  which  it  was  placed.  That  assumption 
in  the  first  place,  leads  to  a  direct  denial,  either  that  God  is 


474 

benevolent,  or  else  that  he  is  the  creator  and  preserver  of 
the  universe.  As  evil  in  fact  exists ;  it  of  course  either 
exists  by  his  permission,  or  in  spite  of  his  utmost  efl'orts  to 
prevent  it.  If  he  permits  it  to  exist  when  he  might  prevent 
it,  then,  according  to  the  assumption,  it  demonstrates  that 
he  is  not  a  benevolent  being.  If  it  exists  because  he  cannot 
prevent  it  from  existence,  then  it  demonstrates  that  he  is 
not  the  voluntary  creator  and  preserver  of  the  beings  who 
are  the  subjects  of  it ;  since,  even  if  he  cannot  prevent 
them  from  sin  by  any  measures  of  providence  or  moral 
government,  he  might  have  prevented  them  from  it, by 
abstaining  from  their  creation.  The  reviewer  has  no  al- 
ternative, therefore,  if  he  attempts  to  maintain  his  theory 
on  this  ground,  but  either  directly  to  deny  that  God  is  the 
preserver  and  creator  of  the  agents  who  sin,  or  else  to  im- 
peach his  benevolence  of  imperfection. 

But  secondly,  he  has  expressly  admitted  that  God  volun- 
tarily permits  the  evil  that  exists,  when  he  might  prevent  it, 
in  granting  that  he  might  prevent  us  from  sin  in  the  instances 
in  which  we  transgress,  and  has  accordingly  abandoned 
and  contradicted  the  assumption  in  question.  He  can 
never  maintaiti  it,  therefore,  on  this  ground,  nor  again 
attempt  it,  without  involving  himself  in  inextricable  incon- 
sistencies ;  and  must  accordingly  relinquish  all  his  confi- 
dent hopes  of  silencing  infidels  and  atheists  by  this  expe- 
dient— which,  in  truth,  in  place  of  refuting  them,  yields 
them  the  very  position  which  they  claim,  and  makes  the 
ground  of  their  inference  against  the  divine  existence. 

Nor  can  it  be  sustained  with  any  more  facility  on  the 
third  ground  alleged  for  its  support, — that  were  the  Most 
High  to  carry  the  means  of  prevention  any  farther  than  he 
does,  it  might  ultimately  increase,  in  place  of  diminishing 
ihe  sum  of  sin  in  his  empire.     The  reviewer  has  not  indeed, 


475 

nor  have  his  coadjutors,  attempted  to  offer  any  proofs  or 
probabilities  in  favor  of  this  supposition.  They  only  claim 
that  for  aught  that  appears,  it  may  be  that  such  would  be 
the  result  of  a  further  interposition  to  prevent  sin. 

"  Dr.  Taylor  asked,  on  the  supposition  that  God  had  prevented  any 
past  sin,  who  can  prove  that  the  requisite  interposition  for  the  pur- 
pose would  not  result  in  a  vast  increase  of  sin  in  the  universe  ?" — 
"  Had  he  prevented  the  sins  oCone  human  being  to  the  present  time, 
or  had  he  brought  to  repentance  one  sinner  more  than  he  has,  who 
can  prove  that  the  requisite  interposition  for  the  purpose,  would  not 
result  in  a  vast  increase  of  sin  in  the  system,  including  even  the 
apostacy  and  augmented  guilt  of  that  individual?" 

This  is  truly  a  slight  foundation  for  the  support  of  a 
theory  fraught  with  such  momentous  bearings  on  the  attri- 
butes and  government  of  God.  If  any  specious  hypothesis 
can  be  given,  of  a  mode  in  which  an  interposition  of  that 
kind  could  naturally  produce  such  results,  how  happened  it 
that  no  hint  is  given  of  its  nature  ; — that  the  assumption  is 
left  thus  utterly  unsupported  ?  There  is  in  fact  no  hypothesis 
whatever,  on  which  that  supposition  can  be  maintained.  If 
attempted,  it  must  be  on  the  ground,  either  that  such  an 
interposition  would  naturally  lead  those  who  were  the  sub- 
jects of  it,  to  greater  sin  ;  or  that  it  would  give  birth  to 
that  effect  in  others.  If  attempted  to  be  maintained  in 
regard  to  the  subjects  themselves  of  the  interposition — it 
must  be  on  the  ground,  either  that  the  means  of  the  preven- 
tion from  sin,  would  naturally  give  rise  to  that  result ;  or 
that  the  obedience  that  would  be  exerted  under  their  influ- 
ence, would  legitimately  produce  it ;  or  else  that  it  would 
take  place  as  a  consequence  of  the  fact  that  those  means 
were  brought  to  act  on  the  mind  by  a  divine  interposition. 

It  can  never,  however,  be   maintained   on  the  ground, 

60 


4t6 

that  the  means  of  prevention  themselves,  or  the  presence  in 
the  mind  of  such  perceptions  and  emotions  as  excite  it  to 
obedience,  would  naturally  give  birth  to  a  greater  sum  of 
sin  than  is  now  exerted.  By  the  supposition,  that  would 
not  be  its  first  effect,  but  the  reverse — holiness  in  place  of 
transgression ;  and  to  suppose  that  its  next  or  remoter  effect 
should  naturally  be  of  precisely  an  opposite  nature — sin 
instead  of  holiness,  or  temptation  in  place  of  excitement  to 
obedience, — is  not  only  wholly  without  reason,  but  contra- 
dictory to  the  usual  mode  of  our  agency.  The  presence  of 
views  that  deeply  affect  the  mind,  lays  a  foundation  for  the 
occurrence  again,  by  suggestion  of  similar  apprehensions; 
and,  as  by  the  repetition  of  acts,  the  associating  power  becomes 
quickened,  and  habits  of  thought  are  established,  the  pro- 
bability of  their  return  is  increased  precisely  in  proportion  to 
the  frequency  of  such  perceptions.  The  repetition  of  such 
interpositions,  therefore,  to  extricate  the  mind  from  tempta- 
tion, by  the  transfusion  into  it,  of  vivid  and  affecting  appre- 
hensions of  divine  things,  in  place  of  diminishing,  would 
by  a  fundamental  law  of  our  nature,  directly  tend  to 
increase  the  likelihood  of  the  subsequent  recurrence  of  the 
same  or  similar  views,  and  thence  of  the  exertion  again  of 
obedient  acts  under  their  influence. 

Nor  for  the  same  reason  can  that  supposition  be  main- 
tained on  the  ground,  that  the  obedience  itself  exerted  un- 
der the  influence  of  those  apprehensions,  would  naturally 
give  rise  to  more  sin  than  would  otherwise  exist.  Holy 
affections,  like  the  perceptions  of  divine  things  that  excite 
them,  lay  a  foundation  by  the  same  laws  of  suggestion,  for 
the  recurrence  of  the  objects  by  which  they  are  excited ; 
and  the  probability  of  that  recurrence  is  heightened  propor- 
tionally to  the  frequency  and  intenseness  with  wliich  they 


477 

are  exerted.  To  imagine  that  this  great  law  of  our  nature 
should  be  wholly  superseded,  and  precisely  the  converse  of 
its  effects  take  place,  is  wholly  unphilosophical.  What  can 
be  at  once  more  contradictory  to  experience,  or  more  absurd 
than  to  suppose  that  obedience  unfits  the  mind  more  than 
sin  for  holiness,  and  that  transgression  places  it  in  a  more 
favorable  condition  for  holiness  than  obedience,  and  more 
naturally  and  strongly  disposes  it  to  obey  ? 

Nor  can  it  be  shown  that  the  fact,  that  the  means  by 
which  the  mind  is  prevented  from  sin  are  brought  to  bear 
on  it,  by  an  interposition  of  the  Spirit  or  of  Providence, 
can  give  rise  to  such  a  result.  Is  there  any  thing  in  an 
interposition  that  fills  the  mind  with  affecting  views  of 
divine  things,  and  prompts  it  to  holy  choices,  or  in  the  infi- 
nite condescension,  benevolence,  aversion  to  sin,  and  love  of 
holiness  which  it  exhibits,  that  is  naturally  adapted  to  in- 
spire a  disregard  of  God's  will,  aversion  to  his  service,  and 
attachment  to  sin  ?  Such  were  not  the  views  of  the  apostle. 
"  How  shall  we  who  are  dead  to  sin,  live  any  longer  therein  ? 
The  love  of  Christ  constraineth  us,  because  we  thus  judge, 
that  if  one  died  for  all,  then  were  all  dead,  and  that  he  died 
for  all,  that  they  which  live,  should  not  henceforth  live 
unto  themselves,  but  unto  him  that  died  for  them  and  rose 
again."  Such  interpositions  are  obviously  eminently 
adapted  to  fill  the  mind  with  a  dread  of  offending  him,  to 
deepen  its  views  of  the  guilt  of  sin,  quicken  its  sense  of 
obligation,  touch  it  with  gratitude  and  love,  and  thus  invi- 
gorate all  its  holy  affections,  and  strengthen  its  purposes  of 
obedience. 

In  whatever  relation  then  the  tendency  of  such  an  inter- 
position with  respect  to  the  subjects  of  it  is  contemplated, 
it  is  clear  that  its  legitimate  and  necessary  influence  must 


478 

be  in  favor — not  of  deeper  and  more  habitual  sin — but  of 
higher  and  more  habitual  holiness.  To  suppose  it  can  be 
otherwise,  is  to  contradict  the  essential  laws  of  our  nature, 
and  the  usual  influence  of  the  causes  that  excite  us,  and  to 
ascribe  to  the  means  of  holiness,  and  to  holiness  itself,  an 
agency  which  sin  and  temptation  alone  exert. 

It  is  equally  impossible  for  the  reviewer  to  prove  that 
such  interpositions  would  become  causes  of  leading  beings 
who  were  not  their  subjects,  to  greater  degrees  of  sin  than 
they  would  otherwise  commit.  Were  he  to  attempt  it,  it 
must  be  either  on  the  ground  that  divine  interpositions 
that  prevent  sin  in  others,  are  adapted  to  exert  such  an  influ- 
ence ;  or  that  it  is  the  natural  eflfect  of  the  obedient  example 
of  those  who  are  prevented  by  them  from  sin.  But  it  can- 
not be  maintained  on  the  first  ground  ;  as  the  interpositions 
by  which  God  prevents  sin,  and  the  infinite  displays  they 
involve,  of  justice,  holiness,  and  benevolence,  in  fact 
exert  precisely  the  opposite  influence,  and  are  obviously 
pre-eminently  adapted  to  excite  the  obedient  aflections 
of  holy  beings,  and  overawe  and  win  back  the  rebel- 
lious. To  suppose  that  that  is  not  their  natural  influence 
on  the  great  universe  of  minds  who  contemplate  them,  is 
derogatory  to  God,  and  reproachful  to  them,  as  well  as  a 
rank  absurdity  ;  as  it  implies  that  manifestations  of  excel- 
lence are  not  fitted  to  excite  an  approval  of  it,  and  thence 
that  the  nature  of  intelligent  creatures  is  such,  that  just 
views  of  that  excellence  are  not  adapted  to  prove  to  them 
succesful  inducements  to  love  it. 

The  supposition  that  the  holiness  consequent  on  those 
interpositions  should  become  to  others  a  stronger  temptation 
to  sin  than  would  otherwise  reach  them,  is  equally  absurd 
and  reproachful,  both  to  God  and  his  creatures  ;  as  it  im- 
plies that  they  are  so  formed  that  holiness  naturally  becomes 


479 

tD  them  a  stronger  temptation  to  sin,  than  sin  itself;  and 
that  an  obedient  example  is  more  likely  than  an  evil  one,  to 
prompt  them  to  rebellion  ;  and  proceeds  theretbre  virtually 
on  the  assumption,  that  they  ai'e  fraught  with  a  constitu- 
tional bias  to  sin,  and  aversion  to  holiness  ;  as  there  is  no 
other  imaginable  hypothesis,  on  which  those  causes  can  be 
supposed  to  give  birth  to  such  an  efiect. 

There  is  no  conceivable  ground  then,  whatever,  on  which 
the  supposition  in  question  can  be  successfully  maintained. 
Alike  inconsistent  with  the  laws  of  our  nature,  the  natural 
tendencies  of  holiness  and  sin,  and  the  interpositions  of  God, 
by  which  we  are  prevented  from  transgression,  it  is  de- 
monstrably erroneous. 

Another  proof  of  its  error  is  seen  in  its  inconsistencj'  with 
the  impressions  on  which  we  naturally  act,  in  our  endeavors 
to  guard  ourselves  against  temptation,  and  promote  the  sanc- 
tification  of  others.  We  are  accustomed  to  proceed  on  the 
conviction,  that  to  prevent  ourselves  from  successful  temp- 
tation, and  obey  instead  of  sinning,  will  contribute  to 
our  subsequent  safety,  rather  than  increase  the  likelihood 
of  our  sinning  to  a  greater  or  equal  degree  ;  and  it  is  un- 
questionably a  safe  and  just  assumption,  both  in  respect  to 
ourselves  and  others. 

It  would  be  wholly  unauthorized,  however,  were  the  sup- 
position in  question  legitimate.  It  would  then  be  wholly 
uncertain  that  a  present  triumph  over  temptation  would 
contribute  to  strengthen  us  against  its  influence  hereafter, 
or  that  our  resisting  the  devil  would  cause  him  to  flee  from 
us  ;  or  if  it  did,  that  it  would  not  place  us  in  a  far  worse, 
instead  of  a  more  eligible  condition  ;  and  equally  uncertain 
that  our  efforts  to  promote  the  reformation  and  conversion 
of  others  would  not  ultimately  augment,  instead  of  diminish- 


480 

ing  the  sum  of  evil.  If  adopted,  therefore,  as  authentic,  it 
would  naturally  discourage  our  efforts  to  advance  our  own 
holiness,  and  paralyze  our  labors  to  promote  the  sanctifica- 
tion  of  our  fellow  men.  Who  would  submit  to  toils  and 
sacrifices  to  instruct  and  reform  the  guilty  ; — who  would 
encounter  the  self-denials  and  dangers  of  conveying  the 
gospel  to  heathen  lands ;— who  would  embark  in  the  ardu- 
ous labors  of  the  ministry,  in  even  the  most  favorable 
conditions ;  if  impressed  with  the  conviction,  that  were  he 
in  fact  to  become  the  means  of  turning  men  from  the  power 
of  Satan  unto  God,  it  might  after  all  result  in  boundlessly 
increasing,  instead  of  lessening  the  aggregate  of  evil  in 
the  divine  empire !  A  supposition,  which,  if  allowed  its 
legitimate  influence,  would  thus  at  once  suspend  every 
benevolent  labor  in  our  world,  and  arrest  the  progress  of 
holiness,  cannot  possibly  be  correct. 

But,  finally,  were  it  granted  to  the  reviewer  that  any  fur- 
ther successful  interpositions  to  prevent  sin  might  prove  the 
occasion  of  increasing,  in  place  of  diminishing  it,  and  that 
a  system  of  such  preventions  might  at  length  place  the 
universe  in  such  a  condition  as  to  render  it  impossible  to  the 
Most  High  any  longer  to  prevent  it ;  it  would  then  be  imprac- 
ticable to  him  to  prove  that  such  a  system  of  interpositions  has 
not  already  been  pursued,  and  that  the  reason,  accordingly, 
of  the  non-prevention  of  the  sin  that  is  now  exerted,  is  not, 
that  God  has  so  far  exhausted  his  means  of  preventing  it, 
that  he  can  no  longer  carry  them  any  farther  than  their  pre- 
sent limits,  and  thereby  place  it  out  of  his  power  to  vindi- 
cate his  admission  that  God  can  prevent  us  from  sin  in  the 
instances  in  which  we  transgress.  If  such  might  be  the 
consequence  of  his  preventing  the  sins  that  now  take  place, 
how  can  the  reviewer  show  that  it  may  not,  in  fact,  have  re- 


4ei 

suited  from  his  having  already  interposed  and  prevented 
sins  which  would  otherwise  have  been  exerted  ?  What  rea- 
son can  be  offered  to  show  that  God  might,  by  such  a  sys- 
tem of  interventions,  hereafter  place  it  out  of  his  power  to 
prevent  us  from  transgressing,  that  will  not  equally  show 
that  he  may  already  have  placed  it  out  of  his  power  by  the 
administration  he  has  heretofore  pursued  ?  The  reviewer, 
then,  if  he  maintains  the  supposition  in  question,  cannot 
prove  that  God  can  prevent  us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in 
which  we  transgress ;  and  if,  therefore,  he  adheres  to  this 
position,  he  must,  to  be  consistent,  relinquish  that  suppo- 
sition. 

On  the  whole,  then,  it  is  sufficiently  clear  from  these  con- 
siderations, fraught  as  it  is  with  so  many  erroneous  and  con- 
tradictory principles,  that  the  reviewer's  theory  can  never 
be  maintained,  either  on  any  of  the  grounds  on  which  it  has 
hitherto  been  placed,  or  on  any  other  that  can  be  alleged 
for  its  support. 

V.  In  place  of  any  such  adaptation  as  he  claims  for  it, 
to  obviate  the  objections  of  infidels,  his  theory  openly  yields 
to  them  the  assumptions,  and  sanctions  the  logic  on  which 
they  rest  their  conclusion  against  the  divine  existence. 

The  atheist,  proceeding  on  the  assumption  that  to  per- 
mit evil  that  might  be  prevented,  is  inconsistent  with  bene- 
volence, and  that  an  omnipotent  being,  were  there  one, 
could, — and,  if  benevolent,  therefore,  would, — prevent  all 
evil,  infers  from  the  fact  that  evil  exists,  that  there  is  no 
such  being.  This  inference,  the  reviewer  asserts,  must  fol- 
low with  all  the  force  of  absolute  demonstration,  if  the  as- 
sumption that  an  omnipotent  God  could  prevent  all  sin  is 
admitted  to  be  true ;  and,  accordingly,  attempts,  in  his  first 
article,  to  evade  it,  simply  by  assuming  and  endeavoring  to 


482 

show  that  it  is  not  possible  to  God,  although  omnipotent^ 
by  any  measures  of  providence  and  moral  government,  to 
prevent  the  existence  of  evil,  though  he  might,  as  Creator. 
This,  however,  in  place  of  refuting  or  escaping  that  objec- 
tion— in  expressly  admitting  that  God  voluntarily  creates 
and  sustains  the  beings  who  sin,  and  that  he  might,  there- 
fore, have  prevented  them  from  it,  by  not  giving  them  exis- 
tence— grants  the  position  from  which,  by  his  own  conces- 
sion, the  inference  against  the  divine  existence  is  rendered 
legitimate  ; — as,  to  lay  a  foundation  for  the  certain  existence 
of  evil  by  an  act  of  creation,  is  voluntarily  to  permit  it 
when  it  might  be  prevented,  as  truly  and  obviously  as  it  is, 
to  permit  its  existence  by  the  measures  of  a  moral  and  pro- 
vidential government.  But  beyond  this  concession  he  has 
likewise,  in  the  article  under  consideration,  expressly  ad- 
mitted that  God  might  by  mere  measures  of  providence  and 
moral  government,  prevent  all  the  evil  that  exists  ;  and  that 
he  voluntarily  permits  it,  therefore,  through  that  medium, 
as  well  as  by  his  acts  as  Creator.  He  thus,  in  place  of 
overthrowing  the  atheistic  inference,  has  granted,  in  the 
fullest  manner,  the  truth  of  the  premise,  from  the  admission 
of  which,  by  his  own  concession,  that  conclusion  is  made  to 
follow  with  demonstrative  certainty !  Such  is  the  issue  of 
this  sagacious  expedient  for  forever  silencing  the  taunts 
and  reasonings  of  infidels,  and  compelling  them,  "  in  spite 
of  every  preventing  influence,"  to  relinquish  their  objec- 
tions. Its  "vantage  ground,"  of  which  its  abettors  have 
given  so  many  flattering  commendations,  turns  out  to  be 
the  brink  of  the  precipice  that  overhangs  the  gulph  of 
atheism  ;  and  "  the  point  of  rest"  which  it  presents  to  its 
disciples,  the  bottom  of  the  abyss  beneath ! 

Such  is  the  result  of  the  reviewer's  reasonings  in  support 


483 

of  his  hypothesis,  and  endeavors  to  overthrow  by  it  the  ob- 
jections of  infidels.  Has  any  better  success — I  am  now  to 
inquire — attended  his  efforts  to  subvert  that  which  I  have 
advocated  ? 

VI.  He  has  followed  in  his  criticisms  on  it,  Dr.  Taylor's 
rule  of"  the  true  usus  loquendi,''^ — which  requires  an  inter- 
preter to  construe  the  language  of  others  by  his  own  views 
of  the  subject  of  which  it  treats — and  has,  accordingly  treat- 
ed it  as  though  it  were  founded,  like  his  own  hypothesis,  on 
the  scheme  of  self-determination  ! 

The  article  on  his  review  in  the  number  for  May  last,  was 
chiefly  employed,  it  will  be  recollected,  on  the  one  hand,  in 
demonstrating  that  his  hypothesis  is  founded  on  the  theory 
of  a  self-determined  will  or  the  contingency  of  actions,  in 
tracing  that  theory  to  its  results,  and  in  showing  it  to  be 
contradictory  to  our  moral  agency,  and  to  the  doctrines  of 
the  gospel ;   and  on  the  other,  in  maintaining  in  opposition 
to  it,  the  doctrine  that  moral  beings  act  only  for  intelligent 
reasons,   that  God   by  his  own  agency  determines  the  na- 
ture of  their  actions,  and  that  he  constitutes  accordingly,  by 
his  purposes  respecting  his  own  agency,  a  certainty  before- 
hand of  the  mode  in  which  they  are  to  act.     It  was  at  the 
close  of  a  series  of  arguments  employed  in  sustaining  these 
positions,  that  that  statement  of  the  theory  I  have  advanced, 
was  added,  which  the  reviewer  has  made  the  ground  of  his 
representation  of  it.     The  language  on  which  he  founds  his 
criticism,  occurs  in  the  first  member  of  the  following  passage : 

"  The  prime  element  of  tliat  theory  is  the  doctrine  that  God 
places  each  and  all  of  his  moral  creatures  in  that  series  of  conditions 
in  which,  on  the  one  hand,  the  obedience  he  requires  would,  if  ren- 
dered, secure  the  greatest  good ;  and  in  which,  on  the  other,  if  tTiat 
obedience  is  not  rendered,  the  sin  that  is  exerted  may  be  overruled  so 
as  to  secure  an  equal  good  ;  that  the  fact  that  the  obedience  which 

61 


484 

he  requires  would,  it"  lendored,  constitute  and  prove  tlie  instrument 
of  that  good,  is  the  ground  of  his  placing  tiieni  in  that  series  of  cir- 
cumstances and  desiring  and  requiring  from  them  Ihat  obedience;  and 
that  the  reason  accordingly  of  his  voluntarily  permitting  them  to 
sin  as  theij  do,  in  place  of  preventing  them,  is,  that  no  other  obedience 
than  that  which  he  enjoins  could,  if  rendered,  constitute  and  become 
the  means  of  as  great  a  sum  of  good,  as  the  obedience  he  requires 
would  have  involved;  and  as  his  present  administration,  through  its 
displays  of  grace  and  justice,  is  the  instrument  of  gaining." — No.  X. 
p.  203. 

On  this  he  oflers  the  following  remarks: 

"  According  to  this  theory,  the  design  of  God  in  ordering  the  con- 
ditions of  his  creatures,  is  not  to  gain  any  certain  results,  in  the 
amount  of  obedience  rendered,  and  the  numbers  forever  holy  in  his 
kingdom.  He  refuses  to  place  his  creatures  in  conditions  which  would 
secure  the  whole  universe  in  holiness  to  eternity,  and  places  them  in 
others,  which  bring  in  all  the  occasions  of  sin,  merely  for  the  sake  of 
providing  two  possibilities ;  the  possibility  of  his  creatures'  securing 
the  greatest  good  if  they  obey,  and  the  possibility  of  his  securing 
an  equal  good  himself,  if  they  refuse  I  Is  this  true?  Does  God  do  no- 
thing to  obtain  a  decision  from  his  creatures  cither  way  ?  nothing  to 
favor  the  extent  of  holiness,  and  prevent  that  of  sin  in  his  kingdom  ? 
Are  all  his  measures  of  moral  government  and  providence  concen- 
trated on  the  one  object  of  placing  his  creatures  in  conditions  of  su- 
preme indifference  to  him,  as  it  respects  their  obedience  or  sin?  Has 
God  no  eye,  or  heart,  fi.xed  on  the  results  which  he  can  secure  in  the 
actual  decisions  of  his  creatures?" — p.  645. 

He  has  thus, — proceeding  on  the  assumption  that  no  cer- 
tainty is  constituted  by  their  being  placed  in  those  condi- 
tions, that  they  will  act  in  the  manner  in  which  they  do — 
interpreted  the  theory  as  though  it  were  founded  on  the  hy- 
pothesis of  contingency,  or  self-determination,  and  not  on 
the  doctrine  maintained  in  the  article  in  which  the  passage 
occurs,  and  uniformly  advocated  by  me — that  creatures  are 
determined  in  their  choices  through  the  agency  of  motives, 
and  that  God  accordingly,  in  determining  through  his  mo- 


485 

ral  and  providential  administration,  the  influences  that  reach 
them,  renders  it  certain  that  they  will  exert  the  series  of  ac- 
tions which  they  do.  What  the  grounds  are  on  which  he 
rests  this  construction  of  it,  he  has  not  thought  proper  to 
state.  There  clearly  is  nothing  whatever  in  the  language 
of  the  passage  to  authorize  it.  The  "  alternative"  it  ex- 
presses— too  clearly  to  admit  of  disputation — respects  solely 
the  obedience  required  that  is  not  rendered,  and  "  the  sin 
that  is  exerted  in  its  place.''''  It  has  no  relation  whatever  to 
obedience  that  is  in  fact  rendered,  and  sin  that  is  not  ex- 
erted. There  is  no  intimation  in  the  passage  that  any  sin 
beside  that  which  is  actually  exerted,  could  be  so  overruled 
as  to  secure  the  greatest  good.  Nor  is  there  any  thing  in 
any  of  the  positions  advanced  in  it,  that  authorizes  his  con- 
struction. It  does  not  follow  from  the  fact  that  the  condi- 
tions in  which  moral  creatures  are  placed,  are  such  that  their 
perfect  obedience  would  secure  the  greatest  good,  and  that 
God  places  them  in  those  conditions  for  that  reason,  that  no 
certainty  is  constituted  by  their  being  placed  in  them,  of 
the  mode  in  which  they  are  to  act.  It  does  not,  from  the 
fact  that  such  an  agency — obedient  and  sinful — as  that 
which  they  exert,  may  be  made  the  means  of  securing  the 
greatest  good.  Nor  does  it,  from  the  fact  that  God  requires 
and  desires  a  perfect  obedience  from  them  in  those  condi- 
tions ;  nor  from  the  fact  that  he  voluntarily  permits  them  to 
sin  as  they  do,  in  place  of  preventing  them,  because  no 
perfect  obedience  from  them,  except  in  those  conditions, 
would  secure  the  greatest  good.  But  these  are  all  the  pro- 
positions which  the  passage  contains. 

Accordingly,  in  place  of  expressing  or  authorizing  the 
doctrine  he  ascribes  to  it,  the  theory — proceeding  on  the 
known  and  previously  demonstrated  fact,  that  their  being 
placed  in  such  conditions,  renders  it  certain  that  they  will 


136 

exert  identically  that  agency,  lioly  and  sinful,  which  they 
do — teaches  on  the  one  hand,  that  were  they,  conformably 
to  their  obligations,  to  yield  the  obedience  required,  it 
would  secure  the  greatest  good ;  and  on  the  other,  that  the 
sin  that  is  exerted  is  so  overruled,  that  God  in  fact  secures 
that  good.  That  it  is  founded  on  this  view  of  the  con- 
nexion of  their  conditions  with  their  agency,  the  reviewer 
himself  indeed  represents  in  the  statement  he  gives  of  it 
on  an  earlier  page  of  his  article,  in  which  he  exhibits  it  as 
teaching,  that  "these  evils" — the  sin  and  suffering  that  exist — 
"  result  with  certainty  from  placing  creatures  in  conditions 
in  which  they  may  obtain  a  higher  degree  of  holiness,  if  they 
will,  than  they  possibly  could  in  conditions  which  would 
insure  universal  holiness" — p.  620.  And  had  he  compared 
his  other  construction  of  it,  with  the  passage  itself  on  which 
he  founded  it,  with  the  arguments  that  precede  and  follow 
it,  or  with  the  views  of  the  subject  that  are  given  in  previ- 
ous discussions,  he  could  not  have  failed  to  discern  that  his 
representation  is  not  only  wholly  unauthorized,  but  the  di- 
rect converse  of  the  theory  I  have  advanced.  Of  this  the 
following  passages  occurring  in  the  discussion  from  which 
his  quotation  is  made,  furnish  sufficient  proof. 

"  But  if  it  is  (iius  clear  tliat  he  requires  from  his  creatures  precisely 
that  obedience  which  would,  if  rendered,  secure  the  greatest  good, 
then  the  next  element  of  the  theory  in  question — that  he  desircsfrom 
them  the  exercise  of  that  obedience — follows,  likewise,  with  an  equally 
indisputable  certainty.  There  not  only  is  no  ground  whatever  loft  for 
any  other  conclusion  ;  but  manifestly  no  other  can  be  compatible  with 
either  his  wisdom,  his  purity,  or  his  benevolence.  To  suppose  him 
not  to  desire  that  obedience,  were  in  so  many  words  to  suppose  him  not  to 
desire  the  greatest  good,  and  impute  imperfection  alike  to  his  goodness 
and  wisdom. 

Such  being  the  certainty  of  this  branch  of  the  theory,  tlic  next 
point  to  be  determined  respecting  it  is,  whether,  as  it  assumes,  the  sin 


487 

thai  is  permilled  to  he  exerted,  is  so  overruled  as  to  secure  as  great  an 
amount  of  good  as  would  Jiave  been  the  result,  had  all  his  creatures 
rendered  the  obedience  whicli  he  requires.'' 

"  The  remaining  qviestion  to  be  decided  respecting  this  theory  i.s^ 
whether,  as  it  assumes,  God — inasmuch  as  men  do  not  obey  in  the 
conditions  in  which  they  are  placed — hud  any  alternative  than  either 
to  permit  them  to  sin  as  he  does,  and  thereby  secure  the  greatest  good 
through  the  remedial  measures  of  his  present  administration  ;  or  else 
to  debar  himself  from  the  greatast,  and  limit  himself  to  the  attainment 
of  only  an  inferior  good  by  wholly  preventing  them  from  sin." 

"  In  these  three  positions  then — that  the  obedience  which  he  re- 
quires would,  if  rendered,  secure  the  greatest  good  ;  thai  the  siniohich 
he  permits  is,  together  with  the  obedience  that  is  exerted,  actually  made 
the  instrument  of  attaining  that  good  :  and  that  no  other  system  of 
agency  from  his  creatures,  except  either  that  which  he  requires,  or 
that  which  they  exert,  couli  prove  the  means  of  gaining  an  equal  sum 
of  holiness  and  happiness — we  thus  have  all  the  requisite  materials 
for  the  reconciliation  of  his  j^ermission  of  the  evil  which  takes  place, 
with  his  purity,  his  sincerity,  his  wisdom,  and  his  benevolence. — No. 
X.  p.  205—210. 

Here  then  there  is  no  hypothesis  respecting  any  sin,  except 
that  which  is  "  permitted  to  be  exerted."  There  is  no 
pretence  of  theorizing  respecting  the  effects  which  might 
arise  from  the  existence  of  any  additional  or  different  sin  ; 
no  intimation  that  were  men  left  to  transgress  in  any  in- 
stances in  which  they  now  obey,  their  sin  in  those  instances 
could  be  so  overruled  as  to  secure  as  great  a  good,  as  that 
which  the  obedience  they  now  exert  involves  ; — no  repre- 
sentation that  it  is  a  matter  of  total  indifference  to  God  whe- 
ther a  solitary  act  of  obedience  is  ever  exerted  by  any  of 
his  creatures  ;  that  a  system  in  which  there  was  no  holiness, 
might  involve  as  much  holiness  and  happiness  as  exist  in 
the  present  system — that  "  a  whole  universe  obedient  and 
blest  to  eternity  before  his  benignant  throne,  and  a  whole 
universe  dashed  upon  the  shores  of  everlasting  rebellion  and 
blasphemy  and  punishment" — are  "  two  equal  goods  !  both 


488 

the  greatest  possible  !"  Yet  such  are  the  doctrines  which  the 
reviewer  exhibits  it  as  teaching !  Nor  are  there  any 
representations,  as  though  the  theory  were  built  on  the 
doctrine  of  the  contingency  of  actions,  that  "  the  design 
of  God  in  ordering  the  conditions  of  his  creatures  is 
not  to  gain  any  certain  results,  in  the  amount  of  obe- 
dience rendered,  and  the  numbers  forever  holy  in  his 
kingdom  :"  that  "  he  refuses  to  place  his  creatures  in  con- 
ditions which  would  secure  the  whole  universe  in  holiness 
to  eternity,  and  places  them  in  others,  which  bring  in  all 
the  occasions  of  sin,  merely  for  the  sake  of  providing  two 
possibilities,— the  possibility/  of  his  creatures  securing  the 
greatest  good  if  they  obey,  and  the  possibility  of  his  secur- 
ing an  equal  good  himself  if  they  refuse  !" — that  he  "  does 
nothing  to  obtain  a  decision  from  his  creatures  either  tcay, 
nothing  to  favor  the  extent  of  holiness  and  prevent  that  of  sin, 
in  his  kingdom,''''  but  that  "  all  his  measures  of  moral  govern- 
ment and  providence"  are  "concentrated  on  the  one  object  of 
placing  his  creatures  in  conditions  of  supreme  indiflerence 
to  him,  as  it  respects  their  obedience  or  sin,"  .with  "  no  eye 
or  heart  fixed  on  the  results  which  he  can  secure  in  their  ac- 
tual decisions." 

Yet,  these  again  are  the  representations  which  the  reviewer 
exhibits  it  as  presenting, — representations  that  are  not  only 
utterly  unauthorized,  but  that  are  on  every  point  which 
they  affect,  the  direct  converse  of  the  views  that  are  ex- 
pressed in  the  paragraph  itself,  and  the  whole  discussion 
from  which  he  made  his  quotation. 

As  might  be  expected,  they  are  passed  off  without  the 
slightest  attempt  to  vindicate  their  accuracy,  or  effort  to  sub- 
vert the  theory,  of  which  they  are  represented  as  the  main 
elemenl,  by  pointing  out  their  palpable  and  total  contradic- 


489 

toriiiess  to  all  the  positions  which  the  discussion  from  which 
he  made  his  quotation,  is  employed  in  maintaining,  as  well 
as  to  all  the  views  1  have  on  othei*  occasions  advanced  on 
those  subjects.  He  would  have  found  it  an  easy  taskto 
accomplish  the  latter.  How  happened  it, — if  his  con- 
struction of  the  theory  is  indisputably  con-ect, — that  he 
neglected  so  favorable  an  opportunity  to  reciprocate  a 
service,  I  have  so  frequently  rendered  him  and  his  asso- 
ciates !  He  has  not  shown  any  reluctance  to  perplex  his 
other  opponents  by  this  expedient.  The  former,  however, 
he  could  not  have  so  readily  accomplished.  It  would 
have  been  a  matter  of  some  difficulty  to  show,  that  to 
represent  that  "  the  sin  that  is  permitted  to  be  exerted,  is  so 
overruled  as  to  secure  as  gi-eat  an  amount  of  good,  as 
would  have  been  the  result  had  all  his  creatures  rendered 
the  obedience  which  God  requires  ;"  is  to  teach  that  were 
all  the  beings  who  exercise  obedience,  to  transgress  in  all 
the  instances  in  which  they  obey,  the  additional  sin  which 
would  then  exist,  could  also  be  so  overruled.  It  would 
have  been  a  task  of  equal  difficulty  to  demonstrate  that  to 
represent  that  God  supremely  "  desires  from  them  the  obe- 
dience" which  he  requires; — is  to  exhibit  him  as  supremely 
indifierent  whether  they  exert  that  or  the  opposite  agency  ; 
or  to  prove  that  to  state  that  one  ground  of  his  placing 
them  in  that  series  of  circumstances  in  which  he  does, 
*'  and  desiring  and  requiring  from  them  that  obedience" 
is,  "  that  that  obedience  would,  if  rendered,  constitute  and 
prove  the  instrument"  of  the  "greatest  good;" — is  to  state 
that  "  all  his  measures  of  moral  government  and  provi- 
dence" are  "concentrated  on  the  one  object  of  placing  his 
creatures  in  conditions  of  supreme  indifference  to  him  as 
it  respects  their  obedience  or  sin."  It  would  have  been  an 
equally  perplexing  undertaking  to  show,  that  to  represent 


490 

"  that  no  other  system  of  agency  ffom  his  creatures,  except 
either  that  which  lie  requires,   or   that  vvhicli  they  exert? 
could  prove  the  means  of  gaining"  the  greatest  "  sum  of 
holiness  and  happiness;" — is  to  represent,  that  a  system  of 
agency  that  should  involve  none  of  the  obedience  which  he 
requires,  and  that  is  exerted,  but  should  consist  solely  of 
sin,  would  prove  the   means   of  gaining  the  same  sum  of 
holiness  and  happiness  !     The  sin  that  is  in  fact  "  permitted 
to  be  exerted,"   is  overruled  so   as   to  secure  the  greatest 
good  ; — therefore,  were  the  whole  universe  of  creatures  to 
sin  uninterruptedly,  all  the  sin  that  would  then  exist  could 
also  be  so  overruled  !   God  supremely  desires  all  his  subjects 
to  yield  a  perfect  obedience  to  his  laws ; — therefore,  he  is 
supremely  indifferent  whether  they  ever  yield  any  whatever ! 
Of  the  agency  which  his  creatures  in  fact  exert,  a  vast  pro- 
portion is  holy  ; — therefore,  an  equal  share  of  it  would  be 
holy,  were  they  to  exert  no  holiness  whatever !      Such  is 
the    admirable    logic  to   which    the  reviewer  would   have 
found  himself  obliged  to  resort,  had  he  attempted  to  verify 
the  representation  he  has  given  of  the  theory  ! 

In  place,  then,  of  having  convicted  it  of  any  essential 
error,  he  has  not  even  made  it  the  subject  of  his  animad- 
version ;  but  has  merely,  without  a  semblance  of  authority, 
and  in  defiance  of  the  most  palpable  facts,  ascribed  to  me 
a  hideous  complication  of  positions  that, — although,  in 
several  points  they  bear  a  very  near  resemblance  to  some 
of  the  elements  of  his  hypothesis — are  in  every  respect  the 
direct  converse  of  that  which  I  have  maintained. 

VII.  In  place  of  "  this  false  and  mazy  theory,  whlcii  for 
a  moment  crossed  his  patii  ;"  that  which  I  have  advanced, 
as  is  seen  from  the  passages  quoted  above,  is  summarily, 
that  God  places  each  and  all  of  his  moral  creatures  in  such 


491 

a  series  of  conditions,  that,  first,  the  obedience  he  requires, 
would,  if  rendered,  secure  the  greatest  good  ;  and  that  next, 
he  so  overrules  the  sin  that  is  exerted,  as  to  secure  an  equal 
good.  Had  the  reviewer  then  stated  and  assailed  this 
theory,  whatever  may  be  its  relations  to  fact,  he  clearly 
could  never  consistently  with  his  own  admissions,  have 
proved  it  to  be  erroneous.  For  he  admits  that  God  places 
his  creatures  in  those  conditions ;  that  the  obedience  which 
he  requires  would,  were  it  rendered,  secure  the  greatest 
good  ;  and  that  he  places  them  in  those  conditions  with  a 
full  foresight  that  they  will  not  yield  the  obedience  univer- 
sally which  he  requires,  but  that  their  agency  will  be 
precisely  that  which  they  exert.*  He  likewise,  as  has 
already  been  seen,  admits,  though  inconsistently  with  the 
fundamental  elements  of  his  theory  of  moral  agency,  that 
God  might  prevent  us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which  we 
transgress  ;    and,   thence,   that  he  voluntarily   permits  the 

•'  *  The  principal  facts  on  which  this  theory  is  founded  are  two  ;  that  God 
orders  the  conditions  of  his  creatures  by  his  providence,  and  that  he  prefers 
that  his  creatures  in  the  conditions  in  which  he  places  them,  should  obey 
rather  than  sin.  Tlie  facts  we  fully  admit,  and  they  show,  as  we  contend, 
that  God  regulates  the  condition  of  creatures,  knoivhig  what  they  will  do  m 
these  conditions,  with  the  design  of  doing  the  most  possible  in  a  whole  uni- 
verse to  promote  holiness  and  prevent  sin.  For  this  design  to  secure  the 
highest  good  possible  on  his  part,  is  still  consistent  with  the  still  higher  con- 
ceivable good  of  the  voluntary  cooperation  of  all  his  kingdom,  and.  with  his 
preference  that  they  should  obey."     p.  645. 

Why,  after  thus  admitting  the  doctrine  I  have  uniformly  taught,  and 
taught  in  refutation  of  the  fundamental  assumption  of  his  own  hypothesis — 
that  God  in  determining  the  conditions  in  which  his  creatures  are  to  act, 
constitutes  a  certainty  of  the  agency  they  are  to  exert,  he  should,  without  the 
slightest  authority,  proceed  in  the  next  sentence  to  represent  the  theory  as 
teaching  that  no  certainty  is  constituted  by  their  being  placed  in  those  con- 
ditions, of  the  mode  in  which  they  are  to  act;  that  "the  design  of  God"'  in 
placing  them  in  them,  "  is  not  to  gain  any  certain  rcsidts,"  but  only  to  provide 
"possibilities;"  is  left  to  the  reader  to  conjecture,  or  the  reviewer  <o  ex- 
plain. 

62 


492 

sin  that  exists,  when  he  i;riight  prevent  it:  and,  consequently, 
that  the  reason  of  his  permitting  it  is,  that  he  can  secure 
more  good  by  permitting  it,  than  he  could  were  he  to  pre- 
vent it.  He  grants,  also,  that  one  mode  in  which  he  gains 
more  good  by  permitting,  than  he  could  by  preventing  it, 
is  by  raising  his  obedient  creatures,  through  his  measures 
of  justice  and  grace,  to  higher  degrees  of  holiness,  than 
they  would  otherwise  exert,     p.  638. 

He   manifestly,   therefore,   can   never  consistently  with 
these  admissions,  prove — which  is  the  only  other  point  he 
needs  to  give  up  in  order  to  assent  to  the  whole  theory — that 
God  does  not  in  fact  secure  as  great  a  sum  of  good  by  his 
present  administration,  as  would  exist,  were  all  his  creatures 
to  exert  the  obedience  which  he  requires.      He  cannot  on 
the  ground,  that  God  cannot  prevent  all  sin  ;  since  in  ad- 
mitting that  he  might  have  prevented  all  the  sin  that  exists, 
he  has  placed  it  out  of  his  power  consistently  to  claim  that 
he  could  not  prevent   his  creatures  from   It  in  all  future 
instances,  had  he  withheld  them  from  it  hitherto.     On  what 
ground  has  he  made  that  concession .''     Is  it  that  the  denial 
that  God  could  prevent  us  from  sin  in  the  instances  in  which 
we  transgress,  is  inconsistent  with  his  attributes.''    But  they 
would  have  been  the  same  had  he  wholly  prevented  us  from 
sin.    Is  it  that  that  denial  is  inconsistent  with  our  attributes, 
and  the  laws  of  our  agency.''     They  also  would  have  con- 
tinued the  same  under   any  other  administration,  and  fur- 
nished at  any  stage  of  our  existence,  the  same  obstacle  to 
such  a  denial.    Nor  can  he  show  that  God  could  not  prevent 
his  creatures  from  sin  in  all  future  instances,  had  he  with- 
held them  from  it  hitherto,  on  the  ground  that  the  prevention 
of  sin   has   a   natural   adaptation    to   increase   it.       That 
assumption  is  both  at  variance  with  fact  and  the  laws  of  oui 


493 

agency,  and  were  it  legitimate,  would  contradict  his  own 
doctrine  that  God  actually  prevents  the  occurrence  of  it  in 
other  instances,  by  his  agency  towards  that  which  is 
exerted  ;  since,  if  the  prevention  of  sin  has  a  natural  ten- 
dency to  increase  it,  how  can  the  reviewer  prove,  that  the 
prevention  which  results  at  first  from  the  divine  administra- 
tion towards  the  sin  that  is  exerted,  may  not  at  length 
betray  that  adaptation,  and  give  rise  ultimately  to  a  far 
greater  additional  sum  of  sin,  than  it  is  the  means  of  pre- 
venting ? 

He  clearly  then  can  never  on  any  of  these  grounds  on 
which  he  relies  for  the  support  of  his  own  theory,  prove 
consistently  with  his  admissions,  that  God  could  not  prevent 
his  creatures  from  sin  in  all  future  instances,  had  he  withheld 
them  from  it  hitherto,  as  well  as  in  those  in  which  they 
transgress,  and  thereby  wholly  exclude  sin  from  his  king- 
dom. But  it  is  thence  equally  clear,  that  he  cannot,  com- 
patibly with  those  concessions,  prove  that  God  does  not 
secure  as  great  a  sum  of  good  by  the  present  system  of 
events,  as  would  exist  were  all  his  creatures  to  obey  ;  on 
the  ground  which  he  assumes,  that  any  system  of  obedient 
agency  from  all  moral  creatures,  would  involve  a  greater 
sum  of  good,  than  is  gained  by  the  present  administration. 
For  as  his  concessions  will  neither  permit  him  to  prove,  nor 
allow  him  to  claim,  that  God  could  not  have  wholly  withheld 
his  creatures  from  sin,  he  must,  to  be  consistent,  admit  that 
the  reason  of  his  permitting  it  is,  that  he  can  secure  by  it  a 
greater  sum  of  good,  than  would  be  gained,  were  he  to 
withhold  them  wholly  from  transgression,  and  sustain  them 
in  uninterrupted  holiness.  If  he  voluntarily  permits  it, 
when  he  might  wholly  exclude  it  from  his  kingdom,  and  is 
wise  and  benevolent  in  its  permission  ;  his  reason  for  it  must 


494 

be,  that  more  good  is  secured  by  it,  than  would  be  gained 
by  maintaining  them  in  a  uniform  obedience.  His  admission 
that  the  obedient  part  of  the  universe  is  raised  to  a  higher 
range  of  holiness  by  the  measures  of  the  divine  government 
towards  sin,  than  it  would  otherwise  attain ;  also  places  it 
out  of  his  power  to  prove  that  God  does  not  secure  as  great 
a  sum  of  good  by  the  present  system  of  events  as  would 
exist  were  all  his  subjects  to  exert  the  obedience  which  he 
requires ;  as  he  can  never  show  that  the  excess  of  holiness 
and  happiness  thus  produced,  is  not  such  that  on  the  whole, 
as  great  a  sum  of  good  is  gained,  as  would  exist,  had  all 
his  creatures  rendered  that  obedience.  He  may,  indeed, 
allege  apparent  possibilities  in  favor  of  the  opposite 
assumption,  and  specious  probabilities  perhaps,  but  no  de- 
monstrative proofs.  In  order  to  that,  he  must  determine 
the  relative  numbers  of  the  holy  and  sinful,  and  the  relation 
which  the  holiness  that  is  in  fact  exerted,  bears  to  that 
which  would  have  been  exerted  by  the  same  beings,  had 
no  sin  ever  been  committed ;  must  furnish,  in  short,  an 
exact  enumeration  on  the  one  hand,  of  all  the  acts  that  are 
exerted  under  the  present  administration,  and  estimate  of 
the  good  and  evil  which  they  involve  ;  and  on  the  other,  of 
all  the  acts  that  would  have  been  exerted,  had  no  sin  ever 
been  exercised.  That,  however,  is  impossible :  and  it  is 
equally  impossible,  accordingly,  for  him  to  present  any 
demonstration  on  that  ground,  that  God  does  not,  in  fact, 
gain  as  great  a  sum  of  good  from  the  present  system  of 
events,  as  would  exist,  had  all  his  creatures  rendered  the 
obedience  he  requires. 

Had  the  reviewer  then  correctly  represented  the  theory 
I  have  advocated,  and  endeavored  to  overthrow  it,  it  is 
abundantly  clear  from  these  considerations,  that  whether 


495 

true  or  false,  he  could  never,  consistently  with  those  of  its 
positions  which  he  has  admitted,  have  proved  it  to  be  erro- 
neous. 

VIII.  Whether,  however,  it  is  in  reality  correct,  or  any 
better  adapted  to  the  end  for  which  it  is  designed,  than 
other  hypotheses  that  are  held  on  the  subject,  is  to  be  de- 
termined, not  by  his  concessions  or  criticisms,  but  by  a 
reference  to  the  facts  which  it  respects,  and  which  it  is 
intended  to  explain. 

The  great  object  of  discussion  on  the  subject  is,  to  show 
the  compatibility  of  the  admission  of  evil  into  the  universe, 
with  wisdom  and  benevolence.  That  God  is  in  fact  in- 
finitely good  and  wise,  is  held  by  each  of  the  parties  to  the 
present  controversy  ;  and  that  his  admission  of  evil  into  his 
kingdom,  is  both  compatible  with,  and  a  consequence  of 
his  benevolence  and  wisdom.  It  is  held  by  each  of  them, 
likewise,  that  its  permission  by  him  is  necessary  to  his 
attainment  of  the  greatest  sum  of  good  in  his  empire ;  or 
that  its  entire  prevention  by  him,  by  a  change  of  his  ad- 
ministration, is  incompatible  with  the  production  of  that 
good.  The  diflerence  between  them,  respects  the  ground 
or  nature  of  that  necessity.  The  reviewer  and  his  associ- 
ates suppose  the  reason  of  it  to  be,  that  it  is  physically 
impossible  to  him  wholly  to  exclude  sin  from  a  moral 
system.  Calvinists  generally  suppose  it  to  be,  that  by 
permitting  it,  he  secures  a  greater  sum  of  holiness  and 
happiness — not  only  than  would  exist  were  he  so  to  alter 
the  conditions  of  his  creatures  as  to  lead  ihem  to  a  perfect 
obedience,  but  than  would  exist  were  they  universally  to 
yield  obedience  in  the  conditions  in  which  they  are  in  fact 
placed  by  his  providence-  The  reason  that  I  liave  alleged 
is,  that  he  gains  by  it — not  a  greater  good  than  would  exist 


490 

were  they  to  yield  the  obedience  he  requires  in  the  condi- 
tions in  which  he  places  them ;  but  than  he  could  secure  by 
so  changing  their  conditions,  as  to  lead  them  to  a  perfect 
obedience.  The  objection  to  the  reviewer's  theory  is,  that 
it  contradicts  alike  all  the  attributes  of  God,  the  doctrines 
of  his  word,  and  the  laws  of  our  agency.  The  objection  to 
that  of  the  Calvinists  is,  that  it  implies  that  God,  all  things 
considered,  prefers  that  his  creatures  should  sin  in  the 
instances  in  which  they  do,  rather  than  yield  the  obedience 
which  he  requires.  Whether  there  are  any  insuperable 
objections  to  that  which  I  have  offered,  remains  to  be  seen. 
Such  as  the  reviewer  has  suggested,  I  shall  notice  in  the 
progress  of  the  discussion.  In  order  to  be  exempt  from 
such  objections,  and  adapted  to  the  exigency  ;  the  principles 
on  which  it  is  founded  must  be  just,  its  representations 
should  accord  with  all  the  facts  which  it  respects,  and  it 
should  present  such  a  view  of  the  measures  of  the  divine 
administration,  as  to  show  that  they  are  founded  on  reasons 
of  benevolence  and  wisdom. 

What  then  are  the  great  facts,  which  a  theory  affects, 
and  with  which  it  should  harmonize? 

1.  God  from  eternity  determined  on  all  the  acts  he  was 
ever  to  exert  as  creator,  preserver,  and  moral,  and  provi- 
dential ruler,  and  with  a  full  foresight  of,  and  purpose 
respecting  all  the  results  that  were  ever  to  transpire,  in 
consequence  of  those  acts. 

2.  As  the  reason  of  his  creating  and  governing  his 
works,  lies  primarily  in  the  blessedness  it  affords  himself, 
and  that  consists  in  the  wise  and  benevolent  exercise  of  his 
attributes,  he  being  infinitely  wise  and  good,  has  chosen  to 
exert  that  system  of  agency  which  will  give  existence  to  the 
greatest    possible   sum    of   holiness   and   happiness  in   his 


497 

creatures ; — as  the  production  of  that  will  involve  the 
highest  exercise  of  his  infinite  perfections,  and  thence  his 
highest  blessedness  in  his  agency. 

3.  He  accordingly,  in  execution  of  his  design  from  eter- 
nity, and  for  the  purpose  of  giving  existence  to  that  holiness 
and  happiness,  voluntarily  gave  and  continues  existence  to 
his  intelligent  universe,  and  exerts  all  his  acts  of  legislation 
and  providence  over  it,  with  a  full  foresight  that  the  agency 
of  his  creatures  is  to  be  precisely  that  which  they  exert. 

4.  He  has  made  known  to  them,  the  species  of  agency 
which  his  rights  and  their  obligations  and  well  being 
require  them  to  exert ;  and  desires  and  requires  them  to 
exert  that  agency. 

5.  They  are  free  agents,  the  efficient  causes  of  the  volun- 
tary acts  which  they  exert,  not  mere  subjects  of  effects  pro- 
duced in  them  by  creative  power,  and  exert  their  choices  for 
intelligent  reasons,  not  from  the  promptings  of  a  blind  and 
self-determined  will. 

6.  As  the  reasons  for  which  they  exert  their  agency  are 
intelligent,  they  lie  solely  in  their  perceptions  and  involuntary 
emotions;  and  thence,  as  God  by  his  various  acts  as  creator 
and  moral  and  providential  ruler,  constitutes  and  controls 
all  the  causes  that  affect  them,  he  thereby  either  directly  or 
indirectly  determines  the  nature  of  all  the  influences  that 
reach  them,  and  through  that  medium,  the  succession  of 
their  perceptions  and  involuntary  emotions,  and  accordingly, 
by  his  purpose  to  exert  his  own  acts,  constitutes  to  himself 
a  certainty  beforehand,  that  they  will  act  in  the  mode  in 
which  they  do,  under  those  influences.  This  position  is  held 
by  all  the  disciples  of  Edwards,  and  is,  obviously,  the  only 
doctrine  that  either  accords  with  consciousness,  or  coin- 
cides with  the  representations  of  the  scriptures.     There  are 


498 

no  known  or  imaginable  reasons  for  which  moral  beings 
exert  volitions  except  such  as  are  seen  and  felt,  and  none 
that  are  seen  and  felt  but  those  that  lie  in  perceptions  and 
emotions,  and  no  emotions  that  are  not  effects  of  percep- 
tions, and  no  perceptions  but  that  are  produced  by  causes 
that  owe  their  existence  and  power  to  act  through  every 
successive  moment  to  God,  and  are  wholly  subject  to  his 
control.  That  those  causes  act  therefore  in  the  manner  and 
give  rise  to  the  effects  which  they  do,  is  either  directly  or 
remotely  the  consequence  of  his  agency. 

7.  He  might,  accordingly,  by  multiplying  or  decreasing 
those  causes,  vary  in  an  infinite  diversity  of  ways  their 
influences,  and  thereby  give  rise  to  a  corresponding  change 
in  the  agency  of  those  who  act  under  them.  To  deny  that 
he  might  multiply,  diminish,  and  vary  those  causes,  were 
to  deny  that  they  are  dependent  on  him,  and  exhibit  them  as 
self-existent.  To  deny  that  he  might  through  that  medium 
vary  the  agency  of  those  who  act  under  their  influence, 
were  to  deny  that  they  act  for  reasons  that  lie  in  their  per- 
ceptions and  emotions,  and  exhibit  them  as  unintelligent  in 
their  agency. 

8.  He  can  prevent  his  creatures  from  sinning  in  all  the 
instances  in  which  they  transgress,  and  carry  them  forward 
in  an  uninterrupted  obedience.  To  deny  it,  were  to  deny 
either  that  the  reasons  of  their  acting  as  they  do,  lie  in  the 
influences  that  affect  them,  or  that  he  can  determine  the 
influences  that  reach  them ;  or  else,  that  they  are  capable 
of  being  excited  to  obedience  by  any  influence  whatever, 
and  thereby  exhibit  them  as  physically  disqualified  for  a 
holy  agency. 

9.  He,  accordingly,  voluntarily  limits  the  excitements  to 
holiness  that  reach  them  to  their  present  degree,  when  he 
might  so  increase  them  ns  to  prevent  flic  occurrence  of  sin. 


499 

A  conspicuous  instance  of  this  limitation,  is  seen  in  the 
imperfect  disclosure  by  Christ  to  the  Jews,  antecedently 
to  his  crucifixion,  of  his  character  and  the  object  of  his 
mission.  In  place  of  an  explicit  announcement  of  himself 
as  the  Son  of  God,  and  full  explication  of  the  method  of 
redemption  which  he  came  to  accomplish  ;  he  spake  to  them 
in  parables,  that  seeing  they  might  see  and  not  perceive, 
and  hearing  they  might  hear  and  not  understand  :  or  in 
other  words,  while  he  announced  himself  as  a  messenger 
from  God,  and  gave  such  proofs  of  his  truth,  as  to  place 
them  under  high  obligations  to  receive  him  as  such  and 
obey  his  instructions,  he  still  did  not  carry  the  disclosures 
of  his  nature  and  object  to  such  an  extent,  as  wholly  to 
remove  their  ignorance,  and  overcome  their  prejudice,  nor 
enforce  them  by  such  cflusions  of  the  Spirit,  as  to  make 
them  the  means  of  their  general  reformation. 

10.  Though  he  thus  voluntarily  limits  the  excitements  to 
obedience  that  reach  his  creatures,  he  nevertheless  su- 
premely desires  them  to  obey  in  all  the  instances  in  which 
they  transgress;  as  the  Redeemer,  while  he  withheld  from 
the  Jews  such  a  disclosure  of  his  character  and  object,  and 
such  effusions  of  the  Spirit,  as  would  have  turned  them 
universally  to  repentance  and  faith  ;  yet  supremely  desired 
their  obedience  in  the  conditions  in  which  they  were  placed, 
and  wept  at  their  rebellion  and  foreseen  doom. 

11.  By  the  peculiar  administration  which  he  pursues  in 
consequence  of  their  sin,  he  raises  those  who  continue  holy, 
and  are  recovered  from  sin  to  obedience,  to  higher  degrees 
of  holiness  and  happiness  than  they  would  have  attained  had 
all  his  creatures  continued  obedient. 

12.  He  exhibits  supreme  joy  in  all  his  works  and  the 
results  of  his  administration,  and  all  holy  beings  ascribe  to 

63 


500 

him  holiness,  wisdom  and  benevolence,  as  characteristic  of 
all  the  measures  of  his  government. 

Such  are  the  great  facts  on  which  a  theory  on  the  subject 
should  be  founded,  and  with  which,  to  be  correct,  it  must 
harmonize.  What  then  are  the  conclusions  to  which  they 
are  adapted  to  conduct  us  ?  On  what  ground  will  they 
authorize  us  to  infer,  that  sin  is  permitted  for  wise  and  be- 
nevolent reasons  ?  The  chief  of  those  facts  are  ;  that  he 
voluntarily  places  his  creatures  in  the  conditions  in  which 
they  act,  with  a  full  foresight  of  their  exerting  the  agency 
which  they  do ;  that  he  desires  from  them  a  perfect  obe- 
dience in  those  conditions  ;  and  that  he  leaves  them  to 
transgress,  when  he  might  by  a  change  of  his  administra- 
tion, prevent  them  from  sin.  It  will  obviously  then  at  least 
reconcile  these  measures  of  his  procedure,  to  assume  on  the 
one  hand,  that  their  obedience  in  those  conditions,  were  it 
rendered,  would  secure  the  greatest  good ;  as  that  would 
form  a  just  and  benevolent  reason  for  placing  them  in  those 
conditions,  and  desiring  from  them  that  obedience  ;  and  on 
the  other,  that  by  his  measures  of  justice  and  grace  he  ac- 
tually secures  the  greatest  good  from  the  present  system  of 
events,  and  could  secure  it  through  no  other  agency  from 
them,  than  either  such  as  he  requires,  or  such  as  they  exert : 
as  that  would  furnish  an  adequate  reason  alsor  for  his  per- 
mitting them  to  sin  as  he  does,  in  place  of  preventing  them. 
It  is  equally  manifest,  also,  that  that  hypothesis  alone  meets 
the  foregoing  facts,  and  furnishes  such  an  explication  of 
these  measures  of  his  government.  The  great  question  to 
be  determined  respects  the  necessity — in  order  to  his  giving 
birth  to  the  greatest  sum  of  holiness  and  happiness  in  his 
creatures, — of  his  placing  them  in  those  conditions  of  trial, 
in  which  the  reason  primarily  lies  of  their  sinning  in  such 


501 


numbers  and  to  such  an  extent  as  the}'  do,  and  by  wliich 
tbe  certainty  is  constituted  of  their  thus  sinning.  No  the- 
ory can  furnish  any  solution  of  that  measure  of  his  adminis- 
tration, that  does  not  demonstrate  the  existence  of  such  a 
necessity.  Where  then  does  the  ground  of  it  lie  ?  Is  it 
that  their  existence  in  such  conditions  of  trial,  is  wholly  im- 
avoidable  to  the  creator,  as  the  reviewer's  theory  teaches  ? 
Is  it  as  the  supralapsarian  theory  assumes,  that  it  is  on  the 
whole,  better  that  they  should  sin  as  they  do,  than  it  would 
be  were  they  to  obey  universally  in  the  conditions  in  which 
they  exist?  Or  is  it  that  a  perfect  obiedience  from  them  in 
such  conditions,  would,  were  it  rendered,  secure  the  great- 
est good  ;  and  thence  that  his  placing  them  in  those  condi- 
tions, is  essential  to  the  fulfillment  of  his  responsibilities  as 
creator  and  ruler,  and  thereby  to  the  possibilitj^  of  his  so 
overruling  the  agency  which  they  in  fact  exert,  as  to  secure 
the  greatest  good  ?  The  first  it  cannot  be  ;  as  it  contra- 
dicts several  of  the  forestated  facts,  and  is,  as  has  been 
shown,  in  every  respect  erroneous.  It  cannot  be  the  second, 
since — as  has  already  been  seen,  and  will  hereafter  more 
fully  appear — he  desires  that  they  should  obey  in  all  the 
instances  in  which  they  transgress.  It  follows  then  from 
the  fact  that  those  theories  are  erroneous — as  there  is  no 
other  conceivable  hypothesis  that  is  compatible  with  the  be- 
nevolence of  such  an  administration — that  it  must  be  that 
their  existence  in  such  conditions,  is  essential,  in  order  that 
their  obedience,  were  it  universally  rendered,  might  be  such 
as  to  secure  the  greatest  good  ;  and  thence  that  his  placing 
them  in  such  conditions  is  also  essential,  in  order  to  his  pur- 
suing such  an  administration  toward  the  agency  which  they 
in  fact  exert,  or  to  secure  that  good.  And  if  such  are  the 
facts,  then  he  obviously  has  wise  and  benevolent  reasons 


502 

for  placing  them  in  those  conditions,  ("or  desiring  tlieir  obe- 
dience, for  permitting  tiiem  to  sin,  and  for  pursuing  his 
present  system  of  administration  towards  them  as  transgres- 
sors, by  which  he  actually  secures  the  same  amount  of  good 
as  would  exist,  were  they  universally  to  obey. 

These  positions  are  the  main  elements  of  the  theory  I 
have  advanced  on  the  subject.  To  prove  them  to  be  cor- 
rect, will  be  to  sustain  that  theory  and  show  that  it  furnish- 
es a  natural  and  adequate  explication  of  those  great  mea- 
sures of  the  divine  administration. 

In  proof  then  of  the  first  branch  of  it — that  God  places 
his  moral  creatures  in  such  conditions  that  their  perfect  obe- 
dience, would  if  rendered,  secure  the  greatest  good — I 
allege  the  fact,  that  an  obedience  in  such  conditions  as  those 
in  which  they  are  placed  in  this  world,  would  involve  a 
higher  share  of  excellence,  than  an  obedience  in  conditions 
of  inferior  trial. 

It  is  obviously  necessary  in  order  to  their  exerting  a  high 
degree  of  excellence,  that  they  should  be  placed  under  a 
providential  administration  that  calls  them  to  frequent  and 
decisive  acts  of  duty. 

A  holy  agency  is  made  up  of  acts  of  reverence,  love, 
submission,  trust,  and  other  forms  of  obedient  affection 
toward  God,  and  justice,  truth,  fidelity,  and  good  will  to- 
ward our  fellow  creatures  ;  and  as  there  are  differences  in 
the  intenseness  of  holy  affections,  and  the  frequency  of  acts, 
the  excellence  of  an  obedient  agency  will  depend  on  the 
number,  diversity,  and  energy  of  the  actions  of  which  it 
consists.  These,  however,  will  as  obviously  depend  on  the 
nature  of  the  conditions  in  which  those  who  exert  them 
exist,  or  the  system  of  providential  administration  under 
which  they  are  placed.     In  order  that  they  may  exert  those 


503 

and  other  forms  of  obedience  vviiich  the  divine  law  enjoins, 
they  must  be  brought  into  the  requisite  relations  for  the  ex- 
ertion of  such  acts.      That  they  may  realize  and  manifest  a 
sense,  for  example,  of  their  dependence  on  God,  they  must 
be   placed  in  conditions  that  demonstrate  it  to  them,  and 
bring  it  strongly  home  to   their  convictions.      That  they 
may  deeply  and  habitually  appreciate  his  beneficence,  and 
be  excited  to  prayer,  trust,  and  praise,  his  government  must 
be  so  arranged  that  all  their  blessings  may  be  seen  to  come 
from  him ;   and  that  they  may  fulfill  the  duties  of  justice, 
truth,  and  kindness  toward  each  other,  it  is  essential  tiiat 
they  should  be  placed  in  circumstances  that  naturally  call 
them  to  the  exercise  of  those  forms  of  obedience.     There  is 
no  other  mode  in  which  they  can  be  led  to  the  frequent  and 
energetic  exercise  of  those  acts.      Their  voluntary  agency 
is  of  necessity  founded  on  their  perceptions,    and  by  their 
constitutions  they  are  dependent  for  them  directly  to  a  great 
degree,  and  ultimately,  wholly  on  the   agency  of  external 
causes.     Their  perceptions  must,  therefore,  be  founded  on 
facts,  not  on  mere  phantasmagoria,  in  order  that  they  may 
correspond  to    their  relations    and   constitute    real  know- 
ledge.    Their  apprehensions  of  God,  for  example,  must  be 
wholly  derived  from   his  works   to   possess   that  character, 
and    not   be    merely   hypothetical  or   imaginative.     They 
have   no  intuitive  knowledge   of  his   being,    attributes,  or 
will,  and  can  see  nothing  of  him,  except  what  he  displays 
in  his  agency  toward  themselves,  and  the  objects  within  the 
range  of  their  perception,  or  others  of  which  they  have  au- 
thentic memorials  ;   and  their  homage,   accordingly,  must 
be  wholly  rendered  to  him  as  the  being  who  exerts  that 
agency,  not  to  an  unseen   and   merely  imagined  object. — 
Their  knowledge  of  each  other  must,  in  like  manner,  be  ob- 


504 

tallied  wholly  through  a  similar  medium,  and  their  social 
duties  exercised  toward  real,  and  not  ideal  beings  ;  and 
thence  to  perform   them,  they  must  exist  in  society. 

It  is  obviously  essential,  therefore,  in  order  to  the  possibi- 
lity of  a  distinct  and  frequent  exercise  and  manifestation  of 
those  various  affections  toward  God  and  each  other,  that 
they  should  be  placed  in  situations  that  continually  bring 
their  relations  to  him  and  them,  home  strongly  to  their  re- 
alization, and  call  them  to  a  formal  choice  between  the  ful- 
fillment and  disregard  of  their  duty  ;  and  that  under  a  provi- 
dential arrangement  that  daily  and  perpetually  calls  them 
to  such  choices,  their  obedience  would,  if  rendered,  involve 
a  far  higher  share  of  excellence  than  under  an  administration 
that  subjects  them  to  such  a  necessity  much  less  frequently. 
And  such  is  the  administration  which  God  in  fact,  exerts 
over  them.  While  his  laws  prescribe  duties  that  respect  all 
their  relations,  his  providence  is  such  as  to  bring  them  con- 
tinually 1o  act  in  those  relations,  and  call  them  to  fulfill  those 
duties.  All  the  great  arrangements  of  his  government  are 
adapted  to  remind  them  continually  that  they  are  his  crea- 
tures, and  dependent  on  him  for  life,  health,  happiness,  and 
salvation,  and  he  is  habitually  making  displays  to  them  of 
his  power,  wisdom,  condescension,  faithfulness,  and  love, 
and  placing  them  under  a  necessity — unless  they  disregard 
him — of  recognising  and  glorifying  him  as  their  father,  ru- 
ler, and  benefactor.  His  providence  is  also  such  as  to  fur- 
nish them  incessantly  with  opportunities  and  excitements  to 
justice,  truth,  kindness,  sympnfhy,  or  duty  in  some  other 
form  toward  each  other. 

Tlieir   existence    in    circumstances   fraught   with   severe 
trials,  is  likewise  adapted  to  heighten  the  value  of  their  obe- 


505 

dience,  if  rendered,  by  bringing  them  to  a  specific  choice 
between  good  and  evil,  and  thereby  to  a  decisive  manifes- 
tation of  their  principles.  An  obedience  in  such  condi- 
tions, in  which  forbidden  enjoyments  are  rejected,  and  holi- 
ness preferred  though  at  the  price  of  self-denial,  forms  an 
indubitable  demonstration  of  supreme  attachment  to  right, 
and  regard  to  God  ;  and  is  fraught  with  a  larger  merit  of 
approval  than  an  obedience  involving  no  such  manifestation. 
God  accordingly  places  a  higher  estimate  on  such  acts 
than  on  others,  and  makes  them  the  conditions  of  accept- 
ance and  reward. 

From  these  considerations,  then,  it  is  sufficiently  clear, 
that  an  obedience  in  such  conditions  as  those  in  which  moral 
creatures  are  in  this  world  placed,  would,  were  it  rendered, 
involve  a  higher  share  of  excellence,  than  an  obedience  in  cir- 
cumstances of  inferior  trial.  An  obedient  agency  in  condi- 
tionsof  exemption  from  probation,  or  that  called  them  less  fre- 
quently and  decisively  to  acts  of  duty,  would  involve  fewer 
species  of  obedient  acts,  fewer  acts  of  each  species,  and  an 
inferior  share  of  energy  and  decisiveness  in  each  act ;  and 
such  a  providential  administration  over  them  as  would  be 
requisite  to  place  them  in  those  inferior  conditions  would 
also  involve  far  fewer  manifestations  of  divine  power,  con- 
descension, and  goodness,  than  enter  into  the  present,  and 
lay  in  that  respect,  a  far  less  ample  foundation  for  the 
knowledge  of  his  being,  agency,  and  character,  and  for  his 
love  and  service. 

Are  the  conditions  in  which  he  places  his  creatures  such, 
however,  that  their  obedience  universally,  were  it  rendered, 
would  constitute,  with  «he  rewards  with  which  it  would  be 
crowned,  the  greatest  sum  of  good. ^ 


506 

There  clearly,  in  the  first  place,  are  no  proofs  that  they 
are  not.  There  are  no  intimations  in  the  scriptures,  that  a 
perfect  obedience  from  all,  would  not  be  compatible  with 
the  highest  good  of  his  kingdom.  All  their  representations 
on  the  contrary,  convey  the  impression,  that  that  obedience 
would  secure  the  greatest  good.  Nor  is  there  any  thing 
in  his  providence,  that  authorizes  the  inference  that  their 
perfect  obedience  would  not  secure  that  good.  It  is  infer- 
red indeed  by  some,  from  the  fact  that  he  does  not  wholly 
prevent  sin.  But  the  fact  that  he  permits  sin,  in  preference 
to  so  changing  his  administration  as  to  prevent  it,  does  not 
prove  that  their  perfect  obedience  under  his  present  system 
of  providence  would  not  secure  the  greatest  good  ;  since  it 
does  not  follow  from  the  fact,  that  a  perfect  obedience  from 
all,  in  the  conditions  in  which  he  places  them,  would  secure 
the  greatest  good,  that  their  obedience  in  very  different 
conditions — in  which  they  were  exempted  from  trial,  or  the 
means  employed  to  defend  them  from  temptation,  were 
greatly  increased — would  also  secure  that  good. 

There  are  in  the  next  place,  many  considerations  that 
authorize  the  conclusion,  that  it  is  essential  to  the  fulfillment 
of  his  responsibilities  as  ruler,  and  the  perfection  of  his  own 
agency,  that  he  should  place  them  in  such  conditions  that 
their  obedience  if  rendered,  would  secure  the  greatest  good  ; 
and  that  such,  therefore,  are  in  fact  the  conditions  in  which 
they  are  placed  by  his  providence. 

It  is  to  be  inferred  from  his  rights.  He  has  un- 
doubtedly a  right,  as  their  creator  and  preserver,  to 
the  highest  homage  their  nature  fits  them  to  yield.  He 
accordingly  recjuires  them  to  love  him  with  all  the  heart, 
and  soul,  and  mind,  and  strength.  It  is  obvious  also,  as 
has  already  been  shown,  that  a  providential   administration 


507 

that  places  iheni  in  the  requisite  conditions  for  the  exercise 
of  such  an  agency,  will  involve  a  larger  display  to  them 
of  his  perfections,  than  one  that  was  fraught  with  fewer 
exhibitions  of  his  power,  wisdom  and  goodness,  and  that 
brought  them  less  frequently  to  act  in  their  relations  to  him. 
It  is  to  be  regarded,  therefore,  as  essential  to  the  assertion 
of  his  rights,  and  full  manifestation  to  them  of  his  perfec- 
tions, that  he  should  exert  over  them  such  an  administration 
as  to  place  it  in  their  power,  if  they  choose,  to  yield  him 
the  highest  service  their  nature  qualifies  them  to  render, 
and  rise  to  the  highest  happiness  they  are  formed  to  enjoy. 
It  is  also  to  be  regarded  as  essential,  in  order  that  he  may 
manifest  his  desire  of  their  perfection  ;  and  that  if  not 
attained,  their  failure  of  it  may  be  wholly  chargeable  to 
themselves.  It  would  obviously  have  been  incompatible 
with  the  full  assertion  of  his  rights  and  manifestation  of  his 
desire  of  the  service  they  are  formed  to  render,  to  have 
required  of  them  in  his  law,  less  than  the  highest  love  with 
which  they  are  capable  of  regarding  him ;  and  would 
doubtless  be  equally  incompatible  with  those  rights  and 
that  desire,  not  to  place  them  in  such  conditions,  that  their 
obedience  if  rendered,  would  involve  and  form  a  proper 
manifestation  of  that  supreme  love. 

That  such  are  the  reasons  of  his  subjecting  them  to  these 
trials,  is  rendered  certain  indeed  by  the  representations  of 
the  scriptures.  They  furnish  no  ground  whatever,  for  the 
assumption  that  the  rectitude  and  propriety  of  his  placing 
them  in  such  conditions,  depend  in  any  degree  on  his  being 
able  by  his  works  of  grace,  to  remedy,  as  he  does,  the  evils 
to  which  they  give  birth  ;  but  teach  that  his  administration 
is  supremely  holy,  just  and  good,  independently  of  his 
interposition  for  that  purpose;  and  authorize  the  conclusion 

04 


508 

that  the  exercise  of  essenliully  such  a  government  would  be 
indispensable  to  the  assertion  of  his  rights  and  exhibition  of 
his  perfections,  were  he  never  to  sanctify  and  pardon  any 
who  rebel.  It  is  not  the  object  of  the  work  of  redemption 
to  correct  errors,  or  remedy  imperfections  in  his  legislative 
or  providential  government,  but  those  branches  of  his  ad- 
ministration are  irrespectively  of  that,  precisely  such  as 
infinite  purity,  rectitude,  and  benevolence  require  him  to 
exert ;  and  it  is  by  his  having  pursued  such  an  administra- 
tion— in  which  he  fulfills  all  his  responsibilities  and  displays 
his  perfections  in  all  his  relations  to  them, — that  the  founda- 
tion is  laid  for  his  interposition,  by  the  mediation  of  Christ 
to  renew  and  save  the  guilty.  That  interposition  itself  in 
fact  furnishes  the  highest  confirmation  of  these  views;  as  its 
object  was  to  vindicate  and  sustain  the  administration  of  the 
Most  High,  as  moral  and  providential  ruler,  and  manifest 
his  inflexible  adherence  to  the  claims  he  asserts  in  those 
relations.  It  demonstrates,  therefore,  that  his  rights  and 
perfections  require  him  to  exert  over  them  such  an  adminis- 
tration. But  if  the  assertion  of  his  rights,  and  exercise  of  his 
infinite  rectitude,  thus  require  him  to  place  them  in  such 
conditions  as  those  in  which  they  are  called  to  exert  their 
agency ;  it  must,  of  course,  be  on  the  g^-ound  that  it  is  in 
those  alone,  that  their  obedience  can,  if  rendered,  be  such  as 
is  his  due,  and  secure  the  greatest  sum  of  good. 

This  is  likewise  to  be  inferred  from  the  fact,  that  many 
of  the  trials  to  which  he  subjects  them  are  wholly  adventi- 
tious, as  were  many  of  those  to  wiiich  the  Israelites  were 
called,  on  their  journey  from  Egypt ;  and  those  of  Abraham, 
Job  and  Paul.  Doubtless  such  are  many  of  those  also 
which  all  are  called  to  experience.  Of  those  trials  which 
thus  are  appointed  for  the  express  pur[)osc  of  proving  their 


509 

hearts,  no  other  explication  can  be  given,  than  that  they 
are  essential  to  an  upright,  wise,  and  benevolent  govern- 
ment over  such  creatures: — and  that  is,  that  they  are  in- 
dispensable to  his  fulfilling  his  responsibilities  as  creator 
and  ruler,  or  maintaining  his  rights,  and  laying  a  proper 
foundation  for  their  rendering,  if  they  obey  his  require- 
ments, such  a  service  as  is  his  due  ; — and  that  is,  placing 
them  in  such  conditions,  that  their  obedience  will  if  ren- 
dered, secure  the  greatest  good. 

It  is  in  the  third  place,  obviously  essential  that  he  should 
place  them  in  such  conditions,  in  order  that  his  providential 
administration  may  accord  with  his  requirements  and  pro- 
mises. The  species  of  agency  which  he  requires — supreme 
love  to  himself,  and  subordinate  love  to  each  other, — is 
indisputably  such,  as  far  as  its  nature  is  concerned,  as  if 
exerted  to  the  requisite  degree,  would  constitute  the  greatest 
moral  excellence ;  and  he  requires  it  to  be  exerted  to  the 
utmost  extent  of  which  they  are  capable,  and  promises  to 
their  obedience,  the  rewards  of  everlasting  happiness.  To 
suppose,  therefore,  that  after  having  enjoined  this  agency, 
he  places  them  by  his  providence  in  such  conditions,  that 
their  uninterrupted  obedience — even  if  rendered — could  not 
rise  to  such  a  degree  as  to  secure  the  greatest  good,  is  to 
suppose  that  his  providential,  is  inconsistent  with  his  moral 
administration,  and  exhibit  him  as  doing  that  in  the  one, 
which  would  render  what  he  requires  and  promises  to  crown 
with  everlasting  rewards  in  the  other,  were  it  yielded  by  his 
creatures,  incompatible  with  the  perfection  of  the  system. 

It  is  seen  in  the  fourth  place,  from  the  fact,  that  he  de- 
sires from  them  a  perfect  obedience  in  the  conditions  in 
which  they  are  placed.  That  he  truly  and  supremely 
desires  it,  is  seen  from  his  requiring  it,  from  his  employing 


510 

a  vast  system  of  means  to  induce  them  to  render  it,  and 
from  his  express  declarations;  and  as  the  object  at  which 
he  ultimately  aims  in  all  his  works,  is  the  production  of  the 
greatest  sum  of  good,  his  thus  desiring  that  obedience  is  de- 
monstrative, that  were  it  rendered,  it  would  constitute  that 
good. 

And  finally,  that  that  obedience,  were  it  rendered,  would 
secure  the  greatest  good,  is  seen  from  the  consideration, 
that  the  holiness  and  happiness  it  would  involve,  are  such 
as  accord  with  our  apprehensions  of  the  greatest  good. 
That  obedience,  were  it  rendered,  would  consist  of  pre- 
cisely such  an  agency  toward  God,  as  accords  with  all  his 
relations  and  varied  displays  of  himself  in  his  providence 
and  moral  government;  and  such  an  agency  toward  their 
fellow-creatures,  as,  in  all  the  instances  in  which  they  are 
called  to  act  with  any  reference  to  each  other,  corresponds 
to  their  mutual  relations  ;  and  would  involve,  accordingly, 
as  numerous,  decisive  and  energetic  exercises  of  holy  affec- 
tion, as  their  nature  fits  them  to  render;  and  thence  form  a 
proper  foundation  for  the  gift  to  them  of  as  large  rewards 
as  can  with  propriety  be  bestowed  on  a  perfect  obedience. 
But  such  an  agency  and  such  rewards,  would  constitute, 
according  to  our  apprehensions,  the  greatest  sum  of  good. 
We  have  no  higher  conception  of  the  greatest  holiness  and 
happiness  in  creatures,  than  that  of  a  universe  of  beings 
yielding  in  all  their  agency  toward  God,  precisely  that 
service  which  his  rights,  wisdom,  and  benevolence  require ; 
meeting  every  expression  of  his  will  in  his  law,  and  every 
manifestation  of  his  presence  and  ageiicy  in  his  works — in 
such  a  system  of  providence  as  that  which  he  is  exercising, 
which  incessantly  calls  them  to  act  in  their  relations  to  him, — 
witli  all  the  reverence,  love,   submission,  trust,  praise,  and 


511 

devotedness,  that  are  due  from  them  to  him  ;  and  exhibit- 
ing, likewise,  toward  their  fellow-creatures,  all  the  benevo- 
lent aflections  of  which  they  are  properly  the  objects,  in 
every  instance  in  which  such  an  administration  as  that  un- 
der which  they  are  called  to  act,  furnishes  an  opportunity ; 
and,  finally,  receiving  from  him  in  conjunction  with,  and  in 
consequence  of  that  obedience,  all  the  happiness  which  it 
befits  him  to  bestow  in  expression  of  his  approval  of  such 
an  agency. 

In  these  considerations  then,  that  obedience  in  such  con- 
ditions as  those  in  which  they  are  placed,  would  involve  a 
higher  share  of  excellence,  and  be  crowned  with  larger  re- 
wards, than  an  obedience  in  circumstances  of  inferior  trial ; 
that  it  would  be  precisely  such  as  would  form  and  secure, 
according  to  our  conceptions,  the  greatest  sum  of  good  ; 
that  God  treats  it  as  such  in  his  legislation  and  all  the  ex- 
pressions of  his  desires;  and,  finally,  that  to  place  them  in 
such  conditions,  seems  to  be  as  essential  to  the  perfection 
of  his  administration,  as  their  obedience  itself  is  to  the  per- 
fection of  their  character  and  happiness  ;  we  have  demon- 
strative evidence  that  that  obedience,  were  it  rendered, 
would  secure  the  greatest  sum  of  good.  And  in  this  great 
fact,  we  have  as  obviously  an  adequate  explication  of  this 
branch  of  his  administration — a  wise  and  benevolent  rea- 
son for  his  placing  them  in  those  conditions,  and  requiring 
and  desiring  that  obedience. 

The  remaining  positions  to  be  demonstrated  arc,  on  the 
one  hand,  that  he  cannot  place  them  in  any  conditions  in 
w^hich  they  icould  universally  yield  an  obedience  that  would 
secure  the  greatest  good  ;  and  on  the  other,  that  by  his 
measures  of  justice  and  grace,  he  actually  secures  that 
good   from  their  present  agency.     The  first  is  seen  witli 


512 

certainty  from  the  fact,  that  an  obedience  in  their  present 
conditions  would  involve  a  higher  share  of  excellence,  than 
in  circumstances  of  inferior  trial ;  and  that  the  only  method 
of  leading  them  to  a  universal  obedience,  would  be  to  place 
them  in  conditions  of  inferior  trial,  by  so  changing  their  cir- 
cumstances as  to  diminish  their  temptations  and  increase 
their  excitements  to  holiness. 

There  are  likewise  satisfactory  proofs  that  he  actually 
secures  the  greatest  good  from  the  agency  which  they  exert. 
It  is  seen  to  be  possible  from  the  fact,  that  by  the  superior 
displays  of  himself,  which  he  thus  makes,  he  raises  those  of 
his  subjects  who  continue  holy  and  are  recovered  from  sin, 
to  higher  degrees  of  holiness  than  they  would  have  attained 
had  he  wholly  prevented  transgression;  since  the  numbers 
of  the  obedient  may  so  far  exceed  those  of  the  finally  rebel- 
lious, that  the  accession  of  good  from  punishment  and  re- 
demption, may  counterbalance  the  evil  of  sin  and  suffering, 
and  raise  the  system  to  as  high  a  range  of  good  as  it  would 
have  attained  had  all  rendered  the  obedience  to  which  they 
were  called,  and  been  crowned  forever  with  its  beatific  re- 
wards. And  that  such  is  actually  to  be  the  result  of  his 
administration,  is  seen  with  certainty  from  the  fact,  that  he 
voluntarily  limits,  as  he  does,  the  work  of  salvation,  when 
he  might  extend  it  to  all  the  guilty  with  the  same  ease  with 
which  he  originally  could  have  withheld  all  from  sin  ;  as 
no  other  bounds  can  be  supposed  to  be  thus  of  choice  fixed 
to  a  work  of  such  benevolence,  but  those  of  that  infinite 
benevolence  and  wisdom  themselves  which  accomplish  it ; 
and  those  limits  cannot  be  supposed  to  be  any  others  than 
liiose  at  which  that  wisdom  and  benevolence  aimed  in  the 
creation  of  the  moral  universe — the  greatest  possible  sum 
of  holiness  and  happiness  in  creatures. 


513 

111  the  fact  then  thus  demonstrated,  that  he  could  not 
liave  prevented  his  creatures  from  sinning,  without  debar- 
ing  himself  from  the  attainment  of  the  greatest  good,  and 
that  he  actually  secures  it  by  his  present  administration ;  it 
is  seen  that  he  also  has  wise  and  benevolent  reasons  for  thus 
leaving  them  to  transgress.  Uniting  therefore  these  seve- 
ral facts — that  he  places  them  in  such  conditions,  that  the 
obedience  he  requires,  would  if  rendered,  secure  the  great- 
est good;  that  he  could  place  them  in  no  conditions  in 
which  they  would  yield  a  perfect  obedience  that  would  in- 
volve as  high  9,  degree  of  excellence  ;  and  -that  he  actually 
attains  the  greatest  good,  by  his  present  administration — 
we  have  a  just  and  adequate  explanation  of  those  great 
measures  of  his  government ;  an  explication  not  only  com- 
patible with  all  his  attributes  and  rights,  and  accordant 
with  the  i-epresentations  of  the  scriptures,  but  that  ascribes 
the  subjection  of  his  moral  creatures  to  trial,  and  the  per- 
mission, the  punishment,  and  the  pardon  of  sin,  to  the  per- 
fection of  his  rectitude,  wisdom,  and  goodness. 

Such  is  the  theory  I  have  advanced  on  the  subject.  And 
are  there  any  traces  in  it,  I  now  take  leave  to  ask,  of  the 
hideous  errors  and  impieties  of  which  the  reviewer  has 
thought  proper  to  exhibit  it  as  consisting  ?  any  indications 
of  the  blasphemous  representation  that  God  is  utterly  re- 
gardless alike  of  his  responsibilities  and  rights,  as  creator 
and  ruler — a  mere  contriver  of  possibilities,  without  eye  or 
heart  for  results  ;  that  he  concentrates  "  all  his  measures  of 
moral  government  and  providence,"  "  on  the  one  object  of 
placing  his  creatures  in  conc^'  ions  of  supreme  indiflerence 
to  him  as  it  respects  their  obfe  lience  or  sin  ;"  that  there  is 
no  difference  whatever  either  to  him  or  them  between  holi- 
ness and  transgression,  or  happiness  and  misery  ;   and  tliat 


514 

"  a  whole  universe,  obedient  and  blest  to  eternity  before  his 
benignant  throne,  and  a  whole  universe  dashed  upon  the 
shores  of  everlasting  rebellion,  and  blasphemy,  and  pun- 
ishment," are  "  two  equal  goods — both  the  greatest  possi- 
ble ?"  When  a  critic  of  his  discernment  is  forced  into 
such  extravagances,  in  order  to  fasten  a  charge  of  error  on 
an  opponent,  it  bespeaks  a  singular  absence  of  just  grounds 
of  objection,  and  becomes  a  vehicle  of  eulogy,  in  place 
of  confutation. 

The  objections  which  he  has  offered  to  this  theory — or 
rather,  the  first  one  especially,  to  his  construction  of  it — re- 
main to  be  considered.  The  first  will  be  sufficiently  seen 
from  the  following  quotation  : 

"  But  if  the  two  alternatives  could  be  rendered  precisely  equal, 
where  is  the  evidence  tiiat  God  has  exalted  the  scale  of  these  equali- 
ties to  the  highest  posxihle  degree?  He  evidently  has  not  on  the  princi- 
ples by  which  this  theory  is  supported  by  its  author." — "  That  which 
exalts  the  scale  of  equal  alternatives,  and  renders  one  system  better 
than  another,  is  in  his  view  this;  that  God  introduces  more  aggrava- 
ted temptations  into  one  than  another,  and  thus  renders  it  possible  for 
his  subjects  in  these  circumstances,  to  render  a  more  valuable  obedi- 
ence, and  for  him  to  secure  an  equally  more  valuable  equivalent.  But, 
if  God  elevates  the  scale  of  good  in  this  way,  then  is  it  plain  that  he 
has  not  placed  the  present  system  on  as  high  a  scale  of  good  as  he 
might,  had  he  begun  on  a  plan  of  still  more  aggravated  temptations, 
which  would  make  obedience  under  it,  if  rendered,  still  more  valuable, 
or  the  equivalent,  if  obedience  were  not  rendered,  equally  more  valu- 
able. For  the  writer  cannot  stop  at  the  precise  graduation  of  tempta- 
tion in  the  present  universe,  and  hold  that  God  secures  the  greatest 
good  possible,  unless  he  maintains  that  on  the  present  system  God  ex- 
hausts his  poioer  in  bringing  temptations  to  assail  his  creatures.  This 
follows  if  the  hifjhest  possible  good  which  God  can  secure  is  rested 
on  conditions,  and  not,  as  u'c  maintain,  on  the  exact  results  obtained 
m  the  proportional  extent  of  obedience." — pp.  640,647. 

This  objection  proceeds  on  the  assumption,  that  in  order 


515 


that  a  moral  system  may  be  perfect,  or  involve  the  greatest 
sum  of  good,  each  individual  and  species  belonging  to  it 
that  admits  of  degrees,  must  be  raised  to  the  greatest  degree 
that  is  possible  :  as  it  is  on  this  ground  that  he  claims  that 
if  beings  exhibit  a  more  decisive  attachment  to  right  and  a 
higher  regard  to  God  when  they  obey  against  the  opposing 
influence  of  strong  temptation,  than  when  exempt  from 
such  trials,  and  exert  therefore  a  higher  degree  of  excel- 
lence ;  then  in  order  that  their  agency  may  become  fraught 
with  the  greatest  possible  excellence,  the  temptations  to 
which  they  are  subjected  must  be  carried,  in  number  and 
intensity  to  the  greatest  possible  extent. 

This  principle  is,  however,  obviously  false,  since  if  true, 
it  would  prove  against  his  theory  and  every  other,  as  well 
as  mine,  that  the  present  system  neither  does,  nor  can,  by 
any  possibility,  contain  the  greatest  sum  of  good  ;  for  it  is 
indisputable,  that  the  individuals  and  species  of  which  it  is 
made  up,  are  not  advanced  to  the  highest  degrees  to  which 
they  might  have  been  raised.     The  individuals  of  the  hu- 
man race,  for  example,  might  have  been  far  more  nume- 
rous than  they  are,  their  powers  of  a  far  higher  order,  their 
relations  immensely  more  diversified,  their  knowledge  vastly 
more  extensive,  and  the  rapidity  of  their  mental  action  much 
greater.     The   principle,  then,  on  which   the  objection   is 
founded,  is  erroneous,  since  were  it  true,  it  would  prove  that 
the  present   system,  so  far  from  involving  the  greatest  sum 
of  good,  is  marked  with  vast  and  palpable  imperfection  in 
all  the  ingredients  of  which  it  consists.     And  it  is  as  false 
in  reference  to  actions  as  to  any  other  element  of  the  pre- 
sent system.    It  no  more  follows  from  the  fact  that  there  are 
degrees  in  the  excellence  of  actions,  that  in  order  to  the 
perfection  of  the  system,  each  obedient  act  must  be  fraught 

65 


516 

with  the  intensest  affection,  and  be  raised  to  the  utmost  ex- 
eellence  possible,  than  it  follows  from  the  fact  that  there  are 
degrees  in  the  capacities  of  agents,  and  differences  of  in- 
tensity in  different  species  of  enjoymenty  that  each  agent 
must  be  endowed  with  the  highest  capacity,  and  each  spe- 
cies of  enjoyment  raised  to  the  utmost  intensity  that  omni- 
potence can  communicate. 

But  the  principle  is  pre-eminently  false  in  respect  to  the 
subject  to  which  the  reviewer  applies  it ;  since  to  carry 
temptation  to  the  utmost  degree  possible,  in  place  of  add- 
ing a  superior  energy  to  obedience,  would  be  by  the  sup- 
position wholly  to  prevent  obedience  from  being  exerted. 
There  is  a  limit  beyond  which  that  influence  cannot  be  car- 
ried without  defeating  its  objer.t,  and  that  limit  is  doubtless- 
to  be  seen  in  the  extent  to  which  it  is  in  fact  carried  in  the 
administration  God  exerts  ;  which  is  such  as  to  place  his 
creatures  under  a  necessity  of  showing  by  their  agency 
what  the  supreme  afiections  are  of  their  hearts  ;  or  to  put 
them  to  the  proof  whether  they  are  ready  at  his  call,  to  re- 
linquish all  for  God,  and  yield  him  and  his  rights  the  su- 
preme regard  which  is  his  due ;  or  whether  they  prefer  to 
that,  the  short-lived  pleasures,  great  though  they  may  be, 
of  a  disobedient  agency.  It  obviously,  however,  does  not 
follow  from  the  fact  that  it  is  essential  to  carry  their  proba- 
tion to  such  an  extent,  in  order  that  he  may  place  them  ii* 
a  condition  to  show  their  supreme  affections  decisively,  to 
render  their  obedience  if  they  yield  it,  such  as  to  involve 
the  highest  share  of  excellence,  and  lay  a  proper  founda- 
tion for  his  making  their  agency  here  the  ground  of  his 
subsequent  dealings  with  them;  that  it  is  likewise  essential 
for  the  same  reasons  that  he  should  carry  their  trials  to  as 
much  greater  an  extent  as  is  possible,  and  thereby  defeat 


517 

its  object,  and  wholly  exclude  obedience  from  his  system: — • 
no  more  than  because  it  is  essential  to  his  attainment  of  the 
greatest  good,  that  he  should  carry  the  excitements  to  obe- 
dience to  such  an  extent  as  he  does,  it  follows  that  it  is  also 
essential  that  he  should  advance  them  to  such  an  extent  as 
wholly  to  exempt  his  creatures  from  temptation  ;  or  than 
because  the  rebukes  and  judgments  with  which  he  here  visits 
his  children,  are  productive  of  good  to  them,  it  follows  that 
■were  he  to  subject  them  to  endless  manifestations  of  dis- 
pleasure, it  would  also  prove  to  them  a  blessing. 

He  offers  a  further  objection  in  the  following  language, 

"  Where  on  this  theory  is  the  ground  for  that  choice  which  God  en- 
tertains, that  his  creatures,  in  their  various  conditions,  should  obey 
rather  than  sin .'  For  ourselves  we  should  suppose  that  the  only  al- 
ternative which  calls  for  such  a  choice,  must  be  that  of  a  greater 
good  on  the  side  of  obedience  than  sin,  not  a  precisely  eqnal  good  on 
4>oih  sides." — pp.  647- 

This  objection  proceeds  on  the  assumption,  that  no  rea- 
son can  exist  for  God's  preferring  the  obedience  of  those  who 
sin,  to  their  rebellion,  if  he  can  so  overrule  the  latter,  as  to 
secure  as  great  a  good  as  would  exist  were  they  to  obey; 
and  implies  accordingly  that  the  Most  High  can  have  no 
reason  for  preferring  the  obedience  of  his  creatures  in  the 
instances  in  which  they  transgress,  except  what  lies  in  the 
good  which  that  obedience  itself  would  involve  or  secure. 
This  is  however  manifestly  erroneous  and  absurd.  He 
clearly  may  prefer  their  obedience  because  it  is  holy  and 
right  in  him  to  prefer  it,  and  essential  to  the  perfection  of 
his  agency,  as  well  as  because  it  is  holy  and  right  in 
diem  to  exert  it,  and  that  it  would  secure  the  greatest  good: 
precisely  as  a  parent  may  prefer  the  obedience  of  his  chil- 


518 

dren,  not  only  because  it  is  right  in  them  to  exert  it,  and 
essential  to  their  wellbeing,  but  also  because  that  preference 
is  as  indispensable  to  the  fulfilment  of  his  duty,  and  the 
perfection  of  his  character,  as  that  obedience  itself  is  to  the 
perfection  of  theirs.  And  such  is  indisputably  the  fact  with 
the  Most  High.  He  does  not  love  righteousness  in  his 
creatures  any  the  less,  that  it  is  not  indispensable  to  the 
purposes  of  his  benevolence  in  the  instances  in  which  they 
refuse  to  exert  it.  He  is  not  rendered  indifferent  to  their 
conduct  by  the  fact  that  they  are  unable  by  their  rebellion 
to  baffle  his  wisdom  and  wrest  from  his  hands  the  possibility 
of  securing  the  greatest  good  !  In  place  of  that,  he  con- 
tinues to  regard  a  perfect  obedience  from  those  of  them 
who  rebel,  with  infinite  complacency  and  supreme  pre- 
ference, as  well  as  that  which  is  in  fact  rendered  by  his  obe- 
dient subjects.  And  such  a  preference  of  it  is  manifestly 
essential  in  order  to  its  being  possible  for  him  successfully 
to  overrule  the  sin  that  is  exerted.  To  be  indifferent  whe- 
ther his  creatures  obey  or  not,  when  he  can  so  overrule 
their  sin  as  to  secure  the  greatest  good,  would  obviously  be 
incompatible  with  his  exerting  towards  it  such  an  agency  ; 
as  it  is  chiefly  by  the  manifestations  involved  in  that  agency, 
of  his  infinite  love  of  holiness  and  aversion  to  sin,  that 
he  counteracts  the  evil  influences  of  their  rebellion,  and 
makes  it  the  occasion  of  good. 

It  is  manifest,  therefore,  that  God  may  have,  and  has 
the  most  efficient  reasons  for  the  preference  of  a  perfect 
obedience  from  his  creatures,  notwithstanding  he  overrules 
their  sin  in  such  a  manner  as  to  secure  as  great  a  sum  of 
good,  as  their  obedience  if  rendered,  would  involve; — 
reasons  as  efficient  and  infinite  as  can  be  constituted  by  its 
necessity  to  his  own  infinite  holiness  and  happiness. 

These  are  the  only  objections  offered   by  the  reviewer, 


519 

ihat  have  any  applicability  to  the  theory  I  have  advanced. 
All  the  others  urged  by  him  are  directed  solely  against  the 
false  statement  he  gave  of  it,  and  was  answered  accordingly 
by  the  exposure  of  that  misrepresentation. 

Such  then  is  the  theory  I  have  advanced.  Whether  it 
furnishes  a  just  and  satisfactory  solution  of  the  problem 
which  it  is  its  aim  to  explain,  the  public  will  judge.  That 
the  great  principles,  at  least,  on  which  it  proceeds  are  cor- 
rect, is  I  hope  sufficiently  apparent.  That  none  of  the 
positions  with  which  it  is  fraught  can  justly  be  regarded  as 
subversive  of  any  of  the  fundamental  doctrines  of  the 
gospel,  is  also,  I  trust,  abundantly  clear.  That  the  reviewer 
can  never  refute  it  consistently  with  his  concessions,  is  in- 
disputably certain.  That  the  orthodox  cannot  consistently 
dissent  from  most  of  its  positions  is  equally  obvious,  as  they 
are  conspicuous  elements  of  their  own  creed.  It  accords 
with,  and  is  founded  on  the  doctrine  of  God's  universal 
purposes  and  foreknowledge  ;  with  the  fact  that  by  his  de- 
termination respecting  his  own  agency,  he  constituted  a 
certainty  of  all  the  events  of  the  agency  of  his  creatures  ; 
with  the  fact  that  they  are  intelligent,  free  and  responsible, 
in  all  their  moral  actions  ;  and  with  the  fact  that  he  might 
wholly  prevent  them  from  sin,  that  it  is  for  wise  and  bene- 
volent reasons  that  he  permits  them  to  transgress  as  they 
do,  and  that  he  so  overrules  their  rebellion  as  to  secure 
the  greatest  good. 

Its  chief  difference  from  the  common  theory,  lies  in  the 
doctrine,  that  the  greatest  good  would  be  secured  by  the 
perfect  obedience  of  his  creatures  in  the  conditions  in  which 
they  are  placed,  were  it  rendered  ;  and  that  he  accordingly 
desires  it  from  them  for  that  reason,  as  well  as  because  it  is 
holy  and  right  in  him  to  desire  it.    No  principle  therefore, 


520 

deemed  fundamental  by  the  advocates  of  the  current  theory, 
— unless  those  involved  in  these  differences  are  regarded  as 
such — needs  to  be  relinquished,  in  order  to  its  adoption ; 
while  it  wholly  escapes  the  objections,  if  I  mistake  not,  to 
which  that  hypothesis  is  obnoxious. 

Whatever   may  be  thought    of  this    or    the  reviewer's 
theory  however,  it  is  abundantly  clear  from  the  foregoing  • 
discussion,  that  the  subjects  which  the  controversy  affects, — 
the  attributes,  purposes  and  agency  of  God,  and  the  nature 
and  character  of  his  moral  creatures, — are  of  fundamental 
importance  ;    and  that  the  principles   on  which  the  two 
systems  proceed,  the  views  they  exhibit  and    the    results 
which  they  involve,  are  the  direct  opposites  of  each  other. 
According  to  that  of  the  reviewer,  God,  in  place  of  being 
the  absolute  sovereign  of  his  empire,  and  doing  according 
to  his  will  in  the  army  of  heaven  and  among  the  inhabitants 
of  the  earth,  is  dependent  for  his  purposes  on  the  uncontrol- 
lable actions  of  his  creatures,  and  influenced  and  determined 
by  them  in  his  agency.     As  their  creator  indeed,  and  the 
continuer  of  their  existence,  he  is  absolutely  sovereign  over 
them  ;  but  there  his  efficient  sway  terminates.     As  agents, 
they  are  as  independent  of  his  control,  and  superior  to  all 
decisive  influence  from  him,  as  he  is  with  respect  to  them. 
That  portion  of  their  agency  which  is  sinful,  is  a  storm 
that  sweeps  over  his  empire,  not  by  his  permission,  but  in 
spite  of  his  utmost  efforts  to  prevent  it,  and  all  that  he  is 
able  to  accomplish  is,  to  mount  its  terrific  current,  and  sway 
its  course  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  some  extent,  to  mitigate 
its  ravages.*     This  theory  is  built,  as  has  been  shown,  on 


*  "  Is  it  not  more  honorable  to  a  God  of  benevolence  who  can  find 
no  gratification  himself,  nor  give  his  kingdom  any,  in  the  everlasting 


521 

the  assumption  that  moral  agents  are  determined  in  their 
choices  by  power  solely,  in  distinction  from  motives ;  and 
exhibits  their  agency  accordingly  as  a  purely  unintelligent 
and  mechanical  process.  It  not  only  touches  therefore,  all 
the  fundamental  truths  of  the  gospel,  but  subverts  them. 
There  is  not  an  attribute,  either  of  God  or  man,  that  it 
does  not  contradict,  nor  doctrine  of  revelation  that  relates 
to  his  or  their  future  agency,  that  can  be  maintained  in 
consistency  with  its  principles.  Let  the  reviewer,  if  he 
pleases,  make  the  experiment.  A  more  impracticable  task 
he  will  find  was  never  undertaken.  Thus,  while  he  ex- 
presses his  belief,  that  holiness  and  happiness  will  exist  at 
every  period  in  the  universe,  and  swell  to  such  an  excess 
over  sin  and  suflering,  as  to  vindicate  God's  goodness  in 
creating  and  upholding  the  system;  he  yet  maintains  that 
the  system  involves  causes  of  sin  which  the  Most  High  can- 
not, by  any  agency  he  can  exert,  wholly  withhold  from  the 
production  of  that  effect;  and  exhibits  those  causes  as  lying 
in  the  nature  itself  of  moral  agency.  They  belong,  accord- 
ingly, to  every  moral  agent,  and  on  the  reviewer's  princi- 
ples, must  be  as  incapable  of  prevention  from  sin  in  any  one 
being  by  whom  they  are  possessed,  as  in  any  other.  He  can 
never  therefore  on  his  theory,  furnish  any  proof  or  proba- 
bility that  there  is  any  one  moral  being  in  whom  those  causes 
will  not  give  birth  to  sin,  in  spite  of  every  preventing  influ- 
ence ;  nor,  therefore,  that  the  whole  universe  will  not  ulti- 

desolations  of  sin,  to  assert  of  him,  that  as  the  very  elements  of  ruin 
are  necessarily  involved  in  the  existence  and  nature  of  his  kingdom, 
the  storm  of  ruin  must  sweep  over  it ;  and  that  he  has  determined  in 
the  chariot  of  his  providence  to  ride  in  the  whirlwind  and  the  storm 
himself,  and  direct  it  in  its  entrance  and  course  where  it  can  do  the 
least  harm,  and  where  its  injuries  can  be  farthest  repaired."  p.  627, 


522 

mately  or  immediately  plunge  into  rebellion.  To  suppose 
that  he  can,  were  in  so  many  words  to  suppose  that,  with- 
out contradicting  his  principles,  he  can  prove  a  position 
which  his  principles  directly  contradict.  He  may,  indeed, 
shrink  back  from  this  conclusion,  and  protest  that  he  holds 
as  firmly  as  any  to  the  everlasting  perseverence  of  all  God's 
holy  subjects  in  their  obedience.  His  beliefs  however,  on 
that  topic  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  point  here  at  issue. 
He  may  likewise  protest,  perhaps,  that  he  is  assured  of  their 
perseverence  by  the  divine  testimony :  but  neither  has  his 
belief  of  that  testimony  any  concern  with  the  present  argu- 
ment. The  question  is  not  what  he  believes,  nor  what  the 
scriptures  teach,  but  simply,  whether  on  his  theory  of  moral 
agency,  any  proof  can  be  furnished,  or  certainty  exist,  that 
a  solitary  created  agent  will  forever  continue  obedient,  or 
even  ever  again  exert  a  holy  affection ;  and  that  is,  whether, 
while  he  holds  that  there  is  in  each  agent  a  cause  of  sin 
which  God  cannot,  or  which  it  may  be  that  he  cannot 
wholly  prevent  from  giving  birth  to  that  efl'ect,  he  can  still 
show,  consistently  with  it,  that  there  is  a  certainty  that  that 
cause  will  never  give  rise  to  sin;  and  that  is,  whether  while 
he  holds  that  there  neither  is  nor  can  be  any  such  certainty, 
he  still  can,  consistently  with  that  position,  prove  that  such 
a  certainty  exists! 

Nor  can  he  any  more  prove  or  exhibit  any  probability 
on  his  scheme,  that  God  will  continue  to  exert  a  holy  agen- 
cy !  His  principles  are  as  applicable  to  the  divine  being  as 
they  are  to  created  agents.  It  will  not  avail  him  to  allege 
that  God  is  a  being  of  infinite  intelligence,  wisdom,  and 
benevolence ;  for  his  theory  does  not  allow  those  charac- 
teristics the  humblest  influence  in  the  determination  of  ac- 
tions,  but  traces  them  exclusively  to  power.      Intellect, 


523 

heart,  and  will,  are  wholly  dissevered  from  it,  and  shut  out 
from  all  participation  in  the  determination  of  acts.  No 
more  ground,  therefore,  on  liis  scheme  is  furnished  by  the 
fact  that  God  is  infinite  in  knowledge,  wisdom,  and  good- 
ness, of  a  certainty  or  probability  that  he  will  continue  to 
exert  a  holy  agency,  than  would  exist  were  he  wholly  des- 
titute of  those  perfections!  The  reviewer  cannot,  indeed, 
prove  on  his  principles  that  God  is  a  being  of  knowledge, 
wisdom,  and  goodness,  nor  exhibit  the  slightest  probabi- 
lity of  it!  for,  as  he  traces  the  exertion  and  determination 
of  the  nature  of  his  agency  wholly  to  his  power,  he  must 
ascribe  all  its  characteristics  to  that,  and  cannot,  therefore, 
legitimately  infer  from  it,  or  its  eflects,  the  existence  of  any 
other  than  that  attribute.  Such  is  the  gulf  into  whose  bot- 
tomless depths,  "in  spite  of  every  preventing  influence," 
his  theory  plunges  him ! 

No  pretence,  therefore,  can  be  more  false  and  absurd, 
than  that  which  is  so  frequently  made  by  his  associates  and 
others,  that  the  differences  of  their  system  and  that  of  tiie 
orthodox  are  merely  verbal,  or  of  but  slight  importance. 

It  is  also  clear  that  the  controversy  can  never  be  settled, 
and  the  parties  brought  to  a  union  by  any  other  method, 
than  a  formal  and  explicit  recantation  by  one  or  the  other 
of  them,  of  their  peculiar  principles.  Either  the  reviewer 
must  abandon  his  views  of  moral  agency — which  are  the 
source  of  his  other  peculiarities — and  adopt  those  of  Ed- 
wards, or  those  who  hold  the  latter  must  surrender  them  and 
embrace  the  theory  of  self-determination.  To  suppose  that 
while  their  views  of  this  fundamental  subject  are  the  direct 
converse  of  each  other,  they  still  can  agree  respecting  it,  or 
the  doctrines  which  it  affects,  is  to  suppose  that  their  theo- 
retical views  have  no  influence  whatever  on  their  belief; 

66 


524 


and  that  is  wholly  to  disconnect  their  failh  with  knowledge 
and  conviction,  and  exhibit  it  as  a  blind  and  unintelligent 
sentiment.  The  zealous  protestations  of  some  who  hold  the 
reviewer's  theory,  that  notwithstanding  their  concurrence 
with  him  on  that  subject,  they  disagree  in  no  respect  what- 
ever with  the  orthodox  on  any  of  the  great  doctrines  of 
revelation,  in  place  of  demonstrating  their  continued  and 
consistent  adherence  to  those  doctrines,  only  show,  if  they 
are  to  be  received  as  sincere,  that  they  are  utterly  ignorant 
or  inconsiderate  of  the  import  of  their  principles.  What 
acquaintance  with  the  subject  can  they  possess  who,  after 
having  speculated  on  it  for  years,  have  yet  never  become 
able  to  discover  that  the  Edwardean  and  Arminian  theories 
of  moral  agency  have  any  diflerent  bearing  on  the  doc- 
trines of  revelation  ?  To  what  respect  can  their  opinions  be 
entitled  who  proceed  in  their  professions  on  the  assumption 
that  a  total  disagreement  in  views  and  conviction?,  forms  no 
obstacle  whatever  to  a  coincidence  in  belief;  that  the  most 
absolute  difference  in  premises  lays  no  foundation  for  a  dif- 
ference in  conclusions ;  that  faith,  therefore,  has  no  depen- 
dence on  knowledge  or  evidence  ;  and  that  logic,  accord- 
ingly is  a  useless  and  unmeaning  farce  !  But  how  is  it,  if 
they  are  sincere  in  their  professions  of  continued  agreement 
with  the  orthodox,  that  they  are  accustomed,  as  they  are, 
to  boast  of  having  made  discoveries  and  improvements  in 
metaphysical  theology,  by  which  the  essential  elements  of 
the  orthodox  system  are  superseded  ?  What  views  of  the 
gullibility  of  their  fellow  men  must  they  entertain,  in  order 
to  flatter  themselves  that  these  contradictory  representations 
can  be  passed  off  with  success,  and  the  public  made  at  once 
to  regard  ihcm  as  possessed  of  the  most  di.^tinguished  per- 
spicacity, and  incapable  of  discerning  the  plainest  distinc 


525 


tions  ;  believers  and  rejectors  in  the  same  <'  indivisible 
moment"  of  the  same  propositions ;  consistent  and  conscien- 
tious assertors  and  disclaimers  of  the  same  fundamental 
doctrines  ! 

It  is  by  the  discussion  of  principles  alone  therefore — not 
by  mere  professions  or  protestations — that  the  controversy 
can  be  settled,  and  made  the  instrument  of  permanent  good. 
To  this  then  I  take  leave  again  to  invite  the  reviewer,  if  he 
chooses  to  pursue  it.  Does  he  deny  the  accuracy  of  the 
construction  I  have  placed  on  his  theory  ?  Let  him  over- 
throw the  reasons  on  which  I  rest  that  construction,  and 
show  what  other  version  can  be  consistently  given  to  his 
hypothesis.  Does  he  acquiesce  in  that  construction,  and 
assent  to  the  principles  I  regard  his  scheme  as  involving  i 
Let  him  vindicate  it  from  the  objections  that  are  urgec 
against  those  principles,  and  make  known  the  manner  ii 
which  they  are  to  be  reconciled  with  the  doctrines  of  th( 
gospel. 


,„,  sf.-"."»-'jp"-:,tur;ii 


7To12  01145  2671 


Date  Due 

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